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rejecting Butler's argument that it was Mason's alleged misbehavior in the handling of the applications for writs of habeas corpus that resulted in his injuries and that, therefore, the trial court abused its discretion when it relied on the bar stated in the Peeler case
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No. 11-05-00273-CV.
December 21, 2006.
On Appeal from the 191st District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 2004-07501.
Panel consists of: WRIGHT, C.J., MCCALL, J., and STRANGE, J.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an appeal from the trial court's dismissal of Cedric Dinell Bulter's pro se suit against Edgar A. Mason. We affirm.
In 1998, the jury convicted Butler of murder and aggravated assault. Bulter's retained counsel, Harry Zimmerman, perfected an appeal but passed away before oral argument. Mason argued the appeals. Butler later retained Mason to file applications for both state and federal postconviction writs of habeas corpus. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied the application in 2001. The federal application was dismissed as being time-barred in 2003.
The convictions were affirmed by the Dallas Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion. Butler v. State, Nos. 05-98-02161-CR 05-98-02162-CR, 2000 WL 100116 (Tex.App.-Dallas Jan. 31, 2000, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Cause No. WR-48,775-01.
United States District Court, Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, Cause No. 3-02-CV-1411-G.
In 2004, Butler filed this suit alleging that Mason was negligent in his handling of the applications for writs of habeas corpus and that Mason breached his contract with Butler. Butler sought a total of $6,000,000 as compensation for lost employment and as punitive damages. Mason filed a motion to dismiss contending that Butler failed to comply with TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 14.004 (Vernon 2002) and that a malpractice claim against an attorney was frivolous as a matter of law under the facts of this case. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the cause.
The trial court found that all of Butler's alleged injuries flowed from his convictions and resulting incarceration, that the gravamen of his complaints was that he remained incarcerated because of Mason's conduct, that the realistic chance of ultimate success was slight, that these allegations had no arguable basis in law, and that dismissal under TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 14.003 (Vernon 2002) was appropriate.
In his sole point of error, Butler contends that the trial court abused its discretion. Specifically, Butler argues that the trial court's reliance on Peeler v. Hughes Luce, 909 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. 1995), was misplaced. We disagree.
In Peeler, the Texas Supreme Court held:
Because of public policy, we side with the majority of courts and hold that plaintiffs who have been convicted of a criminal offense may negate the sole proximate cause bar to their claim for legal malpractice in connection with that conviction only if they have been exonerated on direct appeal, through post — conviction relief, or otherwise. While we agree with the other state courts that public policy prohibits convicts from profiting from their illegal conduct, we also believe that allowing civil recovery for convicts impermissibly shifts responsibility for the crime away from the convict. This opportunity to shift much, if not all, of the punishment assessed against convicts for their criminal acts to their former attorneys, drastically diminishes the consequences of the convicts' criminal conduct and seriously undermines our system of criminal justice. We therefore hold that, as a matter of law, it is the illegal conduct rather than the negligence of a convict's counsel that is the cause in fact of any injuries flowing from the conviction, unless the conviction has been overturned (citation omitted).
Id. at 497-98.
We disagree with Butler's contentions that it was Mason's alleged misbehavior in the handling of the applications for writs of habeas corpus that resulted in his injuries and that, therefore, the trial court abused its discretion when it relied on the bar stated in the Peeler case. The bar in Peeler applies to Butler's claims. As the trial court noted, all of Butler's alleged injuries and claims flowed from Butler's continued incarceration. The trial court did not abuse its discretion. All of Butler's arguments have been considered, and each is overruled.
The order of the trial court is affirmed.