Opinion
No. 05-09-01287-CR
Opinion Filed February 8, 2011. DO NOT PUBLISH.
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 1 Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F08-72924-YH.
Before Justices RICHTER, FRANCIS, and MYERS.
OPINION
Appellant, Quintesta Gwen Brown, was convicted of injury to a child and sentenced to eighteen years in prison. In five issues, appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, the trial court erred in admitting lay opinion testimony, and the court failed to admonish appellant regarding the immigration consequences of her no contest plea. We affirm.
Background
On August 25, 2008, William Griffith, a Dallas Police Department detective assigned to the Child Abuse Unit, learned that Garland "Gudda" Townsend, the father of the complainant in this case, C.S., had brought the child to a hospital for treatment for "immersion burns." Because the suspected child abuse occurred in the City of Dallas, Townsend was brought to the Dallas Police Department for questioning. Griffith testified that police were unable to question Townsend because he was "extremely upset" over his daughter's medical condition and being detained by the police, so the decision was made to release Townsend and interview him later. Later that day, the detective learned that Townsend had gone back to the apartment he shared with appellant and damaged appellant's vehicle and "wrecked" the apartment after telling neighbors that appellant "had burned his daughter." At trial, Townsend admitted that he "lost [his] cool" when he was told at the hospital that C.S. had been burned, and that he "trashed" appellant's car and apartment. Griffith subsequently interviewed Townsend — an admitted drug user with a criminal history — and ruled him out as a suspect. During the investigation, Griffith also discovered that Townsend had several children with various women but he did not take care of them, and he always left child rearing duties to "[t]he person he's with" or family members. Townsend testified that he believed it was "the woman's job to raise the child," and he did not bathe, dress, feed, or take care of C.S. Townsend blamed appellant for causing the burns because she was the only person who cared for the child. On the same day that C.S. was brought the hospital, Griffith also interviewed appellant, who was not the mother of C.S. but had been caring for the child while appellant dated Townsend. The detective explained that appellant became a suspect when he learned that C.S. had been staying at appellant's apartment, and that appellant fed, bathed and took care of all the child's basic needs. The detective testified that appellant was not under arrest during the interview, and was free to leave. Appellant wrote out a statement that was later admitted into evidence during the trial. In her statement, appellant said that she woke up on the morning of August 24, 2008, a Sunday, and changed the child's diaper and gave her some food. Later, she bathed and dressed the child. Her cousin, Kyra, came over and they walked to the mail box and returned to the apartment. Townsend and his friends were in the living room, and her cousin then took appellant's two daughters to Oak Cliff. Later, at 7:30 p.m., Townsend left the apartment and went to a party. Appellant then watched television. Her daughters returned to the apartment between 8:15 to 8:20 p.m. Appellant changed the child's diaper and laid her back down. Appellant fell asleep but was awakened when Townsend returned home. Appellant went back to sleep but woke up at "about" 3:30 a.m. because C.S. was crying. Appellant changed her diaper, gave her some water, and then woke up Townsend and told him C.S. "don't look good." Appellant also said in her statement that C.S. looked "swollen but she stopped crying and went back to sleep," so Townsend said "ok and he went back to sleep." At 5:40 a.m. appellant woke up, and she and her daughters got dressed. Before leaving the apartment with her daughters, she again told Townsend, according to her statement, that C.S. was "not feeling good and she" was "sick." Appellant went to work and, later that day, was told by her mother that Townsend said appellant "hurt" C.S. Townsend also told appellant's mother that he was going to "kill" appellant. After the interview with Griffith, appellant went home. On the same day that he interviewed appellant, Griffith also spoke to Dr. Matthew Cox, the physician that examined C.S. at the hospital, who said that C.S.'s injuries reflected a "classic forced immersion burn." On August 26, Griffith observed a forensic interview of appellant's two daughters. The children stated that they saw appellant give the child a bath on the morning of August 24, 2008, that they saw appellant force C.S. to stay in the water, and that C.S. was crying. On August 27, 2008, Griffith again interviewed appellant. Because by this point the detective suspected that appellant had caused C.S.'s injuries, appellant was advised of her Miranda rights. After being advised of those rights, she wrote out a second statement. This statement was also admitted into evidence during the trial. See Footnote In her second written