Opinion
E076911
10-07-2022
LINDA LYNN BROWN, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. TODDELLA D. BROWN, as Trustee, etc., Defendant and Appellant.
Toddella D. Brown, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant. Signature Law Group and Gregory M. Finch for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County No. TRUPS1800182. Stanford E. Reichert, Judge. Walter T. Moore, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed.
Toddella D. Brown, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
Signature Law Group and Gregory M. Finch for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
FIELDS, J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant, Toddella D. Brown, appeals from the January 21, 2021 judgment and order directing a (nonfinal) distribution of assets from the trust estate of the late Catherine Brown Morris (the Trust). Toddella served as trustee of the Trust after Catherine died on November 21, 2015. Toddella and plaintiff and respondent, Linda Lynn Brown (Linda), are Catherine's daughters.
Given that the parties and their mother, Catherine Brown Morris, share the surname Brown, we refer to the parties and to Catherine by their first names, intending no disrespect, but for purposes of clarity, convenience, and in order to avoid confusion. (Cruz v. Superior Court (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 175, 188, fn. 13.)
The Trust provides that its residue is to be distributed in equal shares to Toddella and Linda upon Catherine's death. The residue originally included two real properties, one in Oakland, which Toddella sold in 2016, and another in Kern County. Among other things, the judgment (1) awards Linda $105,609.97, representing the unpaid balance of Linda's one-half share of the net proceeds from the 2016 sale of the Oakland property; (2) orders that Linda and Toddella hold title to the Kern County property as tenants in common; and (3) orders Toddella to file an accounting of Trust assets.
Toddella claims the judgment is invalid because: (1) Linda disclaimed her interest in the Trust residue in a September 2, 2014 letter to Catherine and Toddella; (2) based on her petition, Linda must be deemed "disinherited" based on the Trust's no contest clause; (3) the Kern County property "should belong" to Toddella's and Linda's brother; (4) Toddella was unlawfully denied her constitutional right to represent the Trust, as trustee, and without counsel, in opposing Linda's petition; (5) Toddella did not consent to have a temporary judge rule on the petition; and (6) Judge Reichert, who previously denied Toddella's motion for summary judgment on the petition, was biased. We find no merit to any of Toddella's claims. Thus, we affirm the judgment in its entirety.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
On July 19, 2006, Catherine, as sole settlor and trustee, established the Trust, a revocable inter vivos trust called the Catherine Brown Morris Revocable Trust. The Trust provides that all of the property in the Trust was Catherine's separate property; Catherine was married to Barbee Morris; they had entered into a "martial agreement" dated October 11, 2001; the agreement was still in effect; and pursuant to the agreement all property in Catherine's name was Catherine's separate property.
Catherine died on November 21, 2015 and the Trust became irrevocable.
Following Catherine's death, Toddella served as sole trustee of the Trust. The Trust provides that Toddella was to inherit a San Bernardino property, and that the residue of the Trust estate was to be distributed in equal shares or "one half" each to Toddella and Linda. In the Trust, Catherine "intentionally le[ft] nothing to her children Willie F. Brown, III and Deandre Brown."
The trust appointed "in order of priority" Toddella, then Linda, to serve as Catherine's successor trustees. Linda never served as a trustee.
When Catherine died in November 2015, the residue of her Trust included a residence in Oakland and what appears to be a vacant lot in Kern County. In May 2016, Toddella, as trustee, sold the Oakland property for $510,000 through an escrow and received $291,219.95 in net sales proceeds. On June 6, 2016, Toddella, as trustee, purchased and gave Linda a cashier's check for $40,000, payable to "Linda L. Brown" and referencing "Inheritance."
The seller's final closing statement for the sale of the Oakland property identifies the seller as "Toddella D. Brown, Successor Trustee of the Catherine Brown Morris Irrevocable Trust dated July 19, 2006."
B. Linda's Petition
On February 23, 2018, Linda petitioned the superior court for an order distributing trust assets, surcharge of trustee, breach of trust, and accounting. (Prob. Code, §§ 16410, 17200 et seq.) In her petition, Linda acknowledged that Toddella "distributed $40,000" to Linda from the Trust after Toddella sold the Oakland property, but Linda said she was informed and believed that the Oakland property was unencumbered and that its sales price was $510,000. Linda sought the "remainder of monies due" for her one-half share of the proceeds from the Oakland property, together with an accounting of trust property, damages, and other relief.
