Opinion
A148801
09-10-2018
BURBANK HOUSING DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BELLEVUE UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants and Appellants.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Sonoma County Super. Ct. No. SCV-256799)
In written agreements with Bellevue Union School District and City of Santa Rosa High School District (collectively, Districts), property owner William Lechmanksi agreed to pay school impact fees exceeding those authorized by former Government Code section 65995. Lechmanski's successor in interest, Burbank Housing Development Corporation (Burbank), paid the fees required by the agreements, then petitioned for writ of mandate and for declaratory relief, alleging the agreements were "illegal, contrary to state law, and unenforceable." The trial court granted the petition, invalidated the agreements, and refunded Burbank $19,557.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Government Code. School impact fees are "fees that local governments impose on real property development to cover the costs of constructing and maintaining school facilities attributable to such development." (Candid Enterprises, Inc. v. Grossmont Union High School Dist. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 878, 878-881.) We deny the Districts' request for judicial notice of their respective board policies because that evidence was not before the trial court. (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3.) We also deny Burbank's request for judicial notice, filed in support of its response to the amicus curiae brief of Education Legal Alliance of the California School Boards Association, because the legislative history of section 65995 is adequately addressed by the case law and other authorities discussed herein. (California Taxpayers Action Network v. Taber Construction, Inc. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 115, 150.)
BACKGROUND
California's School Impact Fees
To place the issues in context, we briefly review California's school financing legislation.
A. The School Facilities Act
In the early 1970's, local governments began imposing school impact fees on property developers to cover the cost of building new school facilities necessitated by residential development. These fees were generally considered a valid exercise of police power under the California Constitution. (Grupe Development Co. v. Superior Court (1993) 4 Cal.4th 911, 916 (Grupe).) In 1977, the Legislature enacted the School Facilities Act, which authorized " 'cities and counties to enact ordinances requiring residential developers to pay fees to finance . . . school facilities necessitated by new development.' " (Grupe, at p. 916.) The School Facilities Act, however, "did not authorize school districts to impose school-impact fees themselves;" it "did not occupy the field of school construction financing and did not preempt local ordinances imposing school-impact fees under the police power." (Grupe, at p. 917, fn. omitted.)
B. Stirling Facilities Act
In 1986, "the Legislature reentered the field of school financing" with the Stirling Facilities Act—former section 65995—which authorized school districts to impose school impact fees. (Grupe, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 915.) Former section 65995 provided in relevant part: "Except for a fee, charge, dedication, or other requirement under Section 53080, or pursuant to Chapter 4.7 (commencing with Section 65970), no fee, charge, dedication, or other requirement shall be levied by the legislative body of a local agency against a development project . . . for the construction or reconstruction of school facilities." (Former § 65995, subd. (a).) The Stirling Facilities Act "placed a cap" on school impact fees of "$1.50 per square foot of assessable space" for residential construction, adjusted for inflation. (Grupe, at pp. 915, 918; see also former § 65995, subds. (b)(1), (3).)
The Stirling Facilities Act did not apply to agreements between developers and school districts entered before 1987. (Former § 65995, subd. (c)(2).) As to agreements after that date, former section 65995 " 'was intended to provide the exclusive method of raising local financing for permanent school facilities.' " (Grupe, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 918.) Former section 65995 "stated unequivocally: 'The Legislature finds and declares that the subject of the financing of school facilities with development fees is a matter of statewide concern. For this reason the Legislature hereby occupies the subject matter of mandatory development fees and other development requirements for school facilities finance to the exclusion of all local measures on the subject.' " (Grupe, at p. 918; see also former § 65995, subd. (e).)
A line of cases beginning with Mira Development Corp. v. City of San Diego (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1201, 1217-1218 (Mira) limited the Stirling Facilities Act to a local agency's adjudicative decisions, "such as issuance of building permits. [Citation.] Under this narrow view, developers that were requesting legislative actions, such as approvals of general plan amendments, specific plans or rezoning, were not protected by the provision that limited mitigation measures to the capped school facilities fee." (Chawanakee Unified School Dist. v. County of Madera (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1016, 1023, italics added (Chawanakee).) Under Mira and its progeny, "when acting in a legislative capacity, local governments may impose additional exactions beyond those permitted by the Stirling [Facilities Act]." (Abbott, et al., Exactions and Impact Fees in California (3d. ed. 2012) School Facilities, p. 123 (Abbott); see also William S. Hart Union High School Dist. v. Regional Planning Com. (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1612, 1622-1624 (Hart) [discussing legislative action exception].)
