Opinion
No. FA05-4004906 S
March 8, 2011
The court enters the following orders regarding the motion coded 513.50: the claim of the interested person that the defendant should be sanctioned monetarily for the abuse of process included but not limited to counsel fees of Christina Bruno is denied. The claim that the defendant should be precluded from utilizing any of the documents she received pursuant to the JP Morgan Chase subpeona duces tecum is denied. The defendant is ordered to turn over all remaining JP Morgan Chase documents that she has to counsel for Christina Bruno within ten days of the date this decision is filed. The claim that the subpeona duces tecum regarding JP Morgan Chase should be quashed is denied.
The court enters the following orders regarding interested person Christina Bruno's motion coded 554. The court orders that the defendant disclose and turn over to counsel for interested person Christina Bruno all documentation that she has obtained from JP Morgan Chase subpoena. The request that any discovery or production of any documentation or information regarding Christina Bruno be barred and preluded is denied.
ORDER RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR CONTEMPT RE 111 SVR EXPENSES, POSTJUDGMENT, CODED 571
The court orders the plaintiff to pay to the defendant the following shelter expenses totaling $9,600.80.
a. $1,166 landscaping (lawn mowing, weeds, fall clean up, wood chips, etc.) to Appletree Landscaping;
b. $100 lighting repair to MCK Lighting;
c. $1,100 painting/powerwashing/repairing exterior door damages caused by plaintiff's dogs to Fran Houser;
d. $100 furnace repair to Mitchell;
e. $100 Plumbing repair;
f. $100 pest control;
g. $100 replacement of stolen garage remotes and door keys;
h. $45 electrical repair;
i. $132 alarm costs to United Alarm (5 mos.@ $26.50/mo.);
J. $325 Snow plowing to Appletree Landscaping;
k. $4,644 Heating oil to Mitchell Oil;
l. $1,688.80 for electric to Northeast Utilities ($326.91 + $407.57 + $259.04 + $299.59 + $367.08 + $28.61)
TOTAL COSTS INCURRED $9,600.80
Interest on the $9,600.80 is to run at the rate of 8 percent per annum from March 3, 2011.
The court, in accordance with the Rules of Appellate Procedure § 61-11(c) sua sponte, orders that the automatic stay be terminated.
ORDER RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ORDER RE RENT PROCEEDS POSTJUDGMENT, CODED 565
The foregoing motion, having been heard by the court, it is hereby ordered denied.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ORDER RE FURNITURE, POSTJUDGMENT, CODED 533
The value of the items of furniture in question is $417,372 less depreciation or $334,000. The court also awards interest on the $334,000 at 8 percent per annum retroactive to June 1, 2010. Interest from June 1, 2010 to March 1, 2011 amounts to $20,059.54, for a total of $354,059.54.
On July 12, 2010, this court clarified its decision and found that the value of the furniture and furnishings shown on Exhibit D that were purchased between March 2, 2005 and December 3, 2005 and were awarded to the defendant was $417,372.88. The plaintiff now seeks to claim that part of the value was for delivery fees and designer fees. The plaintiff does not have the right to relitigate the finding that this court made on July 12, 2010 that the $417,372.88 represented the value of the furniture and furnishings only.
The court, in accordance with the Rules of Appellate Procedure § 61-11(c) sua sponte, orders that the automatic stay be terminated.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR CONTEMPT RE PROPERTY STOLEN FROM 111 SVR, POSTJUDGMENT, CODED 532
The court orders the plaintiff to pay to the defendant the sum of $108,600.49 as compensation for the removal of the Creston Automation and Systems Integration equipment, security equipment, flat panel TVs, audio/visual and remotes removed from 111 Spring Valley Road, Ridgefield, CT. The court awards interest on the $108,600.49 at the rate of 8 percent per annum retroactive to June 1, 2010. Interest from June 1, 2010 to March 1, 2011 amounts to $6,521.20, for a total of $115,121.69.
The court, in accordance with the Rules of Appellate Procedure § 61-11(c) sua sponte, orders that the automatic stay be terminated.
