Opinion
No. 04-05-00846-CV
Delivered and Filed: September 13, 2006.
Appeal from the 216th District Court, Gillespie County, Texas, Trial Court No. No. 9932, Honorable Stephen B. Ables, Judge Presiding.
Affirmed.
Sitting: Alma L. LÓPEZ, Chief Justice, Catherine STONE, Justice, Sarah B. DUNCAN, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this dog bite case, Genevia Bushnell and her husband, Deward Raymond (D.R.) Bushnell (the Bushnells), appeal from a take-nothing summary judgment rendered in favor of Janet Mott. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Factual and Procedural Background
In March of 2001, Genevia began corresponding via email with Janet Mott regarding Mott's purchase of Shaklee products. On March 18, 2001, Genevia emailed Mott and asked if she could make her delivery that evening. Although the record does not contain a response from Mott, Genevia claims to have confirmed the delivery with Mott by telephone. Genevia's son and daughter-in-law drove her to Mott's mobile home in Fredericksburg that evening. Genevia knocked on Mott's front door and heard dogs barking. When Mott opened the inside door, her three dogs pushed open the screen door and rushed out. Genevia was attacked by Mott's three dogs and was bitten fifteen times. Genevia claims that Mott did not attempt to stop the attack, and failed to render aid following the attack. Genevia's son stopped the attack and took her to the emergency room, where she received over thirty stitches. Genevia also claims that Mott refused to provide her with the dogs' shot records following the attack. Since the incident, Genevia has had two surgeries for injuries related to the bites.
Shaklee is a multilevel marketing company selling health and wellness products.
On March 17, 2003, the Bushnells sued Mott, alleging claims of negligence and strict liability. Mott moved for a no-evidence summary judgment in November 2003, but never set a hearing date. Mott filed an amended no-evidence motion for summary judgment in December 2003.
The Bushnells also sued Mott's parents, Douglas and Frances Hubbard, because they are the owners of the land on which Mott's residence is located. They are not parties to this appeal.
On July 14, 2005, Mott filed a supplemental motion for summary judgment (traditional and no-evidence) and simultaneously set the hearing for August 8, 2005. The Bushnells claimed they were not notified of this hearing until July 26, 2005, at which time they asked opposing counsel for a resetting. The hearing was then reset for August 19, 2005. The Bushnells' counsel claimed he was not notified of the resetting until August 2, 2005. The Bushnells filed their response to the summary judgment motion, which included supporting affidavits and a motion for leave to file the untimely response and a motion for continuance, on August 17, 2005, two days before the hearing. Subsequently, on August 19, 2005, the trial court refused to consider the Bushnells' late-filed response, but postponed hearing oral argument on the summary judgment motions until September 2, 2005 to give the Bushnells' counsel more time to prepare. On August 24, 2005, nine days before the September 2, 2005 hearing, the Bushnells filed a supplemental response to the summary judgment motions, including amended affidavits and a supplemental motion for reconsideration requesting that the trial court reconsider whether all of the evidence presented in response to the motions should be considered.
At the September 2, 2005 hearing, the trial court refused to consider the amended affidavits. After hearing oral argument, the court took Mott's motion for summary judgment under advisement. Ultimately, the trial court granted the Bushnells' supplemental motion for reconsideration, but only with respect to Genevia's original affidavit filed on August 17, 2005, because the trial court concluded good cause had been shown for the late filing of the original affidavit. Nevertheless, the trial court refused to consider the evidence filed in support of the supplemental response, including Genevia's amended affidavit, and granted Mott's motion for summary judgment.
Summary Judgment Standard of Review
Mott moved for both no-evidence and traditional summary judgment. We apply a de novo standard of review to summary judgments. Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150, 156 (Tex. 2004). A traditional motion for summary judgment is properly granted only when the movant establishes that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on a ground expressly set forth in the motion. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1985). In reviewing the grant of a summary judgment, we indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in favor of the non-movant. Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 549. Additionally, we assume all evidence favorable to the non-movant as true. Id. at 548-49. A no-evidence summary judgment is improper if the non-movant presents more than a scintilla of probative evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i); Moore v. K Mart Corp., 981 S.W.2d 266, 269 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied). More than a scintilla of evidence exists if it would allow reasonable and fair-minded individuals to differ in their conclusions. Forbes, Inc. v. Granada Biosciences, Inc., 124 S.W.3d 167, 172 (Tex. 2003). Less than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence is so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion of a fact. Id. If the trial court's judgment does not specify the grounds relied upon for its ruling, we must affirm the judgment if any of the theories advanced are meritorious. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001).
