Opinion
Civil Action 99-D-1233-E
March 20, 2001
Robert E. Sasser, Patrick Sefton, Montgomery, AL; Richard H. Sforzini, Jr., Wynne, AR, Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
Randall C. Morgan, Erika Tatum, Hill, Carter, Franco, Montgomery, AL; Attorneys for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This case came before the court for a non-jury trial, which commenced October 16, 2000 and lasted four days. Plaintiffs Yolanda Burton, Dwight Russell, and Ronnie Smith Homes, and Defendant Alexander City, Ala., also filed pre-trial and posttrial memoranda. After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, the relevant law, and the record as a whole, the court finds in favor of Defendant on all counts.
Burton and Russell were married in a civil ceremony after this lawsuit was filed. The court refers to them collectively as "the Russells."
"RSH."
"Defendant" or "Alex City."
I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
The court exercises subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction) and 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction). The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs attack a zoning ordinance that restricts the placement of manufactured homes within the city limits of Alex City. Plaintiff Ronnie Smith Homes is a corporate manufactured home dealer that would have sold a home to Plaintiffs Yolanda Burton and Dwight Russell if the city council of Defendant Alex City had approved the Russells' zoning application.
Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that Alex City: (1) established standards for the construction or safety of manufactured homes that are preempted by the National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974 ("the 1974 Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 5401 et seq., prior to amendment by American Homeownership and Economic Opportunity Act of 2000, Pub.L. No. 106-569, 114 Stat. 2944 § 601 et seq. (2000); (2) enforced zoning regulations concerning manufactured homes that violate Plaintiffs' rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and Alabama law; and (3) is estopped from denying Plaintiffs' zoning request. The City denies the allegations.
The court refers to these construction and safety standards, promulgated by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, as "HUD standards." See 24 C.F.R. § 3280.1 to -.904.
Incorporated within the Act were the provisions of the Manufactured Housing Improvement Act of 2000 ("the 2000 Act"). See H.R. REP. No. 106-553 (March 29, 2000) (referring H.R. 1776 to the full House); S. REP. No. 106-274 (April 13, 2000) (referring S. 1452 to the full Senate).
Plaintiffs abandoned their previously asserted Commerce Clause claims. (Doc. No. 18 at 2.)
III. FINDINGS OF FACT
In accordance with Rule 52(a), the court makes the following findings of fact from the totality of the evidence:
A. City's Zoning Ordinance
1. Alex City adopted a zoning ordinance in 1995. The City also approved an advisory, non-binding comprehensive land use plan in the early 1980s. To the extent, if any, that the zoning ordinance and the comprehensive plan are at odds, the ordinance governs city land use policy.
The ordinance divides the city into five primary residential zones: RR (reserved), R-1 (low density), R-2 (medium density), and R-3 (high density), and R-3M (mobile home). Mobile home parks are plotted on the zoning map, and special zoning permits for individual parcels can be granted by the city council. See Ordinance § 4 et seq.
2. The zoning ordinance's definition of "mobile home or manufactured home" is not inconsistent with federal statutes or regulations for any relevant purpose.
The court recognizes the technical distinctions between a "mobile home" and "manufactured home" but uses the terms interchangeably. See Georgia Mfr'd Hous. Ass'n v. Spalding County, 148 F.3d 1304, 1306 n. 1 (11th Cir. 1998).
The City defines a manufactured home as: "A transportable, single-family dwelling intended for permanent occupancy contained in one unit, or in two or more units designed to be joined into one integral unit capable of again being separated for towing, which arrives at a site complete and ready for occupancy except for minor or incidental assembly, which is constructed so that it may be used with or without a permanent foundation." See Ordinance § 1-2. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 5402 (6); 24 C.F.R. § 3280.2 (defining "manufactured home").
3. Manufactured homes are a distinct housing stock. Though manufactured homes are available in a wide range of sizes and prices, they typically, if not always, differ from modular and traditional site-built homes in numerous ways including, but not limited to: their height and width; foundation and chassis; number of floors; types of roof, roof overhang, and roof pitch; and types of siding. They typically have fewer windows and doors than other types of housing, and they exhibit less overall variety in design.
The City defines a modular home as: "A manufactured building built and inspected in accordance with a national building code and in compliance with the provisions of Code of Ala. 1975, tit. 24, ch. 4A."See Ordinance § 1-2. The court finds that this definition is not inconsistent with any relevant federal statute or regulation. Compare id. and Ala. CODE § 24-4A-2 (1975) (defining "modular home" and "manufactured building") with 24 C.F.R. § 3280:12 (defining "modular home") and id. § 3280.7 (excluding modular homes from coverage under the Act).
4. Manufactured homes have no permanent chassis and almost never rest on a permanent foundation. Thus, they are often placed on concrete blocks that expose the ground beneath the home. While this space can be hidden with skirting or curtilage, this requires the purchase of optional materials sold separately from the manufactured home itself.
