Opinion
C/A No. 2:18-2312-RBH-JDA
09-27-2018
Leonard C. Brown #1193154, Plaintiff, v. The State of South Carolina, R. Markley Dennis, Jr., Benjamin Chad Simpson, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Leonard C. Brown ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Defendants violated his constitutional rights. Plaintiff is a pre-trial detainee incarcerated at the Al Cannon Detention Center in Charleston, South Carolina, and he files this action in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The Complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
BACKGROUND
According to the Complaint, "Plaintiff was accused of a capital crime and snatched away from his wife and kids." [Doc. 1-2 at 9.] The Court takes judicial notice, see Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (courts "may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record"); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) ("We note that 'the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'") (alteration omitted), that Plaintiff has been charged with murder at case number 2016A1010204001, which remains pending against him in the Charleston County Court of General Sessions. See Charleston County Ninth Judicial Circuit Public Index https://jcmsweb.charlestoncounty.org/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search case # 2016A1010204001) (last visited Sept. 25, 2018). A true bill indictment was issued on February 6, 2017, at indictment number 2017GS1000934. Id.
The facts included in this Background section are taken directly from the Complaint. [Doc. 1-2.]
Plaintiff alleges that in October 2017, Judge Dennis denied Plaintiff's right to have a reasonable bail in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. [Doc. 1-2 at 4.] Judge Dennis never stated a valid reason for his conclusion. [Id.] Plaintiff filed a motion for a speedy trial and appeared before Judge Dennis on November 3, 2017, regarding his motion. [Id.] Judge Dennis ordered the State to call Plaintiff's case to trial in the first quarter of 2018 and to have a status conference one month before the start of his trial. [Id.]
Plaintiff then filed a motion to dismiss the criminal case for failure to prosecute after the State failed to comply with Judge Dennis's Order on the speedy trial motion. [Id. at 5.] Judge Dennis conducted a hearing on the motion to dismiss on April 13, 2018, but "declared that he doesn't have to follow his orders," and denied Plaintiff's motion. [Id.] Judge Dennis used an "intimidating tone and bias language" under the color of his authority against Plaintiff. [Id.] Judge Dennis stated he did not think Plaintiff was "that smart," that Plaintiff was "going to be like a deer caught in head lights at trial," and that "if it was to him he would make sure [Plaintiff] doesn't get out of jail until he was (70) seventy years old." [Id.] Plaintiff contends that Judge Dennis was attempting to make Plaintiff look incompetent for trying to assert his constitutional rights. [Id.]
Judge Dennis ordered the solicitor to offer Plaintiff a plea deal since the State had not called Plaintiff's case to trial, to which the State agreed. [Id.] Plaintiff again requested that Judge Dennis reduce his bail due to the change of circumstances in his case. [Id. at 6.] Plaintiff informed Judge Dennis that "he has no accuser in his case and the affiant officer was found giving several false misleading statements." [Id.] Plaintiff also asserted that the state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff. [Id.]
Plaintiff has been incarcerated for over two years without a plea offer and without a trial date, causing serious physical and mental injuries. [Id.] Plaintiff has been unable to make bail and has lost his defense attorney, forcing him to accept a state public defender to represent him. [Id.]
Plaintiff then filed another motion to reduce his bail, and a hearing was held before Judge Dennis on July 26, 2018. [Id.] At that point, the State had not offered Plaintiff a plea deal, despite being ordered to do so; had not proven that the state court has subject matter jurisdiction; had refused to disclose exculpatory material evidence and statements that it is using to prosecute Plaintiff; and had engaged in fraud on the court in order to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights. [Id. at 6-7.]
Judge Dennis denied Plaintiff's motions and claims, despite not having jurisdiction. [Id. at 7.] Judge Dennis forced an ineffective public defender to represent Plaintiff "without his consent." [Id.] Judge Dennis has conspired with the State and the Clerk of Court to deprive Plaintiff of his rights. [Id.]
Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts Defendants have violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Thirteenth Amendments. [Id. at 8.] For his injuries, Plaintiff contends he has suffered mentally and must now take psychotic medication, he has suffered physically and is now deformed, he has been deprived of his life and forced into bondage and slavery, and he has been deprived of the right to a fair trial. [Id. at 10.] For his relief, Plaintiff requests money damages in the amount of $1 million and punitive damages. [Id.]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., the undersigned is authorized to review the Complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district court. Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the district court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," is "frivolous or malicious," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, Plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and "seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if Plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court would be charged with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se pleading remains subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a complaint to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the Court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
The Complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 "creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1501 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Liberally construed, the Complaint asserts claims for due process violations under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and for speedy trial violations. [See Doc. 1-1.] However, for the reasons below, the claims in this § 1983 action are subject to summary dismissal.