C. Leroy F. Green School Facilities Act (SB 50)
Effective November 1998, the Legislature enacted SB 50 to, among other things, overturn the Mira decisions. (See Chawanakee, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1023.) SB 50 brought an end to the Mira "exception for legislative acts" and amended section 65995 to preclude "any fees for school facilities other than those allowed under the Stirling [Facilities Act] . . . for both adjudicative as well as legislative approvals." (Abbott, supra, at p. 120.) With the enactment of SB 50, the Legislature recognized the three groups of agreements correlating to the three phases described above. As relevant here, agreements entered during the second phase—between 1987 and 1998—are valid only if "imposed in connection with, or made a condition of" a legislative action or decision. (§ 65995, subd. (c)(2); Abbott, supra, p. 121 [validity of contracts entered during this time frame is "controlled by the law as it existed prior to the passage of SB 50"].)
Lechmanski's Agreements with the Districts
Lechmanksi owned undeveloped property within the Districts' boundaries but outside the boundary of the City of Santa Rosa (the City). He intended to subdivide the property and build and sell residences; to facilitate the subdivision, Lechmanski sought to annex the property into the City. In 1996, Lechmanski entered into a "mutual benefit agreement" with each school district. The agreements are substantively identical. They refer to Lechmanski as the "developer" of a residential development, i.e. the Project. In the agreements, Lechmanski acknowledges his proposed development will impact the Districts' facility needs, and that the statutory fees will not adequately mitigate that impact. The agreements provide that Lechmanksi and the Districts recognize "it is to their mutual benefit that the District[s] be provided with financial assistance in order that school facilities and related services be available to future inhabitants of the Project."
The agreements require Lechmanski to pay "impact" or "mitigation" fees significantly exceeding the amount authorized by former section 65995. According to the agreements, the fees are "in lieu of" the Districts' authority to levy and collect fees under the statute. Lechmanski agreed to pay half of the fees before building permits were issued, and the remaining half when the residences were sold. The agreements bound Lechmanski's successors.
In 1997, the property was annexed into the City, but Lechmanski did not build the residences. Burbank purchased the property in 2007, intending to build affordable housing. In 2014, when Burbank began preparing for construction, the total amount of school impact fees would have been $276,000. Pursuant to the agreements, however, Burbank was required to pay $591,055. The Districts refused to reduce the fees. Burbank applied for building permits; under protest, it paid half of the fees—$295,527—as required by the agreements.
Burbank's Writ of Mandate Petition
Burbank filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory relief. The writ of mandate cause of action sought an order commanding the Districts to cease enforcing the agreements and to refrain from imposing additional school impact fees, and for an order refunding impact fees already paid. The declaratory relief cause of action alleged a controversy concerning the legality of the agreements and sought a judicial declaration that the agreements were unenforceable and that Burbank was entitled to a refund of school impact fees imposed in excess of state law. The Districts answered the petition and complaint.
Burbank's supporting memorandum of points and authorities argued the Legislature had preempted the subject matter of school impact fees in former section 65995, and that the agreements did not come within the legislative action exception articulated in the Mira decisions. Burbank sought a refund of $19,557—the difference between the amount it paid to secure the building permits and the amount permitted under section 65995—and an order declaring no further school impact fees could be imposed on the development.
In opposition, the Districts conceded they did not enter the agreements "as part of the annexation process." According to the Districts, however, the agreements came within the legislative action exception because the City took note of the agreements during the annexation process. In a supporting declaration, a former employee of the City of Santa Rosa High School District averred the City entered into "dozens" of similar agreements so that, when properties were annexed into the City, developers could subdivide their properties. According to the employee, without the agreements, the City "would have opposed" the annexation application. The opposition acknowledged the Stirling Facilities Act "occupied the field with regard to the financing of school facilities" but suggested the fees, which were "put in place by contract," were somehow outside the reach of former section 65995.
