Opinion
Civil Action No. 00-0114-CB-M
December 14, 2000
FINAL JUDGMENT
Pursuant to separate order entered this date granting defendants' motion for summary judgment, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the claims of the plaintiff, Hazel Bullard as Administratrix of the Estate of Tamann Bullard, against the defendants, the City of Mobile, Sgt. Jeffrey Graham and Officer Horace Jackson, be and hereby are DISMISSED with prejudice.
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on motions for summary judgment filed by each of the above-named defendants (Docs. 28, 31 36) along with supporting briefs (Docs. 29, 32 37), plaintiffs responsive briefs (Docs. 29, 32 37), and various reply briefs (Docs. 42 47). At issue on summary judgment is whether the individual defendants — City of Mobile Police Officers Jeffrey Graham and Horace Jackson — are entitled to immunity from liability from both the state and federal law claims asserted against them by the estate of Tamann Bullard, who was killed during a confrontation with police. Also at issue is whether the City of Mobile may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for inadequately training its officers in matters related to the use of deadly force. After considering all of the issues raised in light of the evidence presented, the Court concludes that the individual defendants are immune from liability under both state and federal law and that the City cannot be held liable under § 1983 for alleged training deficiencies.
I. Findings of Facts
These facts are set forth, as the law requires, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, as the non-moving party. Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994 (11th Cir. 1992).
On October 21, 1999, plaintiffs decedent Tamann Bullard went to a Mobile business, Engineered Textile Products, looking for his roommate, Maurice Jones, who worked there. (Jones Dep. at 38.) When Jones first saw Bullard, Bullard was holding a knife. (Id.) When Jones asked Bullard why he had a knife, Bullard replied, "Come and go with me." (Id. at 40.) As Jones and Bullard stood just outside the building where Jones worked, Jones asked Bullard to put the knife down. (Id.) Bullard told Jones that he was not going to hurt him and kept asking Jones to come with him. (Id.) Bullard said that the Lord had sent him to get Jones and that Jones should come with him if he wanted to go to heaven. (Id. at 43.) For about ten minutes, the conversation continued in this vein with Jones trying to talk Bullard into putting the knife down, and Bullard "constantly trying to get [Jones] to come with him" as other employees watched. (Id.)
When the first two police officers arrived and approached Bullard with guns drawn, Jones stepped a few steps back. (Id. at 46.) The officers walked slowly toward Bullard and yelled at him to drop the knife. (Id. at 47 50.) Bullard said, "If you shoot me, you'll be shooting a child of God." (Id.) Four to six more officers arrived during a ten to twelve minute period. (Id. at 48-49.) At some point when Bullard was near the doorway of the building, he got down on his knees and put the knife on the ground, along with some Bible scriptures he had been holding. (Id. at 56.) During this time, the knife was on the ground for about "[h]alf a minute." (Id. at 88.) Bullard picked up the knife and got back up. (Id. at 56.)
According to Officer Jackson, when he arrived Bullard was standing in the doorway of the building with a knife in his hand. (Jackson Dep. at 35.) Approximately four other officers had their weapons drawn and pointed at Bullard. (Id. at 37) Those officers were telling him, "Drop the knife, drop the knife." Id. at 36. Bullard was saying, "I'm going to kill him[.] I'm going to kill him[.] [Y]'all can't stop me." (Id.)
Officer Daugherty went into the building and approached Bullard from behind, trying to disarm him with a night stick. (Jackson Dep. at 42-44.) Bullard saw Daugherty, however, and turned toward him with the knife raised in a stabbing motion. (Id. at 43) Other officers yelled at Daugherty to get back, and Daugherty moved away.