In September 2018, Linda filed a supplement to her petition, adducing the seller's final closing statement for the sale of the Oakland property, and noting that Toddella, as the seller and trustee, received $291,219.85 in net proceeds from the sale. Of that amount, Linda sought $105,609.92, representing one-half of the $291,219.85 sum, less the $40,000 that Linda received in June 2016.
In October 2018, Toddella, as trustee, through her counsel, Moises A. Aviles, filed a response to the supplemental petition, admitting that Catherine died on November 21, 2015, the authenticity of the Trust, and that Toddella was sole trustee. But Toddella denied that Linda was entitled to any monies from the Trust, "other than the $40,000 that was already given" to her, because she had "disclaim[ed]" any interest in the Trust assets in a letter dated September 2, 2014 to Catherine and Toddella.
Toddella adduced a partial copy of the letter.
The letter began: "Hi Mom &Toddella[.] [¶] I am not sure if Toddella got my text or voice message earlier today so I decided to send it in writing to you both so you will have a written copy. I don't want to be included in any of your financial affairs. If my name is on anything that you two have please remove it. Life insurance, accounts and property. I am glad for the time we had together." (Italics added.) The letter continued: "I am glad that I can see how fast you can change over money stuff. I am not all about money stuff. If I was[,] I would had did [sic] like Derrell, charge for anything and everything. [¶] I was not charging for anything because sometimes that is what family does for each other."
Linda complained in the letter about people who were "selfish over money," and implied that Catherine and Toddella were also selfish over money. Linda wrote, "I was trying to help you mom get a plan but you &Toddella &Larry and who ever [sic] else have it all planned out. I hope that it works out for all of you and you are all able to get all of the money that you all hope for. [¶] Take care of yourselves and success to you all. [¶] Love, Linda L. Brown."
In February 2019, Linda filed a reply, arguing that the September 2014 letter did not qualify as a disclaimer of any Trust assets because it did not meet the requirements of Probate Code sections 278 and 279. In June 2019, Linda filed an amended petition, claiming she had recently discovered that the Trust residue also included a Kern County property and adducing a grant deed, recorded on August 24, 2006, whereby Catherine conveyed the Kern County property to the Trust. Linda also adduced an affidavit of death of trustee, signed by Toddella in March 2016, and recorded in May 2016, attesting that the Trust owned the Kern County property at the time of Catherine's death. Linda claimed she was informed and believed that the Trust residue included other assets, including a Las Vegas timeshare, and Toddella was likely hiding other Trust assets. Linda continued to seek an accounting and the distribution of the rest of her one-half share of the Trust residue.
Later in June 2019, Toddella, through her counsel, Moises A. Aviles, filed several objections to Linda's amended petition. Toddella claimed: (1) the petition was barred by Linda's September 2014 "Letter of Disclaimer"; (2) Toddella had "given" Linda the $40,000 disbursement at a San Bernardino police station, only because of and to stop Linda's "duress," "multiple threats," and "harassment"; (3) the Kern County property was "only worth about $700" and had been willed to Toddella and Linda's brother, Willie Frank Brown II, by the three siblings' father, Willie Frank Brown I. The Las Vegas timeshare was actually a Hawaii timeshare, lost to foreclosure due to "Barbee Morris Jr.'s" failure to pay taxes and association fees. For 10 years, Toddella contributed to her parents' monthly household bills and living expenses. For all of these reasons, Toddella asked the court to deny Linda any relief.
In October 2019, Toddella moved for summary judgment on Linda's petition on the ground Linda disclaimed her interest in all Trust assets by her September 2014 "Letter of Disclaimer." Toddella also claimed Linda should be deemed disinherited as a Trust beneficiary based on the Trust's no contest clause. In opposition, Linda averred: she did not know that Catherine had a trust when Linda wrote the September 2014 letter to Catherine and Toddella; Linda first learned that Catherine had a trust around November 2015; Linda wrote the letter because she was "upset about a utility bill," Catherine had caused Linda's utility bill to exceed $300, and Linda was expected to pay the entire bill.
