Opinion
02 Civ. 1218 (KNF).
August 5, 2009
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, made pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The defendant opposes the motion, which is analyzed below.
BACKGROUND
On January 24, 2008, at the conclusion of the jury trial held for this action, which was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the parties were directed, by the Court, to make "[a]ny post trial motions . . . within ten days as set forth in the applicable provision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."See Fed.R.Civ.P. 59. The jury had determined the plaintiff, who proceeded pro se at the trial, failed to establish his claims, by a preponderance of the evidence, and it returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. No motion was made for a new trial or to alter or amend the judgment entered on January 29, 2008, by the Clerk of Court. A little more than 14 months after judgment was entered, the plaintiff, proceeding pro se, presented the instant motion — styled "Motion for Reconsideration," and made pursuant to Fed. R Civ. P. 60 — to the Pro Se Office for this judicial district, for filing with the Clerk of Court. Through the motion, the plaintiff contends, in essence, the jury got it wrong: the defendant did violate the plaintiff's 14th Amendment right to refuse medical treatment and committed battery, by performing a medical procedure on him, without consent, while the plaintiff was incarcerated. Therefore, according to the plaintiff, the Court should: (a) upset the jury's verdict; (b) enter judgment for him; and (c) award him "the sum of one [h]undred and eleven million [d]ollars."
In a letter submitted to the Court with his motion, the plaintiff apologized for the delay in filing the motion and explained that, "as a pro-se [l]edagant," he "was unaware" that "I was suppose to address the Court to [r]econsider." The plaintiff explained further that he "was unaware of the common [p]rocedures that are normally done after [t]rial." The plaintiff acknowledged he "waited for an extensive amount of time" to file his motion, and he asked the Court to "[p]lease excuse my negligence and lack of knowledge of the [l]egal [s]ystem."
The defendant opposes the motion. He maintains it is untimely, that is, it was not made within a reasonable time, as it was filed more than one year after judgment was entered. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c). Furthermore, according to the defendant, the plaintiff "has offered no legal grounds for reconsideration of the unanimous jury verdict in favor of the defendant," and granting the motion will prejudice the defendant, by requiring him to incur additional legal costs, unnecessarily and will contravene the "public policy of finality."
DISCUSSION
In its most pertinent part, Fed.R.Civ.P. 60 provides that:
On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively if it is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c) explains that a motion made pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) "must be made within a reasonable time — and for reasons (1), (2) and (3) [of Rule 60(b)] no more than a year after the entry of judgment." Inasmuch as the plaintiff has not alleged fraud, newly discovered evidence or a void judgment prompted him to file the instant motion, only Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1) appears to be relevant to the Court's analysis of the plaintiff's motion.
A motion for Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) relief is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 233-34, 115 S. Ct. 1447, 1460 (1995); Browder v. Director, Dept. of Corrections of Illinois, 434 U.S. 257, 263 n. 7, 98 S. Ct. 556, 560 n. 7 (1978); Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1986); Devino v. Duncan, 215 F. Supp. 2d 414, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) provides for "extraordinary judicial relief" and a court should exercise its discretion to grant a Rule 60(b) motion only in a circumstance where the movant demonstrates that "exceptional circumstances" exist. Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).
The plaintiff has explained that ignorance of post-trial procedures and the "[l]egal system," owing to his status as a pro se litigant, as well as his own negligence caused him to file the instant motion approximately 14 months after judgment was entered by the Clerk of Court. A party's pro se status "does not exempt [him] from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law." Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983). However, while ignorance of the rules applicable to court proceedings does not constitute excusable neglect, as contemplated by Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1), see Ohliger v. United States, 308 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1962), a party's negligence, which leads him to fail to comply with a filing deadline, may be found to be excusable neglect. See Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 394, 113 S. Ct. 1489, 1497 (1993). Since the Supreme Court interprets neglect as negligence, in determining whether a party's neglect of a filing deadline is excusable, a court is required to take "account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party's omission," because "the determination is at bottom an equitable one."Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395, 113 S. Ct. at 1498. "Those circumstances include prejudice to the adversary, the length of delay, the reason for the error, the potential impact on the judicial proceedings, whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith. Fetik v. New York Law School, No. 97 Civ. 7746, 1999 WL 459805, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 1999) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
The Court has interpreted the plaintiff's submissions liberally, as it must, see Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994), and concludes the plaintiff's motion is based on the inadvertence and excusable neglect provisions of Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1).
In the case at bar, the plaintiff's delay in making the instant motion prejudices the defendant by requiring him to expend time and additional resources, unexpectedly, on a matter he believed, based on the plaintiff's failure to: (a) move timely under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59 or Fed.R.Civ.P. 60, for relief; or (b) file timely a notice of appeal from the judgment to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, was resolved finally by the verdict rendered by the jury. As noted above, a Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1) motion must be made "not more than one year after the entry of judgment." Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c). Here, the plaintiff delayed filing his motion until almost 14 months after judgment had been entered; this is two months beyond the time prescribed by the relevant Rule for making such a motion.
The reasons offered by the plaintiff for his delay: ignorance of the rules governing post-trial proceedings and his pro se status, do not absolve him of his failure to file the motion timely. "[I]nadvertence, ignorance of the rules, or mistakes construing the rules do not usually constitute `excusable neglect.'" Canfield v. Van Atta/GMC Truck, Inc., 127 F.3d 248, 250 (2d Cir. 1997). Vacating the judgment now, as the plaintiff requests, would require the Court to convene a new jury trial. This would be a significant and unnecessary undertaking by the Court, particularly in the circumstance of the case at bar, where the plaintiff has not demonstrated that a legal or factual basis for doing so exists.
The timing of the motion was entirely within the plaintiff's control. He was made aware, by the Court, at the conclusion of the trial, that post-trial motions had to be made, in accordance with the applicable provision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and, further, that a limited period of time for filing such motions, ten days, existed. His apparent failure to heed the Court's directive, as it related to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59 motions or to consult the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, respecting post-trial motions, until well after any such motion could be made, is a matter for which the plaintiff must take responsibility.
In deciding a Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion, a court must "balance fairness considerations present in a particular case against the policy favoring the finality of judgments." Williams v. New York City Dep't of Corrections, 219 F.R.D. 78, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Having considered the relevant circumstances pertinent to the plaintiff's neglect of the one-year Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1) filing deadline, as well as the reasons the plaintiff proffered for his dilatory conduct, the Court finds that the plaintiff has failed to show good cause for not acting sooner to file his Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion and has not met his burden of demonstrating either that the motion is justified or that, granting the motion "will not impose an undue hardship on the defendant." Williams, 219 F.R.D. at 84. Therefore, vacating the judgment entered following the conclusion of the jury trial held for this action is neither reasonable nor appropriate.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the plaintiff's motion, made pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1), Docket Entry No. 78, is denied.
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N.B. Any unpublished opinion to which citation has been made is being provided to the plaintiff with a copy of this memorandum and order.
SO ORDERED.