At this point, Bullard backed into the building where employees were located. The officers continued to walk slowly toward Bullard, maintaining a distance of about eight to twelve feet, still yelling at him to drop the knife. (Jackson dep. at 45; Jones dep. at 54.) Bullard gradually backed up, ending up about forty feet inside the building. During the confrontation, Bullard told the police that he was going to kill before he left and that he was going to kill in the name of God. (Id.) Bullard did not yell when he made these statements. (Id.) Maurice Jones did not hear Bullard say anything after he backed into the building, but Jones admits that he moved behind a wall after Daugherty's failed attempt to get the weapon and that "[m]aybe he did [say something][.] I didn't hear it." (Jones dep. at 91-93.)
In her Statement of Disputed Facts, plaintiff disputes defendants' contention that Bullard made threatening statements about killing someone. In support of her claim that Bullard never threatened anyone, plaintiff cites Jones' deposition testimony. However, Jones' testimony does not contradict the officers' version of events. Jones testified that he "didn't hear [Bullard] say anything after he got in the building" and that he could have said something that Jones did not hear. (Jones dep. at 93) (emphasis added.)
When Sgt. Jeffrey Graham arrived, a line of police officers was standing just inside the door to the building with their backs to him. Graham saw Bullard looking back and forth, with a wild or crazed look, "pumping the knife" which he held in an "ice pick grip." (Graham dep. at 32-33.) Bullard was mumbling, but all Graham could understand was "stab." (Id.) Graham joined the line of officers in front of Bullard and raised his weapon. (Id. at 39.) Graham told Bullard once to drop the knife. (Id. at 38.) Within moments after Graham got up to the line, Bullard "stopped from where he was moving his hand. He hesitated for a moment. He turned and stepped purposely right towards [Graham]." (Id. at 39-40.) Bullard had the knife raised "up by his head." (Id. at 39.) (Jackson dep. at 49.)
Sgt. Graham was at the precinct when he heard over the police radio the initial dispatch regarding a man with a knife and heard Officer Walker respond that he would take the call. (Graham dep. at 29.) Then Sgt. Graham heard Walker over the radio saying that he had a man with a knife at gunpoint and that the man was refusing to drop the knife. (Id. at 30.) When he heard another call from Walker requesting that his back-up step it up, Sgt. Graham left the precinct to assist. (Id. at 30-31.)
When Bullard stepped toward Sgt. Graham, Graham and Officer Jackson fired at Bullard. (Graham dep. at 42) (Jackson dep. at 49.) At the time the shots were fired, Bullard was eight to ten feet from Sgt. Graham. (Id.) Graham fired two shots. (Graham dep. at 40.) Jackson fired three. (Jackson dep. at 49.) Both of Graham's shots hit Bullard, killing him. (Graham dep. at 41.) Both Graham and Jackson feared for Graham's safety and for the safety of others when Bullard stepped toward Graham (Graham Aff.; Jackson Aff.)
It is unclear from the evidence presented whether any of Jackson's shots hit Bullard.
Both Graham and Jackson were trained to shoot center mass, rather than to shoot to incapacitate the suspect. (Graham dep. at 40-41; Jackson dep. at 55.) Neither Graham nor Jackson had received training in negotiation tactics. (Graham dep. at 20; Jackson dep. at 19.)
As a result of the shootings, Hazel Bullard, the administratrix of the Estate of Tamann Bullard, filed the instant action against the City of Mobile, Graham and Jackson. In Count One of her Amended Complaint, plaintiff asserts a federal law claim against Graham and Jackson under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for use of excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In Count Two plaintiff asserts an excessive force claim under § 1983 and the Fourth Amendment against the City of Mobile for its alleged policy or custom of failing to train, supervise, discipline or control its employees. Finally, in Count Three plaintiff asserts a state law claim for assault and battery against Jackson and Graham.