Burbank's reply argued the agreements did not result from legislative action. As Burbank explained, the annexation was a matter considered by the Local Agency Formation Commission and the City, not the Districts. That the City could have conditioned annexation approval on the existence of the agreements—i.e. that the City could have acted legislatively in requiring the agreements—was irrelevant, because the City "approved the annexation without conditioning the annexation on the existence of the agreements or otherwise requiring them."
Ruling on Petition for Writ of Mandate
At a hearing, the parties focused on whether the agreements came within the legislative action exception articulated in the Mira decisions. Following the hearing, the court granted the writ petition. In a written order, the court determined the agreements were not legislative acts. It determined the agreements "were entered into in conjunction with an application requesting a legislative act by the City," but the agreements "preceded the application for annexation, and were not mandated as part of the legislative process." Relying on Grupe, supra, 4 Cal.4th 911, the court concluded "no legislative act was directly involved" in the agreements. "For this reason, the Agreements are not exempted from the preemption provisions in [former section] 65995 under the legislative act doctrine created by Mira. [¶] The result might have been different had Lechmanski simply agreed to pay Districts for their cooperation in the annexation process. But instead he agreed to a fee schedule that would be binding on successor owners of his property and applicable to projects approved at a later time with school impacts that might or might not bear any relationship to the impacts identified in the agreements."
The court granted Burbank's writ petition. It issued a peremptory writ of mandate commanding the Districts to cease enforcing the agreements, and ordering them to refund mitigation fees of $19,557, the amount in excess of the fees authorized by state law. The court entered judgment for Burbank.
DISCUSSION
I.
The Districts Forfeited Their Claim Regarding the
Propriety of Writ Relief
We begin with an argument the Districts raise for the first time on appeal, at the end of their opening brief: that a writ of mandate "was not an appropriate remedy" because they had no "ministerial duty" with respect to the agreements. "A writ of mandate may be issued against a public body or public officer 'to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station' in cases 'where there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of law.' [Citations.] 'Two basic requirements are essential to the issuance of the writ: (1) A clear, present and usually ministerial duty upon the part of the respondent [citations]; and (2) a clear, present and beneficial right in the petitioner to the performance of that duty.' " (Flores v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 199, 205.)
Burbank's writ petition and supporting memorandum of points and authorities alleged mandamus review was appropriate. In their answer, the Districts did not dispute that allegation—they did not, for example, aver the absence of a ministerial duty. To the contrary, the Districts seemed to acknowledge Burbank's remedy was "via a writ of mandate." The Districts' opposition addressed the merits of the writ petition, seeking to uphold the validity of the agreements. The Districts did not argue a writ petition was not the appropriate procedural vehicle to remedy the alleged wrong. Thus, the only issue before the trial court was the validity of the agreements. The court held a hearing on the writ petition, and rendered a decision on the merits. (See, e.g., Cresta Bella, LP v. Poway Unified School District (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 438, 444 [developer paid school impact fees under protest, then petitioned for writ of mandate seeking a refund; trial court evaluated merits and entered judgment].)
"Generally, a party may not raise a new contention on appeal." (Shaw v. Regents of University of California (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 44, 51 (Shaw).) " 'This rule is based on fairness—it would be unfair, both to the trial court and the opposing litigants, to permit a change of theory on appeal; and it also reflects principles of estoppel and waiver.' " (Vallejo Police Officers Association v. City of Vallejo (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 601, 621 (Vallejo).) In their reply brief, the Districts acknowledge they did not raise this argument below; they nevertheless urge us to consider the theory, claiming it presents a question of law to be applied to undisputed facts. (See Shaw, at p. 51.) Assuming the accuracy of that statement, we "decline the invitation." (Vallejo, at p. 621, fn. 14.) One reason "parties are not normally allowed to raise new issues on appeal is that it is unfair to their opponents who did not have the opportunity to attack that theory factually or legally in the trial court, and to the trial court itself, which may be required to retry issues that might have been handled more efficiently the first time around." (In re Marriage of Moschetta (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1227.)
