Summary
waiving but also alternatively affirming on merits
Summary of this case from Eco Planet, LLC v. ANT TradingOpinion
No. 05-06-00942-CV
Opinion Filed June 27, 2007.
On Appeal from the County Court at Law Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. cc-05-10880-A.
Before Justices WRIGHT, RICHTER, and LANG.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Carlotta M. Brown and John R. Brown appeal the no-evidence summary judgment granted in favor of RREEF Management Co., North American Composites Co., Calwest Texas Properties, L.P., and Calwest TP, L.L.C. In three issues, appellants contend the trial court erred by: (1) denying appellants' motion for continuance; (2) granting appellees' motion for summary judgment; and (3) denying appellants' motion for new trial. We overrule appellants' issues and affirm the trial court's judgment.
In their brief, appellants combine all three issues into a single argument. Their discussion of these issues consists of six paragraphs, four paragraphs of which are devoted to a general discussion of no-evidence summary judgment procedure. Appellants' application of the law to the facts in this chemical exposure case consists of the following:
5.5 With regard to the application of the primary factors to the case at bar, it is easy to recognize that the only evidence before the Court presents a clear picture of Appellants diligently attempting to learn the cause of Carlotta Brown's injuries as detailed in her affidavit (CR 33). This case was filed August 22, 2005; and, therefore, was pending only 7 months at the time judgment was entered on March 24, 2006. This cannot be the type of fact situation contemplated by the draftsmen of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166(a)(i) when the language "after adequate time for discovery" was used.
5.6 Appellants provided to the trial court competent evidence that refuted Appellees' motion for summary judgment at the earliest possible date that the evidence was available to them. Appellants' discussion contains a single record citation to an affidavit and does nothing more than summarily conclude that they were not provided adequate time for discovery and that the affidavit they provided six months after the motion for summary judgment was filed was sufficient to defeat appellees' motion. Appellants do not offer any meaningful legal analysis or discussion regarding adequate time for discovery or causation in a chemical exposure case, and have not meet their responsibility to assist this Court in evaluating their contentions. Thus, we conclude appellants have failed to provide us with argument that is sufficient to make their appellate complaint viable. See Hope's Fin. Mgmt. v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp., 172 S.W.3d 105, 107 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, pet. denied); McIntyre v. Wilson, 50 S.W.3d 674, 682 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2001, pet. denied); see also Fredonia State Bank v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 284 (Tex. 1994) (appellate court has discretion to waive point of error due to inadequate briefing). By failing to adequately brief their complaints, appellants have waived these issues on appeal.
Moreover, even if we were to consider the merits of appellants' complaints, we would conclude appellants' summary judgment evidence is insufficient to defeat appellees' motion for summary judgment. To establish causation in a personal-injury suit, a plaintiff must prove that the defendants' conduct caused an event and that this event caused the plaintiff to suffer compensable injuries. Brookshire Brothers, Inc. v. Smith, 176 S.W.3d 30, 36 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (citing Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Crye, 907 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex. 1995)). When a lay person's general experience and common sense will not enable that person to determine causation, expert testimony is required. Brookshire Brothers, 176 S.W.3d at 36. Expert testimony is particularly necessary in chemical-exposure cases, in which medically complex diseases and causal ambiguities compound the need for expert testimony. Id. Chemical-exposure plaintiffs must prove both general and specific causation. Id. General causation asks whether a substance is capable of causing a particular injury in the general population; specific causation asks whether that substance caused a particular individual's injury. Id. Proving one type of causation does not necessarily prove the other, and logic dictates that both are needed for a chemical-exposure plaintiff to prevail. Id. We review an expert's testimony in its entirety and will not accept the expert's opinion as some evidence merely because the expert used "magic words." Id. An expert's bare opinion will not suffice. Id
Here, appellants' summary judgment evidence contains a series of affidavits by Dr. William J. Rea. None of these affidavits contain any evidence of general causation, and they contain only conclusory statements regarding specific causation. Because Dr. Rea's affidavits are merely his "bare opinion" regarding specific causation and do not address general causation at all, the affidavits are insufficient to defeat appellees' no-evidence motion.
We affirm the trial court's judgment.