5. Manufactured homes cost comparatively less to construct than other types of homes. Despite quality control checks, they do suffer from construction defects.
6. The City sites modular homes built to SBCCI standards in any residential district but limits the siting of manufactured homes to areas zoned as mobile home parks, unless the prospective homeowner obtains an "R-3M" zoning permit.
The Southern Building Code Congress International ("SBCCI") standards are promulgated by a private trade association.
7. Several areas within Alex City are zoned as mobile home parks. The City also has granted more than fifteen R3-M permits.
8. If one obtains a permit to site a manufactured home, the subject lot must originally be no less than 20,000 square feet, which is larger than lot sizes for traditional site-built residences.
9. The 20,000 square-foot requirement serves several purposes. One is to ensure that the home is sited with its longest side facing the street, and that sufficient space remains on both sides of the lot for aesthetic purposes. This requirement evidently works in tandem with the fact that mobile homes are brought to the site via large trucks that need space to maneuver during siting. In addition, the homes are, by their very nature, mobile. If they are moved or forcibly repossessed — which is known to happen — trucks come to the site, tear the homes down, and take them away.
See 24 C.F.R. § 3280.901 to -.904 (setting standards related to transportation of manufactured homes).
Furthermore, the court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to prove that they would not have eventually sold, moved, or lost title to their manufactured home if it had been sited on the property.
10. Once the City rezones a parcel of land as R-3M, then any type of manufactured home can be placed on it, so long as the City does not burden the property with other conditions or stipulations. Alabama municipalities rarely, if ever, impose such burdens.
11. To obtain a permit, one files a petition with the City, and the petition is forwarded to the Planning Commission for review. If the commission denies the permit, the prospective homeowner may appeal to the City Council. The council's decision is final.
12. The City's R3-M permit system offers flexibility in land use and reasonably furthers the City's goals of offering affordable housing stock that is consistent with the character, integrity and aesthetics of pre-existing structures and land uses.
B. Plaintiffs' Interests
13. Since at least 1993, Dwight Russell and Yolanda Burton held themselves out as husband and wife. Dwight had named Yolanda as a beneficiary on his life insurance policy, and the couple shared the same home and mailbox. They exchanged civil marital vows after filing this lawsuit.
14. In June 1999 Yolanda contracted to purchase from Speake Realty and S P Manufactured Homes a manufactured home and a lot at 687 Lonesome Road in Alex City for $65,000. RSH supplied the home.
15. At the time, the lot was not then zoned for manufactured homes.
16. Dwight and Yolanda would have satisfied any and all conditions precedent to obtaining a loan, and they would have lived together at 687 Lonesome Road if the property had been rezoned.
17. Because the City denied the rezoning, RSH lost the sale of the manufactured home, thereby reducing RSH's ability to earn a volume-based rebate from the manufacturer and causing RSH to internalize certain finance charges.
18. Also, when the City denied rezoning petitions in the past, RSH lost the sale of other homes that would have been placed on the subject properties.
C. The Russell Permit
19. The Russells petitioned City Hall for an R-3M permit. Pursuant to city guidelines, their petition was forwarded to the Planning Commission for consideration.
20. Although the Russells had actual knowledge of the date and time of the hearing, neither they nor a representative of Speake Realty attended.
21. However, several homeowners, whose lots are adjacent to the site upon which the Russells sought to place their mobile home, did attend and object to the proposal. The homeowners stated that the home would lower their property values because it was incompatible with neighborhood aesthetics and character.
22. The Planning Commission recommended to deny the permit because its members agreed with the citizens' assessment.
23. The Planning Commission had no knowledge of, and was not influenced in any way by the fact that the home complied with HUD standards but not SBCCI standards.
24. The Russells appealed the commission's decision to the City Council. At the meeting, Dwight Russell urged the council to approve the permit. Patricia Looney, spokesperson for the homeowners adjacent to the subject property, reiterated the concerns raised before the Planning Commission.
25. The City Council denied the permit because it agreed with Looney's assessment.
26. The City Council had no knowledge of, and was not influenced in any way by the fact that Plaintiffs' home complied with HUD standards but not SBCCI standards.
27. Prior to the Planning Commission meeting, Plaintiffs had not sited their home at 687 Lonesome Road, and no representative of Alex City ever suggested to Plaintiffs that they could place their home there. Mobile homes cannot be seen from the property, and no mobile home has ever been sited upon it.
D. The Lonesome Road Neighborhood
28. Experts preferably define a "neighborhood" with reference to how the residents define it themselves.
Tr. 137.
29. The quiet, relatively isolated "neighborhood" where Plaintiffs proposed to site their home is strictly limited to the vacant lots abutting the subject property, and the land encompassing a church and three houses across the street. Other residential properties are separated by appreciable distance, natural boundary lines, and conflicting land uses.