statement, appellant stated that after she fed C.S., the child fell down on the floor and began crying. Appellant put her in the bathtub while she was still crying and washed her hair. Appellant took the child out of the water and wrapped her in a towel and took her to the bedroom, where she dressed the child. C.S. was still crying. Townsend returned to the apartment with some friends and started yelling at C.S. because she would not stop crying. Appellant told him C.S. had been "whining" all day and was not feeling well. Townsend said the child was "spoiled." Later that day, Townsend asked appellant to accompany him to a party but appellant stayed at the apartment because her back was hurting. Appellant took some medicine for her back and watched television, "then started dozing back off to sleep." By this time, according to appellant, Kyra and appellant's two daughters had left the apartment, and appellant was alone with C.S. About ten to fifteen minutes after Townsend left the apartment, according to the statement, C.S. woke up. As appellant changed the child's diaper, she noticed that C.S. "was red and swollen all over her coochi." Appellant removed the child's pants and noticed that her legs were also "red and swollen." Then C.S. started crying and appellant "blanked out." Appellant remembered that her "head started spinning" after she laid the child down. Appellant put some ointment on C.S's "coochi" and then "got scared" because she could not figure out what had happened. Appellant returned a telephone call from her aunt, who yelled and cursed at appellant. See Footnote Appellant put some "aloe vera gel" on C.S.'s legs and feet and laid her back down. By this point appellant's "head was spinning" because her daughters, who had returned to the apartment, kept asking her "what happened to [C.S.]" and "who did it." Appellant recalled that she eventually fell sleep and was awakened when Townsend came back to the apartment. Townsend told her to sleep in the middle of the bed next to C.S. Appellant told Townsend they "need[ed] to take [C.S.] to the doctor" because the child was "warm" and looked "swollen and redder than usual." They fell asleep and at "about 3:30 [C.S.] woke up screaming [at] the top of her lungs." When appellant "jump[ed] up" and tried to calm the child, she noticed C.S.'s feet and legs "were huge." Appellant told Townsend that something was "wrong" with the child, but he "didn't do anything and went back to sleep." According to her statement, appellant woke up at 5:40 a.m. on August 25, 2008 feeling scared, tired, and confused. Before she went to work, appellant told Townsend that they needed to take C.S. to the doctor because she was "sick" and "something is wrong with her," but Townsend "just rolled over and put [C.S.] under his arm." Appellant then left the apartment with her daughters and, while she was at work, appellant began receiving telephone calls. During one of those calls, Townsend told appellant that C.S. "got burned" and the police were investigating. Appellant told Townsend that she was "busy" and would "call him back." Appellant recalled, "[T]he phone kept ringing and people started asking me questions[.] I couldn't think and I black out again." Appellant's mother arrived and told her that Townsend said she had "burned his baby." Appellant's statement then recounts the subsequent police search of her apartment as well the reaction of Townsend and her family to the investigation, and concludes as follows:When I knew for sure it was all my fault the evidence was in I burned [C.S.] I swear I did not mean too [sic] I love [C.S.] I have been thinking about everything not sleeping, not really eating, just how to face [C.S.], [Townsend], all of his family and my family but mostly my own girls I really didn't think it was my fault. And I did not hold [C.S.] under the water at all I bathe her as I always did I don't know what happen[ed] this time. I'm sorry I didn't mean to do it I didn't call the police because I was scared I was gonna get arrested.After writing the second statement, appellant was released but told that a warrant would be issued for her arrest. She later voluntarily surrendered to the police. Griffith testified that appellant's statement that she "blanked out" after C.S. started crying pinpointed the time when appellant "realized that she really hurt [C.S.]" In his opinion as a police investigator, the statement showed appellant's "guilty conscience." See Footnote Griffith also believed the frequent references in appellant's statement that she was scared showed that she was "worried about the consequences of what's going to happen, the police, her family, everybody, especially [Townsend]." Griffith noted that his conclusion that appellant was the suspect in this offense relied, among other information, on Dr. Cox's opinion that C.S. had suffered a "classic immersion burn," the forensic interview of appellant's daughters, and appellant's acknowledgment that she was the only person who bathed C.S. The detective believed the injury was probably inflicted on August 24, 2008, between 11:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m., during a time when appellant