Linda argued that "a literal reading" of her September 2014 letter "clearly indicates that the topic being discussed was global and addressed family disharmony in general and did not address any specific assets of my mother [Catherine]." Linda claimed it was her intent "to not be involved in my mother's financial affairs at that time," but that it was never her intent "to give up my inheritance." (Italics added.) Linda also argued that she did not violate the Trust's no contest clause by filing her petition for an accounting and distribution of Trust assets. (Prob. Code, §§ 21310, 21311.)
The court (Judge Reichert) denied Toddella's motion for summary judgment at a January 6, 2020 hearing. Meanwhile, in June 2019, Linda issued a subpoena to JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A., seeking bank records for all accounts held by or on behalf of Catherine and the Trust. Toddella wrote a letter to the bank, which the bank interpreted as an objection. Linda then filed a motion to enforce the subpoena against the bank. According to Linda's counsel, the motion to enforce the subpoena was granted on January 6, 2020, but the court did not sign an order granting the motion and, by July 2020, the docket was showing that the hearing on the motion had been continued to August 6. The hearing on Linda's petition was also set for August 6. The hearing on the petition was continued from June 8 due to the COVID-19 emergency.
Linda filed objections to the evidence Toddella adduced in support of Toddella's motion for summary judgment, but the court did not rule on the objections and the record does not indicate that Linda's counsel asked the court for rulings by the time of the January 6, 2020 hearing.
Court minute orders show that, on August 6, 2020, Toddella appeared in court and informed the court that her attorney, Mr. Aviles, was "no longer eligible to practice law." Also on August 6, Toddella filed a declaration stating Mr. Aviles had been suspended from practicing law and asking the court to stay the proceedings "so that if I need representation by a COMPETENT and RELIABLE attorney, I may retain one." On August 6, the court (Judge Reichert) granted Linda's motion to enforce the subpoena, then granted Toddella's request to stay the proceedings, retroactive to February 8, 2020. The court continued the hearing on the petition to October 1, 2020, to allow Toddella an opportunity to retain new counsel. Toddella did not appear in court on October 1, 2020. The court (Judge Reichert) then set an order to show cause, on November 5, 2020, regarding why Linda's petition should not be granted.
The record does not include a reporter's transcript or other record of the August 6, 2020 oral proceedings, or of any other oral proceedings in this matter.
On November 5, 2020, Toddella appeared in court, and attorney James T. Imperiale appeared telephonically, indicating he was specially appearing for Toddella. The court (Judge Reichert) indicated that Mr. Imperiale was making a general appearance and ordered Mr. Imperiale to "file a document indicating his general appearance with a mailing address on it" by 2:00 p.m. on November 13. The court continued the hearing on the petition to December 3 and set a trial setting conference. The order to show cause was taken off calendar.
On December 3, 2020, Toddella appeared in court, unrepresented by counsel. The court (Judge Reichert) continued the hearing to January 21, 2021, to allow Toddella to retain new counsel; informed Toddella "that no further continuances" would be granted; further informed Toddella that, "if she fails to retain counsel prior to the next hearing[,] a default may be entered against her"; and "reminded" Toddella that she had "no standing without legal representation." The court advanced the hearing on and denied Toddella's pending motion to quash Linda's subpoena, finding the motion procedurally improper because "the trustee cannot represent herself in this action."
On January 21, 2021, the hearing on Linda's petition was held before Walter T. Moore, Temporary Judge. At 9:14 a.m., when the matter was called, Toddella was neither present nor represented by counsel. Linda appeared through her counsel. The register of actions states that, at 9:14 a.m., the parties were "advised re: commissioner/attorney pro tem.; no objection raised. Failure to object is deemed a stipulation to commissioner/attorney pro tem. sitting as judge pro tem." The court (Temporary Judge Moore) then lifted the stay order, granted the petition, and signed the January 21, 2021 judgment and order. The matter was recalled at 9:54 a.m., after Toddella arrived at 9:20 a.m., still unrepresented by counsel. The record indicates that, after the matter was recalled and Toddella appeared, a stipulation and order regarding the appointment of the temporary judge was filed, and Toddella filed several documents that the court "overruled."
The record includes the January 21, 2021 judgment or "Order for Distribution of Trust Assets; for Surcharge of Trustee, and Accounting," signed by Temporary Judge Moore. As noted, the judgment awards Linda $105,609.97, the rest of Linda's one-half share of the net sales proceeds from the Oakland property, decrees that Toddella and Linda hold title to the Kern County property as tenants in common, and orders Toddella to file an accounting of Trust assets. Toddella filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment.
