Opinion
C/A No.: 1:20-2747-HMH-SVH
01-20-2021
Anthony Jai Brown, #56283-019, Petitioner, v. Warden Phelps, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Anthony Jai Brown ("Petitioner"), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this action seeking habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c) (D.S.C.) for a Report and Recommendation on Respondent's motion to dismiss. [ECF No. 18]. Pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the court advised Petitioner of the motion to dismiss and dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to Respondent's motion. [ECF No. 19]. Petitioner filed a response on November 2, 2020. [ECF No. 21]. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned finds the petitioner's petition moot and recommends the district judge grant Respondent's motion to dismiss. I. Factual and Procedural Background
When Petitioner filed this action, he was a federal inmate incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution ("FCI") in Edgefield, South Carolina. [ECF No. 1 at 1]. In 2003, Petitioner robbed three Georgia banks in the span of 24 days, taking approximately $8,971. United States v. Brown, No. 04-CR-647 (N.D. Ga. 2005), ECF No. 1. He also attempted to rob a fourth bank before traveling to New York City where he continued to commit robberies. Brown, ECF No. 19. After pleading guilty to state charges in New York and receiving a 12-year prison sentence, Petitioner was transferred to the Northern District of Georgia to face a four-count indictment for his bank robberies. Brown, ECF Nos. 1, 19.
The court takes judicial notice of the records in Petitioner's criminal cases. Courts "may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record." Phillips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009). "We note that the most frequent use of judicial notice . . . is in noticing the content of court records." Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
In April 2005, Petitioner entered into a plea agreement with the United States, accepting responsibility for all four counts and waiving his "right to appeal his sentence and the right to collaterally attack his sentence in any post-conviction proceeding on any ground." Brown, ECF No. 16. Following that agreement, the Northern District of Georgia sentenced Petitioner to 235 months' imprisonment, allowing his sentence to run concurrently with his 12-year New York sentence. Brown, ECF No. 21. Petitioner did not file a direct appeal.
Twelve years after his conviction, Petitioner filed a post-conviction motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which raised three grounds: (1) that he did not qualify as a career offender; (2) that he did not receive a 3-level downward departure for accepting responsibility; and (3) that his attorney committed ineffective assistance by not objecting to a prior drug conviction. Brown, ECF No. 22. After the magistrate judge recommended dismissing the § 2255 motion as untimely, the district court agreed and adopted the magistrate judge's reasoning. Brown, ECF No. 23, 26.
In 2018, Petitioner filed a Bivens complaint with the Southern District of Mississippi asserting claims unrelated to the instant case. Brown v. Nash, C/A No 3:18-528 (S.D. Miss. 2018), ECF No. 1. It appears that case has not been resolved, although a report and recommendation has been submitted recommending the action be dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute. See Brown v. Nash, ECF No. 60.
In March 2020, Petitioner filed another motion with the Northern District of Georgia, asking the sentencing court to recommend that he serve the last 12 months of his incarceration in a residential reentry center ("RRC"). Brown, ECF No. 28. That motion was denied on November 5, 2020. Brown, ECF No. 30.
The current petition before this court, filed pursuant to § 2241, was filed in July 2020. In it, Petitioner requests this court "grant him home confinement or Residential Reentry Center ('RRC') placement pursuant to the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security ('CARES') Act and the First Step Act of 2018." [ECF No. 1 at 1, see also ECF No. 21 at 10 ("Petitioner requests for the court to . . . order the BOP to either release him to home confinement or immediately process his RRC transfer.")]. The Federal Bureau of Prison's website establishes during the pendency of this action, Petitioner is no longer incarcerated at FCI Edgefield and is now under the supervision of a residential reentry management ("RRM") field office located in Atlanta, Georgia, with a projected termination of this supervision on October 11, 2021. See https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (Federal Bureau of Prison's website indicating inmate Anthony Jai Brown, register # 56283-019, is located at "Atlanta RRM") (last visited January 20, 2021); see also Jackson v. Atkinson, C/A No. 8:13-01179, 2013 WL 5890231, at *5 n.3 (D.S.C. Nov. 1, 2013) (taking judicial notice of petitioner's release from the Federal Bureau of Prison's website and finding the § 2241 petition to be moot); Croteau v. Joyner, C/A No. 2:18-00773-JMC-MGB, 2018 WL 5650024, at *2, n.2 (D.S.C. Aug. 28, 2018) (taking judicial notice of petitioner's placement in a RRC and finding "the Court can no longer provide petitioner the relief he seeks" in his habeas petition where petitioner sought release to a RRC), report and recommendation adopted, C/A No. 2:18-00773-JMC, 2018 WL 5633996 (D.S.C. Oct. 31, 2018) (dismissing petitioner's habeas petition as moot). II. Discussion
"A case becomes moot 'when the issues presented are no longer 'live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.'" Williams v. Ozmint, 716 F.3d 801, 809 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969)). " '[I]t is not enough that a dispute was very much alive when [the] suit was filed,' but the parties must continue to have a 'particularized, concrete stake' in the outcome of the case through all stages of litigation." Id. at 808-09 (quoting Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477-79 (1990)). Thus, "[a] claim may be mooted 'when the claimant receives the relief he or she sought to obtain through the claim,' because the court no longer 'has [ ] effective relief to offer.'" Id. at 809 (quoting Friedman's, Inc. v. Dunlap, 290 F.3d 191, 197 (4th Cir. 2002)); see also Simmons v. United Mortg. & Loan Inv., LLC, 634 F.3d 754, 763 (4th Cir. 2011) (finding claim moot on appeal where plaintiff received relief sought).