ORDER RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR CONTEMPT RE TAX RETURNS, POSTJUDGMENT, CODED 566
The court finds that the plaintiff is in contempt of court for failure to provide to the defendant copies of his tax returns, W2s, 1099 forms and K-l forms, both for federal and state income tax returns, for the calendar years 2008 and 2009. The court enters the following orders.
1. The court grants the defendant the right to directly obtain United States federal tax returns of the plaintiff, Stephen J. Bruno, directly from the Internal Revenue Service (United States Department of Treasury).
2. The court grants the defendant the right to directly obtain state tax returns of the plaintiff, Stephen J. Bruno, directly from the relevant state department(s) of treasury.
3. The court grants the defendant the right to directly obtain social security earnings statements from the U.S. Social Security Administration of the plaintiff, Stephen J. Bruno.
4. The court grants the defendant the right to directly obtain credit reports for the plaintiff, Stephen J. Bruno, from the following three credit agencies: (1) Experian; (2) Equifax, (3) Transunion.
The court, in accordance with the Rules of Appellate Procedure § 61-11(c) sua sponte, orders that the automatic stay be terminated.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S AMENDED MOTION FOR JOINDER RE JEAN BRUNO POSTJUDGMENT DATED NOVEMBER 26, 2010 AND CODED 548 AND INTERESTED PERSON JEAN BRUNO'S OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR JOINDERThe court overrules interested person Jean Bruno's objection to motion for joinder and grants the defendant's amended motion for joinder of Jean Bruno except for the following claims, which claims are not under the jurisdiction of the family court and should therefore be filed in the civil court: the claims under paragraphs 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 28, 30, 32, 34, 35, 37, 38, 40, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 51 and 53 are stricken.
In deciding the issue of a motion for joinder, the court, in In re Devon B., 264 Conn. 572, 825 A.2d 127 (2003), stated in part as follows:
Practice Book § 9-18 provides: "The judicial authority may determine the controversy as between the parties before it, if it can do so without prejudice to the rights of others; but, if a complete determination cannot be had without the presence of other parties, the judicial authority may direct that they be brought in. If a person not a party has an interest or title which the judgment will affect, the judicial authority, on its motion, shall direct that person to be made a party."
Id., 577.
"Necessary parties . . . are those [p]ersons having an interest in the controversy, and who ought to be made parties, in order that the court may act on that rule which requires it to decide on, and finally determine the entire controversy, and do complete justice, by adjusting all the rights involved in it . . . [But if their interests are separable from those of the parties before the court, so that the court can proceed to a decree, and do complete and final justice, without affecting other persons not before the court, the latter are not indispensable parties."12 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Napoletano v. CIGNA Healthcare of Connecticut, Inc., 238 Conn. 216, 225-26 n. 10, 680 A.2d 127 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1103, 117 S.Ct. 1106, 137 L.Ed.2d 208 (1997). "A party is deemed necessary if its presence is absolutely required in order to assure a fair and equitable trial . . . Biro v. Hill, 214 Conn. 1, 6, 570 A.2d 182 (1990)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Caswell Cove Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Milford Partners, Inc., 58 Conn.App. 217, 224, 753 A.2d 361, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 922, 759 A.2d 1023 (2000). Id., 579-80.
12 In the past, there had been a distinction between "necessary" and "indispensable" parties. See Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130, 139, 15 L.Ed. 158 (1855) (defining both terms). Over time, however, this distinction has become less pronounced; see Sturman v. Socha, 191 Conn. 1, 6, 463 A.2d 527 (1983) (recognizing that misleading nature of terms "has resulted in a blurring of the distinction typically drawn between them"); and provisions of our Practice Book and General Statutes currently refer only to necessary parties. See, e.g., Practice Book §§ 9-6 and 9-24; General Statutes §§ 8-8 (f) and 12-638n. Id., 580.
"The decision whether to grant a motion for the addition of a party to pending legal proceedings rests generally in the sound discretion of the trial court." Id.
"In essence, the trial judge's discretion should be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law and in a manner to subserve and not to impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sturman v. Socha, 191 Conn. 1, 7, 463 A.2d 527 (1983). Id., 581.