30. All the homes in this neighborhood are permanent brick homes. Some evidence suggested that a nearby residence was a manufactured home, but the residence, in fact, has a brick facade and bears absolutely no resemblance to a typical manufactured home or to Plaintiffs' proposed home.
Tr. 499-500.
31. The nearest manufactured homes are separated from the site property by appreciable distance and natural boundaries.
32. The overall trend in the Lonesome Road neighborhood and surrounding areas is towards the siting of permanent, traditional homes.
33. There is an abundance of vacant lots in the area. Residents are worried that the approval of one R3-M permit will have a slippery slope effect, whereby one lot after another is rezoned for manufactured housing.
34. An influx of manufactured homes into a residential area with predominately permanent site-built homes can be destabilizing. Rational existing homeowners, who prefer living near site-built homes because of the differences in housing aesthetics and quality, will become more likely to sell their homes. Similarly, rational prospective homeowners, who prefer avoiding areas with manufactured homes, will become less likely to purchase property in the area. In addition, for similar reasons, the perception of an influx of manufactured homes can also can skew the area's supply and demand for housing. As a result, property values are reasonably likely to decline when a neighborhood sees the siting of manufactured housing.
See Findings 3-5, 9.
35. Plaintiffs' manufactured home is inconsistent with the character, integrity, and aesthetic nature of the Lonesome Road neighborhood.
36. It is reasonably likely that the siting of Plaintiffs' manufactured home at 687 Lonesome Road would have adversely affected property values in the surrounding area.
E. SBCCI Standards and HUD Homes
37. Less than two months after accepting employment as the City's building inspector, Todd Betts informed the Russells that modular homes can be sited anywhere within city limits, but manufactured homes may be sited only in mobile home parks unless the City Council approves a zoning permit.
38. Because Betts was confused about the precisely appropriate terminology, he also informed the Russells that a "manufactured home" meeting SBCCI standards could be placed anywhere in city limits, without a need for rezoning.
39. During these conversations, however, Betts meant that a modular home meeting SBCCI standards could be placed anywhere without rezoning. Betts did not mean that a manufactured home had to comply with SBCCI standards to be sited outside the trailer parks, or for its owners to obtain an R-3M permit. Nor did Betts mean that manufactured homes meeting HUD standards are treated differently during the zoning process than those meeting SBCCI standards.
The court finds that most people say "mobile home" when they mean "manufactured home" and say "manufactured home" when they mean "modular home." The meaning of Betts's vernacularism was clear. Having given careful attention to the demeanor of the witness and all possible sources of bias, the court finds from the totality of the evidence that, when Betts said "manufactured home," he meant "modular home."
40. The written minutes of a March 1999 planning commission meeting state that another building inspector, Glen Riley, told a zoning petitioner "that if the property is not rezoned . . . [the petitioner] can put Manufactured homes built to SBCCI specifications on the property without it being rezoned."
41. Riley also told Betts that a manufactured home meeting SBCCI standards could be placed anywhere within city limits, without a need for rezoning.
42. In making these statements, however, Riley, like Betts, meant that a modular home meeting SBCCI standards could be placed anywhere without rezoning. Riley did not mean that a manufactured home had to comply with SBCCI standards to be sited outside the trailer parks, or for its owners to obtain an R-3M permit. Nor did Riley mean that manufactured homes meeting HUD standards are treated differently during the zoning process than those meeting SECCI standards.
The court's findings in note 17 are equally applicable here. To the extent that Riley's deposition and courtroom testimony differed, the court rejects the inferences drawn by Plaintiffs.
43. The City has never enforced any policy that requires manufactured houses to be built to SBCCI standards. The City has never denied a R-3M zoning petition because a manufactured home met HUD standards but not SBCCI standards.
44. The City did not deny the Russells' request because their manufactured home met HUD standards but not SBCCI standards. This fact was wholly irrelevant to the actions of Betts, Riley, the Planning Commission, and the City Council.
F. Credibility Determinations
45. The testimony of Alexander City Mayor Donald McClellan was highly credible.
46. Significant portions of the evidence submitted by Plaintiffs' city planning and zoning expert, Larry Keating, were incredible. Keating is a long-time consultant and expert witness on behalf of the manufactured housing industry. He also relied heavily on studies sponsored by this industry, and so he is not truly an independent witness.