In Leonard v. Hammond, the Fourth Circuit noted that there are two exceptions to the mootness doctrine: (1) the "collateral consequences" exception; and (2) the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception. 804 F.2d 838, 842 (4th Cir. 1986). Under the collateral consequences exception, a habeas claim is not moot where a conviction results in collateral consequences that survive the sentence. Id. "Where the criminal conviction, for example, results in the continued denial of important civil rights, such as the right-to-vote or the right to be considered for jury duty, the claim for habeas relief will remain a live controversy even after the prisoner has been released from custody. Similarly, where the criminal conviction may result in an enhanced sentence should the petitioner later be convicted of another crime, h[is] stake in habeas relief permits the court to exercise its judicial function long after [he] has been freed." Broughton v. State of N.C., 717 F.2d 147, 148-149 (4th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted). Under the capable of repetition, yet evading review exception, a conviction is not moot where two elements are met: "(1) the challenged action [is] in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again." Leonard, 804 F.2d at 842 (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975)) (alterations in original).
Because the court can no longer provide Petitioner the relief he seeks, Williams, 716 F.3d at 809, and there is no basis to find that either exception to the mootness doctrine applies, Leonard, 804 F.2d at 842, the undersigned recommends that Petitioner's habeas claims be dismissed as moot. See, e.g., McKinney-Bey v. Hawk-Sawyer, No. 03-6455, 2003 WL 21236189 (4th Cir. May 29, 2003) (affirming dismissal of § 2241 petition as moot, where petitioner sought immediate transfer from prison to half-way house, and petitioner received transfer prior to consideration by Court of Appeals); Croteau, 2018 WL 5633996, at *4 ("Petitioner's Habeas Petition requests that the court order the BOP to immediately release him to a halfway house or home confinement program . . . . Petitioner's placement in this halfway house is also reflected on the BOP's website, which states Petitioner is located at "Orlando RMM" and will be released on January 11, 2019. Accordingly, Petitioner's request for habeas relief is moot."); see also Walker v. Sanders, No. 09-56380, 2010 WL 2640358 (9th Cir. July 1, 2010) (affirming district court's dismissal of § 2241 petition as moot, where petition challenged BOP's determination concerning RRC placement and sought immediate transfer to an RRC, and petitioner was placed at an RRC during pendency of the proceeding); Laor v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 340 Fed. Appx. 771 (3rd Cir. Aug. 19, 2009) (holding that federal prisoner's release to RRC rendered moot § 2241 petition challenging BOP's pre-release custody policies and seeking placement in pre-release custody; prisoner demonstrated no concrete and continuing injury or collateral consequence that remained after placement in an RRC); Miller v. Whitehead, 527 F.3d 752, 756 (8th Cir. 2008) (dismissing § 2241 appeal as moot because inmates had received the requested relief of placement in an RRC). III. Conclusion and Recommendation
Although Respondent did not argue for dismissal based on mootness, "[m]ootness is a jurisdictional question and thus may be raised sua sponte by a federal court at any stage of proceedings." United States v. Springer, 715 F.3d 535, 540 (4th Cir. 2013).
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Respondent's motion to dismiss [ECF No. 18] and dismiss the petition without prejudice.
See Iron Arrow Honor Soc'y v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 70 (1983) (finding a court is deprived of jurisdiction over a case when the case becomes moot); Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 316 (4th Cir. 2013) (same); S. Walk at Broadlands Homeowner's Ass'n v. OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC, 713 F.3d 175, 185 (4th Cir. 2013) ("A dismissal for . . . [a] defect in subject matter jurisdiction[ ] must be one without prejudice, because a court that lacks jurisdiction has no power to adjudicate and dispose of a claim on the merits.").
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED. January 20, 2021
Columbia, South Carolina
/s/
Shiva V. Hodges
United States Magistrate Judge
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached "Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation."
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).