Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-2171 Section "K".
December 22, 2004
ORDER REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 21) filed by defendant, ConAgra Foods, Inc. ("ConAgra") seeking dismissal of the claims against it which consist of being named in the main demand along with Great Creation Shipping, Ltd. and being named as a defendant in a cross-claim filed against it by Great Creation Shipping Ltd. Having reviewed the pleadings, memoranda, exhibits, depositions and the relevant law, the Court finds no merit in the motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, James S. Broussard, was allegedly injured while embarking from the M/V GREAT CREATION while berthed at the St. Elmo Grain Terminal in Paulina, Louisiana. The berthing dock is owned and operated by defendant, ConAgra. Plaintiff is a security guard for Ben Pelot Enterprises whose job inter alia is primarily insuring that foreign seamen do not disembark the vessel in compliance with various Homeland Security procedures. Plaintiff allegedly fell as he was stepping from the vessel's portable gangway onto a stack of plywood owned by ConAgra for use in commodity separation. The crux of the motion for summary judgment is that ConAgra owes no duty to Broussard, but the gangway is merely an extension of the ship for which it has no responsibility. Moreover, it argues that Broussard was aware that the condition was dangerous, and it was open and obvious and therefore, and thus he is precluded from recovery under the law. Broussard and Great Creation Shipping alleges that there are genuine issues of material fact.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
Summary judgment should be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Substantive law determines the materiality of facts, and "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The moving party "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] . . . which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the non-movant "to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Id. at 322. "[M]ere allegations or denials" will not defeat a well-supported motion for summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Rather, the non-movant must come forward with "specific facts" that establish an issue for trial. Id.
When deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must avoid a "trial on affidavits. Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts" are tasks for the trier-of-fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. To that end, the Court must resolve disputes over material facts in the non-movant's favor. "The party opposing a motion for summary judgment, with evidence competent under Rule 56, is to be believed." Leonard v. Dixie Well Service Supply, Inc., 828 F.2d 291, 294 (5th Cir. 1987). With this standard in mind, the Court now turns to the substantive motion.
B. Analysis
ConAgra moves for summary judgment on Broussard's claim for negligence. In claims such as Broussard's, the Fifth Circuit has stated that "the gangplank has served as a rough dividing line between the state and maritime regimes." Florida Fuels, Inc. v. Citgo Petroleum, 6 F.3d 330, 334 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 207, 92 S.Ct. 418, 422 (1971)). Maritime law covers the gangway and means of access between a vessel and the dock. Id. Piers and docks on the other hand, "are deemed extensions of land." Id. As such, state law governs liability for negligence arising from accidents that occur on piers and docks. "Absent a maritime status between the parties, a dock owner's duty to crew members of a vessel using the dock is defined by the application of state law, not maritime law." Id. See also Champagne v. Nautical Offshore Corporation, 2002 W.L. 31387134 (E.D. La.) (Vance, J.).
Here, plaintiff contends that he fell as he was stepping from the vessel's portable gangway onto a stack of plywood owned by ConAgra for use in commodity separation. Plaintiff testified at his deposition that the stack upon which the gangway was resting also had an unsecured ramp lying on an angle from the stack to the wharf. (Deposition of James S. Broussard, p. 89, lines 1-6; Broussard diagram, Deposition Exhibit "1," attached to the plaintiff's Opposition as Exhibit "B").
Louisiana law has long provided that dock owners owe invitees, including employees of vessels using the dock facility the duty to provide a dock that is reasonably safe. Champagne, 2002 WL 31387134 at 2. See also Young v. Cenac Towing Company, Inc., 1997 WL 685267 (E.D. La. 1997); Sons v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 186 So.2d. 375, 376 (La.Ct.App. 1966). ConAgra asserts that it is not liable for Broussard's injuries because he was familiar with the facilities, the condition was open and obvious and it was part of the gangway. Moreover, it argues that Broussard is not an invitee.
Unquestionably, there are indications that Broussard may have been contributorily negligent, as he was aware of the placement of plywood, that it had been hosed down and that there was probably a grain residue on it. Nevertheless, this gangplank was apparently his only means of egress off of the vessel. Further, it is not clear to the Court to what extent the dock and the vessel colloborated in determining how the gangplank would be deployed. Clearly, however, the method of deployment was not safe as the gangplank was on top of plywood which was on the dock. There was a plywood ramp that also had to be utilized. The facts also indicate that Mr. Broussard had absolutely nothing to do with deploying the gangplank and had minimal, if any, control over how it was deployed. However, it is contested as to whether Mr. Broussard could have demanded that the gangplank be placed in a safer position if, in fact, one existed. As stated, the Court is not certain as to what extent, if any, ConAgra played in the determination of where the gangplank would be located. Therefore, the Court finds that there are questions of material fact as to whether ConAgra provided a reasonably safe docking facility. Given the evidence provided, the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that conAgra is not liable at least in part for Broussard's injuries. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by ConAgra Foods, Inc. (Doc. No. 21) is DENIED.