"The necessary parties rules originated in equity and expressed the principle that a court of equity, once it undertook a case, would not do justice `by halves' but would seek to clean up the whole controversy." F. James G. Hazard, Civil Procedure (3d Ed. 1985) § 10.11, pp. 531-32. Id., 586
The remaining allegations in the defendant's amended motion for joinder regarding Jean Bruno in part are that the plaintiff has conspired with various third parties including Jean Bruno to liquidate and conceal assets and avoid compliance with the final judgment. The amended motion for joinder alleges that the plaintiff and his wife made more than $51,000 in cash transfers to Jean Bruno and made additional transfers to Jean Bruno totaling in excess of $43,000. All of those transfers are alleged to have been made in 2009. The defendant claims that the funds transferred to Jean Bruno are part of the funds that the plaintiff should have transferred to her under the original Memorandum of Decision dissolving the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant. Those allegations and various other allegations in the defendant's amended motion to joinder leads the court to conclude, based on the standard established in In re Devon B., that joinder of Jean Bruno should be granted. The court therefore grants the defendant's amended motion for joinder regarding Jean Bruno.
In granting the defendant's amended motion for joinder, this court has not ruled on the issue of whether any of the allegations in the amended motion for joinder are correct. That issue will be determined when the court hears the evidence on the ex parte injunctions coded 480, 494.50 and 545.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JOINDER RE CHRISTINA BRUNO, POSTJUDGMENT, CODED 534, AND INTERESTED PERSON CHRISTINA BRUNO'S OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR JOINDER, CODED 543The court overrules interested person Christina Bruno's objection to motion for joinder and grants the defendant's motion for joinder of Christina Bruno except for the following claims which are not under the jurisdiction of the family court and should therefore be filed in the civil court. The claims under paragraphs 17, 25, 33, 35, 36 and 37 are stricken in full. So much of the claim under paragraph 46 that alleges "lost wages, loss of enjoyment of life, sleepless nights, anxiety, apprehension, despair and depression" is also stricken. So much of paragraph 46 as alleges "punitive damages" is also stricken.
In deciding the issue of a motion for joinder the court, in In re Devon B., 264 Conn. 572, 825 A.2d 127 (2003), stated in part as follows:
Practice Book § 9-18 provides: "The judicial authority may determine the controversy as between the parties before it, if it can do so without prejudice to the rights of others; but, if a complete determination cannot be had without the presence of other parties, the judicial authority may direct that they be brought in. If a person not a party has an interest or title which the judgment will affect, the judicial authority, on its motion, shall direct that person to be made a party." Id., 577.
"Necessary parties . . . are those [p]ersons having an interest in the controversy, and who ought to be made parties, in order that the court may act on that rule which requires it to decide on, and finally determine the entire controversy, and do complete justice, by adjusting all the rights involved in it . . . [B]ut if their interests are separable from those of the parties before the court, so that the court can proceed to a decree, and do complete and final justice, without affecting other persons not before the court, the latter are not indispensable parties."12 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Napoletano v. CIGNA Healthcare of Connecticut Inc., 238 Conn. 216, 225-26 n. 10, 680 A.2d 127 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1103, 117 S.Ct. 1106, 137 L.Ed.2d 208 (1997). "A party is deemed necessary if its presence is absolutely required in order to assure a fair and equitable trial . . . Biro v. Hill, 214 Conn. 1, 6, 570 A.2d 182 (1990)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Caswell Cove Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Milford Partners, Inc., 58 Conn.App. 217, 224, 753 A.2d 361, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 922, 759 A.2d 1023 (2000). Id., 579-80.
12 In the past, there had been a distinction between "necessary" and "indispensable" parties. See Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130, 139, 15 L.Ed. 158 (1855) (defining both terms). Over time, however, this distinction has become less pronounced; see Sturman v. Socha, 191 Conn. 1, 6, 463 A.2d 527 (1983) (recognizing that misleading nature of terms "has resulted in a blurring of the distinction typically drawn between them"); and provisions of our Practice Book and General Statutes currently refer only to necessary parties. See, e.g., Practice Book §§ 9-6 and 9-24; General Statutes §§ 8-8(f) and 12-638n. Id., 580.
"The decision whether to grant a motion for the addition of a party to pending legal proceedings rests generally in the sound discretion of the trial court." Id.
