Opinion
No. 2 CA-HC 2020-0007
12-23-2020
PATRICE E. BROWN, Petitioner/Appellant, v. DAVID SHINN, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent/Appellee.
Patrice E. Brown, Florence In Propria Persona
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(a)(1), (f). Appeal from the Superior Court in Pinal County
No. S1100CV202001121
The Honorable Barbara A. Hazel, Judge Pro Tempore
AFFIRMED
Patrice E. Brown, Florence
In Propria Persona
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Eckerstrom authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Eppich and Judge Espinosa concurred. ECKERSTROM, Judge:
¶1 Appellant Patrice Brown challenges the trial court's order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶2 Brown, an Arizona Department of Corrections (ADOC) inmate, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in August 2020. Citing A.R.S. § 31-472, he argued that ADOC had "fail[ed] to obey the procedural law," thereby "depriv[ing him] of his Due Process right." He further maintained that "once Due Process is denied, all jurisdiction ceases." Brown therefore reasoned that, although his "imprisonment was at first lawful," he "has become entitled to be discharged" because of "acts, omissions, and event[s that have] taken place afterward," pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-4132(2).
¶3 The trial court denied Brown's petition. It explained, "Based upon the statutes referenced by [Brown], the Court finds no legal basis exists to grant the requested relief." This appeal followed.
¶4 "[T]he purpose of a writ of habeas corpus is to test the legality and correctness of a prisoner's judgment and confinement." Griswold v. Gomes, 111 Ariz. 59, 62 (1974). Pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-4121, "[a] person unlawfully committed, detained, confined or restrained of his liberty, under any pretense whatever, may petition for and prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment or restraint." However, habeas corpus "is not the appropriate means to order something less than 'absolute release.'" Long v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 180 Ariz. 490, 494 (App. 1994) (quoting Escalanti v. Dep't of Corr., 174 Ariz. 526, 527 n.1 (App. 1993)). We review the denial of a writ of habeas corpus for abuse of discretion. State v. Cowles, 207 Ariz. 8, ¶ 3 (App. 2004).
¶5 On appeal, Brown contends that the trial court "did not explain how referencing these two statutes brought [it] to conclude" that no legal basis for the requested relief exists. Brown further maintains, "The Petition show[s] upon its face that [he] is entitled to be discharged."
¶6 In his petition below, Brown cited § 13-4132(2) and § 31-472 without adequately developing any corresponding argument. He summarily asserted that ADOC had "fail[ed] to obey the procedural law" in § 31-472. In relevant part, § 31-472 provides:
Although Brown attempts to develop his argument in his opening brief, the trial court did not have that information. We therefore do not consider it. See Powell v. State, 19 Ariz. App. 377, 379 (1973) ("With limited exceptions, not present here, propositions not raised in the court below in a habeas corpus proceeding will not be considered on appeal.").
Any court or other agency or officer of this state having power to commit or transfer an inmate . . . to any institution within or without this state if this state has entered into a contract or contracts for the confinement of inmates in such institution . . . , but no inmate sentenced under Arizona law may be transferred from an institution within this state to an institution without this state, unless he has executed, in the presence of the warden or other head of the institution in this state in which he is confined, a written consent to the transfer.But Brown did not explain how ADOC had violated this statute or how such violation entitled him to a discharge under § 13-4132(2).
Section 13-4132(2) provides that, on return of a writ, if it appears "the prisoner is in custody by virtue of process from any court of this state . . . , the prisoner shall be discharged . . . [w]hen the imprisonment was at first lawful, but by some act, omission or event, which has taken place afterward, the party has become entitled to be discharged." --------
¶7 Moreover, the record contains no evidence that Brown was transferred to an out-of-state institution without his consent. Brown asserted in his petition that he was "currently incarcerated" in Florence, Arizona. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in dismissing his petition. See Brown v. State, 117 Ariz. 476, 477 (1978) (finding "petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief because he does not allege any facts which show that he is entitled to immediate release from custody"); State v. Superior Court, 22 Ariz. 452, 459 (1921) (to warrant relief, petition must show "upon its face that the petitioner is entitled to be discharged").
¶8 We therefore affirm the trial court's order denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.