III. DISCUSSION
A. On Its Face, the September 2014 Letter Is Not a Disclaimer (Prob. Code, § 278 )
Toddella claims Linda "waived and disclaimed" her interest in all Trust assets by her September 2014 letter to Catherine and Toddella. We disagree.
Because Toddella was not represented by counsel at the January 21, 2021 hearing on the petition, the judgment was uncontested. (Code Civ. Proc., § 594; Merrifield v. Edmonds (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 336, 341.) As a result, Toddella did not preserve the disclaimer issue for appellate review. (Amato v. Mercurty Casualty Co. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1784, 1794.) Nonetheless, we exercise our discretion to consider the issue because the relevant facts-the contents of the letter and Linda's extrinsic evidence of her intent in writing the letter-are undisputed; thus, the issue presents a pure question of law. (People v. Oneal (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 581, 590.)
California law defines a" 'disclaimer'" as "any writing which declines, refuses, renounces, or disclaims any interest that would otherwise be taken by a beneficiary." (Prob. Code, § 265; see Patow v. Marshack (In re Patow) (2021) 632 B.R. 195, 203.) An" 'interest'" includes "the whole of any property, real or personal," including an interest "under a trust." (Prob. Code, § 267.) A disclaimer must (1) be in writing; (2) be signed by the disclaimant; (3) identify the creator of the interest; (4) describe the interest to be disclaimed; and (5) state the disclaimer and its extent. (Id. at § 278). To be effective, a disclaimer must also be filed with "the creator of the interest," the trustee, or another specified person (id. at § 280, subd. (a)) "within a reasonable time after the person able to disclaim acquires knowledge of the interest" (id. at § 279, subd. (a). When effective, a disclaimer is irrevocable and binding on the beneficiary. (Id. at § 281.)
We review the construction or interpretation of a writing de novo, where the trial court's interpretation is based on the writing alone without the aid of extrinsic evidence. (Findleton v. Coyote Valley Band of Pomo Indians (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1194, 1205.) If the court's interpretation of the writing turns on the credibility of conflicting extrinsic evidence, we uphold any reasonable interpretation of the writing that is supported by substantial evidence. (McLear-Gary v. Scott (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 145, 158; see Prob. Code, § 21102.) But"' [w]here the evidence is undisputed and the parties draw conflicting inferences, [the appellate court] will independently draw inferences . . . .'" (Blech v. Blech (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 989, 1002.)
The record is silent on whether the court considered the disclaimer issue at the January 21, 2021 uncontested hearing on the petition. (See fn. 7, ante.) The record does not contain a reporter's transcript of the hearing or otherwise show what evidence and issues the court considered in issuing the judgment on the petition. But" '[a] judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct,'" and" '[a]ll intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent . . . .'" (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564; Vo v. Las Virgenes Municipal Water Dist. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 440, 447 [appellant has obligation to demonstrate error based on appellate record that adequately allows the court to assess the error].) Thus, we presume that, in entering judgment on the petition, the court considered the disclaimer issue based on all relevant evidence in the court file. All of this evidence shows the letter was not a disclaimer. (Prob. Code, §§ 278, 279.)
Based on its words alone, without the aid of any extrinsic evidence, the letter is not a valid disclaimer. The letter neither "describe[s]" property disclaimed nor "state[s] the disclaimer and its extent." (Prob. Code, § 278, subds. (b), (c).) That is, the letter neither describes the Trust residue or the Oakland or Kern County properties, nor states a disclaimer of any part of Linda's interest in the Trust residue or those properties. The letter does not even mention the Trust or those properties. Nothing in the letter indicates that Linda even knew of the Trust or her expectancy interest in the Trust-that through the Trust, Linda was to inherit one-half of the Oakland and Kern County properties. (Prob. Code, § 279, subd. (a) ["A disclaimer to be effective shall be filed within a reasonable time after the person able to disclaim acquires knowledge of the interest"].)
Further, the relevant extrinsic evidence is undisputed and is consistent with our interpretation of the letter as failing to constitute a disclaimer. (Blech v. Blech, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 1001 [" 'Extrinsic evidence is "admissible to interpret the instrument, but not to give it a meaning to which it is not reasonably susceptible" [citations], and it is the instrument itself that must be given effect.' "].) In her declaration in opposition to Toddella's earlier motion for summary judgment, which the court (Judge Reichert) denied, Linda averred that when she wrote the letter, she did not know about the Trust, and she did not intend to disclaim her inheritance from Catherine. She explained she wrote the letter because she was angry about a utility bill that Catherine and Toddella had refused to help her pay. Toddella offered no contradicting extrinsic evidence.