While Plaintiff appears to seek only money damages in this action, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks release from custody, his claim should be brought, if at all, as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) ("[H]abeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983.").
Defendants are Entitled to Dismissal
Plaintiff has named three Defendants in this action: the State of South Carolina, R. Markley Dennis, Jr., and Benjamin Chad Simpson. [Doc. 1 at 2-3.] All of the named Defendants are entitled to dismissal from this § 1983 action.
Defendant State of South Carolina
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution divests this Court of jurisdiction to entertain suits against the State of South Carolina. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 728-29 (1999); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). As noted in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 n.9 (1984), a state must expressly consent to suit in a federal district court. The State of South Carolina has not consented to suit in a federal court. The South Carolina Tort Claims Act, section 15-78-20(e) of the South Carolina Code of Laws, expressly provides that the State of South Carolina does not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity, consents to suit only in a court of the state of South Carolina, and does not consent to suit in a federal court or in a court of another state. See McCall v. Batson, 285 S.C. 243, 329 S.E.2d 741, 743 (1985) (abolishing sovereign immunity in tort "does not abolish the immunity which applies to all legislative, judicial and executive bodies and to public officials who are vested with discretionary authority, for actions taken in their official capacities"); see also Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 121 ("[N]either pendent jurisdiction nor any other basis of jurisdiction may override the Eleventh Amendment."). Plaintiff has not asserted a claim pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act. Therefore, the Defendant State of South Carolina is entitled to summary dismissal.
Defendant R. Markley Dennis , Jr.
Judge Dennis has absolute judicial immunity from this civil action and should be dismissed from this case. It is well settled that judges have absolute immunity from a claim for damages arising out of their judicial actions unless they acted in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978); see also Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985) (explaining that even if a challenged judicial act was unauthorized by law, the judge still has immunity from a suit seeking damages). Whether an act is judicial or non-judicial relates to the nature of the act, such as whether it is a function normally performed by a judge and whether the parties dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12. Immunity applies even when the judge's acts were in error, malicious, or in excess of his authority. Id. at 12-13. Immunity presents a threshold question. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Absolute immunity is "an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
Here, Plaintiff makes numerous allegations against Judge Dennis, but these allegations all relate to judicial actions. Thus, because all of the alleged misconduct of Judge Dennis arose out of his judicial actions, judicial immunity squarely applies and should bar this lawsuit against him.
Defendant Benjamin Chad Simpson
Plaintiff presents no specific factual allegations in the Complaint against Defendant Simpson, an assistant solicitor with the Ninth Circuit Solicitor's Office. The sole allegation in the Complaint specifically related to Defendant Simpson is that he, along with Judge Dennis, denied Plaintiff's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Thirteenth Amendment rights "all in Court." [Doc. 1-2 at 9.] Such a cursory allegation fails to state any claim for relief. Accordingly, this Defendant is entitled to summary dismissal from this action because Plaintiff provides no factual allegations against him to assert a plausible claim for relief under § 1983. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 397 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting dismissal is proper where there were no allegations against defendants); Gibson v. Foster, No. 5:17-cv-01333-JMC-KDW, 2017 WL 7355301, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 7, 2017), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 690060 (D.S.C. Feb. 1, 2018) (finding summary dismissal proper where "the Complaint contains no allegations of wrongdoing by th[e] Defendant").
Further, and more importantly, Defendant Simpson is entitled to prosecutorial immunity. Prosecutors have absolute immunity for activities in or connected with judicial proceedings, such as criminal trials, bond hearings, bail hearings, grand jury proceedings, and pre-trial "motions" hearings. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 272-73 (1993); Dababnah v. Keller-Burnside, 208 F.3d 467, 470-71 (4th Cir. 2000). Any actions taken by a solicitor in preparing a criminal charge and prosecuting the case against Plaintiff are part of the judicial process; therefore, the solicitor has absolute immunity from suit. See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 (explaining absolute immunity is "immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability"); see also Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 340-43 (2009).