The court specifically rejects, among others, Keating's opinions that: manufactured housing is not a distinct type of housing that may reasonably warrant special zoning treatment; the City has no reasonable or legitimate basis for requiring the siting of manufactured homes on larger lots than other residential homes; the City has a shortage of affordable land available for manufactured housing; the City's R3-M classification is not a legitimate, floating zone; Plaintiffs' manufactured home was compatible with the homes in the neighborhood; the City had no reasonable, viable zoning ordinance or comprehensive plan in place when it denied Plaintiffs' zoning request; the rezoning would have had no material adverse impact on property values in the neighborhood; the rezoning would not have jeopardized the aesthetics of the neighborhood; and manufactured homes are visible from Plaintiffs' proposed home site. The court also rejects Keating's outlandish opinion that the Lonesome Road neighborhood spans some 35 blocks bounded by Forest Avenue, North Central Avenue, Ann Street, and Jefferson Street/State Route 63.
47. Significant portions of the evidence submitted by Plaintiffs' expert real estate appraiser. Greg Rushton, also were incredible. Rushton formerly worked within the manufactured home industry; he sympathizes with it. His sincerity was questionable, and his opinions are not truly independent.
The court specifically rejects, among others, Rushton's opinions that: the siting of Plaintiffs' manufactured home would have had no adverse effect on the value of homes across the street, in the immediate area, or the surrounding residential district; and the home was essentially compatible with the homes within the neighborhood. The court also rejects Rushton's definition of the Lonesome Road neighborhood.
IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The court now applies the relevant law to the preceding findings of fact. The court first finds that Plaintiffs have standing to bring this civil action, then finds that Plaintiffs have failed to prove any of their claims.
A. Standing
In this Subpart, the court rejects Defendant's argument that Plaintiffs lack standing. Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to "Cases" and "Controversies." The standing doctrine, which requires litigants to have a concrete stake in the action that they prosecute, is inexorably intertwined with principles of separation of powers and federalism. Thus, it is partly prudential and partly "an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III." Lulan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992);see also Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Sep'n of Church St., Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982).
At the time of the City's actions, the court finds that the Russells were married at common law, see Walton v. Walton, 409 So.2d 858, 861 (Ala.Civ.App. 1982), and they and RSH allegedly suffered constitutional and economic deprivations when the City refused to site the mobile home. Such injuries are direct, concrete and potentially redressable by the court's decision. Accordingly, the court finds that all three Plaintiffs have standing. See Crow v. Brown, 457 F.2d 788, 789-90 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (discussing standing to challenge zoning ordinance); Colorado Mfr'd Hous. Ass'n v. City of Salida, 977 F. Supp. 1080, 1084 (D. Colo. 1997) (same); see also Northeastern Fla. Chap't of Assoc'd Gen. Contr's of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993) (discussing quantum of proof). Cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193-94 (1976) (discussing vendor-vendee standing).
The Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit prior to October 1, 1981. See Bonner v. Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
B. Federal Preemption
Plaintiffs' first argument is that the City denied their rezoning request because their manufactured home did not meet SBCCI construction and safety standards. Thus, they argue that the City required the home to comply with SBCCI as a condition to receive a zoning permit, despite Congress's intent to preempt the imposition of standards inconsistent with HUD's.
At this juncture, the court notes that the preemption clause in place at the time of Alex City's alleged misconduct was amended by forward-looking legislation that took effect December 27, 2000. See infra Part IV.B.2. This is of no real import. Alex City's actions complied with then-existing and present federal law.
1. National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act of 2974
Article VI of the Constitution nullifies state or local actions that conflict with federal legislation and regulations. However, in light of the Tenth Amendment and the recognition that states serve as "laboratories of democracy" with a comparative advantage at responding to uniquely local concerns, the Supreme Court has held that federal statutes should be narrowly construed when they purport to preempt matters traditionally addressed by the states' exercise of police power. See Lewis v. Brunswick Corp., 107 F.3d 1494, 1501 (11th Cir. 1997) (citingMedtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 484-85 (1996)).
The 1974 Act directed HUD, "after consultation with the Consumer Product Safety Commission," to establish "construction and safety standards" that are "reasonable and . . . meet the highest standards of protection." 42 U.S.C. § 5403 (a); see also 42 U.S.C. § 5403 (f) (1) (directing HUD to examine "construction and safety data . . . to determine how to best protect the public.")
The Act reads in the conjunctive. Its plain language indicates that Congress was concerned not just with consumer safety; Congress wanted HUD to protect consumers from shoddy workmanship generally and safety hazards specifically. See Scurlock v. City of Lynn Haven, 858 F.2d 1521, 1524 (11th Cir. 1988) ("[t]he language of the statute clearly precludes states and municipalities from imposing construction and safety standards upon mobile homes that differ in any respect from those developed by HUD.")