"In essence, the trial judge's discretion should be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law and in a manner to subserve and not to impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sturman v. Socha, 191 Conn. 1, 7, 463 A.2d 527 (1983). Id., 581.
"The necessary parties rules originated in equity and expressed the principle that a court of equity, once it undertook a case, would not do justice `by halves' but would seek to clean up the whole controversy." F. James G. Hazard, Civil Procedure (3d Ed. 1985) § 10.11, pp. 531-32. Id., 586
The remaining allegations in the motion for joinder claim that the plaintiff made over $1,000,000 in cash transfers to the interested person Christina Fiorito/Bruno in four separate transactions on June 10, 2009 and June 12, 2009. They further allege that interested person Christina Fiorito/Bruno forged the defendant's signature on various documents to assist the plaintiff's theft of $202,056.51 from a secured escrow account held in the names of both the defendant and plaintiff. The various allegations in the motion for joinder lead the court to conclude based on the standard established in In Re Devon B., that joinder of Christina Fiorito/Bruno should be granted, and the court therefore grants the defendant's motion for joinder regarding Christina Fiorito/Bruno.
In granting the motion for joinder, this court has not ruled on the issue of whether any of the allegations in the motion for joinder are correct. That issue will be determined when the court hears the evidence on the ex parte injunctions coded 480, 494.50 and 545.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE JEAN BRUNO'S AMENDED MOTION TO VACATE PJRs, CODED 522
Connecticut General Statutes § 36a-43 provides in part as follows:
(a) Except as provided in section 36a-44, a financial institution shall disclose financial records pursuant to a lawful subpoena, summons, warrant or court order served upon it if the party seeking the records causes such subpoena, summons, warrant or court order or a certified copy thereof to be served upon the customer whose records are being sought, at least ten days prior to the date on which the records are to be disclosed, provided a court of competent jurisdiction, for good cause may waive service of such subpoena, summons, warrant or court order, or certified copy thereof, upon such customer . . .
(b) A customer of a financial institution shall have standing to challenge a subpoena of the customer's financial records, by filing an application or motion to quash in a court of competent jurisdiction. Upon the filing of such application or motion by the customer, and service of such application or motion upon the financial institution and the person issuing the subpoena, production of the records shall be stayed, without liability to the financial institution, until the court holds a hearing on the motion or application and an order is entered sustaining, modifying or quashing the subpoena. (Emphasis provided.)
Service upon Jean Bruno was made by a marshal on September 28, 2010 by leaving a true and attested copy at 111 Spring Valley Road, Ridgefield, Connecticut, the residence on file with the Connecticut Department of Motor Vehicles. The court does find that throughout these proceedings Jean Bruno did show her residence on file with the Connecticut Department of Motor Vehicles as 111 Spring Valley Road, Ridgefield, Connecticut. Jean Bruno on two occasions testified that while she moved to a residence in Massachusetts, she nevertheless gave her residence as a post office box. It is clear that no one can live in a post office box. In view of her attempt to show a post office box as her address, the court finds that she has not established a new residence. In Spalding v. Spalding, 171 Conn 210, 368 A2d 14 (1976), the court stated in part as follows:
[T]o constitute domicile, the residence at the place chosen for the domicile must be actual, and to the fact of residence there must be added an intention of remaining permanently; and that place is the domicile of the person in which he has voluntarily fixed his habitation not for a mere temporary or special purpose but with the present intention of making it his home, unless and until something which is uncertain or unexpected shall happen to induce him to adopt some other permanent home.
The court finds that for a period of time Jean Bruno has established 111 Spring Valley Road, Ridgefield, Connecticut with the present intention of making it her home and has failed to meet her burden of proving that something which is uncertain or unexpected has happened to induce her to adopt some other permanent home.
Under the facts of this case, the court finds that 111 Spring Valley Road, Ridgefield continued to be her residence on September 28, 2010.
Another issue is whether or not this court has the authority under § 36a-43(a) for good cause shown to waive service of the subpoena upon Jean Bruno. Clearly there is good cause shown to waive service of subpoena upon her and the court so orders.
