Opinion
C.A. No. 09C-06-038 (RBY).
Submitted: April 21, 2010.
Decided: May 27, 2010.
Upon Consideration of Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment GRANTED and Motion to Exclude Testimony MOOT.
Kate Shumaker, Esq., Kimmel Silverman, Wilmington, Delaware for Plaintiff.
Vicki L. Shoemaker, Esq., Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman Goggin, Wilmington, Delaware for Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDERSUMMARY
Defendant Chrysler Group, LLC ("Defendant") moves this Court to grant partial summary judgment in its favor against Plaintiff Ronald Brown ("Plaintiff"). In July 2008, Plaintiff purchased a 2008 Dodge Nitro. Approximately five months later, Plaintiff began a series of unsuccessful repairs that ultimately led to the filing of this suit. Plaintiff asserts claims under Delaware's Lemon Law, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Improvement Act, and the Delaware Consumer Fraud Act.
6 Del. C. §§ 5001 — 5009.
15 U.S.C. §§ 2301 — 2312.
6 Del. C. §§ 2511 — 2527.
Defendant challenges the validity of Plaintiff's Lemon Law claim. Defendant contends that, in order to prevail under Delaware's Lemon Law, Plaintiff must show that the vehicle has a defect, and that defect must " substantially impair the use, value, or safety of the vehicle." Because Plaintiff cannot establish substantial impairment, his claim must fail as a matter of law. Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is, therefore, GRANTED.
6 Del. C. §§ 5001 — 5009 (emphasis added).
FACTS
The facts are taken from the well-pled allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint.
On or before December 1, 2008, when the vehicle had registered 4,462 miles, Plaintiff complained that the "Transmission [Was] Not Shifting Properly," and that there was a "Squeak in the Right Rear Wheel." Plaintiff took the car to Holden Dodge, a Chrysler-authorized dealer and repair shop. Holden Dodge reprogrammed the powertrain control module, which corrected the transmission problem. Holden Dodge also repaired the wheel. All of this repair work was covered by Plaintiff's warranty.
On or before January 5, 2009, when the vehicle had registered 6,345 miles, Plaintiff complained that the "Transmission [Was] Not Shifting Properly," and that there was a "Roaring Noise at Highway Speeds." Plaintiff took the car to Holden Dodge. No problem was found with the transmission, and the "roaring noise" was repaired. This repair work was covered by Plaintiff's warranty.
On or before February 2, 2009, when the vehicle had registered 7,217 miles, Plaintiff complained, inter alia, that the "Converter Locks Up," and there was "Shudder and Vibration at Highway Speeds." Plaintiff again took the car to Holden Dodge. During this visit, the torque converter was replaced, but the "shudder" remained present in the vehicle when it was driven. This repair work was covered by Plaintiff's warranty. Additionally, Holden Dodge informed Plaintiff that Chrysler "was coming out with a new transmission fluid in four months," which, impliedly, would eliminate the shudder.
Finally, on or before March 2, 2009, when the vehicle had registered 8,060 miles, Plaintiff complained about "Noise at Highway Speeds," and that the "Transmission [Was] Not Shifting Properly." Plaintiff took the car to Holden Dodge. Although Holden Dodge attempted to repair Plaintiff's complaints, the noise persisted. This repair work was covered by Plaintiff's warranty.
On June 18, 2009, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated the Delaware Automobile Warranty Act, also known as Delaware's Lemon Law (Count I), the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Improvement Act (Count II), and the Delaware Consumer Fraud Act (Count III). As a result of these alleged violations of Delaware and Federal law, Plaintiff seeks damages. Defendant now moves for summary judgment on Count I of Plaintiff's Complaint.
6 Del. C. §§ 5001 — 5009.
15 U.S.C. §§ 2301 — 2312.
6 Del. C. §§ 2511 — 2527.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court's function is to examine the record to ascertain whether genuine issues of material fact exist and to determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. "The court must `view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.'" "The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that the undisputed facts support his legal claims." "If the proponent properly supports his claims, the burden `shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate that there are material issues of fact for resolution by the ultimate fact-finder.'" "Summary judgment will not be granted if, after viewing the record in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, there are material facts in dispute, or if judgment as a matter of law is not appropriate." "If, however, the record reveals that there are no material facts in dispute and judgment as a matter of law is appropriate, then summary judgment will be granted."
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c).
Mayew v. Chrysler, LLC, 2008 WL 4447707, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 1, 2008) (citing Storm v. NSL Rockland Place, LLC, 898 A.2d 874, 880 (Del. Super. 2005)).
Id. (citing Storm, 898 A.2d at 879).
Id. (citing Storm, 898 A.2d at 880).
Id. (citing Storm, 898 A.2d at 879).
Id.
DISCUSSION
Delaware's Lemon Law "requires a manufacturer or its authorized dealer to repair and correct any nonconformity in the vehicle during the term of warranty." "Before bringing a claim, a plaintiff must permit the dealer at least four opportunities to repair the alleged defect." "It is an affirmative defense to a claim under the Lemon Law that `the alleged nonconformity does not substantially impair the use, value[,] or safety of the new automobile.'""To determine whether the car has a `substantial impairment,' the Court applies a two-part test." "The Court first considers the particular buyer's subjective circumstances and needs[,] and next considers objectively whether the value of the car to the buyer has been impaired." In an attempt to provide tangible parameters to the objective impairment standard, the court in Freedman v. Chrysler Corp. stated:
Id.