II. Conclusions of Law A. Summary Judgment Analysis
Summary judgment should be granted only if "there is no issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment bears "the initial burden to show the district court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial." Clark v. Coats Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). Once the moving party has satisfied his responsibility, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. "If the nonmoving party fails to make `a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof,' the moving party is entitled to summary judgment." Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)) (footnote omitted). "In reviewing whether the nonmoving party has met its burden, the court must stop short of weighing the evidence and making credibility determinations of the truth of the matter. Instead, the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 999 (11th Cir. 1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
B. Graham and Jackson are Entitled to Qualified Immunity under Federal Law
The guiding principles of qualified immunity are well-established. InLassiter v. Alabama A M University, 28 F.3d 1146 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc), the appellate court stated:
Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from civil trial (and other burdens of litigation, including discovery) and from liability if their conduct violates no "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991). . . That qualified immunity protects government actors is the usual rule; only in exceptional cases will government actors have no shield against claims made against them in their individual capacities. Unless a government agent's act is so obviously wrong, in the light of pre-existing law, that only a plainly incompetent officer or one who was knowingly violating the law would have done such a thing, the government actor has immunity from suit. . . . Because qualified immunity shields government actors in all but exceptional cases, courts should think long and hard before stripping defendants of immunity.Id. at 1149 (citations and footnote omitted).
The qualified immunity determination involves a two-step process. First, the defendant must prove that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the alleged wrongful conduct occurred.Jordan v. Doe, 38 F.3d 1559, 1565 (11th Cir. 1994). A defendant may discharge this burden by establishing that the actions were undertaken in performance of his duties and were within the scope of his authority. Id. There is no dispute in this case that the defendants were acting within the scope of their authority.
Next, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant violated clearly established law. Id. In order to be clearly established, "the law must have earlier been developed in such a concrete and factually defined context to make it obvious to all reasonable government actors, in the defendant's place that `what he is doing' violates federal law." Lassiter, 28 F.3d at 1149 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). The plaintiff may not discharge his burden "by referring to general rules and to the violation of abstract `rights'." Id. at 1150. "For qualified immunity to be surrendered, pre-existing law must dictate, that is, truly compel (not just suggest or allow or raise a question about), the conclusion for every like-situated, reasonable government agent that what the defendant is doing violates the law in the circumstances." Id.
The Eleventh Circuit has also addressed, in some detail, the scope of qualified immunity in excessive force cases:
We have said many times that `if case law, in factual terms, has not staked out a bright line, qualified immunity almost always protects the defendant.'" In the context of Fourth Amendment excessive force claims, we have noted that generally no bright line exists for identifying when force is excessive; we have therefore concluded that unless a controlling and materially similar case declares the official's conduct unconstitutional, a defendant is usually entitled to qualified immunity.Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 926 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Smith v. Mattox, 127 F.3d 1416, 1419 (11th Cir. 1997)). However, the appellate court has also recognized that a bright line may exist even absent particularized case law. "When an excessive force plaintiff shows `that the official's conduct lies so obviously at the very core of what the Fourth Amendment prohibits that the unlawfulness of the conduct was readily apparent to the official, notwithstanding the lack of caselaw,' the official is not entitled to the defense of qualified immunity." Id. (quoting Smith, 127 F.3d at 1419). This narrow exception recognizes "the easiest cases don't even arise. There has never been . . . a section 1983 case accusing welfare officials of selling foster children into slavery; it does not follow that if such a case arose, the officials would be immune from damages [or criminal] liability." United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997).
Plaintiff argues that qualified immunity does not protect Sgt. Graham or Officer Jackson because "the law in the Eleventh Circuit was clearly established that the shooting of suspects who did not pose an immediate threat amounts to the use of excessive force." (Pl. Br. p. 8.) However, plaintiffs statement is nothing more than a general proposition of law, and plaintiff cites no factually similar cases from which an officer in the circumstances of this case would have known that his actions were illegal.
Perhaps recognizing the lack of factually similar case law, plaintiff also attempts to overcome the qualified immunity defense by asserting that this case falls within that narrow exception where the defendants' conduct is so egregious that no case law is necessary. This exception applies only if plaintiff can show that the defendants' conduct was "so far beyond the hazy border between excessive and acceptable force that . . . every reasonable officer in their position would [inevitably] conclude the force was unlawful." Priester, 208 F.3d at 926-27. For several reasons, this qualified immunity argument also fails.
