Opinion
C/A No. 8:20-cv-01159-TMC-JDA
05-15-2020
Belinda Diane Brown, Plaintiff, v. SC Department of Corrections, Ms. Lee, Case Managers at Leath Correctional Inst., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Belinda Diane Brown ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brought this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. At the time Plaintiff commenced this action, she was an inmate in the custody of the North Carolina Department of Corrections ("NCDC") and was incarcerated at the North Carolina Correctional Institution for Women ("NCCIW") in Raleigh, North Carolina. [Doc. 1 at 2.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the undersigned finds that this action is subject to summary dismissal.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Complaint, which was entered on the docket on March 25, 2020. [Doc. 1.] By Order dated April 7, 2020, the Court notified Plaintiff that this action was subject to summary dismissal for the reasons identified by the Court in its Order. [Doc. 12.] The Court, however, noted that Plaintiff may be able to cure the deficiencies of her Complaint and granted Plaintiff twenty-one days to amend her Complaint. [Id. at 10-11.] Plaintiff was specifically warned as follows:
If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint or fails to cure the deficiencies identified [in the Court's Order], the undersigned will recommend to the District Court that the claims be dismissed without leave for further amendment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A (explaining that, as soon as possible after docketing, district courts should review prisoner cases to determine whether they are subject to summary dismissal).[Id. at 11.] Nevertheless, Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint, and she has failed to cure the deficiencies identified by the Court in its Order.
Because Plaintiff did not respond to the Court's Order, and the time for response has lapsed, she has failed to prosecute this case and has failed to comply with an Order of this Court. Accordingly, as an additional basis for dismissal, the case should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
Plaintiff makes the following allegations in her Complaint. [Doc. 1.] Plaintiff asserts she is seeking the "[r]ight to all of [her] pre-jail credits . . . ordered by [the sentencing] Judge." [Id. at 4.] According to Plaintiff, Defendant Lee failed to complete a jail credit verification form to reduce Plaintiff's current sentence, as required by law and ordered by the sentencing judge. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges her claims occurred from December 8, 2016, through April 17, 2017, at the Wake County and Cumberland County Detention Centers in North Carolina. [Id. at 5.] Plaintiff alleges that a certified copy of her jail credit was submitted to her case worker, which should have been sent to records for processing, but nothing was ever followed-up and the jail credit was never given as ordered by the judge. [Id. at 5-6.]
Plaintiff alleges that she was previously an inmate in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections ("SCDC") and was confined in the Leath Correctional Institution ("Leath") in Greenwood, South Carolina. [Doc. 1-1 at 2.] Plaintiff alleges Defendant Lee, as the case manager supervisor at Leath, was responsible for the overall operation of case management at Leath. [Id.] According to Plaintiff, a warrant for her arrest was sent to North Carolina to hold Plaintiff for two cases in South Carolina via extradition. [Id. at 4.] Plaintiff was served with a bench warrant, extradition papers, and bond papers on January 5, 2017, and remained in a North Carolina jail until June 28, 2017. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges the sentencing judge ordered all pre-jail credits be applied to her active sentence, but, upon certified information being received by Defendant Lee, SCDC failed to adjust the jail credits. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges the "negligence of state law, judges order and job duty violated [Plaintiff's] rights and constituted a due process violation under the Eighth[ ] Amendment to the United States Constitution." [Id. at 5.]
For her injuries, Plaintiff alleges that, although she suffered "[n]o personal [i]njuries," she lost her home, land, car, and all belongings due to the approximate four to six months of incarceration over the estimated time she was sentenced to serve in prison. [Doc. 1 at 6.] For her relief, Plaintiff requests money damages in the amount of $250,000 for her house, $50,000 for her land, $15,000 for her car, and $25,000 for her personal clothing and household items. [Id.]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," is "frivolous or malicious," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, Plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and "seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, this Court is charged with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Amended Complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, her pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se complaint and a plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in his pleadings, the complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact); cf. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011) (holding that plaintiff need not pin his claim for relief to precise legal theory). "A claim has 'facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'" Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014). While Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove her case as an evidentiary matter in the Complaint, she must allege facts that support a claim for relief. Bass v. DuPont, 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 "creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Here, Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to summary dismissal because she has named Defendants who are not subject to suit under § 1983, and she has failed to state a claim for relief.
Defendants are entitled to dismissal.
Defendant SCDC
Defendant SCDC is not a person amenable to suit under § 1983. Additionally, Defendant SCDC is a department of the State of South Carolina that has Eleventh Amendment immunity from a suit for damages brought in this Court. See Belcher v. South Carolina Bd. of Corr., 460 F. Supp. 805, 808-09 (D.S.C. 1978). The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution divests this Court of jurisdiction to entertain a suit for damages brought against the State of South Carolina or its integral parts. U.S. Const. amend. XI; see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Harter v. Vernon, 101 F.3d 334, 338-39 (4th Cir. 1996); Bellamy v. Borders, 727 F. Supp. 247, 248-50 (D.S.C.1989). SCDC, as a South Carolina state agency, is an integral part of the state and, thus, entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in this case. As a result, to the extent that Plaintiff sues SCDC, this case is subject to summary dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Under Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984), a state must expressly consent to suit in a federal district court. However, the State of South Carolina has not consented to suit in federal court. See S.C. Code § 15-78-20(e) (1976) (South Carolina statute expressly provides that the State of South Carolina does not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity, consents to suit only in a court of the State of South Carolina, and does not consent to suit in a federal court or in a court of another State); see also McCall v. Batson, 329 S.E.2d 741, 743 (S.C. 1985) (abolishing sovereign immunity in tort "does not abolish the immunity which applies to all legislative, judicial and executive bodies and to public officials who are vested with discretionary authority, for actions taken in their official capacities"), superseded by statute, S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-100(b), as recognized in Jeter v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 369 S.C. 433 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006). Since the Eleventh Amendment bars the relief that Plaintiff requests against SCDC, the Complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted against this Defendant and, as a result, it should be dismissed as to SCDC. See Alkebulanyahh v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., No. 6:10-cv-2976-MBS-KFM, 2010 WL 5625463, at *1-2 (D.S.C. Dec. 2, 2010), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 202987 (D.S.C. Jan. 21, 2011); Felton v. S.C. Dep't of Corr. Div. of Classification, No. 8:12-cv-1290-SB-JDA, 2012 WL 2149788, at *3 (D.S.C. May 31, 2012), Report and Recommendation adopted sub nom., 2012 WL 2154235 (D.S.C. June 13, 2012). Accordingly, SCDC cannot be held liable under § 1983 for any of the matters alleged.
