Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. CV-05-715-KD.
March 30, 2007
ORDER
This matter is before the court on the following: defendant, Winston Godwin's ("Godwin") motion for a conditional dismissal of plaintiff's state law claim against him alleging assault and battery (Doc. 100) filed March 28, 2007; plaintiff's response in opposition thereto (Doc. 106), filed March 30, 2007, and Godwin's amended conditional motion to dismiss (Doc. 109) filed March 30, 2007.
On March 28, 2007, when Godwin filed the motion for conditional dismissal, Smurfit's motion to reconsider the order denying summary judgment on plaintiff's retaliation claim was pending before the court. Godwin contends in the motion that if the court were inclined to grant the reconsideration the sole remaining claim would be the state law assault and battery claim and he urges the court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the claim. On March 29, 2007 the court was informed that Burroughs and Smurfit had settled the remaining claim against Smurfit. Godwin's amended motion acknowledges that Smurfit and Burroughs have settled the remaining federal claim.
I. Background
II. Discussion
In her opposition brief plaintiff conceded that her state law claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress (outrage), invasion of privacy, and negligent training, supervision and retention were time barred and due to be dismissed. (Doc. 70 at 62).
Counsel filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 108) on March 30, 2007.
Plaintiff objects to the motion on the grounds, in sum, that she "already had to wait almost four (4) years for her day in court and should Defendant Godwin's motion be granted, she would have to endure starting all over again in state court." (Doc. 106 at 1-2) Plaintiff further argues that she will be prejudiced by any delay and a state court judge may "allow additional discovery . . . causing Plaintiff to incur additional costs and expenses. . . ." (Id. at 3)
It is noteworthy that plaintiff does not argue that the applicable statute of limitations period would be a hinderance to her ability to refile in state court.
Notwithstanding the fact that there remains a lone state law claim in this action, federal jurisdiction is judged at the time of removal. However, when all federal claims have been dismissed, the decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims lies within the discretion of the trial court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Poore v. American-Amicable Life Ins. Co. of Texas, 218 F.3d 1287, 1290 (11th Cir. 2000). "[D]istrict courts can decline to exercise [supplemental] jurisdiction . . . for a number of valid reasons. Accordingly, . . . `district courts [should] deal with cases involving pendent claims in the manner that best serves the principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. . . .'"Shotz v. City of Plantation, Fla., 344 F.3d 1161 (11th Cir. 2003) quoting City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 172-73, 118 S.Ct. 523, 533, 139 L.Ed.2d 525 (1997) (citations omitted).
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1)-(4) identifies the following four scenarios under which a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction:
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1)-(4). In determining whether the Court should continue to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after all federal law claims have been dismissed, a court should take into account the concerns of comity, judicial economy, convenience, and fairness. See, e.g., Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 349-50 (1988); Crosby v. Paulk, 187 F.3d 1339, 1351 (11th Cir. 1999).
Absent any indication of gamesmanship by the parties or prejudice to the plaintiff, Courts should not take lightly concerns of federalism and comity. "State courts, not federal courts, should be the final arbiters of state law." Baggett v. First Nat. Bank of Gainesville, 117 F.3d 1342, 1353 (11th Cir. 1997). More specifically, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has noted that "if the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, Gibbs strongly encourages or even requires dismissal of state claims." L.A. Draper Son v. Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., 735 F.2d 414, 428 (11th Cir. 1984) (citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966)).
In the present case, the court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant Smurfit on plaintiff's sexual harassment claim, and denied the motion as to plaintiff's retaliation claim and state law assault and battery claim against the alleged harasser [Godwin]. Prior to trial, the court was informed that the company and plaintiff had settled the retaliation claim, leaving only the state law assault and battery claim against Godwin. The resolution of plaintiff's assault and battery claim depends on determinations of state law. With that principle in mind, coupled with the discretion that is vested in the court under § 1367(c), the undersigned concludes that the sole remaining state law claim is best resolved by an Alabama court. This is especially true here where the court dismissed Plaintiffs' federal law claim prior to trial. Eubanks v. Gerwen, 40 F.3d 1157 (11th Cir. 1994) (remanding case to district court to dismiss plaintiff's state law claims where court had granted summary judgment on plaintiff's federal law claims).
The Court finds that judicial economy, fairness, convenience, and comity dictate having plaintiff's state law assault and battery claim decided by the state courts. See generally Shotz v. City of Plantation, Fla., 344 F.3d at 1185. As noted by Godwin, the witnesses are more conveniently located to the state courthouse, thus, it would be more economical to try the case in Escambia County, Alabama. (Doc. 109 at 2) Moreover, it is not an efficient use of federal judicial resources to retain supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim of assault and battery. Accordingly, plaintiff's claim for assault and battery against Winston Godwin, is DISMISSED without prejudice.
Since this case originated in federal court, the court will dismiss the remaining state law claims, rather than remanding it to state court. Cf. Cook ex rel. Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe County, Fla., 402 F.3d 1092, 1123 (11 Cir. 2005) ("Because this case was originally filed in state court and removed to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, if the district court declines to continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, Cook's remaining claim should be remanded to state court.").