Opinion
Civil No. L-99-1245, L-99-1246, (Consolidated).
March 15, 2001.
MEMORANDUM
The plaintiff filed two civil actions against his employer, Bell Atlantic-Maryland, Inc. ("BAMI" or "Company"). In the first action (Case L-99-1245), plaintiff sought the enforcement of an arbitration award against the Company. In the second action (Case L-99-1246), plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that BAMI discriminated against him based on his race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; the Fourteenth Amendment; 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and Maryland common law.
The defendant has moved for Summary Judgment. Because the parties have fully briefed the motion, the Court will dispense with a hearing. See Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md. 1999). For the following reasons, the Court shall, by separate Order, GRANT the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and close the case.
I. Factual Background
Plaintiff Joseph Bryant, Sr., an African-American, is currently employed by BAMI as a compliance inspector. Bryant started working for the Company in 1973. From 1978 to June 1997, Bryant worked as a service technician.
In 1995, the Company implemented the Red Letter Day Policy ("Policy") which required all service technicians to be available to work overtime (and complete a certain number of jobs) at least one day a week (the "Red Letter Day"). Under the Policy, the Company posted a schedule that notified technicians of their Red Letter Days several weeks in advance. Supervisors were authorized to excuse technicians from working Red Letter Days on a case-by-case basis, for unexpected emergencies.
Plaintiff has devoted considerable time to arguing the merits of the Red Letter Day Policy and whether BAMI's stated purpose (improved customer service and more equitable overtime distribution) was the true goal of the policy. An employer is free to set its own race-neutral job requirements and performance standards. Palucki v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 879 F.2d 1568, 1571 (7th Cir. 1989). This Court will not, under the rubric of Title VII, act as a super-personnel department that re-examines a corporation's valid business decisions. Beall v. Abbott Labs., 130 F.3d 614, 620 (4th Cir. 1997).
Bryant regularly failed to follow the Red Letter Day Policy due to child care obligations. BAMI excused Bryant from working several Red Letter Days and made a variety of other accommodations to assist Bryant in making permanent child care arrangements. The Company did not extend similar accommodations to other service technicians. Despite the Company's efforts to help Bryant comply with the Policy, he failed to do so on at least 15 occasions between 1995 and 1997.
As a result of his violations of the Red Letter Day policy, Bryant was initially suspended. Bryant's continuing violation of the Policy eventually led to his termination on March 5, 1997.
Several white BAMI employees who failed to work overtime on their Red Letter Days were also disciplined. Furthermore, Bryant failed to work more Red Letter Days than any other BAMI technician.
Bryant's union, the Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO ("CWA") filed a grievance challenging Bryant's termination. On July 30, 1998, an arbitrator issued an award directing BAMI to reinstate Bryant and compensate him for lost earnings. Acting pursuant to the Award, the Company (i) gave Bryant a position with wages and benefits similar to those he enjoyed as a technician (but was not covered by the Red Letter Day Policy); and (ii) made a payment to compensate Bryant for his lost earnings.
The arbitrator found that BAMI should have exempted Bryant from the Policy because of his child care responsibilities. The union did not argue that discrimination of any sort (involving race, sex, etc.) was a factor in Bryant's termination nor did it present any evidence to that effect. Rather, the arbitration focused primarily upon the question of whether termination of Bryant was too harsh a disciplinary action.
Bryant concedes that his new job at BAMI also makes it easier for him to take care of his children.
II. Summary Judgment Standard
The Court may grant summary judgment when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); see also Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir. 1987) (recognizing that trial judges have "an affirmative obligation" to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial.). Nevertheless, in determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the Court views the facts, and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Pulliam Inv. Co. v. Cameo Properties, 810 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir. 1987).III. Discussion
A. Title VII and § 1981 Claims
Counts I, II, and V of Bryant's complaint (Case L-99-1246) allege violations of Title VII and § 1981 by BAMI. The familiar burden-shifting standard that the Supreme Court set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), applies to Bryant's Title VII claims: if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions; if the defendant provides such a reason, the plaintiff must then demonstrate that the proffered reason was a pretext. Gillins v. Berkeley Electric Cooperative, Inc., 148 F.3d 413 (4th Cir. 1998). Although the burden of production shifts, the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion throughout all the stages of proof. Burns v. AAF-McQuay, Inc., 96 F.3d 728, 731 (4th Cir. 1996).
To sustain a claim of discrimination in violation of Title VII at the summary judgment stage, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by showing: (i) that he is a member of a protected class; (ii) that the agency took some adverse employment action; and (iii) in taking that action the agency treated plaintiff differently than similarly situated persons outside the protected class. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Claims under § 1981 are analyzed under the same standard. Gairola v. Com. of Va. Dept. of General Services, 753 F.2d 1281, 1285 (4th Cir. 1985).
Bryant is unable to establish a prima facie case for any of his allegations of discrimination. Although as an African-American, he is a member of a protected class, he has not produced any evidence that BAMI made any decisions regarding him based on his race. Bryant concedes, as he must, that he consistently violated the Company's Red Letter Day Policy.