Discussion
On appeal, the Bushnells argue that the trial court erred in refusing to consider their amended affidavits filed nine days before the September 2, 2005 hearing. At the August 19, 2005 hearing, the trial court denied the Bushnells' motion for continuance but postponed oral arguments on the summary judgment motions until September 2, 2005 to give the Bushnells' counsel more time to prepare his argument. The trial court stated on the record:
The motion for summary judgment, response to summary judgment, I'm not going to expand the time for you to file additional motions for summary judgment or for [plaintiffs' counsel] to add anything to his response. He is finished, and what he attempted to file August 17th, I am not going to consider that, but I am going to give him more time to prepare his argument on motion for summary judgment. He just came back. He said he hasn't had an opportunity to look through it and formulate his thoughts, so I'll give you more time on that and give you a date, but no additional filings, and the August 17th attempts at late filing will not be considered by the Court.
Mott argues that the September 2, 2005 setting was not a hearing in the sense that there had been no resetting or continuance, and therefore the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider the supplemental response filed on August 24, 2005. Mott, however, has failed to cite any authority for the proposition that a postponement of oral argument does not constitute a resetting.
Rule 166a(c) provides, "Except on leave of court, the adverse party, not later than seven days prior to the day of hearing may file and serve opposing affidavits or other written response." Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). Texas courts have interpreted the rule to mean that a written response to a motion for summary judgment can be filed, without leave of court, on the seventh day before the hearing or before. See, e.g., Volvo Petroleum, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 717 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ). Any written response or opposing affidavit filed on the seventh day before the day of the hearing will be deemed timely and may be properly considered without leave of court. See Benger Builders, Inc. v. Bus. Credit Leasing, Inc., 764 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied) (holding trial court's failure to consider a response and supporting affidavits filed in opposition to motion for summary judgment seven days before the hearing on the motion was error); Allen v. Roddis Lumber Veneer Co., 796 S.W.2d 758, 761 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied) (stating that when summary judgment hearing is reset and the nonmovant files an affidavit seven days prior to new hearing date, the affidavit is timely filed).
Assuming without deciding that the trial court erred in refusing to consider the supplemental response submitted nine days before the summary judgment hearing, see Barry v. Moores, No. B14-91-00884-CV, 1992 WL 110706 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] May 28, 1992, writ denied) (not designated for publication), the Bushnells voluntarily waived the admission of "ninety-nine percent" of their evidence. The Bushnells' counsel stated on the record that he was withdrawing ninety-nine percent of the evidence filed on August 17, 2005 and asked only to be permitted to argue the summary judgment motion on the basis of Genevia's amended affidavit, with her original affidavit attached, filed on August 24, 2005. On appeal, the Bushnells argue that this withdrawal was "conditioned" on the trial court's consideration of the Bushnells' supplemental response, which included Genevia's amended affidavit. We do not agree, however, that the withdrawal was conditioned on the trial court's consideration of Genevia's amended affidavit. In view of the Bushnells' counsel's withdrawal of all the evidence except Genevia's amended affidavit, we will assume for purposes of this opinion that the trial court erred in failing to consider Genevia's amended affidavit. Such error, however, would be harmless if the amended affidavit failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact. The Bushnells admitted on the record at the September 2, 2005 hearing that they were no longer pursuing their claim of strict liability. After having withdrawn most of their evidence, the Bushnells' counsel stated:
At the September 2, 2005 hearing, plaintiffs' counsel stated the following: "So what we are asking Your Honor is that — this is what [plaintiffs' counsel] filed on August 17th, and what we are saying is that by stipulation, we withdraw 99 percent of it and ask only that we be permitted to argue the summary judgment motion on the basis of this supplemental affidavit of Ms. Bushnell, which attaches to it the original statement that she made back when the incident happened, four or five-page statement by a witness of how the attack began, how it occurred, what happened, and if we can simply argue — make argument on the basis of that one affidavit without bringing in anything else in view of all these other things, the failure to provide 21 days' notice of a hearing twice is what we are talking about here."