was alone with C.S. Griffith did not believe it could have occurred between 6:00 and 8:00 a.m. on August 25, when Townsend was alone with C.S., because appellant's statements showed C.S.'s symptoms actually began to occur at around 8:00 p.m. on day before, when appellant applied the aloe vera gel. Dr. Gary Perdue, the staff physician in the Burn Services Unit at Parkland Memorial Hospital and an expert in burn surgery and treatment, examined C.S. after she was brought to the hospital's burn unit. Dr. Perdue stated that the child suffered scald burns to her genitalia, buttocks, feet, thighs, and legs. C.S. had "very uniform" scald burns and third degree burns to her feet and legs. Some of the burns required skin grafting procedures. It appeared the child had been sitting or squatting in a tub with her feet on the bottom of the tub, her legs bent forward at the ankles, her legs together, and her bottom in the water. Dr. Perdue also found water lines on the child's body that left a "sharp demarcation between burned and unburned skin," which indicated the burns were not accidental. The physician surmised the water was already hot when the child was placed in the water. Dr. Perdue believed swelling would have begun very soon after the third degree burns occurred, and blistering would have started two to four hours later. The physician stated that, if the child had been burned at 11:00 a.m. on August 24, he would have expected to see blistering "by somewhere between 1:00 and 3:00 o'clock" on that same day. The child would have been in severe pain but could have slept, even without medication, until 8 a.m. on August 25, 2008. Dr. Perdue concluded the offense "probably happened a day prior to" C.S. receiving medical treatment, and it could have occurred at any point within that time frame, "from just before to earlier." Dr. Harold Wagner, a former emergency trauma physician, testified for the defense that he examined C.S.'s medical records and copies of the photographs of her injuries. See Footnote By the time of trial, Dr. Wagner had left emergency medicine and had been practicing geriatric medicine for approximately four years. He had additional training in burn care and treated burn patients, including children, but he was not board certified in burn treatment and had never performed skin grafts. According to Dr. Wagner, within five to ten minutes of being burned, a person normally starts to accumulate a significant amount of fluid and blistering. This process is quicker and more painful in a child. Dr. Wagner was shown photographs of C.S.'s burns and stated that those injuries would have appeared in less than thirty minutes and, more likely, in five minutes or less. He also said the pain would have been severe and the child would have been unable to sleep without medication, and that regular Tylenol would not have relieved the pain. The child also would have been "[c]rying in distress" and no one could have been able to sleep around the child. Based on the records indicating that C.S. was brought to the hospital at 8:25 a.m. on August 25, 2008, Dr. Wagner testified that the burning incident could not have occurred at around 11:00 a.m. or 7:30 p.m. on August 24, when C.S. was alone with appellant, and it was "[c]ompletely and totally impossible" for the burns to have occurred on the day before C.S. was brought to the hospital. The doctor believed, based on his examination of the photographs of C.S.'s injuries, that her burns occurred less than ninety minutes before she was brought to the hospital. Appellant testified that she was the primary caretaker for C.S., but Townsend cared for the child when appellant was at work. At the time of the offense, C.S. had been staying at appellant's apartment for about three weeks. Appellant testified she wrote out the first statement by herself and no one told her what to say. But before making the second statement, Griffith placed photographs of a burned child See Footnote in front of appellant and told her how he believed the offense in this case was committed. Appellant stated that portions of her second written statement were not true, and that she was simply repeating what Griffith told her regarding how the offense was committed. Appellant further testified that her statement that the child's legs were swollen at 3:30 a.m. was not true, and she made that statement only because Griffith told her he was an "expert in burns" and that was how the child's burns would have occurred. Appellant testified that she was simply describing the photographs that were shown to her, and she was not describing what she had actually seen at her apartment. Appellant also explained that, when she wrote that C.S.'s "coochi" was "red and swollen," she actually meant the child's "coochi was always red and swollen," and that this redness and swelling were probably caused by eczema. Appellant denied that she ever placed C.S. into hot water, and she insisted the water was only warm when she gave the child a bath on the morning of August 24, 2008, at about 11:00 a.m. Appellant also stated that the child was not swollen when she left the apartment and went to work on the morning of August 25, 2008.