This court is aware of the fact that these proceedings have resulted in an excessive and inordinate controversy and length of time up to the present time. There is still to be heard the trial regarding whether the ex parte injunctions coded 480, 494.50 and 545 should be made permanent.
This court believes that this order, the order making Jean Bruno a party, and whatever orders are entered regarding the ex parte injunctions and whether or not following those orders any property execution order should enter will in all probability result in further appeals. In the event new subpoenas were not ordered and on appeal it was determined that proper abode service was not made and that the court could not waive the service of subpoena after the subpoenas had been issued, then the case would simply come back for a new hearing when the defendant applied for new subpoenas since the Statute of Limitations has not expired. This court believes that a hearing on the merits is in the best interest of everyone involved. Under all the circumstances, the court is therefore ordering that the defendant apply for new bank subpoenas regarding all the financial institutions in question. The court will then determine the date upon when the financial institutions have to respond to the new subpoenas. The court will also determine whether to waive for good cause shown the service of the subpoenas upon Christina Bruno, Jean Bruno and the plaintiff. The original bank subpoenas remain in full force and effect.
Having found that proper abode service was made and having waived requirement of service of the subpoena upon Jean Bruno, the court therefore denies the motion to vacate coded 522.
The court, in accordance with the rules of Appellate Procedure § 61-11(c) sua sponte, orders that the automatic stay is terminated.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE THE PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION, DATED FEBRUARY 3, 2011, TO THE APPLICATION FOR BANK EXECUTION BY THE DEFENDANT
Many of the facts that give rise to this objection are not in dispute. The marriage between the parties was dissolved by Memorandum of Decision dated March 17, 2008. Under that Memorandum of Decision, the plaintiff was to transfer to the defendant in excess of $2,000,000 in liquid assets.
The defendant seeks to enforce some of the orders entered by this court in the Memorandum of Decision dated March 17, 2008. In her application for an execution she states that the date of judgment is March 17, 2008 and amounts to $2,239,985.79. The defendant then has a Schedule A to her application for execution in which she itemizes five separate postjudgment orders. These postjudgment orders will be considered seriatim.
The first postjudgment order that the defendant refers to was dated July 2, 2010. At a hearing held on July 2, 2010 on the defendant's motions coded 476, 477 and 478, the court found that the amount due her from the plaintiff regarding the Charles Schwab brokerage account under the Memorandum of Decision filed by this court on March 17, 2008 was $1,404,337.26 as of August 31, 2009 plus $88,941.36 interest at the statutory rate of 8 percent on the $1,404,337.26 through July 2, 2010, for a total of $1,493,278.62. This court has calculated interest at the statutory rate of 8 percent on the $1,404,337.26 from July 2, 2010 to March 1, 2011 in the amount of $74,795.40. The combined total interest to March 1, 2011 is $163,736.76, for a total of $1,568,074.02.
The defendant has taken an appeal from that July 2, 2010 order regarding the Charles Schwab brokerage account. As the result of that appeal, the order of the trial court regarding the $1,404,337.26 plus interest is stayed. This court, therefore, will not sign a property execution for that amount. The plaintiff claims that he has made payments on the July 2, 2010 order. The court finds that that claim at best is not credible. No such payments have been made.
The defendant then seeks an execution for an order that she claims was entered on December 8, 2010 regarding her motion coded 530 regarding alimony. The court finds that the correct date of the order that was entered by this court regarding the defendant's motion coded 530 was November 23, 2010, not December 8, 2010. This court found that the alimony arrearage as of November 23, 2010 was $123,983.70 and ordered interest on that amount at the rate of 8 percent per annum. Interest from November 23, 2010 to March 1, 2011 amounts to $2,689.83, for a total of $126,673.53. This court also ordered on November 23, 2010 that the plaintiff post a cash security bond for one year's alimony in the amount of $156,000 which he has failed to do. The claim of the plaintiff that he has made payments on the alimony arrearage at best is not credible. No such payments have been made.