Id. (citing Freedman v. Chrysler Corp., 564 A.2d 691, 699 (Del. Super. 1989)).
[determining whether the value of a car has been objectively impaired] calls for evidence of something more than plaintiff's assertion that the nonconformity impaired the value to him; it requires evidence from which it can be inferred that plaintiff's needs were not met because of the nonconformity. In short, the nonconformity must substantially impair the value of the goods to the plaintiff buyer. The existence of substantial impairment depends upon the facts and circumstances in each case.
Freedman, 564 A.2d at 699 (quoting Jorgensen v. Pressnall, 545 P.2d 1382, 1385-86 (Ore. 1976)) (emphasis in original).
The facts of Freedman are similar to the facts in the case sub judice. Eric Freedman complained of his vehicle stalling and of a "grinding" noise in the transmission. Although the jury ultimately returned a verdict in Freedman's favor, the Court granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict on behalf of the defendant dealer, finding that Freedman had failed to establish a substantial impairment. The Freedman court provided the following rationale:
An automobile which is driven in a normal manner, and on a daily basis for fourteen months, compiling a total mileage of 15,353 miles, and not having been out of use longer than one day on each of the seven service visits during that time cannot be reasonably said to have mechanical defects which "substantially impair" its value. The vehicle may well have defects which were a nuisance to the owner, thus subjectively impairing the value of the automobile to him, but that does not end the inquiry. . . . A mechanical defect cannot reasonably be said to substantially impair a car's value if such defects do not hinder the owner's ability to drive the car on a daily basis for fourteen months, logging over 15,300 miles in the process.
564 A.2d at 699 (emphasis in original).
The Freedman decision spawned similar progeny. In Mayew v. Chrysler LLC, plaintiffs, who complained that their vehicle's tire pressure warning lamp would illuminate intermittently, failed to establish substantial impairment. The Mayew court reasoned that, "[w]hile the [l]ight's intermittent illumination may have been a nuisance to [p]laintiffs, it did not, as an objective matter, substantially impair the car's value as [p]laintiffs were still able to drive it a significant distance in the year they owned it." Similarly, in McLaren v. Mercedes Benz USA, LLC, the court held plaintiffs failed to provide objective testimony that the vibrations they felt when driving the vehicle amounted to substantial impairment. Although the McLaren court focused on plaintiffs' lack of an expert as fatal to their claim, the result was ultimately the same: "[one] cannot use goods and later claim they have been of little value to him."
2008 WL 4447707 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 1, 2008).
Id. at *5.
2006 WL 1515834, at *4.
Freedman, 564 A.2d at 700 (citing Olmstead v. General Motors, Inc., 500 A.2d 615, 618 (Del. Super. 1985)) (additional citations omitted).
The Court can discern no reason why it should deviate from the analysis of Freedman. Plaintiff cannot prove a substantial impairment to his vehicle under Delaware law. While the persistent reverberation in the vehicle may constitute a nuisance, there does not appear to be an impediment to the function of the vehicle itself. In fact, Plaintiff has logged 23,000 miles over nineteen months. This mileage equates to more miles per month than the mileage in Freedman and Mayew. Borrowing language from the Mayew court, Plaintiff's continued use of the Nitro "objectively indicates that the car was not substantially impaired."
Mayew, 2008 WL 4447707, at *5.
The Court notes that the issue in this case is not whether the vehicle has a defect. The issue before the Court, assuming that there is defect, is whether that defect constitutes a substantial impairment pursuant to Delaware law. The Court finds that Plaintiff cannot meet this burden.
CONCLUSION
Considering all of the foregoing, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's Lemon Law claim fails as a matter of law, because Plaintiff has failed to establish that the alleged defect rises to the level of substantial impairment. Therefore, Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Count I of Plaintiff's Complaint is GRANTED. Consequently, Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Testimony Regarding An Alleged Safety Issue is MOOT, as it was an issue only in the context of the Lemon Law claim.
Furthermore, Count III of Plaintiff's Complaint alleges a violation of the Delaware Consumer Fraud Act. This claim was brought in conjunction with the Delaware Lemon Law claim, pursuant to
6 Del. C. § 5009 ("Section 5009"). Section 5009 provides that, "[i]n addition to any remedies the consumer may have at law or in equity, a violation of this chapter shall be an unlawful practice as defined in § 2513. Plaintiff has alleged no independent factual basis for his Consumer Fraud Act claims. Consequentially, because Count III of Plaintiff's Complaint is dependent upon the success of Plaintiff's Lemon Law claim, it is fatally defective as well.
6 Del. C. § 5009 provides that, "[i]n addition to any remedies the consumer may have at law or in equity, a violation of this chapter shall be an unlawful practice as defined in § 2513 of this title."
As a result, Count II of Plaintiff's Complaint remains Plaintiff's only viable claim. SO ORDERED this 27th day of May, 2010.