BAMI apparently valued Bryant's long term service enough to make several attempts to assist Bryant in finding a permanent solution to his child care needs. Bryant offers no explanation for why the same Company that made several accommodations in order to facilitate Bryant's continued employment would, soon thereafter, terminate him based on his race. Cf. Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 798 (4th Cir. 1991).
Bryant is unable to show that the Company treated similarly situated employees outside his class more favorably. The evidence shows that the Company also disciplined white employees who violated the Red Letter Day Policy. Furthermore, the Company made numerous accommodations for Bryant that it did not make for any other employee either inside or outside Bryant's protected class. Bryant's Title VII and § 1981 claims cannot, therefore, survive.
To support his claim that the Company treated white employees more favorably, Bryant cites the case of a former white employee of the Company caught with a prostitute in a Company owned truck who was forced to resign (instead of being fired). Bryant offers no reason why this incident is relevant to his case.
B. Equal Protection Claim
Count III of Bryant's complaint (Case L-99-1246) alleges a violation of the Equal Protection Clause by BAMI. It is well settled that the Equal Protection Clause only protects against action by state-sponsored entities. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948); Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Co., 218 F.3d 337, 341 (4th Cir. 2000). Defendant Bell Atlantic is a private sector company. Furthermore, no state action was involved in the Company's decisions to suspend or terminate Bryant. Nonetheless, Bryant argues that state and federal regulation of some aspects of BAMI's business transforms the Company's activities into state action. The Supreme Court has explicitly rejected that argument. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974). Bryant's equal protection claim cannot, therefore, survive.
C. State Common Law Claim: Wrongful Discharge
Count IV of Bryant's complaint (Case L-99-1246) alleges that BAMI wrongfully discharged Bryant in violation of the public policy of the State of Maryland.
Maryland courts have long held that a state common law public policy claim is essentially a gap-filler available only in cases not covered by Title VII or other statute. Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 561 A.2d 179, 180 (Md. 1989); Chappell v. Southern Maryland Hosp., Inc., 578 A.2d 766, 772 (Md. 1990).
It is well established that Maryland law does not recognize a claim for violations of public policy when the statute setting forth the public policy involved contains its own remedy for the violation in question. Farasat v. Paulikas, 32 F. Supp.2d 244, 249 (D.Md. 1997); Makovi, 561 A.2d at 180.
Title VII provides that it "shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
Because Title VII provides a potential remedy for the discrimination alleged by Bryant, his state public policy claim fails. Crosten v. Kamauf, 932 F. Supp. 676, 686 (D.Md. 1996).
D. Infliction of Emotional Distress Invasion of Privacy Claims
Counts VI and VII of Bryant's complaint (Case L-99-1246) allege that BAMI (i) intentionally inflicted emotional distress on Bryant, and (ii) invaded Bryant's privacy in requesting his 1997 tax returns and other supplemental information related to the arbitration award.
In McCormick v. AT T Technologies, Inc., 934 F.2d 531, 535 (4th Cir. 1991), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that various state law claims, including intentional infliction of emotional distress, are preempted by federal law (the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, § 301, 29 U.S.C.A. § 185) when resolution of the claims requires interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement to determine if the employer was authorized to act as it did.
After reviewing the claims made by Bryant, the actions taken by BAMI, and the collective bargaining agreement between BAMI and the CWA, this Court finds that Bryant's claims (in Counts VI and VII) are meritless. BAMI'S conduct was neither discriminatory nor did it "exceed the bounds of civilized society." In addition, BAMI never requested any information from Bryant that was confidential or non-public. Bryant's claims cannot, therefore, survive.
E. Enforcement of Arbitration Award
In Case L-99-1245, Bryant asks the Court to enforce the July 30, 1998 arbitration award against BAMI. Bryant seeks judicial enforcement of the arbitrator's award despite having failed to follow the contractual grievance procedure outlined in the collective bargaining agreement. An employee is generally barred from bringing suit unless and until he has utilized all of the dispute resolution procedures specified in the collective bargaining agreement. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653 (1965).
In addition, when a collective bargaining agreement specifies an arbitration procedure in which a union functions as the individual's exclusive representative (as it does in this case), the job of enforcing the arbitration award is delegated to the union as one of its duties as exclusive representative. Maddox, 379 U.S. at 653; Samples v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 755 F.2d 881, 886 (5th Cir. 1985). Bryant's right to bring a claim to enforce an arbitration award under the collective bargaining agreement is contingent upon a showing that his union breached its duty of fair representation.
The union's conduct in dealing with Bryant must be "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith" for there to be a breach of the duty of fair representation. Sutton v. Weirton Steel, 724 F.2d 406, 412 (4th Cir. 1983). See Bruce v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n., 7 F. Supp.2d 609, 615 (D.Md. 1998). Bryant has not attempted to show that his union breached its duty. To the contrary, the undisputed evidence establishes that Bryant's union ably represented him, successfully managing to have Bryant reinstated to a better position than he originally held. Bryant's claims (in Case L-99-1245) cannot, therefore, survive.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court shall, by separate Order, GRANT defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.