Scurlock gives proper deference to HUD's position that states and municipalities cannot "take any action that stands as an obstacle" to the full implementation of the Act. 24 C.F.R. § 3282.11 (d). MUD has interpreted the Act as a mandate to: (1) set comprehensive, uniform standards for construction and safety of mobile homes; and (2) remove barriers to the expanded use of affordable housing, caused by the use of zoning ordinances that established disparate construction and safety standards. See 62 Fed. Reg. 24337 (1997) (interpreting 24 C.F.R. § 3280, 3282) The court finds HUD's interpretation reasonable. See Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
But while Scurlock's holding is broad, it cannot be stretched as far as plaintiffs would like. Plaintiffs, in effect, contend that the 1974 Act prevents a community from using zoning ordinances to limit the siting of manufactured homes within its jurisdiction. This argument is untenable. Neither the Act nor the regulations extinguish the time-honored ability of local communities to regulate the placement of a home without regard to the federally-required construction and safety standards for the home itself.
HUD plainly is unconcerned with a locality's imposition of construction or safety standards that do not directly diverge from a specific, identifiable HUD standard. According to the agency, "[t]he Act does not preempt State construction or safety standards for which a Federal standard has not been established." 62 Fed. Reg. 3456, 3458 (1997). In other words, "Federal preemption cannot be based upon a general purpose of the Act, or the need for national uniformity in the manufactured housing industry." Id. A municipality must have mandated some definite standard that differs from a HUD standard.
Additionally, while plaintiffs have not raised this argument, the court notes that HUD has not preempted zoning ordinances that establish uniform aesthetic standards for all types of homes. A state or municipality acts illegally only when it singles out manufactured homes for disparate treatment. "Thus, a locality cannot accept structures meeting the Federal definition of manufactured homes which comply with different standards, such as the local or State building Code, and exclude or restrict manufactured homes that are aesthetically the same but only meet the Federal standards." Id. at 3457.
There should be no confusion that governmental bodies "`have the right to set minimum standards for housing in residentially-zoned districts.'"Scurlock, 858 F.2d at 1525 (quoting Grant v. County of Seminole, 817 F.2d 731, 736 (11th Cir. 1987)). "Municipalities may zone land to pursue any number of legitimate objectives related to the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the community." Id. Manufactured housing is aberrant housing that is rationally disfavored. A city may exclude such homes altogether, see Barre Mobile Home Park, Inc. v. Town of Petersham, 592 F. Supp. 633, 636 (D. Mass. 1984), aff'd, 767 F.2d 904 (1st Cir. 1985), or restrict them to certain designated areas, see Scurlock,supra; Grant, supra.
Therefore, Plaintiffs' claim fails, for the court finds that Plaintiff's have not proved that the City or the Planning Commission acted on the basis that the manufactured home met HUD standards but not SBCCI standards for safety and construction. As a result, the City's actions posed no obstacle to the full enforcement of the 1974 Act. See Spalding County, 148 F.3d at 1410; Texas Mfr'd Hous. Ass'n. Inc. v. City of Nederland, 101 F.3d 1095, 1100 (5th Cir. 1996) (upholding ordinance that "regulates the placement and permitting of trailer coaches for the purpose of protecting property values and does not expressly link its provisions in any way to local safety and construction standards.");Michigan Mfr'd Hous Ass'n v. Robinson Twp., 73 F. Supp.2d 823, 826 (W.D. Mich. 1999) ("if the state or local ordinance does not conflict with any HUD requirements nor deal with construction and safety, then the preemption doctrine does not apply."); CMH Mfg., Inc. v. Catawaba County, 994 F. Supp. 697, 707 (W.D.N.C. 1998) ("those portions of ordinances which imposed appearance criteria or zoning restrictions on the placement of manufactured housing (without regard to building, construction, or safety concerns) were consistently upheld.")
See Findings 19-27, 37-44.
2. Manufactured Housing Improvement Act of 2000
The court pauses here to note that in late December 2000, Congress amended and expanded the scope of the 1974 Act's preemption clause. The Manufactured Housing Improvement Act of 2000, which is Title VI of the American Homeownership and Economic Opportunity Act, adds the following to the clause:
Federal preemption under this subsection shall be broadly and liberally construed to ensure that disparate State or local requirements or standards do not affect the uniformity and comprehensiveness of the standards promulgated under this section nor the Federal superintendence of the manufactured housing industry as established by this title. . . .
See PUB. L. No. 106-659 § 604(d), 114 Stat. 2944, 3006 (2000). President Clinton signed the Act on December 27, 2000. The preemption clause will be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5403 (d).
Plaintiffs submitted a copy of the 2000 Act and beseeched the court to apply the "broad and liberal construction" rule retroactively. Specifically, they urged the Court to "find that the Defendant City's actions in excluding manufactured homes meeting the federal HUD standard from the City's primary residential zones, while permitting manufactured homes meeting the local building codes, are preempted under federal law."
See Doc. No. 38 at 2.