The prohibition on raising new arguments for the first time on appeal exists to avoid the type of gamesmanship present here, where the court reached a decision on the merits, at the Districts' urging. (See City of Scotts Valley v. County of Santa Cruz (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1, 29.) To allow the Districts to raise a completely new theory on appeal, after the trial court decided the case on the merits, would be unfair to Burbank, and "would be a waste of both administrative and judicial resources" (Eureka Teachers Assn. v. Board of Education (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 353, 366), particularly where the Districts have not pointed to any prejudice they suffered because of Burbank's decision to seek mandamus relief.
II.
The Districts' Belated Argument Regarding the
Government Claims Act Fails
Next, the Districts advance another new theory: that the court lacked "jurisdiction" to provide relief because Burbank did not comply with the Government Claims Act (Claims Act). In an apparent concession this argument was not raised in the trial court, the Districts argue Claims Act compliance is "a jurisdictional issue" they can raise at any time. In their opening brief, the Districts cite a single case, Cornejo v. Lightbourne (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 932 (Cornejo). Cornejo, however, does not hold that an objection based on the failure to comply with the Claims Act survives litigation of a trial court action through judgment, and may be asserted for the first time on appeal. Cornejo stands for the unremarkable proposition that "filing a claim with a public entity pursuant to the Claims Act is a jurisdictional element of any cause of action for damages against the public entity." (Id. at p. 938.)
Absent from the Districts' briefs is a citation to State of California v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234 (Bodde), where our high court held: "Although a Court of Appeal has suggested that failure to comply with the claim presentation requirement divests the court of jurisdiction over a cause of action against a public entity [citation], we have long held to the contrary. . . . '[A]s of 1963, court decisions had clearly settled that a court which erroneously entertained an action against a governmental entity, despite noncompliance with claims requirements, committed only an error of law; it did not act in excess of jurisdiction.' Thus, we concluded that noncompliance does not divest the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over causes of action against public entities. [Citation.] We therefore reject defendants' contention that failure to allege compliance establishes a jurisdictional defect." (Id. at p. 1239-1240, fn. 7.) Applying Bodde, we conclude the District may not raise the Claims Act at this late stage of the litigation.
We reject the Districts' belated argument for the additional reason that it is not adequately briefed in the opening brief. " 'Appellate briefs must provide argument and legal authority for the positions taken. "When an appellant [raises a point] but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as" ' " forfeited. (Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956.) In addition to ignoring the dispositive authority discussed above, the Districts state—in conclusory fashion—that the Claims Act applies because Burbank's lawsuit is an "action for damages." The Districts' opening brief, however, is devoid of reasoned argument: it ignores the substantial body of case law holding the Claims Act does not necessarily apply to nonpecuniary actions, such as those seeking mandamus declaratory relief. (Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1081.) The opening brief also fails to mention cases holding that where an action seeks monetary and equitable relief, the applicability of the Claims Act is determined by the "primary purpose of the action." (See Gatto v. County of Sonoma (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 744, 761.) "We are not bound to develop appellants' arguments for them." (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830.) The Districts' perfunctory argument regarding the Claims Act fails.
III.
The Agreements Violate Former Section 65995
We now turn to the merits of the appeal: whether the agreements are valid under the Stirling Facilities Act, former section 65995. (See Abbott, supra, at p. 121 [validity of contracts entered between 1987 and 1998 is "controlled by the law as it existed prior to the passage of SB 50"].) Our review is de novo. (Western/California, Ltd. v. Dry Creek Joint Elementary School (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1461, 1479; Garrick Development Co. v. Hayward Unified School Dist. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 320, 328.)
Former section 65995 provided in relevant part: "Except for a fee, charge, dedication, or other requirement under Section 53080, or pursuant to Chapter 4.7 (commencing with Section 65970), no fee, charge, dedication or other requirement shall be levied by the legislative body of a local agency against a development project . . . for the construction of school facilities." (Former § 65995, subd. (a).) With the exception of agreements entered before 1987, former section 65995 was the exclusive method for a local agency to impose school impact fees. (Former § 65995, subds. (a), (e); Shapell Industries, Inc. v. Governing Board (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 218, 227.) As the Districts acknowledged in the trial court, the Stirling Facilities Act "occupied the field with regard to the financing of school facilities."