Toddella claims Linda effected a disclaimer of her interest in the Trust residue by saying in the letter that she, Linda, no longer "want[ed] to be included" in Catherine's or Toddella's "financial affairs," and that, if her "name" was "on anything" including "[l]ife insurance, accounts and property," to "please remove it." We disagree. These statements were too general to constitute a disclaimer of Linda's interest in the Trust residue, given that a disclaimer is required to "describe" the property disclaimed and to "state the disclaimer" and its "extent." (Prob. Code, § 278, subds. (b), (c).) As noted, the letter did not mention the Trust, the Oakland or Kern County properties, or the subject of Linda disclaiming any inheritance from Catherine. Thus, based on the contents of the letter itself and the undisputed, extrinsic evidence concerning Linda's intentions in writing the letter, the letter is not a disclaimer of Linda's interest in the Trust residue.
B. The Trust's No Contest Clause Does Not Apply to Linda's Petition
Toddella claims that Linda, by filing her petition, should be deemed disinherited as a Trust beneficiary based on the Trust's no contest clause. Again, we disagree. Linda's petition does not trigger the no contest clause. The no contest clause applies only if the beneficiary contests the validity of the Trust, and Linda's petition does not contest the validity of the Trust. (Prob. Code § 21311, subd. (a) [no contest clause will only be enforced against a "direct contest that is brought without probable cause"] and Prob. Code, § 21310, subd. (b) [defining" 'direct contest'" as "a contest that alleges the invalidity of a protected instrument" on specified grounds].) Linda's petition seeks to enforce the Trust, not contest its validity. (See Burch v. George (1994) 7 Cal.4th 246, 254 ["No contest clauses are valid in California and are favored by the public policies of discouraging litigation and giving effect to the purposes expressed by the testator"].)
The no contest clause provides: "In the event any beneficiary under this Trust shall . . . contest in any court the validity of the Trust . . . or shall seek to obtain an adjudication . . . that this Trust or any of its provisions is invalid, then the right of that person to take any interest given to him or her by this Trust shall be determined as it would have been determined had the person predeceased the execution of this Declaration of Trust." (Trust, art. 9, § E.)
C. The Kern County Property Is Part of the Trust Residue
Toddella next claims that the Kern County property "has no relevance to the trust proceedings" because it belongs to Toddella's and Linda's brother, Willie Frank Brown II. Toddella claims that Brown I willed the Kern County property to Brown II in 1998, but the record contains no evidence supporting this assertion, or that the Kern County property belonged to Brown I. To the contrary, the record shows that the Kern County property was part of the Trust residue at the time of Catherine's death.
It is unclear whether Linda's and Toddella's brother's name is Willie Frank Brown II or Willie Frank Brown III, given that the Trust mentions Catherine's son as Willie Frank Brown III. The discrepancy, however, does not affect our analysis.
As noted, the record includes a copy of a grant deed, recorded on August 24, 2006, whereby Catherine conveyed the Kern County property to the Trust, and an affidavit of death of trustee, signed by Toddella in March 2016 and recorded in May 2016, attesting that the Trust owned the Kern County property at the time of Catherine's death on November 21, 2015. Because the Kern County property is not specifically disposed of in the Trust, is it part of the Trust residue.
D. Toddella Could Not Lawfully Represent the Trust as Trustee In Propria Persona
Toddella claims the judgment is invalid because the trial court deprived her of her "constitutional right" to represent the Trust, without counsel, in opposing the petition after her attorney, Mr. Aviles, was suspended from practicing law. She argues that, "since she was not suing on behalf of others, and she was not representing [Linda] as she [Toddella] was [also] a beneficiary[,]" she, Toddella, had a right to represent "herself as Trustee" and thus to represent the Trust in opposing Linda's petition. We disagree. Toddella did not have a right to represent the Trust as trustee in propria persona because she was not the Trust's sole beneficiary.
