Opinion
No. CV 02 0087487S
August 31, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
These are motions for summary judgment filed by the defendant, Diane Sol (#157.5) and the defendants, David J. Fenn and Daimler Chrysler (#159). These motions must be granted for the reasons set forth below.
This case arises out of an accident which occurred during a practice exercise at the Skip Barber Racing School, LLC ("the school") conducted at the Lime Rock Race Track in Salisbury, Connecticut. The plaintiff, Robert J. Brown, who claims to have been injured in the accident, was an instructor at the school. His wife, Denise A. Brown, claims a loss of consortium. The defendant, Diane Sol, who was a student at the school, was the driver of a car involved in the exercise which struck and injured the plaintiff. The defendant, David J. Fenn, was also an instructor at the school who was riding in the car driven by defendant Sol. The defendant, Daimler Chrysler was the owner of the car.
The motions for summary judgment are based upon a release and waiver of liability signed by the plaintiff prior to beginning work as an instructor at the school. On June 8, 2004 the court (Brunetti, J.) granted a motion for summary judgment filed by the school based upon the same release. The issue here is whether the release and waiver of liability signed by the plaintiff applies to the other defendants as well.
"A release is a writing manifesting an intention to discharge another immediately, or upon the occurrence of a condition, from an existing or an asserted duty." Corbin on Contracts 77, Discharge by Release § 67.9(1) (2003). "As a general rule, contractual limitations on liability for negligence must be clearly set forth. General language will not suffice. Rather, an exculpatory clause must be conspicuous, readable, unmistakable, unequivocal and clear, not merely unambiguous." 17A Am.Jur.2d 275-76, Contracts § 282 (2004). The plaintiff contends that the release he signed lacks the requisite clarity and is therefore unenforceable. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the release and waiver of liability he signed is not enforceable as to defendants Sol, Fenn and Daimler Chrysler because the release failed to provide the following information: 1) the name of the party who is providing consideration for the release; 2) a clear description of the event covered by the release; 3) the actual name of any of the persons or entities being released; 4) the duties of the persons signing the release; and 5) signatures from the defendants. The only authority the plaintiff cites in support of his position is Hyson v. White Water Mountain Resorts, 265 Conn. 636, 829 A.2d 827 (2003).
The Hyson case involved a release signed by a patron and invitee who was injured while snowtubing at the defendant ski area operator's facility. The Supreme Court held that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment based upon the release because the release signed by the plaintiff failed to expressly provide that the plaintiff was releasing the defendant from liability for the defendant's future negligence. "Because we agree with the plaintiff that the language used in the release at issue does not release the defendant from liability for claims arising from its negligence, we do not reach the issue of whether a well drafted agreement purporting to have such an effect would be enforceable." Id. 641.
The release at issue in this case expressly provides in relevant part that the plaintiff "IN CONSIDERATION of being permitted to . . . work for . . . or being permitted to enter for any purpose any RESTRICTED AREA . . . HEREBY RELEASES, WAIVES, DISCHARGES AND COVENANTS NOT TO SUE the promotors, participants . . . track operators, track owners, officials car owners . . . any persons in any RESTRICTED AREA . . . FROM ALL LIABILITY TO THE UNDERSIGNED, his personal representatives, assigns, heirs, and next of kin FOR ANY AND ALL LOSS OR DAMAGE, AND ANY CLAIM OR DEMANDS THEREFOR ON ACCOUNT OF INJURY TO THE PERSON OR PROPERTY OR RESULTING IN DEATH OF THE UNDERSIGNED ARISING OUT OF OR RELATED TO THE EVENT(S), WHETHER CAUSED BY THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE RELEASEES OR OTHERWISE." This language is patently different from the language in the release the court interpreted in Hyson.
The present release is broad in scope and specifies which parties shall be released. There is no Connecticut case law elucidating how specific a release must be. The defendants qualify for release according to the terms of the release the plaintiff signed. Pursuant to the plaintiff's complaint, Sol was a participant in the driving school lesson, Fenn was a track operator and Daimler Chrysler owned the car Sol was driving. (Amended Complaint, Count One.) The plaintiff cites no authority requiring that defendants be specified by name in order to be released from liability. The release comports with Hyson in that it expressly provides that the defendant would be released from liability for negligence.
Similarly the plaintiff cites no authority for the proposition that each defendant be required to provide consideration for the release. The plaintiff's employment and his presence in a restricted area constitute consideration for the defendants' release pursuant to the terms of the agreement. "Uniform Commercial Code Revised § 3-604 empowers one entitled to enforce an instrument to discharge the obligation of a party to pay by agreeing not to sue or otherwise renouncing rights in a signed writing, with or without consideration . . . Similar effect should be given a written discharge of any contractual right." Corbin on Contracts 79, Discharge by Release § 67.9(1). It seems that the lack of consideration from each defendant does not invalidate the release.
Based on the foregoing discussion, the release signed by the plaintiff applies to Sol, Fenn and Daimler Chrysler. For this reason, the motions for summary judgment are granted.
BY THE COURT,
John W. Pickard