First, plaintiffs argument is based on a recitation of facts and inferences not supported by the record. Plaintiff argues that Bullard was not an imminent threat to anyone on the scene because he had a knife and the police officers had guns and because Bullard "would have to get much closer to the officers in order to inflict pain upon them." (Pl. Brf. p. 10) However, Bullard was not deterred by the fact that he had only a knife while the police had guns, and the shooting occurred as he moved toward an officer with the knife in a threatening position. Plaintiff argues that Bullard simply "moved while holding a knife" (id.), but the record establishes that he turned and moved toward a police officer while holding the knife in a threatening manner.
Next, plaintiffs reliance on hindsight does not overcome the officers' qualified immunity defense. Plaintiff suggests other ways the defendants could have handled the situation, such as backing away and trying to negotiate. However, the availability of other alternatives that the defendants could have used does not render unreasonable the alternative chosen. Crosby v. Paulk, 187 F.3d 1339, 1348 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Lassiter, 28 F.3d at 1150 (cautioning against the use of hindsight in qualified immunity determinations).
Finally, Wood v. City of Lakeland, 203 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2000), provides the best counterpoint to plaintiffs argument in opposition to qualified immunity. In that case, the Eleventh Circuit examined facts similar to the undisputed facts in this case and held that the defendants were protected by qualified immunity. The pertinent facts were as follows:
[O]n February 12, 1995 Officer Tye Thompson shot and killed Clark Mitchell Thomas at a residence in Lakeland, Florida. The Lakeland Police Department had been summoned to the residence by members of Mr. Thomas's family who reported that he was injuring himself and threatening suicide. When the police were unable to talk Mr. Thomas into exiting from the residence, a rescue/entry team consisting of five officers was assembled with the intention of securing Mr. Thomas for commitment. . . Upon entering the residence the officers observed evidence of blood. In the rear bedroom where Mr. Thomas was located, entry was made by Officer Smith kicking open the door. Mr. Thomas was observed to be sitting on a dresser at the end of a bed. The offices observed that his arms were covered with blood and that he was clenching some type of object, which he held to the right side of his neck. He yelled to the officers to get out of the room. The officers identified themselves a Lakeland police officers and ordered Mr. Thomas to drop the knife numerous times. When Mr. Thomas declined to do so and thereafter slid off the dresser, he was shot three times in the chest by Officer Thompson, from a distance of approximately eight feet.Id. at 1290.
In its qualified immunity analysis, the appellate court noted that the Supreme Court's decision in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), "provided a bright line that established when an officer may use deadly force in apprehending a suspect. . . . Where the suspect is not a fleeing felon and poses no immediate threat to the officer or others, the use of deadly force is a violation of the suspects Fourth Amendment Rights and, therefore, unconstitutional." Wood, 203 F.3d at 1292. The court also looked at the applicable Florida law which provided the use of deadly force was justified if the person using the force reasonably believes such force necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm. Id. Applying these standards to the facts of that case, the court held that "a fact finder could not find that no reasonable person in the defendant's position could have thought the facts were such that they justified defendant's acts. To the contrary, Defendant Thompson acted as a reasonable officer would in light of the facts and circumstances facing him at the time." Id. at 1293.