In Ziegler v. Nickel (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 545, 548-549 (Ziegler) the court observed:" '[A] trustee must always act solely in the beneficiaries' interest. [Citations.]' [Citations.] The actions of the trustee affect the trust estate and therefore affect the interest of the beneficiaries. A nonattorney trustee who represents the trust in court is representing and affecting the interests of the beneficiar[ies] and is thus engaged in the unauthorized practice of law." (Id. at pp. 548-549, last italics added; cf. Aulisio v. Bancroft (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1516, 1519-1520 ["A] sole trustee of a revocable living trust who is also the sole settlor and beneficiary of the trust assets he or she is charged to protect does not appear in court proceedings concerning the trust in a representative capacity. Instead, he or she properly acts in propria persona and does not violate the bar against practicing law without a license. ([Bus. &Prof. Code], § 6125.)"].)
Toddella argues Ziegler is distinguishable and does not apply because it involved a trustee who, as a nonlawyer, was unauthorized to represent the beneficiaries in court in their action against a third party, a mobilehome park. Toddella relies on Donkin v. Donkin (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 469 (Donkin), where the court distinguished Ziegler and concluded that a nonlawyer trustee who is acting adversely to the wishes of the trust beneficiaries in petitioning the probate court for instructions on how to interpret the trust is not representing the beneficiaries' interests and is thus not prohibited from representing the trust in propria persona in the probate proceeding adversely to the beneficiaries. (Id. at pp. 472-473.)
Donkin reasoned that, unlike the trustee in Ziegler who was unlawfully practicing law by suing a third party in court on behalf of the trust and its beneficiaries, nonlawyer trustees who petition for instructions are not seeking to represent the interests of the trust beneficiaries. Rather, they are seeking to fulfill their duties as trustees and to effectuate the intent of the trustor. (Donkin, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at pp. 472-473 &fn. 14; see Finkbeiner v. Gavid (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1417, 1420-1421.) Thus, in petitioning for instructions, trustees may represent themselves in propria persona without engaging in the unauthorized practice of law on behalf of the beneficiaries. (Donkin, at pp. 472-473; Finkbeiner, at pp. 1420-1421.) Donkin noted that "[t]he same is true when a trustee disagrees with the need for an accounting or surcharge based on the trustee's and beneficiaries' varying understandings of the document." (Donkin, at p. 473.)
Toddella argues that, under Donkin, nonlawyer trustees may represent themselves in any dispute adverse to trust beneficiaries without engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. We disagree. As discussed, the trustees in Donkin were seeking to fulfill their duties as trustees by petitioning the probate court for instructions on the meaning of the trust instrument and how to execute their duties as trustees. (Donkin, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at pp. 472-473.) In contrast, Toddella is not seeking any instructions or to fulfill her duties as trustee. Rather, she is seeking to use her office as trustee to represent her own beneficial interest in the Trust residue adversely to Linda's beneficial interest. But Toddella cannot represent the Trust as trustee in propria persona for her own benefit, without also representing Linda's beneficial interest in the Trust residue and thus engaging in the unauthorized practice of law on Linda's behalf. (Ziegler, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at p. 548-549; Aulisio v. Bancroft, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 1530 (conc. opn. of Fybel, J.) [Only a natural person who is the sole settlor, sole trustee, and sole beneficiary of a revocable living trust may represent themselves in propria persona in an action involving trust property; otherwise, the person is unlawfully practicing law on behalf of the settlor or other beneficiaries.].)
E. Toddella's Other Claims Lack Merit
Toddella claims the judgment must be reversed, both because Judge Reichert was biased against her and because she did not consent to have Temporary Judge Moore rule on Linda's petition. Neither of these claims find any support in the record.
When the petition was called for hearing on January 21, 2021, Toddella was not present and therefore did not object to having a temporary judge hear the petition. The court's January 21 minute order indicates that Toddella's failure to object was deemed a stipulation to the appointment of a temporary judge.
The record also reveals no judicial bias on the part of Judge Reichert against Toddella. Toddella merely asserts, without evidentiary support, that Judge Reichert "was vindictive against" her, "stifled" her from defeating Linda's "frivolous Petition," and "should not be hearing this case upon being remanded." Judge Reichert reasonably denied Toddella's motion for summary judgment, which was based on the September 2014 letter and the no contest clause. As explained, neither the letter nor the no contest clause was a viable defense to the relief sought in the petition.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover her costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278.)
We concur: MILLER, Acting P.J., MENETREZ, J.