I'm not going to argue the premises liability. I don't think that the plaintiffs have raised a genuine issue of material fact on that issue today, and I don't intend to stand before you and argue strict liability. As far as I'm concerned, those are completely out of the question based upon summary judgment record as this court has determined it to be based upon its ruling to deny [the] motion for reconsideration.
The premises liability claim was against the Hubbards and is not an issue on appeal.
(Emphasis added). We take counsel's statement as a judicial admission that had the effect of withdrawing the issue of strict liability from the court's consideration. Counsel's use of the phrase "completely out of the question" is an admission that the Bushnells lacked the evidence to pursue their claim of strict liability. Thus, the only issue left for consideration is that of negligent handling.
A judicial admission is a formal waiver of proof that dispenses with the production of evidence on an issue and bars the admitting party from disputing it. Lee v. Lee, 43 S.W.3d 636, 641 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, no pet.). The elements required for a judicial admission are: (1) a statement made during the course of a judicial proceeding; (2) that is contrary to an essential fact or defense asserted by the person making the admission; (3) that is deliberate, clear, and unequivocal; (4) that, if given conclusive effect, would be consistent with public policy; and (5) that is not destructive of the opposing party's theory of recovery. Laredo Med. Group Corp. v. Mireles, 155 S.W.3d 417, 429 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2004, pet. denied).
A dog owner may be held strictly liable for injuries inflicted by the dog if: (1) the animal is of a vicious, dangerous, or mischievous nature; (2) the owner has actual or constructive knowledge of such characteristics; and (3) the injury or damage resulted from such propensities of which the owner had knowledge. Villarreal v. Elizondo, 831 S.W.2d 474, 477 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1992, no writ). Assuming, therefore, that the Bushnells did not judicially admit there was no evidence to support their strict liability claim, we nonetheless hold that the Bushnells have failed to meet the standard for strict liability since they did not submit any evidence showing that Mott had prior knowledge of the vicious or dangerous nature of her dogs.
Even though a finding of viciousness is necessary in a strict liability claim, it is not necessary in a negligence claim. See Marshall v. Ranne, 511 S.W.2d 255, 258 (Tex. 1974) (holding owner of domestic animal must have prior knowledge of dangerous propensities abnormal to its class in order to be held strictly liable for injury). An owner of a dog may be liable for injuries caused by the dog even if the animal is not vicious, if the plaintiff can prove that the owner's negligent handling or keeping of the animal caused injury to the plaintiff. See Dunnings v. Castro, 881 S.W.2d 559, 562-63 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied). The Second Restatement of Torts addresses the liability for harm caused by domestic animals that are not abnormally dangerous:
[O]ne who possesses or harbors a domestic animal that he does not know or have reason to know or have reason to know to be abnormally dangerous, is subject to liability for harm done by the animal if, but only if, (a) he intentionally causes the animal to do the harm, or (b) he is negligent in failing to prevent the harm.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 518 (1977); see also Allen ex rel. B.A. v. Albin, 97 S.W.3d 655, 665 (Tex.App.-Waco 2002, no pet.). This court has held that the owner of a domestic animal may be liable for the negligent handling of the animal "if the owner had actual or constructive notice of facts that would put an ordinary person on notice that the animal could cause harm and the owner was negligent in preventing such harm." Moore v. Moore, No. 04-00-00831-CV, 2001 WL 1360014, at *2 (Tex.App.-San Antonio Nov. 7, 2001, pet. denied) (not designated for publication).