At the outset, the court finds that the Act is prospective in nature only. "The principle that statutes operate only prospectively, while judicial decisions operate retrospectively, is familiar to every law student." United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 79 (1982). Absent a plain statement of congressional intent, this maxim of statutory construction is all the more applicable when, as here, the statute implicates "one of the firmest and most basic rights of local control."Couf v. DeBlaker, 652 F.2d 585, 588 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981); see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 469-70 (1991) ("plain statement" rule).
The court finds no evidence in the committee reports, extended floor debates, or language of the 2000 Act even remotely suggesting that Congress intended for the Act to be retroactive. On the contrary, several representatives emphasized that the Act was intended to afford states and municipalities additional flexibility in responding to the nation's affordable housing problems. This federal-state partnership would be gravely jeopardized by retroactive application of a preemption statute, particularly when many municipalities have relied on the 1974 Act when zoning. See, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. H. 1916-03, 1938 (April 6, 2000) (bill will "send a message to America . . . that we can choose consumer choice and flexibility and local control . . ." (Rep. Lazio);Id. H. 1855-02, 1856 (April 6, 2000) ("The flexibility, local control and personal empowerment that this bill offers to our housing policies is the right way to lend a helping hand to those Americans who are honest, hardworking citizens and who need a small boost to get ahead and improve their lives for themselves and their families.") (Rep. Pryce); Id. at 1863 ("Increased flexibility to States within existing Federal programs will empower partnerships between public and private sectors and strengthen community-based nonprofit groups.") (Rep. Morella).
See generally 106th Cong., 2d Sees., 146 CONG. REC. H. 1855-02 to 1916 (April 6, 2000) (transcript of House floor debate over American Homeownership and Economic Opportunity Act of 2000); 5. REP. 106-274,supra note 5; H.R. REP. 106-553, Id.
In any event, plaintiffs' argument on this point is moot, because Congress plainly did not intend to preempt zoning laws that operate only where HUD does not. The most that can be said about the 2000 Act is that it removed any possible ambiguity created by a cryptic footnote inSpalding County, which, one might argue, drew a distinction between preemption based on local construction or safety standards. See 148 F.3d at 1309 n.B (criticizing HUD's rulemaking but conducting no Chevron analysis).
The 2000 Act speaks to federal superintendence of construction and safety standards. See 42 U.S.C. § 5401 (b)(1) (amended). The floor debates confirm this point. See, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. H., supra at 1863 (bill "will establish workable construction, safety, installation, and dispute resolution standards") (Rep. Price).
In this case, as explained previously, Alex City denied Plaintiffs' request without any regard to the standards of Plaintiffs' mobile home. Thus, Defendant's actions would not have conflicted with federal law, even as amended last winter.
C. Fourteenth Amendment
In this Subpart, the court considers and rejects plaintiffs' arguments that the City's zoning ordinance, and its denial of Plaintiffs' R3-M petition, violated plaintiffs' rights under the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Because mobile home purchasers are not a suspect class, the court analyzes Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment claims under the rational basis test. See Restigouche, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, 59 F.3d 1208, 1214 n. 6 (11th Cir. 1995). "The rational basis test is, more or less, a judicial rubber stamp." United States v. Sahhar, 917 F.2d 1197, 1201 n. 5 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J.) "Almost every statute . . . is found to be constitutional." Williams v. Pryor, 2000 WL 81755, ___ F.3d ___ (11th Cir. 2001) (upholding ban on sale of sexual toys and devices). The court readily finds that the City's actions passed constitutional muster.
When considering Due Process challenges to land use ordinances, "a court asks only whether a conceivable rational relationship exists between the zoning ordinance and legitimate governmental ends."Smithfield Concerned Citizens for Fair Zoning v. Town of Smithfield, 907 F.2d 239, 244 (1st Cir. 1990) "(A) court should not set aside the determination of public officers . . . unless it is clear that their action `has no foundation in reason and is a mere arbitrary or irrational exercise of power having no substantial relation to the public health, the public morals, the public safety or the public welfare in its proper sense.'" Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187-88 (1928) (quoting Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926)); Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1577 (11th Cir. 1989). "[B]efore a constitutional infringement occurs, state action must in and of itself be egregiously unacceptable, outrageous or conscience-shocking." Amsden v. Moran, 904 F.2d 748, 754 (1st Cir. 1990).
Similarly, the Equal Protection Clause "is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices." FCC v. Beach Commun. Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). An ordinance should be upheld even if it "seems unwise or works to the disadvantage of a particular group, or if the rationale for it seems tenuous." Romers v. Evans, 523 U.S. 620, 632 (1996); see also Gregory, 501 U.S. at 473 (upholding mandatory judicial retirement policy even though it is "far from true that all judges suffer significant deterioration in performance at age 70," it is "probably not true that most do," and it "may not be true at all," because legislature could have rationally have reached this conclusion).