The defendant also seeks an execution as the result of an order entered by this court on her motion coded 531. This court, on December 7, 2010, found that the plaintiff was in contempt and ordered that the prior requirement for the defendant to transfer to the plaintiff half of her 401k plan plus half of her pension plan was eliminated. This court further found that the amount at the time of dissolution in her 401k plan was $330,188.70 and the amount in her pension plan at the time of dissolution was $71,754.07. This court further found that the amount in the plaintiff's Schwab IRA was $1,042,886. In deducting the defendant's 401k plan and pension plan from the plaintiff's Schwab IRA that left a balance of $640,944, of which the defendant was entitled to one-half or $320,472. This court also ordered that the $320,472 amount be added to the existing capias. This court ordered that interest on the $320,472 run at the rate of 8 percent per annum from March 17, 2008. The interest on the $320,472 at the rate of 8 percent per annum from March 17, 2008 to March 1, 2011 amounts to $75,929.44, for a total of $396,401.44. Once again, the claim of the plaintiff that he has made payment on that liability at best is not credible. No such payments have been made.
The defendant also seeks an execution on an order entered by this court on December 8, 2010 on her motion coded 529. This court awarded to the defendant her attorneys fee bill in the amount of $4,282 as the result of the plaintiff's fraud in forging signatures plus interest in the amount of $9,300 for a total of $13,582. The interest was for the period of March 23, 2010 to October 18, 2010. Once again, the claim of the plaintiff that he has made any payment on that debt is best characterized as not being credible. No such payments have been made.
Finally, the defendant seeks a property execution regarding her motion coded 541 which this court heard on December 8, 2010. This court again found the plaintiff in contempt and ordered him to pay to the defendant $12,500 plus interest at the rate of 8 percent per annum from September 1, 2009 to December 8, 2010. This court has calculated the interest on the $12,500 at the rate of 8 percent per annum from September 1, 2009 to March 1, 2011 to be in the amount of $1,498.78, for a total of $13,998.78. Once again, the claim of the plaintiff's that he has made any payment on that debt can best be classified as being factually inaccurate. No such payments have been made.
This court orders that insofar as the motions coded 530, 531, 529, and 541 that separate executions be filed by the defendant for the amounts found to be due on each of those motions. In each instance the applications for execution should show as the date of judgment either November 23, 2010, December 7, 2010 or December 8, 2010. The amount of the judgment should be the amount shown in this Memorandum of Decision. Block 5 in the application for execution should be filled out showing the total amount unpaid.
The court, in accordance with the Rules of Appellate Procedure § 61-11(c) sua sponte, orders that the automatic stay be terminated.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTIONS FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER AND/OR TO QUASH SUBPOENAS DUCES TECUM IN REGARD TO FINANCIAL RECORDS AND ACCOUNTS FILED BY CHRISTINA BRUNO AND CODED 504-513Connecticut General Statutes § 36a-43 provides in part as follows:
(a) Except as provided in section 36a-44, a financial institution shall disclose financial records pursuant to a lawful subpoena, summons, warrant or court order served upon it if the party seeking the records causes such subpoena, summons, warrant or court order or a certified copy thereof to be served upon the customer whose records are being sought, at least ten days prior to the date on which the records are to be disclosed, provided a court of competent jurisdiction, for good cause, may waive service of such subpoena, summons, warrant or court order, or certified copy thereof, upon such customer . . .
CT Page 6764
(b) A customer of a financial institution shall have standing to challenge a subpoena of the customer's financial records, by filing an application or motion to quash in a court of competent jurisdiction. Upon the filing of such application or motion by the customer, and service of such application or motion upon the financial institution and the person issuing the subpoena, production of the records shall be stayed, without liability to the financial institution, until the court holds a hearing on the motion or application and an order is entered sustaining, modifying or quashing the subpoena. (Emphasis provided.)
