Opinion
C/A 4:22-164-TMC-TER
02-17-2022
Demetrius Alexander Brown, #51104, Plaintiff, v. State of South Carolina, Supreme Court of South Carolina, Sumter County Court of General Sessions, Sumter County Court of Common Pleas, Sumter County Solicitor's Office, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THOMAS E. ROGERS, III UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This is a civil action filed by a pretrial detainee, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1) and District of South Carolina Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e), the undersigned is authorized to review all pretrial matters in such pro se cases and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e); 1915A (as soon as possible after docketing, district courts should review prisoner cases to determine whether they are subject to summary dismissal).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of Plaintiff's pro se complaint filed in this case. This review has been conducted pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147 (4th Cir. 1978).
The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, ” “is frivolous or malicious, ” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. at 31. Under § 1915(e)(2)(B), a claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989).
This court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Such pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Id.; Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Even under this less stringent standard, however, the pro se complaint may be subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a complaint to include claims that were never presented, construct the plaintiff's legal arguments for him, or conjure up questions never squarely presented to the court. Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985); Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1993); Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 1999). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir.1990) (The “special judicial solicitude” with which a [court] should view such pro se complaints does not transform the court into an advocate.).
DISCUSSION
On February 3, 2022, Plaintiff was informed via court order that the court had received his motion and commenced an action but that Plaintiff was required to complete a Complaint form and name specific individual person Defendants. (ECF No. 6). Specifically, “Plaintiff is on notice that the current defendants are not persons under § 1983 and to the extent Plaintiff intends to sue in the future individual judges or court employees that they would be entitled to judicial immunity and summary dismissal.” (ECF No. 6).
Nonetheless, in the Complaint, Plaintiff continues to name as Defendants the State of South Carolina, Supreme Court of South Carolina, the Sumter County Court of General Sessions, the Sumter County Court of Common Pleas, and the Sumter County Solicitor's Office, all in their official capacities only. (ECF No. 10 at 4).
Plaintiff alleges this is a § 1983 action for Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and due process violations. (ECF No. 10 at 5). Plaintiff's request for relief is similar in the motion for injunctive relief and in the Complaint. Plaintiff's request for relief is for this federal court to order the state court clerk to file and hear his pro se motions, to order the state court to give Plaintiff in forma pauperis status in three civil cases, to order the solicitor's office to expunge Plaintiff's convictions, to order the solicitor's office to remove his violent offender indication from his DMV record, and to order the state Supreme Court to accept his filings for “hybrid” representation. (ECF No. 10 at 21-23).
Plaintiff has already attempted similar allegations before in No. 3:21-cv-2405-TMC, which were recommended to be dismissed with prejudice.
Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (internal quotation and citation omitted). A legal action under § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999). Under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation “was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
In order to assert a plausible § 1983 claim against any particular state actor, a “causal connection” must exist between the conduct alleged by the plaintiff and the particular defendant named in the suit. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.159, 166 (1985); Rizzo v. Good, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72 (1976) (a § 1983 plaintiff must show that he suffered a specific injury resulting from a specific defendant's specific conduct and must show an affirmative link between the injury and that conduct); Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977) (for an individual to be liable under § 1983, the Plaintiff must show that the defendant named acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights). Plaintiff here must demonstrate that the official personally caused or played a role in causing the deprivation of a federal right. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 166 and Harris v. City of Va. Beach, 11 Fed.Appx. 212, 215 (4th Cir. 2001) (affirming dismissal of the plaintiff's claim against five defendants when the plaintiff did not allege any of the defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of his civil rights). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. Complaints should contain facts in regard to who did what to whom and when. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 565 n. 10. (2007). Plaintiff does not plead a personal causal connection with facial plausibility as to specific person defendants. Courts and offices are not persons amenable to suit under § 1983.
Plaintiff was informed that even if he named individual persons related to the named courts, they would be subject to immunity. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). The doctrine of absolute immunity for acts taken by a judge in connection with his or her judicial authority and responsibility is well established and widely recognized. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991)
Additionally, Plaintiff's filings may indicate his desire that this federal court intervene in state court proceedings. Because a federal court may not award relief that would affect state proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances, this Court should abstain from interfering. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971); see also Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S.Ct. 584, 588 (2013). The Fourth Circuit has ruled federal district courts should abstain from constitutional challenges to state judicial proceedings if the federal claims could have been presented in an ongoing state judicial proceeding. Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 887 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1989). The following test is applicable to determine when abstention is appropriate: “(1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex County Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). Plaintiff's allegations indicate that an ongoing state criminal proceeding exists. The second criteria has been addressed by the United States Supreme Court's statement that “the States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief.” Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). The Court also addressed the third criteria in noting “‘that ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights.' ” Gilliam, 75 F.3d at 903 (quoting Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975)). Abstention would be an additional reason for dismissal.
Based on the allegations presented by Plaintiff, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted as to the Defendants. Plaintiff was already informed that Defendants were not persons under § 1983 and were subject to summary dismissal. Thus, Plaintiff's action is subject to summary dismissal.
RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that the District Court render all pending motions moot and dismiss the Complaint in this case with prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
Plaintiff was already warned that the Defendants were subject to summary dismissal. Amendment would be futile here. See Workman v. Kernell, No. 6:18-cv-00355-RBH-KFM, 2018 WL 4826535, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 2, 2018) (declining to give plaintiff leave to amend because it would be futile for plaintiff to amend his complaint against the defendants being dismissed), aff'd, 766 Fed.Appx. 1 (4th Cir. 2019).
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 2317
Florence, South Carolina 29503
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).