Summary
In Brown Transport Corp. v. James, 243 Ga. 701 (257 S.E.2d 242) (1979), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule set forth in Cotton States Ins. Co. v. Studdard, 126 Ga. App. 217, 220-221 (190 S.E.2d 549) (1972), that an employer and insurance carrier are estopped from pleading the statute of limitation as a defense to a workers' compensation claim where they have induced the claimant, through misleading or deceptive conduct, whether intentional or unintentional, to postpone filing the claim until the limitation period has expired.
Summary of this case from Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. ChildersOpinion
34496.
ARGUED MARCH 12, 1979.
DECIDED MAY 31, 1979.
Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Georgia — 148 Ga. App. 32 ( 251 S.E.2d 42) (1978).
Hopkins Gresham, H. Lowell Hopkins, Patrick J. McKenna, for appellant. C. Ronald Patton, Jack R. Hancock, for appellee.
We granted this certiorari in order to resolve a conflict in the cases from the Court of Appeals. The issue is whether representations and assurances that an injured employee will be "taken care of" by the company or its insurance carrier create an estoppel barring the company or carrier from asserting the one year statute of limitations for filing a claim under the Workers' Compensation Act (Code Ann. Title 114). Code Ann. § 114-305. The Court of Appeals in this case, under facts which are reported fully in its opinion, found such an estoppel. James v. Brown Transport Corp., 148 Ga. App. 32 ( 251 S.E.2d 42) (1978). We affirm.
The rule is stated in Cotton States Ins. Co. v. Studdard, 126 Ga. App. 217, 220-221 ( 190 S.E.2d 549) (1972), quoting Young v. Sonoco Products Co., 210 S.C. 146 ( 41 S.E.2d 860) (1947): "`The conduct of defendant and its insurance carrier may be such as to estop them from presenting the statutory limitation as a defense in bar of the claim for compensation, if the effect of such conduct was to mislead or deceive claimant, whether intentional or not, and induce him to withhold or postpone filing his claim petition until more than a year had elapsed from the occurrence of the accident.'" The Court of Appeals in Day v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 141 Ga. App. 555 ( 234 S.E.2d 142) (1977), Hartford Accident Indemnity Co. v. Snyder, 126 Ga. App. 31 ( 189 S.E.2d 919) (1972), U.S. Casualty Co. v. Owens, 109 Ga. App. 834 ( 137 S.E.2d 543) (1964), Indemnity Ins. Co. v. O'Neal, 104 Ga. App. 305 ( 121 S.E.2d 689) (1961), and in Welchel v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 54 Ga. App. 511 ( 188 S.E. 357) (1936), has held that statements of assurance to the employee do not amount to the conduct which raises such an estoppel. It has also held to the contrary, however, in Employers' Ins. of Wausau v. Nolen, 137 Ga. App. 205 ( 223 S.E.2d 250) (1976), and in Cotton States Ins. Co. v. Studdard, supra.
We find Fidelity Cas. Co. of New York v. Bishop, 108 Ga. App. 422 ( 133 S.E.2d 51) (1963), distinguishable since in that case the claimant was represented by an attorney. Perkins v. Aetna Casualty c. Co., 147 Ga. App. 662 ( 249 S.E.2d 661) (1978), also differs on its facts. There the employee was told falsely by the company that there was no insurance coverage, and he would not be taken care of. This conduct also created an estoppel.
We think that where an employee relies on the statements of his employer or the insurance carrier, who are in a position of authority, that he will be taken care of, that all is well and he needn't worry, it is going too far then to allow them to raise as a bar to his claim the employee's failure to file within one year. We thus disapprove Day, Snyder, Owens, O'Neal and Welchel, supra, and approve Nolen and Studdard, supra, holding that such conduct on the part of the employer or the insurance company estops them from raising the statute of limitations as a bar to the employee's claim.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.