Service upon Christina Bruno was made by a marshal on September 28, 2010 by leaving a true and attested copy at 111 Spring Valley Road, Ridgefield, Connecticut, the residence on file with the Connecticut Department of Motor Vehicles. The court does find that throughout these proceedings Christina Bruno did show her residence on file with the Connecticut Department of Motor Vehicles as 111 Spring Valley Road, Ridgefield, Connecticut. Christina Bruno never testified in the hearing on her motion for protective order and/or quash subpoena duces tecum. As a matter of fact, she has never appeared in court during all of the proceedings this court has held regarding the defendant's three ex parte injunctions and all of the motions that have been filed therein. Interestingly enough, her attorney has represented to the court that he even does not know where she resides. The court does not question the integrity of her attorney but is unable to make a factual finding in accordance with that representation. At the present time, the plaintiff's attorney represents to the court that the address of the plaintiff is unknown. The mother of the plaintiff has testified that she does not know where the plaintiff resides or his current wife or the plaintiff's child. Interestingly enough, the plaintiff's mother paid for the plaintiff to move his furniture through the use of a credit card but supposedly is unable to find out where the furniture movers moved the plaintiff to. In Spalding v. Spalding, 171 Conn 210, 368 A2d 14 (1976), the court stated in part as follows:
[T]o constitute domicile, the residence at the place chosen for the domicile must be actual, and to the fact of residence there must be added an intention of remaining permanently; and that place is the domicile of the person in which he has voluntarily fixed his habitation not for a mere temporary or special purpose but with the present intention of making it his home, unless and until something which is uncertain or unexpected shall happen to induce him to adopt some other permanent home.
The court finds that for a period of time, Christina Bruno has established 111 Spring Valley Road, Ridgefield, Connecticut with the present intention of making it her home. The issue then is whether or not Christina Bruno has met her burden of proving that something which is uncertain or unexpected has happened to induce her to adopt some other permanent home. All that we know in that regard is that Christina Bruno stopped living at 111 Spring Valley Road, Ridgefield, Connecticut prior to September 28, 2010. There is no evidence as to whether or not she has adopted some other permanent home. There is no evidence as to whether or not since leaving 111 Spring Valley Road, she has been on continual vacation, has been visiting friends or relatives, or what she has been doing and where she has been doing it. There is no evidence as to whether or not wherever she has been has been for a mere temporary or special purpose. Under those circumstances, the court finds that 111 Spring Valley Road continued to be her residence even after she left that residence.
Another issue is whether or not this court has the authority under § 36a-43(a) for good cause shown to waive service of the subpoena upon Christina Bruno. Her attorney argues that that waiver of service has to be made before the attempted service is made upon her. Section 36a-43(a) is not clear as to when the court has the authority to waive the service of subpoena upon the bank customer. Clearly there is good cause shown to waive service of subpoena upon her and the court so orders.
This court is aware of the fact that these proceedings have resulted in an excessive and inordinate controversy and length of time up to the present time. There is still to be heard the trial regarding whether the ex parte injunctions coded 480, 494.50 and 545 should be made permanent. This court believes that this order, the order making Christina Bruno a party, and whatever orders are entered regarding the ex parte injunctions and whether or not following those orders any property execution order should enter will in all probability result in further appeals. In the event new subpoenas were not ordered and on appeal it was determined that proper abode service was not made and that the court could not waive the service of subpoena after the subpoenas had been issued, then the case would simply come back for a new hearing when the defendant applied for new subpoenas since the Statute of Limitations has not expired. Counsel for Christina Bruno represented that she is anxious to have a hearing on the merits. This court believes that a hearing on the merits is in the best interest of everyone involved. Under all the circumstances, the court is therefore ordering that the defendant apply for new bank subpoenas regarding all the financial institutions in question. The court will then determine the date upon when the financial institutions have to respond to the new subpoenas. The court will also determine whether to waive for good cause shown the service of the subpoena upon Christina Bruno, Jean Bruno and the plaintiff. The original bank subpoenas remain in full force and effect.
Having found that proper abode service was made and having waived requirement of service of the subpoena upon Christina Bruno, the court therefore denies all of the motions of Christina Bruno for protective order and/or quash subpoenas coded 504-513.
Each financial institution is therefore ordered to appear in court on March 29, 2011 at 9:30 a.m. with the subpoenaed documents and somebody who can testify as to whether the documents were made in the regular course of any business, and that it was the regular course of the business to make the writing or record at the time of the act, transaction, occurrence or event or within a reasonable time thereafter.
The court, in accordance with the rules of Appellate Procedure § 61-11(c) sua sponte, orders that the automatic stay is terminated.