The actions of defendants Graham and Jackson were likewise justified in this case. Police were called to a business where Bullard was wielding a knife. Bullard refused to put the knife down despite continual and repeated admonitions to do so by police officers. Bullard made repeated statements about killing someone before he left, talked about God and held Bible scriptures in his hand. At times, Bullard held the knife in a threatening position. The police tried to disarm him without force but were unsuccessful in their attempt. The standoff lasted more than ten minutes after Officer Jackson arrived on the scene. Although Sgt. Graham did not arrive until just before the shooting, he had been aware of the incident through radio reports since the initial dispatch. When Graham arrived, officers were approximately ten feet from Bullard with their guns trained on him. As he joined the line of officers, Graham heard Bullard mumbling "stab." Graham also told Bullard to drop the knife as the other officers had done repeatedly. Bullard did not drop the knife but instead turned and started toward Graham from a distance of eight to ten feet, with the knife raised by his head in a stabbing position. At this point, Sgt. Graham and Officer Jackson fired. As in Wood, the defendants "made a reasonable split-second judgment call, in light of the [decedent's] volatile, emotional and aggressive state to use deadly force in order to prevent imminent death or bodily harm . . ." Id. at 1293.
Similar to Florida's statute, Alabama law provides that a law enforcement officer is justified in using deadly force "when and to the extent he reasonably believes it is necessary in order . . . [t]o defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use of imminent use of deadly physical force." Ala. Code § 13A-3-27(b)(2) (1975).
In sum, neither existing case law nor the particular facts of this case dictated that no reasonable officer in the defendants' position would have used deadly force against plaintiffs' decedent. Therefore, defendants are immune from liability under § 1983 and the Fourth Amendment and are entitled to summary judgment with regard to that claim.
C. Graham and Jackson are Entitled to Discretionary Function Immunity under State Law
Alabama law provides immunity from tort liability to police officers for actions "arising out of his or her conduct in performance of any discretionary function within the line and scope of his or her law enforcement duties." Ala. Code § 6-5-338(a) (1975). "Alabama law has defined `discretionary acts' as [t]hose acts as to which there is no hard and fast rule as to course of conduct that one must or must not take and those requiring exercise in judgment and choice and [involving] what is just and proper under the circumstances." Montgomery v. City of Montgomery, 732 So.2d 305, 310 (Ala.Civ.App. 1999) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Discretionary function immunity does not protect officers whose conduct is willful or malicious or undertaken in bad faith. Id. at 311. Thus, state law immunity applies only if the defendants acts were "discretionary" and were not willful, malicious or in bad faith. Plaintiff does contest the discretionary nature of defendants' acts but argues that immunity is not applicable because he committed an intentional, malicious act in bad faith.
As she did with her qualified immunity argument, plaintiff bases her opposition to discretionary function immunity on her version "facts" that are not supported by the record. Plaintiff contends that these defendants' actions were malicious and in bad faith because "there was no need to attack Tamann Bullard, . . . [they] w[ere] . . . done with the intention of killing Bullard[,] [and] . . . Bullard was not a real threat." However, as the discussion regarding qualified immunity, supra, makes clear, no evidence supports plaintiffs assertion that Graham and Jackson attacked or intentionally killed Bullard. Rather, the evidence supports defendants' claims that Graham acted in self-defense and that Jackson acted in defense of Graham.
As police officers for the City of Mobile, Graham and Jackson are entitled to immunity from tort liability for discretionary acts performed within the line and scope of their employment, so long as those acts are not malicious, willful or in bad faith. Since there is no evidence of willfulness, maliciousness or bad faith and there is no dispute as to the discretionary nature of the defendants' actions, the Court finds that defendants Graham and Jackson are entitled to immunity from liability as to plaintiffs state law assault and battery claim.
D. The City of Mobile is not Liable under § 1983
In response to the City's motion for summary judgment, plaintiff asserts that there are material disputes of fact regarding her claim that Bullard's death was the result of the City's failure to train its officers and that this deficiency in training was so severe as to amount to a city police. A city is not automatically liable under § 1983 "even if it inadequately trained or supervised its [employees] and those [employees] violated [the plaintiffs] constitutional rights." Gold v. City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 870 (1998). A city's failure to train or supervise can be the basis for § 1983 liability only in those limited circumstances "[1] where the municipality inadequately trains or supervises its employees, [2] this failure to train or supervise is a city policy, and [3] that city policy causes the employees to violate a citizen's constitutional rights." Id. Plaintiff points to several pieces of evidence to support her failure-to-train claim, including a training policy adopted by the City and several alleged inadequacies in training that, plaintiff contends, amount to an unofficial policy or custom.