Those challenging an ordinance must negate "every conceivable basis" which might support it. Beach, 508 U.S. at 308. "Moreover, the absence of legislative facts explaining a classification has no significance in the rational basis analysis, since the classification `may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.'" Texas Mfr'd Hous. Ass'n v. City of Laporte, 974 F. Supp. 602, 606 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (quoting Beach, supra at 307); see also Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 74 (1978) (inquiry is whether "any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify" city's ordinance).
Linedrawing is more of an art than a science, and legislation often distinguishes between classes of people in a manner that is overinclusive, underinclusive, or both. See Williams, ___ F.3d at ___. But so what? The manufactured home industry accounts for 25 percent of all new single-family home starts, pumps more than $33 billion annually into the domestic economy, and has its own congressional caucus. This industry, like any other faction, can take of itself in the democratic process.
See, e.g., New York City Trans. Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 592 (1979) (methadone users in city employment); Clark v. County of Winnebago, 817 F.2d 407, 408-09 (7th Cir. 1987) (manufactured homes in city limits).
See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1955) (licenses for visual care); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1949) (advertising on vehicles).
See, e.g., Gregory, 501 U.S. at 473 (mandatory retirement for judges); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 108 (1979) (same for civil service employees).
See S. REP. 106-274, supra note 5 (summarizing purpose and need for 2000 Act).
Courts "have nothing to do with the question of the wisdom or good policy of municipal ordinances. If they are not satisfying to a majority of the citizens, their recourse is to the ballot — not the courts."Euclid, 272 U.S. at 393. "Only by faithful adherence to this guiding principle of judicial review of legislation is it possible to preserve to the legislative branch its rightful independence and its ability to function." Beach, 508 U.S. at 315; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison).
The court finds that Alex City's zoning ordinance is rationally and reasonably calculated to protect the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the community by protecting property values and regulating the quality, character, and aesthetics of housing stock. The ordinance also establishes rational and reasonable guidelines by which prospective homebuyers can determine which parts of the city will accommodate housing stock commensurate to their preferences and desires. At a minimum, it is at least debatable whether the ordinance furthers these goals. Thus, the ordinance is constitutionally valid on its face and as applied. See Spalding County, 148 F.3d at 1307-08; Nederland, 101 F.3d at 1106-07; Clark, 817 F.2d at 408-09; Salida, 977 F. Supp. at 1084-86.
Over plaintiffs' objections, the court considered (but gave little weight to) the testimony of Defendant's appraiser, Philip Fischer. The court found that Fischer's testimony met Daubert's standards for admissibility, applied expert knowledge in a reliable manner, and provided sufficient basis for the opinion that the siting of a manufactured home in an area with primarily conventional homes can depress property values by skewing supply and demand in the relevant housing market. (Tr. 341-56.)
The court stresses that it based all of its findings on the totality of the evidence, not the testimony of an individual witness. See supra Part III.
Admittedly, as Plaintiffs recognize, reasonable people could debate the wisdom of the 20,000 square-foot lot requirement for manufactured homes. But the Fourteenth Amendment does not require the City to narrowly tailor its ordinances to the problem at hand. See Beazer, 440 U.S. at 592. Nor does it require uniform zoning treatment for homes that Plaintiffs believe are of equal character, nor even that the lot size for mobile homes inside and outside of a trailer park be equivalent. "Evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and proportions, requiring different remedies. or so the legislature may think. . . . The legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others." Williamson, 348 U.S. at 489 (internal citations omitted); see also Clark, 817 F.2d at 409 (upholding restrictions on mobile home placement).
The City states that its rule insures, for aesthetic purposes, that the longest side of the home will front the street. This reason is eminently rational. See Spalding County, 148 F.3d at 1310. In addition, it is clear that the trucks that bring in the mobile homes, and will transport them away if necessary, might also need the additional land on which to maneuver. The added acreage also conceivably protects surrounding property values by compensating for the lesser comparative value of the homes. See Corp v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 997 F.2d 1369, 1375 (11th Cir. 1993).
Rational people might further mull over the City's additional codicil, which allows homeowners to obtain the R3-M permit, then divide their 20,000 square-foot lots in half, and then site a manufactured home on each 10,000 square-foot lot. Plaintiffs therefore object, asking askance, "If the City allows for downzoning, then why isn't its larger requirement irrational?"
The answer, quite simply, is that various facts could justify the policy. The utility of a mobile home is that it offers affordable housing to consumers who tend to be less wealthy than others. Someone who can afford the larger lot might be less of a credit risk, and therefore be less likely to have her home repossessed. As a result, the ordinance may conceivably avoid noise pollution and wear and tear on city streets, not to mention the public spectacle accompanying a repossession. Similarly, someone who buys and downgrades may be more likely than others to sell the remaining 10,000 square feet to a friend or relative, thereby fostering family and community spirit. There is no doubt that the City can rationally single out manufactured housing in furtherance of these goals. See id. ("restrictions may be imposed in order to protect family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion.")