Defendant Lee
Plaintiff's claims fail against Defendant Lee. The only allegations against this Defendant are that Defendant Lee failed to complete a jail credit verification form to reduce Plaintiff's current sentence, as required by law and ordered by the sentencing judge and that Defendant Lee was the supervisor over the case managers at Leath. [Doc. 1 at 4.] "However, such general allegations, absent any specific facts of personal involvement in the events giving rise to this case, are insufficient to state a cognizable § 1983 claim." Tracey v. Nelson, No. 1:12-cv-1614-JMC-SVH, 2012 WL 4583107, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 31, 2012) (dismissing claims against the Governor of South Carolina and Director of SCDC), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 4588205 (D.S.C. Oct. 1, 2012).
Further, construing Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Lee as one for supervisory liability, the undersigned notes that the doctrine of respondeat superior generally is not applicable in § 1983 actions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 ("Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution."); Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 221 (4th Cir. 1999). To hold a supervisory official liable for constitutional injuries inflicted by their subordinates, certain criteria must be established. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994). Specifically, a plaintiff must show that the supervisory official was (1) actually or constructively aware of a risk of constitutional injury, (2) deliberately indifferent to that risk, and (3) that an affirmative causal link exists between the supervisor's inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff. Carter, 164 F.3d at 221; Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1984). Here, the Complaint contains no plausible allegations against Defendant Lee to demonstrate that she was aware of, or deliberately indifferent to, any constitutional risk of injury to Plaintiff. As such, the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against Defendant Lee, and she should be dismissed from this action on that basis. See London v. Maier, No. 0:10-cv-00434-RBH, 2010 WL 1428832, at *2 (D.S.C. Apr. 7, 2010) (dismissing action where plaintiff failed to allege facts showing director of hospital was liable for subordinates' actions under theory of vicarious liability).
Defendants Case Managers at Leath Correctional Institution
Defendants Case Managers at Leath are entitled to summary dismissal because Plaintiff appears to be referring to an unnamed group of people employed at Leath, and groups of people are not amenable to suit under § 1983. See Harden v. Green, 27 Fed. App'x 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding the medical department of a prison is not a person pursuant to § 1983); Witherspoon v. Matthews, No. 9:17-cv-0020-MGL-BM, 2017 WL 3283855, at *4 (D.S.C. July 14, 2017) (explaining unnamed groups of people are not amendable to suit under § 1983), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 3263939 (D.S.C. Aug. 1, 2017); Dalton v. South Carolina Dep't of Corr., No. 8:09-cv-260-CMC-BHH, 2009 WL 823931, at *2 (D.S.C. March 26, 2009) (dismissing the medical staff of SCDC and Prison Health Services as defendants because they were not persons).
The Complaint fails to state a claim for relief.
Plaintiff's claims fail against Defendants because she has failed to state a claim for relief. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated her constitutional rights by failing to credit her for time she spent in jail prior to her sentencing in North Carolina. Even if Plaintiff were due additional days of credit to her sentence, she fails to allege facts showing that her constitutional rights were violated. Instead, Plaintiff has alleged that, due to the negligence of Defendants, her pre-sentence jail credits were not properly applied against her sentence. However, "[t]o recover under the due process clause, a plaintiff must establish that defendants acted with something more than mere negligence." Davis v. Ozmint, No. 3:09-cv-436-JFA-JRM, 2010 WL 1294117, at *5 (D.S.C. Feb. 9, 2010), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2010 WL 1294115 (D.S.C. Mar. 29, 2010). Thus, Plaintiff fails to allege a constitutional violation. Further, her vague and conclusory claims lack specificity and factual support to establish a claim for relief.
Finally, Plaintiff's requested relief is not cognizable in this action. Plaintiff seeks compensation for the loss of her house, land, car, and personal property. However, deprivations of personal property do not support actions for damages under § 1983. Baker v. Stevenson, No. 8:13-cv-466-JFA-JDA, 2013 WL 4866337, at *1 (D.S.C. Sept. 11, 2013). Due process is not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss or injury to life, liberty, or property. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986).
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
In light of all the foregoing, it is recommended that the District Court DISMISS this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A without leave to amend and without issuance and service of process.
As noted above, Plaintiff was directed to file an amended complaint to cure the deficiencies noted by the Court in its Order dated April 7, 2020. [Doc. 12.] Plaintiff has not filed an amended complaint or attempted to cure the deficiencies in her original filings. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends dismissal without further leave to amend. See Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, No. 17-7621, 2018 WL 2472069, at *1 (4th Cir. June 4, 2018) (explaining that, where the district court has already afforded a plaintiff with the opportunity to amend, the district court, in its discretion, can either afford plaintiff an additional opportunity to file an amended complaint or dismiss the complaint with prejudice); Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 624 (4th Cir. 2015).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Jacquelyn D. Austin
United States Magistrate Judge May 15, 2020
Greenville, South Carolina
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).