Former section 65995 " 'was intended to provide the exclusive method of raising local financing for permanent school facilities.' " (Grupe, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 918.) "[T]he Legislature clearly set out in [former] section 65995, subdivision (e) exactly what it intended to preempt—the requirements for school facilities finance that a local agency will impose on a development project. That is, the Legislature, in effect, said 'We will tell you what you can and cannot require of a developer when you are seeking to have him or her mitigate the impact of the development project on school facilities.' " (Hart, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d at p. 1626.) Former section 65995 also set a cap on the amount of school impact fees. (Former § 65995, subd. (b)(1).)
Here, the agreements were entered after 1987, and they imposed fees in excess of former section 65995's statutory cap. In the trial court—and seemingly cognizant of these undisputed facts—the Districts argued the agreements were valid under Mira's legislative action exception. On appeal, the Districts take a completely different tack: they argue the agreements were not legislative and, as a result, former section 65995 does not apply. The Districts are precluded from raising this argument on appeal, which directly conflicts with their theory of the case in the trial court. " 'The rule is well settled that the theory upon which a case is tried must be adhered to on appeal. A party is not permitted to change his position and adopt a new and different theory on appeal. To permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the trial court, but manifestly unjust to the opposing litigant.' " (Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1334, 1351, fn. 12.)
This conclusion is fatal to the Districts' argument that section 65996 requires reversal. That argument relies on the rejection of two positions taken by the Districts in the trial court: that the agreements were legislative and were not valid under current law.
We are not persuaded by the Districts' other attempts to establish the legality of the agreements. First, the Districts (and amicus curiae) contend "contractually agreed upon" school impact fees are outside the purview of former section 65995. Assuming the Districts preserved this argument for appeal given their superficial treatment of the issue in the trial court, we disagree. As we have already stated, former section 65995 " 'was intended to provide the exclusive method of raising local financing for permanent school facilities.' " (Grupe, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 918.) With the exception of agreements entered before 1987, the statute precluded a local agency from fashioning its own mechanism for levying school impact fees in excess of the statute, whether by contract or otherwise. California Bldg. Industry Assn. v. Governing Bd. (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 212 (CBIA) supports our conclusion. There, school districts adopted a "special tax" as a way "of avoiding the [former] section 65995 limitations" on school impact fees. (Id. at p. 233.) CBIA held "[a]llowing the school districts to characterize these development fees as 'special taxes' would have the effect of permitting them to avoid prescribed statutory limitations by judicious choice of a label. This is not permissible." (Id. at p. 236.) Under CBIA's rationale, the Districts cannot avoid the prescribed statutory limitations by extracting school impact fees pursuant to a contract.
To support their argument that contracts are outside the reach of former section 65995, the Districts rely on City of San Marcos v. Loma San Marcos, LLC (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1045 (San Marcos). But that case has no application here. San Marcos concerned a contract to securitize mitigation "fees due pursuant to a conditional use permit that allowed the owners to convert the property from a recycling facility to a movie studio." (Id. at p. 1049.) Among other things, the San Marcos court held the developer waived its right to protest the fees at issue. San Marcos did not examine the validity of the contract in light of the Stirling Facilities Act. (Id. at pp. 1059-1060.) " ' "It is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not considered." ' " (Ulloa v. McMillin Real Estate and Mortgage, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 333, 340.)
