Opinion
C.A. 99C-10-210 RRC
Submitted: November 13, 2001
Decided: February 28, 2002
On Defendant's Motion for New Trial. Denied. On Plaintiff's Motion for Costs. Granted.
Stephen Casarino, Esquire, Wilmington, DE.
Steve Potter, Esquire, Wilmington, DE.
Dear Counsel:
The Court has before it Defendant's Motion for a New Trial, as well as Plaintiffs request for costs associated with the litigation. The parties have set forth their positions as well as the facts which they contend support their request and the Court will not restate those positions in detail. But for the reasons set forth below, this Motion for a New Trial will be denied, and the request for costs is granted.
The Court finds it troublesome that nearly every trial is now routinely followed by the filing of a motion for a new trial by those dissatisfied with the jury's decision.
Having made the decision that their case merits consideration by twelve impartial and unbiased citizens, if those citizens happen to disagree with a parties version of the facts, they petition the Court for a second bite of the apple hoping that the Court will give them the opportunity to find a more favorable group of citizens. While the Court recognizes the passion that one develops for their litigation, and there are on occasion, cases that warrant a new trial, the regularity of this practice has the potential of turning the jury system from a process that determines what is just and right, into one which continues until a litigant gives up, or their resources to fight their battle have vanished.
The Court has before it outstanding counsel, who diligently advocated for their client's respective positions. The trial was conducted in a professional and thorough manner, and all of the disputed issues were clearly presented to the jury for their determination. But when the Court reviews this motion for a new trial, it is as if one is giving their closing arguments again, perhaps believing it was not fully appreciated or understood when initially given in the courtroom. The hope of course is that the Court will be more convinced by the arguments, than the jury, and will then be willing to substitute its judgment for that of the collective wisdom of the jury panel. However, the jury does not sit in an advisory role to the Court, nor should the Court undermine the jury's verdict by surrendering to such temptations.
After an exhaustive review of the arguments made on this motion and the evidence presented during the course of this trial, it is clear to the Court that the parties in this litigation received a fair trial. Each side clearly and professionally presented their positions, and the primary dispute between the parties as to who was responsible for maintaining the fire escape, was carefully presented to the jury. The issues were fully developed, the jury understood them, and decided the issues for the parties.
The Court also understands why a trial was perhaps necessary in this matter. The relationship between Capital Management Company, which was overseeing the management of the property, and Cathedral Community Services, the owners of the property, was confusing and anything but clear. The majority of the testimony at trial was related to this topic, and there was credible evidence that would support different conclusions on the management issues in dispute. The obligation of the jury was to consider that evidence, use their common sense, and resolve the factual disagreement. That is precisely what the jury did, and the Court cannot find that the verdict is so against the evidence that a reasonable juror would not reach the conclusions set forth in the verdict, nor is that verdict against the great weight of the evidence.
See Lacey v. Beck, 161 A.2d 579, 580 (Del.Super. 1960) ("[O]ur courts are highly reluctant to disturb a jury's verdict on the ground of excessiveness where the damages are unliquidated, as in a tort action for personal injuries, and where there is no fixed measure of mathematical certainty."); James v. Glazer, 570 A.2d 1150, 1156 (Del. 1990) (noting that the Court must determine if the jury's verdict is against the "great weight of the evidence."); Storey v. Camper, 401 A.2d 458, 465 (Del. 1979) (holding that a jury's verdict should not be disturbed unless it is manifest that it was the result of passion, prejudice, partiality or corruption, or that it was clearly in disregard of the evidence or applicable rules of law.)
In addition, Defendant has asked the Court to grant a new trial because a verdict of 2.25 million dollars should "shock the conscience" of the Court. It does not. It was generally uncontested by the Defendant that Plaintiff suffered significant injuries as a result of the fire escape falling on him. He has paralysis on his left side, suffers from significant pain in his neck and back area, has reoccurring headaches, and occasional seizures. He limps, in essence dragging his left leg, and has no significant strength in his left hand. He continually wears a leg brace and his physical limitations makes it impossible to perform even the manual labor jobs he had prior to his accident. He is a nineteen year old man, whose life has been significantly altered by the events of that day. The normal pleasures he enjoyed before the accident such as sports, and drumming in a marching unit have been taken from him, and there is no expectation that his condition will significantly improve over the next fifty-nine years of his life. Under these circumstances, the Court is not shocked by the jury's verdict.
See Lacey v. Beck, 161 A.2d at 580 ("A verdict should not be set aside simply because it is excessive in the mind of the Court, but only when it is so grossly excessive as to shock the Court's sense of justice and the impropriety of allowing it to stand is manifest.").
The Court also finds that the arguments presented by the Defendant as to the jury's interpretation of the economist's testimony, is nothing more than speculation. The Court does not have the benefit of a transcript of Mr. Langdon's testimony, but it does not recall Plaintiff's questioning of this expert was improper, or intended to mislead the jury as to future earnings.
Finally, Defendant asserts that the Court improperly commented on the evidence during the jury's instructions. Defendant was allowed to admit into evidence over Plaintiff's objection, admissions made by Cathedral Community Services in its Answer to the Complaint. Defendant was allowed to argue to the jury the significance of those admissions, and the jury was told they were free to consider them in reviewing the management issues that were in dispute. In Defendant's narrow view of the litigation, these admissions settled the management dispute, and the Court is confident he believes should've ended the litigation, and the pre-trial decision to allow the matter to proceed to trial was simply wrong. The Court during the trial had a fundamental obligation to ensure that the trial was conducted in a fair, and proper manner. The instruction now objected to was not a comment on the evidence, but was simply given to ensure that the jury realized that in spite of the admissions made by Cathedral Community Services they still had an obligation to make a factual determination as to who was responsible for maintaining the property, which lead to this accident. This was the crux of the dispute, not who owned and "controlled" the property. The Court finds the instruction was proper, not an inappropriate comment on the evidence, and Defendant's request for a new trial is denied.
The final issue for the Court to resolve, is Plaintiff's Motion for Costs. It appears from Defendant's Response, that the only objection they have to the costs listed in Plaintiff's pleading is that related to the mediation fee. Pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 16.2(g), each side is to share the mediator's cost, and the Court will not require Defendant to pay the Plaintiff's portion of this fee. As a result, Defendant shall pay to Plaintiffs, his 60% of the costs associated with this litigation, minus that mediation fee.
For the foregoing reasons, the motion for new trial is denied and the motion for costs is granted.