First, plaintiff points to a training policy which she contends was unconstitutional, that is, the City's policy of training policy to shoot "center mass." Plaintiff presents no evidence whatsoever from which a jury could conclude that this policy is inadequate or unconstitutional. Moreover, there is no evidence that this policy caused Bullard's death. Apparently, plaintiff believes that Bullard would not have been killed if the City had trained its officers to shoot to incapacitate, as opposed to shooting center mass, but she has presented no evidence to support her belief.
Plaintiff's remaining evidence of failure to train is equally unpersuasive. Plaintiff claims lack of training in negotiating skills, lack of training on the use of a bean bag gun and the failure of the officers at the scene to pick up Bullard's knife during the thirty-second interval when he placed it on the ground are evidence that the City had a policy of inadequate training. The Supreme Court has held that such evidence is insufficient to establish inadequate training.
That a particular officer may be unsatisfactorily trained will not alone suffice to fasten liability on the city, for the officer's shortcomings may have resulted from factors other than a faulty training program. . . . Neither will it suffice to prove that any injury or accident could have been avoided if an officer had had better or more training, sufficient to equip him to avoid the particular injury-causing conduct.City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390-91 (1989).
Even if plaintiff could establish that training was not adequate, she still has failed to present evidence that the alleged failure to train amounted to a custom or policy. "Since a municipality rarely will have an express written or oral policy of inadequate training or supervising its employees, the Supreme Court has further explained that a plaintiff may prove that a city has a policy by showing that the municipality's failure to train evidenced a `deliberate indifference' to the rights of its inhabitants[.]" Gold, 151 F.3d at 1350. Deliberate indifference on the part of a municipality means that the city's policymakers have made a deliberate choice to follow a course of action from among various alternatives. Id. "[W]ithout notice of a need to train or supervise in a particular area, a municipality is not liable as a matter of law for any failure to train or supervise." Id. at 1351.
Generally, notice of the need to train is established by evidence that a city was aware of one or more prior similar incidents in which an individual's constitutional rights were violated. See e.g., Kerr v. City of West Palm Beach, 875 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1989) (failure-to-train claim established where city received several prior complaints about excessive force). In this case, there is no evidence of any prior incidents to put the City on notice that its training in these areas was inadequate.
In City of Canton, the Supreme Court left open the possibility that in some cases the need for training "may be so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need." Id. at 389. The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that the possibility of establishing a policy of failure to train absent evidence of prior similar incidents is a remote one.Gold, 151 F.3d at 1352. Thus far, the Supreme Court has done no more than " hypothesize that, in a narrow range of circumstances, a violation of federal rights may be a highly predictable consequence of a failure to equip law enforcement officers with specific tools to handle recurring situations." Id. (quoting Board of County Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 1391 (1997) (emphasis added)). It can hardly be said, however, that failure to train every police officer in negotiating tactics or in the use of a bean bag gun or to pick up a knife within thirty seconds would so obviously lead to the violation of a constitutional right that the City could be considered deliberately indifferent.
Plaintiffs evidence falls far short of establishing a material dispute of fact with regard to her § 1983 claim against the City. Accordingly, the City of Mobile is entitled to summary judgment. E. Conclusion
The City also claims entitlement to summary judgment on the discretionary function immunity and substantive immunity — both of which arise under state law. As plaintiffs Amended Complaint asserts no state law claims against the City, the Court sees no reason to address these issues.
For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that the individual defendants, Sgt. Jeffrey Graham and Officer Horace Jackson, are entitled to immunity from suit under both state and federal law. The Court further finds that the City of Mobile is entitled to summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs § 1983 claim against it. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the motions for summary judgment filed by defendants Graham, Jackson and the City of Mobile be and hereby are GRANTED.