Opinion
No. 19-cv-320 (UNA)
04-09-2019
THOMAS D. BROWN, SR., Plaintiff, v. U.S. BLUE CROSS/BLUE SHIELD, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The plaintiff retired from federal government service in 2004 and suffers from several medical conditions. See ECF No. 4 (Am. Compl.) ¶¶ 4, 6-7, 19. He purports to raise a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) against Blue Cross Blue Shield, through which he has or had health insurance. The Court construes the plaintiff's complaint liberally as one under Title II of the ADA, which provides that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Even if the plaintiff is a "qualified person with a disability" under 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2), his ADA claim still fails.
Because the plaintiff does not allege he was ever an employee of Blue Cross Blue Shield, the Court dismisses any claim he purports to bring under Title I of the ADA, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and the Family Medical Leave Act. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 8.
The plaintiff has failed to state a claim because the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Blue Cross Blue Shield is a "public entity" as that term is defined:
The term "public entity" means -
(A) Any State or local government;
(B) any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government; and
(C) the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any commuter authority (as defined in section 24102(4) 1 of title 49).
42 U.S.C. § 12131(1). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. See Anderson v. Usher, No. 12-7107, 2013 WL 1187399, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 4, 2013) (per curiam) (unpublished) (holding that "[t]he district court correctly dismissed appellant's claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act . . . for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted" because "the defendants named in the complaint [we]re individual persons" and Title II of the ADA "applies only to a 'public entity'"); Edison v. Douberly, 604 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2010) (affirming district court's conclusion that private prison management corporation operating Florida state prison was not a "public entity" for purposes of Title II of the ADA); Lee v. Corr. Corp. of Am./Corr. Treatment Facility, 61 F. Supp. 3d 139, 143 (D.D.C. 2014); York v. Forest View Psychiatric Hosp., No. 1:10-CV-28, 2011 WL 1790134, at *1 (W.D. Mich. May 11, 2011); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (requiring the court to dismiss a case filed in forma pauperis "at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted"). The plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted, and his motion for CM/ECF password will be denied as moot.
An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is issued separately.
/s/_________
United States District Judge April 9, 2019