Overall, the court finds that plaintiffs have not met their burden of proving that the ordinance is "so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature's actions were irrational." Vance, 440 U.S. at 97; see also Beach, 508 U.S. at 307 (conceivable basis analysis). Accordingly, their claim fails.
D. Alabama Zoning Law
The court now turns to Plaintiffs' claims that the zoning ordinance violates Alabama law, either on its face or as applied in their case. These arguments are without merit.
Alabama cities shall make zoning decisions "in accordance with a comprehensive plan" calculated to promote the general welfare. ALA. CODE § 11-52-72 (1975). Master plans and guidelines can constitute a "comprehensive plan," but the zoning ordinance trumps all other instruments. See COME v. Chancy, 269 So.2d 88, 95-96 (Ala. 1972)
Judicial review of zoning ordinances "is quite restricted." Homewood Citizens Ass'n v. City of Homewood, 548 So.2d 142, 143 (Ala. 1989). On the one hand, state law codifies and incorporates the equal protection and due process elements of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Indian Rivers Community Health Center v. City of Tuscaloosa, 443 So.2d 894, 896 (Ala. 1983) (per curiam) (interpreting ALA. CODE § 11-52-75 (1975)). On the other hand, state law does not require an ordinance to be a paradigm of modern urban planning. Local governments inevitably make mistakes; we protect their right to be backwards because the process counts often as much as the product. Therefore, if reasonable people can differ about the wisdom of the ordinance, then the ordinance shall be sustained. See Homewood, supra at 143-44; Pate v. City of Tuscaloosa, 622 So.2d 405, 407 (Ala.Civ.App. 1993).
Alabama law allows a city to limit manufactured homes to designated areas. See Davis v. City of Mobile, 16 So.2d 1, 2-3 (Ala. 1943); see also Matthews v. Fayette County, 210 S.E.2d 758, 762-63 (Ga. 1974) (same). This greater power to exclude encompasses the lesser power tochoose whether to exclude. See COME, 269 So.2d at 97-98; Norwood v. Mariner Lakes Prop. Owners Ass'n, 615 So.2d 1210, 1212 (Ala.Civ.App. 1992) (discretionary denial of special permit; "authority to approve a use carries with the concomitant power not to approve the use.") The court agrees with the factual testimony of Defendant's expert, Jim Lehe, who testified that the City's use of the R3-M zoning classification helps protect property values by flexibly siting appropriate housing stock in single-family residential neighborhoods. The ordinance, therefore, is valid on its face.
Furthermore, the court finds that Defendant's actions, as applied to Plaintiffs' zoning petition, were reasonable. Plaintiff' mobile home was inconsistent with the homes in the Lonesome Road neighborhood, and it may well have adversely affected property values in the surrounding area. The City did not violate Alabama law in denying the R3-M petition. See Ex parte City of Jacksonville, 693 So.2d 465, 467 (Ala. 1997); COME, supra; Greenbriar, 881 F.2d at 1577-80.
E. Estoppel
Finally, plaintiffs pray that the City be equitably estopped from denying their permit. plaintiffs contend that, because the City allowed other manufactured homes to be placed within a reasonable distance from the subject property, the City effectively misrepresented that it would site Plaintiffs' home. The court disagrees.
As a general rule, equitable estoppel "is not applicable to the state, to municipal subdivisions, or to state-created agencies because persons dealing with agencies of government are presumed to know the legal limitations upon their power and cannot plead estoppel on the theory that they have been misled as to the extent of that power." Jacksonville,supra at 467 (quoting Marsh v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 349 So.2d 36, 36 (Ala. 1977) (internal quotations omitted). Estoppel "is to be applied against a governmentality only in extreme caution and under exceptional circumstances." City of Prattville v. Joiner, 698 So.2d 122, 126 (Ala. 1997).
The court finds that estoppel cannot arise from the normal operation of city zoning policy. Alex City officials neither expressly nor implicitly informed Plaintiffs that they could place their home on the subject property. The City merely enforced its zoning ordinance and rejected Plaintiffs' R3-M petition. The court likewise rejects Plaintiffs' estoppel argument. See Jacksonville, 693 So.2d at 467-48 (rejecting estoppel claim when plaintiff purchased property in reliance on statements of city officials, then lost investment value when city rezoned property in response to community concerns).
V. ORDER
Based on the foregoing, the court finds that Plaintiffs have not proved any of their federal or state claims. The court also finds that Plaintiffs have not proved their case of equitable estoppel.
Therefore, it is CONSIDERED and ORDERED that judgment shall enter in favor of Defendant City of Alexander City, Alabama, and against Plaintiffs on all counts. All outstanding motions be and the same are hereby DENIED AS MOOT.