Opinion
No. (X02) CV 00-0159421-S
May 10, 2004
RULING ON MOTION CONCERNING PUNITIVE DAMAGES
The plaintiffs, three present or former faculty members and radiologists at Yale University School of Medicine, have brought suit under General Statutes § 31-51q alleging that the defendant, Yale University, retaliated against them for speaking out concerning allegations of systemic medical malpractice and Medicare fraud within Yale's Department of Diagnostic Radiology. In a previous ruling, the court held that the plaintiffs are entitled to a jury trial under § 31-51q. See Burrell v. Yale University, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. 159421 (March 5, 2003) ( 34 Conn. L. Rptr. 255). The defendant now moves for a ruling, prior to trial, that the measure of punitive damages under General Statutes § 31-51q is the common-law standard of attorneys fees and other litigation expenses. The defendant also seeks to preclude the plaintiff from introducing any other type of evidence related to the amount of punitive damages, such as damages suffered by other parties as a result of other purported misconduct by the defendant or the amount of the defendant's endowment.
Section 31-51q provides:
Any employer, including the state and any instrumentality or political subdivision thereof, who subjects any employee to discipline or discharge on account of the exercise by such employee of rights guaranteed by the first amendment to the United States Constitution or section 3, 4 or 14 of article first of the Constitution of the state, provided such activity does not substantially or materially interfere with the employee's bona fide job performance or the working relationship between the employee and the employer, shall be liable to such employee for damages caused by such discipline or discharge, including punitive damages, and for reasonable attorneys fees as part of the costs of any such action for damages.
The inquiry here focuses on the language "shall be liable to such employee for damages caused by such discipline or discharge, including punitive damages, and for reasonable attorneys fees as part of the costs of any such action for damages . . ."
Our Supreme Court has held that "common law punitive damages serve primarily to compensate the plaintiff for his injuries and, thus, are properly limited to the plaintiff's litigation expenses less taxable costs." Berry v. Loiseau, 223 Conn. 786, 827, 614 A.2d 414 (1992). The Court has recognized, however, that the common-law rule "when viewed in the light of the increasing costs of litigation, also serves to punish and deter wrongful conduct." Id. Thus, the rule "fulfills the salutary purpose of fully compensating a victim for the harm inflicted on him while avoiding the potential for injustice which may result from the exercise of unfettered discretion by a jury." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
Connecticut courts "will not interpret a statute to have the effect of altering prior statutory or common law unless the language of the statute clearly expresses an intent to have such an effect." Elliot v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 229 Conn. 500, 515, 642 A.2d 709 (1994). The language of General Statutes § 31-51q does not clearly express any alteration of the common-law measure of punitive damages. As stated by the Appellate Court in deciding to defer to the common law "reckless indifference" test governing the standard of proof of punitive damages under § 31-51q, "[s]ection 31-51q does not embody a specific test to determine the awarding of punitive damages." Arnone v. Enfield, 79 Conn. App. 501, 521, 831 A.2d 260, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 932, 837 A.2d 804 (2003). Cf. General Statutes § 35-53(b) (Uniform Trade Secrets Act) ("if the court finds wilful and malicious misappropriation, the court may award punitive damages in an amount not exceeding twice any award [of compensatory damages] made under subsection (a) and may award reasonable attorneys fees to the prevailing party"). If anything, the language of § 31-51q providing that an employer "shall be liable to such employee for damages caused by such discipline or discharge, including punitive damages . . ." appears to conform to the common-law measure of punitive damages as attorneys fees, since the obligation to pay attorneys fees would normally be part of the damages that a plaintiff would have to incur as a result of, and in order to rectify, a violation of the statute.
The fact that the statute authorizes an award to the prevailing party of "reasonable attorneys fees as part of the costs of any such action for damages" does not negate a construction of the phrase "including punitive damages" as also referring to attorneys fees. Essentially the statutory scheme calls for the plaintiff to receive an initial award of attorneys fees, mandatory upon prevailing, and the possibility of a second award of attorneys fees, contingent on the jury finding that the defendant acted with "reckless indifference to the rights of others or [based on] an intentional and wanton violation of those rights." Arnone v. Enfield, supra, 79 Conn. App. 521. It appears that our Supreme Court approved the same construction in Ford v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Connecticut, Inc., 216 Conn. 40, 64-65, 578 A.2d 1054 (1990), in interpreting General Statutes § 31-290a, an analogous statute that prohibits discrimination against any employee who has filed a workers' compensation claim. Section. 31-290a provides that, in addition to the usual compensatory damages, "[t]he court may also award punitive damages. Any employee who prevails in such a civil action shall be awarded reasonable attorneys fees and costs to be taxed by the court . . ." General Statutes § 31-290a(b)(1). The Supreme Court stated: "Although an award of what may amount in effect to double attorneys fees is unusual, we conclude that there is no legal impediment to such a dual award in an appropriate case." Ford v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Connecticut, Inc., supra, 216 Conn. 64-65.
To be sure, the principal issue in Ford was whether the legislature had the power to authorize such a double recovery. The plaintiff apparently accepted the position that the punitive damages component of the statute referred to attorneys fees. Id., 63. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court did not question that position.
The plaintiff points to the fact that the sponsor of § 31-51q in the House of Representatives stated that the bill "includes punitive damages which take into consideration not just the actual dollars lost, but in other words, punishment." 26 H.R. Proc., Pt. 15, 1983 Sess. p. 5322, remarks of Rep. Tulisano. Upon analysis, these remarks are not necessarily inconsistent with interpreting the punitive damages clause to mean a second award of attorneys fees. In any case, the test for determining whether the statute deviates from the common law is whether "the language of the statute clearly expresses an intent to have such an effect," Elliot v. Sears, Roebuck Co., supra, 229 Conn. 515 (emphasis added), and not whether the language in the legislative history has that effect. As discussed, the language of the statute does not clearly express an intent to deviate from the common law.
The distinction between a compensatory award of exemplary damages and a punitive one is surely elusive. As mentioned, our Supreme Court has recognized that the generally compensatory nature of common-law punitive damages in this state may also have some genuine punitive or deterrent effect. See Berry v. Loiseau, supra, 223 Conn. 827. A punitive award may also help compensate a party for expenses, such as opportunity costs, that are not generally out-of-pocket losses. Thus, it does not seem wise to place much emphasis on a legislator's passing mention of the word "punishment."
Finally, it is not controlling that at least one federal district judge and one superior court judge have interpreted the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes §§ 42-110a et seq., to authorize both attorneys fees to the prevailing party and a separate award of punitive damages not limited to attorneys fees. See Bristol Technology, Inc. v. Microsoft Corporation, 114 F. Sup.2d 59, 77-80 (D.Conn. 2000), vacated after settlement, 250 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2001); Lenz v. CNA Assurance Co., 42 Conn. Sup. 514, 630 A.2d 1082, 9 Conn. L. Rptr. 87 (1993). Unlike § 31-51q, CUTPA provides for attorneys fees and punitive damages in separate subsections. See General Statutes § 42-110(a) and (d). Ultimately, and in any event, these other decisions are not binding on the court in interpreting § 31-51q.
For these reasons, the court grants the defendant's motion in its entirety and precludes the plaintiff from offering any evidence on the amount of punitive damages other than that related to the common-law standard of litigation expenses less taxable costs.
It is so ordered.
Carl J. Schuman Judge, Superior Court