The Districts also argue the agreements are valid notwithstanding former section 65995, subdivision (e). That subdivision states the legislative finding "that the subject of the financing of school facilities with development fees is a matter of statewide concern. For this reason, the Legislature hereby occupies the subject matter of mandatory development fees and other development requirements for school facilities finance to the exclusion of all local measures on the subject." (Former § 65995, subd. (e), italics added.) According to the Districts, former subdivision (e) does not preempt the agreements—or the fees imposed pursuant those agreements—because they are "voluntary." The Districts claim they "asked Lechmanski, 'will you agree to pay this fee?' and Lechmanski said, 'yes.' "
But the record is more nuanced. In the agreements, Lechmanski acknowledged his responsibility, as a developer, to pay school impact fees, and his awareness that the statutory fees would not sufficiently mitigate the impact of his proposed development. In the agreements, Lechmanski acknowledged his payments would "enhance [the] development" of the project, but the agreements also conditioned any future building permit on payment of half of the required fees. The agreements create an inference Lechmanski could not proceed with the annexation and development of his property unless he agreed to pay fees significantly in excess of former section 65995's statutory cap. That Lechmanski might receive some benefit from the presence of school facilities near his proposed development does not place the agreements outside the coverage of former section 65995, subdivision (e).
This inference is reinforced by the Districts' memorandum in opposition to the petition for writ of mandate: "[T]o get his property annexed into the City of Santa Rosa, [Lechmanski] signed an agreement to pay school impact fees. . . . [The agreements helped] ensure that the Local Agency Formation Commission . . . would annex [his] propert[y] into the city limits from the unincorporated territory. Annexation would permit the property to receive, among other things, city water and sewer, which would facilitate subdividing them."
We reach a similar conclusion with respect to the fees imposed pursuant to the agreements. Former section 65995, subdivision (e) preempts "mandatory development fees and other development requirements for school facilities finance." Here, the fees imposed were undoubtedly "development requirements" because Burbank had to pay the fees to obtain a building permit. (Grupe, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 920 [fees collected pursuant to voter-approved measure were " 'requirements' " developers had to satisfy to obtain a building permit]; Sterling Park, L.P. v. City of Palo Alto (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1193, 1204 ["[d]ivesting the developer of money . . . is similar to imposing a fee"].) We have no difficulty concluding the fees imposed pursuant to the agreements were development requirements under former section 65995, subdivision (e), particularly in light of the Districts' description of the fees as "contractually agreed upon amounts to offset the impacts of development" on their " 'school facilities needs.' "
Next, the Districts' claim the agreements are not preempted because former section 65995, subdivision (e) refers to preemption of "local measures," not "voluntary agreements." In Grupe, supra, 4 Cal.4th 911 our high court rejected a similar argument. There, a school district argued special taxes were not preempted by former section 65995 because they were not explicitly listed in former subdivision (e). Grupe rejected this argument, explaining: "section 65995 does not expressly list 'special taxes' among the exactions that it preempts, but this omission may well be explained by reference to history. The problem that the Legislature sought to resolve in section 65995 was caused by increasing school-impact fees, not special taxes. As noted at the outset, the principal reaction of local authorities to the wave of residential development and resistance to rising property taxes in the 1970's was 'to impose on developers school-impact fees' [citation]. Such fees multiplied; special taxes did not, . . . That is why, on the eve of the 1986 legislation that enacted section 65995, we observed that 'such special taxes have rarely been imposed, [and] remain novel' [citation.] In view of their relative rarity and novelty it is not surprising that the Legislature did not expressly list them in section 65995. The omission does not mean that the Legislature did not intend to include such special taxes among the prohibited exactions, but simply that it focused its attention, as it commonly does, on the principal evil to be remedied." (Id. at pp. 920-921.) The same is true here. That the Legislature did not expressly list "voluntary agreements" in former section 65995, subdivision (e) does not mean agreements like those entered into in this case are excluded from the preemptive reach of the statute. The Districts' attempt to distinguish Grupe is unavailing.
The District did not advance this argument in the trial court. Former section 65995 does not define "local measures" and the Districts' passing reliance on provisions of the Education and Government Codes is not persuasive.
The remaining arguments offered by the Districts and amicus curiae "are unconvincing and do not merit further discussion." (Garica v. ConMed Corp. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 144, 149.) We conclude the agreements are invalid under the Stirling Facilities Act, former section 65995.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Burbank is entitled to costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278.)
/s/_________
SIMONS, Acting P.J. We concur. /s/_________
NEEDHAM, J. /s/_________
BRUINIERS, J.