In South Carolina, regional prosecutors are called Solicitors and Assistant Solicitors. See S.C. CONST Art. V, § 24; S.C. Code § 1-7-310. As noted by the cases cited above, such prosecutors are protected by immunity for activities in or connected with judicial proceedings.
In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), the United States Supreme Court held that prosecutors, when acting within the scope of their duties, have absolute immunity from liability under § 1983 for alleged civil rights violations committed in the course of proceedings that are "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process." Id. at 430. This absolute immunity from suit applies when prosecutors exercise their prosecutorial discretion, such as making the determination to go forward with indictment. See Springmen v. Williams, 122 F.3d 211, 212-13 (4th Cir. 1997).
Here, it appears that Defendant Simpson's alleged wrongful conduct relates to his actions in pursuing a criminal case against Plaintiff. This alleged conduct is intricately related to the judicial process and to the prosecution of the State's case against Plaintiff. Therefore, this Defendant has absolute immunity from this suit. Dowdle v. Skinner, No. 6:12-cv-3253-DCN, 2013 WL 5771199, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 24, 2013); Rodgers v. Riddle, No. 6:09-cv-1446-PMD, 2009 WL 1953188, at *3 (D.S.C. July 7, 2009); Brooks v. Johnson, No. 2:15-cv-1074-PMD-BM, 2016 WL 551958, at *6 (D.S.C. Jan. 20, 2016), adopted sub nom., Brooks v. Williamsburg Cty. Sheriff's Office, 2016 WL 1427316 (D.S.C. Apr. 11, 2016). Because such claims are barred under § 1983 by prosecutorial immunity, Defendant Simpson is entitled to summary dismissal. Tolliver v. South Carolina, No. 1:14-cv-341-JMC-SVH, 2014 WL 12814497, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 6, 2014), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 1173577 (D.S.C. Mar. 30, 2017).
In sum, Plaintiff has failed to name any defendant amenable to suit under § 1983. Accordingly, the Complaint is subject to summary dismissal on this basis. Abstention under Younger
Further, this Court is constrained from granting Plaintiff's requested relief by the Younger abstention doctrine. Plaintiff alleges that he is entitled to money damages because the actions of Defendants violated his constitutional rights. However, granting Plaintiff's requested relief would require this Court to interfere with or enjoin a pending state court criminal prosecution against Plaintiff. As such, because a federal court may not award relief that would affect pending state criminal proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances, this Court should abstain from interfering with it.
Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff may be able to amend his Complaint to name a proper Defendant, this Court would nevertheless be required to stay this action pending conclusion of the state court criminal proceedings under the Younger abstention doctrine, as explained above. See Traverso v. Penn., 874 F.2d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1989).
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings "except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances." Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44; see also Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013) (explaining the circumstances when Younger abstention is appropriate).
From Younger and its progeny, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: "[1] there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; [2] the proceedings implicate important state interests; and [3] there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings." Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm. on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). Here, Plaintiff is involved in ongoing state criminal proceedings, and Plaintiff asks this Court to award relief for alleged due process violations, speedy trial violations, and others, thus the first element is satisfied. [Doc. 1 at 6.] The second element is satisfied for reasons the Supreme Court has explained: "[T]he States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief." Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). The third element is also satisfied, as the Supreme Court has noted "'that ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights.'" Gilliam, 75 F.3d at 904 (quoting Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975)).
Plaintiff's Complaint essentially challenges the validity of his pending criminal charges, claiming that he has been denied due process of law by the State of South Carolina, the state judge presiding over his criminal case, and the solicitor assigned to prosecute his case. A ruling in Plaintiff's favor would call into question the validity of the criminal charges pending against him and would significantly interfere with Plaintiff's ongoing state criminal proceedings. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45; Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 887 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1989) ("[F]ederal courts should abstain from the decision of constitutional challenges to state action, however meritorious the complaint may be, 'whenever [the] federal claims have been or could be presented in ongoing state judicial proceedings that concern important state interests.'") (citation omitted); Washington v. Tilton, No. 2:10-cv-997-HFF-RSC, 2010 WL 2084383, at *1 (D.S.C. May 19, 2010). This Court finds that Plaintiff can litigate his federal constitutional rights in the state court proceedings. Thus, even if Plaintiff had named a Defendant amenable to suit under § 1983, this Court should abstain from hearing this action.
RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that the District Court dismiss this action without prejudice and without issuance and service of process. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989). Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Jacquelyn D. Austin
United States Magistrate Judge September 27, 2018
Greenville, South Carolina
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).