Opinion
No. CV 06-5002820S
April 19, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN AUTOMOBILE REAR-END NEGLIGENCE CASE
Plaintiff Deanna Buffington alleges that on April 26, 2005 she was operating a motor vehicle on North Colony Road in Wallingford, Connecticut when she stopped at a traffic light at the intersection of North Colony Road and Cedar Lane. The plaintiff further alleges that while she was stopped at the light the defendant, Henry Estrada, negligently struck her car from behind, causing her injuries and damages. The plaintiff alleges that the motor vehicle that struck her was owned by defendant, Isaias Estrada, maintained by him as a family car, and that Henry Estrada was operating that car within the scope of his authority.
In her complaint, the plaintiff's alleges that her injuries and losses were caused by the defendant Henry Estrada in the following respects:
1) he was inattentive and failed to keep a proper lookout;
2) he failed to keep and operate said motor vehicle under proper control;
3) he failed to reduce the speed of said motor vehicle although reasonable care required him to do so;
4) he failed to make timely application of the brakes on said motor vehicle;
5) he was following the motor vehicle of the plaintiff more closely than was reasonable and prudent having regard for the conditions prevailing, in violation of Section 14-240(a) Connecticut General Statutes; and
6) he failed to take evasive action to avoid said collision.
Both in his statement to police and in his answer, defendant Henry Estrada admits that he struck the rear of plaintiff's vehicle. In their answer to the plaintiff's complaint, the defendants state that they have insufficient knowledge or information with which to form a belief and leave the plaintiff to her proof of her claims of negligence.
The plaintiff has filed a motion for summary judgment as to the issue of liability claiming that since defendant Henry Estrada admitted striking the rear of her vehicle that admission constitutes negligence and that judgment should enter finding him negligent as a matter of law.
Standard for Deciding Motion for Summary Judgment
"Practice Book [§ 17-49] provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Larobina v. McDonald, 274 Conn. 394, 399, 876 A.2d 522 (2005). "In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . The test is whether a party would be entitled to a directed verdict on the same facts." Haeshe v. Kissner, 229 Conn. 213 (1994).
The Motion for Summary Judgment
In support of her motion for summary judgment, plaintiff attaches both her affidavit and a police report. In her affidavit, the plaintiff states that the defendant struck the rear of her vehicle and she repeats the allegations of negligence set out in the second paragraph of this memorandum. The police officer investigating the accident noted in his report that the defendant Henry Estrada said "when the light turned green he took his foot off of the brake and rolled into the rear of [plaintiff's] [v]ehicle."
In their memorandum in opposition to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the defendants argue that plaintiff's motion should be denied because the court, as a matter of law, cannot determine if the defendant Henry Estrada was negligent based solely on his admission of striking the rear of plaintiff's car. The defendants argue that "it is up to the jury to determine whether or not Henry Estrada was acting reasonably when he took his foot off the brake after the light turned green and rolled into the plaintiff's car." The defendants argue that the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint (and repeated in her affidavit) are merely allegations and not proof or evidence of negligence.
While it is noted that the defendant admitted in his answer that he hit plaintiff's vehicle in the rear with his car, that admission alone does not resolve the issue of causation. "The essential elements of a cause of action in negligence are well established: duty; breach of that duty; causation; and actual injury." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) LePage v. Home, 262 Conn. 116 (2002). An issue of proximate cause is ordinarily a question of fact for the trier . . . It becomes a conclusion of law only when the mind of a fair and reasonable [person] could reach only one conclusion . . ." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) BD Associates, Inc. v. Russell, 73 Conn.App. 66 (2002). In O'Brien v. Cordova, 171 Conn. 303, 306 (1976, the Court observed that "[c]ommon experience shows that motor vehicle accidents are not all due to driver negligence."
Analysis
In the present case, the plaintiff contends that the defendant's admissions, her affidavit, and the police report, demonstrate that there are no genuine issues of material fact regarding the defendant's liability for the accident. The defendants also argue that negligence issues are particularly inappropriate cases for summary judgment.
Summary judgment is particularly "ill adapted to negligence cases, where . . . the ultimate issue in contention involves a mixed question of fact and law, and requires the trier of fact to determine whether the standard of care was met in a specific situation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Michaund v. Gurney, 168 Conn. 431, 434 (1975). "Issues of negligence are ordinarily not susceptible of summary application but should be resolved by trial in the ordinary manner." Spencer v. Good Earth Restaurant Corporation, 164 Conn. 194, 199, 319 A.2d 403 (1972). See also, Fogerty v. Rashow, 193 Conn. 442, 446, 476 A.2d 582 (1984). This is especially true when" . . . the trier [of fact] would be called on to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony." Id.
The plaintiff directs the Court's attention to Richards v. Walton, 2003 WL 22293655 (2003), as standing for the proposition that while issues of negligence are not ordinarily appropriate for disposition by summary judgment that the evidence submitted by plaintiff in support of her motion, together with the absence of evidence to rebut this evidence demonstrate that the plaintiff has met her burden of proof to show that there is no genuine issues of material fact remaining as to the issue of liability. However, in Richards, the police officer certifying the report was an eye witness to the accident. In this case the officer completing the police report did not personally see the accident, but rather just reported the two parties' versions of the accident.
In this case the court finds that 1) the specifications of negligence articulated in the allegations of the complaint are not proof of negligence; and 2) an admission of striking the plaintiff's vehicle without more does not resolve the issue of causation. Furthermore, summary judgment is disfavored in negligence cases such as this one.
Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is denied.