In Jones v. Gill, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals analyzed the distinction between dog bites occurring in a place where the animal has a right to be and those occurring elsewhere. See No. 2-03-298-CV, 2005 WL 503182, at * 4 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth Mar. 3, 2005, no pet.). The owner of a domestic animal is not liable for "injuries caused by it in a place where it has a right to be," unless the owner knew or should have known of the vicious or unruly nature of the animal. See Lewis v. Great S.W. Corp., 473 S.W.2d 228, 230 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e). Additionally, in Rodriguez v. Haddock, the Fort Worth court held that "[b]ecause the dog bit Appellant while it was in its own home, Appellant must show more than a mere scintilla of evidence that Appellee knew or should have known of the dog's dangerous nature under her negligence theory as well as her strict liability theory." See No. 2-01-386-CV, 2003 WL 1784923, at *2 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth Apr. 3, 2003, no pet.). Other courts of appeals have similarly held that dog owners are not negligent if the injury occurred where the dog had a right to be and the owner had no knowledge of any dangerous propensities. See, e.g., Petry v. Gasca, No. A14-93-00433-CV, 1994 WL 132772, at *1 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 14, 1994, no writ) (not designated for publication) (the "owner of a domestic animal is not liable for injuries caused by the animal when it is in a place where it has a right to be"); Searcy v. Brown, 607 S.W.2d 937, 941 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, no writ) (because dog was on owner's property, owner did not owe a duty to warn licensee who entered property to inquire about it or to make conditions on property safe).
The Bushnells argue that Mott had prior knowledge of her dogs' dangerous propensities. Genevia claims that she has proved through circumstantial evidence that Mott knew that her dogs were strong enough and aggressive enough to push open the screen door in order to attack Genevia and pull her down onto the front porch steps. Genevia specifically claims that because Mott frantically attempted to position herself in front of the screen door to prevent the dogs from attacking Genevia, Mott knew her dogs were dangerous. We cannot say, however, that this act alone amounts to actual or constructive knowledge of the dogs' dangerous propensities. The Petry court stressed that "evidence that appellant's son put the dog in his room when [the plaintiff] came to visit is not proof that the family had knowledge that the dog was vicious. We can conceive of many other reasons why the son would put the dog in another room when they had a visitor, and no evidence of the son's reason for doing so was presented." 1994 WL 132772, at *3 (emphasis added).
In their reply brief, the Bushnells state that Mott "totally ignores" the Lindsey v. Fuentes opinion, in which "the Houston Court of Appeals ruled that a jury could reasonably infer that a dog owner's failure to stop an attack showed that the owner knew the dog was dangerous and was therefore afraid to intervene." See Lindsey v. Fuentes, No. 01-99-00982-CV, 2000 WL 1867984, at *3 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (not designated for publication). Lindsey, however, is easily distinguished from the instant case. In Lindsey, evidence that the dog owner failed to stop the attack was not the sole evidence presented. Additional evidence included: (1) the owner kept the dog outside at all times and did not allow it inside the house where it might become familiar with other people; (2) the dog growled at a neighbor and frightened her so much that she abandoned her efforts to take the dog to the groomer; (3) on the day of the attack, the owner stood by as her neighbor ran out of his house, scaled a six foot fence, and ran to rescue the victim, who was just a few feet from where the owner stood; (4) a friend who was present during the attack did nothing to help because he knew the backyard was the dog's domain. Because similar evidence was not presented by the Bushnells, we decline to infer that Mott knew her dogs were dangerous.
Likewise, we can conceive of other reasons why Mott would position herself in front of the screen door. She may have feared that the dogs would run out into the yard, or down the street. Mott may have wished to prevent the dogs from jumping on a visitor. In any event, the Bushnells have failed to present evidence showing that Mott had actual or constructive knowledge of facts which would put an ordinary person on notice that the dogs would cause someone injury. Petry, 1994 WL 132772, at *1; see also Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. 1983) (holding that "[w]hen the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion of its existence, the evidence is no more than a scintilla and, in legal effect, is no evidence"); Lette v. Baptist Health Sys., 82 S.W.3d 600, 602 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.) (holding that circumstantial evidence relied on by plaintiffs to prove causation was based on "mere conjecture, speculation and possibility, a standard of proof that is far below that which is permitted by law" and amounts to no more than a scintilla of evidence of causation).
Conclusion
The final judgment entered by the trial court granting Mott's motion for summary judgment did not state the grounds on which it was granted. Therefore, we must affirm the judgment if any of the theories advanced are meritorious. See Dow Chem. Co., 46 S.W.3d at 242. We conclude the Bushnells failed to present more than a scintilla of evidence demonstrating that Mott had actual or constructive notice of facts that would put an ordinary person on notice that the animals could cause harm and the owner was negligent in preventing such harm. See Moore, 2001 WL 1360014, at *2. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting Mott's motion for summary judgment, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.