Issues Withdrawal of No Contest Plea
Before discussing appellant's arguments regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, we must first decide the proper standard of review to be applied in this case in light of appellant's "no contest" plea. The standard of review of the evidence hinges on whether, as alleged by appellant, she affirmatively withdrew her no contest plea; therefore, we will address that issue first. According to the record, appellant waived her right to a jury trial and entered a "no contest" plea. At the time the no contest plea was entered, the trial court stated: Court will approve the waiver of jury. The way that this happens, Ms. Brown, is you will enter a plea of no contest. As far as I'm concerned, when you say, `No contest,' that goes into my head as not guilty. The State has the full burden of proving your case beyond a reasonable doubt before they will be entitled to any kind of conviction. If they prove their case beyond a reasonable doubt, then that gives me an option of either deferring a finding of guilt and placing you on probation, or I can find you guilty and send you to prison. The court also said, "Once you say, `No contest,' that is not an admission of guilt. There is no admission of guilt in this case. As I said, they have to prove it before they're entitled to it." During the final arguments in this case, the defense attorney argued: And there is no evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. So, we are asking you to find her not guilty because the State has not proven their case beyond a reasonable doubt, and not guilty because she just didn't do it. After listening to closing arguments, the trial court told appellant that, "[b]ased on the evidence I've heard, I find beyond a reasonable doubt that you are guilty as charged. . . of injury to a child by burning." Appellant argues the record shows his counsel affirmatively attempted to withdraw the no contest plea. If a guilty-pleading defendant decides mid-trial he wants to compel the trial court to evaluate the evidence under the reasonable doubt standard, he must seek to withdraw the guilty plea. McGill v. State, 200 S.W.3d 325, 331 (Tex. App. — Dallas 2006, no pet.). If he fails to do so, he is precluded from having an appellate court review the evidence against him under the traditional sufficiency analysis. Id. The trial court, however, is not required to affirmatively withdraw a defendant's guilty plea before choosing to evaluate the State's evidence under a reasonable doubt standard. Id. at 330. The court may simply proceed as though it has withdrawn the guilty plea and entered a not guilty plea in its place. Id. There is no duty placed upon the trial court to inform the parties of this change. Id. Based on the record in this case, we agree that appellant withdrew her no contest plea. See Valadez v. State, No. 05-09-01238-CR, 2010 WL 4352718, at *1 (Tex. App. — Dallas Nov. 4, 2010, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (concluding appellant withdrew his no contest plea based on appellant's statements during closing argument and State's agreement that those statements could be construed as affirmative act to withdraw plea). Thus, we will conduct a traditional sufficiency review of the evidence. Id. Having reached this conclusion, we need not determine whether the evidence is insufficient under article 1.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 1.15 (West 2005) (upon entering a plea, the State must provide sufficient evidence to support the plea).Sufficiency of the Evidence
Turning to appellant's first three issues, she argues (1) the evidence is factually insufficient to support the conviction because the State failed to prove she was the person who caused serious bodily injury to the complainant, and that the evidence is (2) legally insufficient and (3) factually insufficient to support the conviction because the State failed to prove appellant "intentionally or knowingly" caused serious bodily injury to the complainant. The court of criminal appeals' recent decision in Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.), overruled Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), and concluded the Jackson v. Virginia standard is the only standard a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 894-95. Under that standard, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899-900; Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We defer to the jury's determinations of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given their testimony because the jury is the sole judge of those matters. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899-900; Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 517-18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). In order to prove appellant committed the offense of injury to a child, the State had to prove she intentionally or knowingly caused serious bodily injury to C.S. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.04(a)(1) (West 2003). Injury to a child is a result-oriented crime. See id. § 22.04(a)(1); Schultz v. State, 923 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Beggs v. State, 597 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Haggins v. State, 785 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Section 22.04 focuses on the result of a suspect's conduct which means that, under the statute, a person acts intentionally when it is her conscious objective or desire to cause serious bodily injury to a child, and a person acts knowingly when she is aware that her conduct is reasonably certain to cause serious bodily injury to a child. Beggs, 597 S.W.2d at 377; see Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 6.03 (West 2003). Mental culpability is of such a nature that it generally must be inferred from the circumstances under which a prohibited act or omission occurs. Hernandez v. State, 819 S.W.2d 806, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). In arguing there is insufficient evidence to support the verdict, appellant calls our attention to, among other things, comments made by the trial court. After listening to the evidence, the trial court had ruled that appellant caused serious bodily injury to C.S., and stated, "I don't think either one of them had any motive to intentionally say, `I think I'm going to run hot water and burn the child.'" Later, during the punishment hearing, the trial court stated: Before we begin, let me address a point. Monday a week ago when I made statements I made and said it boils down to access and found that the access was by [appellant], I made the comment about intentional. What I meant by intentional is I do not believe that [appellant] got up that morning with the thought, `I'm going to hurt that baby today. I am mad at [Townsend]. I'm going to hurt his baby to get back at him.' I don't think that when he went to the party, she said, `Oh, if it weren't for his baby, I could go to the party. I'm going to get him by hurting that baby.' We both know, or all lawyers know that intent can be formed in an instant. So I do think this was an intentional burning. I don't think it was premeditated, and my choice of words probably should have been premeditated. I do not believe that even when she did this, she actually wanted to burn that baby, but the act itself, I believe, based on what I heard, I do believe she had to hold that baby in that water for a sufficient time for that baby to have received these burns. So it is an intentional act, but I don't think it was preplanned to injure the baby. Appellant argues these comments indicate the trial court must have concluded that appellant did not intentionally cause C.S.'s injuries, but the above comments were made toward the end of the punishment hearing, when the trial court was explaining why it would not give probation to appellant. Shortly before sentencing appellant to eighteen years in prison, the court indicated to appellant that, at the very least, she acted knowingly in committing the offense: Whether it lasted for an instant or a minute or two minutes, I don't know. No one but you knows. But at that moment in time when that baby touched that water, she had to scream, and you should have pulled her out of that water and you didn't. As a result of not pulling her out of the water, as a result of your conscious decision to hold her in that water, for whatever reason, this baby is scarred for life and she will never be okay. And I cannot give somebody probation for that kind of act. I have found you guilty. And [defense counsel] is right, I could reverse my finding and put you on probation, but I'm not going to do it. We conclude that the evidence in this case is sufficient to support the verdict. Gilbert King, the Mesquite police investigator who photographed C.S.'s injuries, testified that he had never seen burns as severe as C.S.'s. Dr. Perdue stated that the child's second and third degree burn injuries were not accidentally inflicted or the result of carelessness. He believed that the water was already hot when the child was placed in it. According to Dr. Perdue, C.S.'s severe burn injuries indicated she was placed into hot water and held in a sitting or squatting position, which exposed her genitalia, buttocks, legs and feet to the scalding water. Some of the scalding burns were so severe that they required skin grafts. The doctor's testimony also supported the testimony of the lead detective, Griffith, that only appellant, C.S.'s primary caregiver, could have injured the child. Medical evidence of the kind presented here, coupled with the other circumstantial evidence presented by the State, including the forensic interview of appellant's daughters, is sufficient for a trier of fact to infer appellant's intent to cause serious bodily injury. See Morales v. State, 828 S.W.2d 261, 263 (Tex. App. — Amarillo 1992), aff'd, 853 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Moore v. State, 708 S.W.2d 484, 486-88 (Tex. App. — Dallas 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 749 S.W.2d 54 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988), overruled on other grounds by Awadelkariem v. State, 974 S.W.2d 721, 724 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Dr. Wagner offered contradictory testimony regarding nature and timing of C.S.'s injuries, but the trier of fact is free to believe some, all or none of the testimony of a witness, and its decision is not undermined merely because it resolved conflicting views of the evidence in the State's favor. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899-900; Laster, 275 S.W.3d at 517-18. In addition, appellant tries to minimize the incriminating portions of her second statement by directing our attention to her trial testimony that the statement was not true. She also calls our attention to the audio recording of the second interview, which shows that, before taking the statement, Griffith placed photographs of C.S. in front of her and told her, later in the interview, that he had reviewed the medical evidence, that "we know what happened," and "I know it all." But after listening to the audio recording, the trial court concluded it was "totally inconsistent with [appellant's] memory of that conversation." See Footnote As the trier of fact in this case, and therefore the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence, the trial court was free to conclude appellant's written statement was more accurate and reliable than her trial testimony, and that she intended to cause C.S. serious bodily injury. There was also conflicting evidence as to whether Townsend was a caregiver to C.S., but the trier of fact was likewise free to resolve this evidentiary inconsistency in the State's favor. Viewing the evidence in this case under the appropriate standard, we conclude it is sufficient to support the verdict. Issues one, two, and three are overruled.Griffith's Testimony
In her fourth issue, appellant argues the trial court erred by admitting testimony from Detective Griffith that appellant showed signs of a "guilty conscience" during the police interrogation. During the direct examination of Griffith, the prosecutor asked:Q. [PROSECUTOR]: And about being — the black out or blanking out, the nervousness. Again, does that signal something to you as an investigator?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. That calls for speculation.
THE COURT: Overruled.
A. [GRIFFITH]: It shows to me a guilty conscience about what she had done to [C.S.].We review a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence under an abuse of discretion standard, and we should not reverse a trial court's ruling unless it falls outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. See Burden v. State, 55 S.W.3d 608, 615 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); see also Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Rule of evidence 701 states that a non-expert "witness'[s] testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue." Tex. R. Evid. 701. Whether a witness's opinion meets the fundamental requirements of the rule is within the trial court's discretion, and a decision regarding admissibility should be overturned only if the court abuses its discretion. Fairow v. State, 943 S.W.2d 895, 901 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). A witness's opinion will satisfy the personal knowledge requirement if it is an interpretation of the witness's objective perception of events. Id . at 899 . Moreover, if the record supports the trial court's decision to admit or exclude an opinion under rule 701, there is no abuse, and the appellate court must defer to that decision. See Osbourn v. State, 92 S.W.3d 531, 538 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Powell v. State, 63 S.W.3d 435, 438 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Appellant argues Griffith's answer was impermissible and speculative lay opinion testimony. But taking into account that Griffith was asked what appellant's "blacking" or "blanking" comment meant to him as an investigator, and not what appellant was thinking when she said that she had "blanked" or "blacked" out, we do not believe Griffith's disputed testimony was speculative opinion, but it went instead to his rationally based perception of the interrogation, which provided a clearer understanding of the facts in issue. And even if we were to assume the trial court erred in admitting the complained-of testimony, the error, if any, was harmless because it was cumulative of appellant's statements, e.g., "I knew for sure that it was all my fault," "I burned [C.S.]," and "I didn't call the police because I was scared I was gonna [sic] get arrested," that indicated she felt remorse for what happened. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b) (any error not affecting substantial rights must be disregarded); Sohail v. State, 264 S.W.3d 251, 262 (Tex. App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. ref'd) (substantial rights are only affected when the error has a significant and injurious effect on the jury). Issue four is overruled.