Opinion
No. 00-2318, consolidated with 00-3055, 00-3056, 00-3057
April 2, 2001
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is defendant Sheriff Foti's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, the Court denies the motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs have filed this class action against the Sheriff of Orleans Parish, Charles Foti, in his individual and official capacities. One class of plaintiffs seeks compensation for damages allegedly sustained as a result of their wrongful detention by the Orleans Parish Sheriff. The complaint alleges that these claims arise from practices of the Sheriff's office that are actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As to the detention claims, plaintiffs specifically allege the existence of a culture of "programmed incompetence" at the Orleans Parish prison, which included failing to answer phone calls, misplacing paperwork, abandoning work stations for indefinite periods of time, allowing employees to sleep on the job, a widespread tolerance of inaction and non-responsiveness to detainees' requests, refusing to bring prisoners before a magistrate within the prescribed period, and refusing to feed and/or medicate prisoners, but charging the City of New Orleans for those costs.
On December 13, 2000, the Court dismissed the unlawful detention claims of three named plaintiffs on the grounds that their claims had prescribed under the applicable statute of limitations. On January 26, 2001, plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. In the second amended complaint, Darryl Hawkins was named as an additional plaintiff in the unlawful detention class. Sheriff Foti now moves to dismiss Hawkins' unlawful detention claim under Rule 12(b)(6) on the grounds that his claim has prescribed under the applicable statute of limitations.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Rule 12(b)(6)
In a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996); American Waste Pollution Control Co. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 949 F.2d 1384, 1386 (5th Cir. 1991) Dismissal is warranted if "it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d 512, 514 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 1994)).
B. Prescription
A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it shows on its face that prescription has run. See Mann v. Adams Realty Co., Inc., 556 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1977). Accordingly, a defendant may challenge the complaint by a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Id. at 293.
The parties agree that § 1983 does not provide a statute of limitations. When a federal statute provides a cause of action but offers no specific statute of limitations, courts generally look to state law for an analogous limitations period. In § 1983 cases, courts apply the statute of limitations for personal injuries. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1942 (1985); Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 1994). Under Louisiana state law, a plaintiff has one year from the time an action accrues to bring a personal injury suit. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 3492. Therefore, the applicable statute of limitations for this § 1983 case is one year.
The Court must also determine when the limitations period actually begins to run. In deciding the accrual issue, the Court looks to federal law. Under federal law, an action accrues when a plaintiff has actual or constructive knowledge of the injury he alleges to have been caused by the defendant. See Helton v. Clements, 832 F.2d 332, 334 (5th Cir. 1987). Courts find constructive notice when "the plaintiff has information sufficient to excite attention and prompt further inquiry." Id. Such notice "includes knowledge or notice of everything to which that inquiry might lead." Adams v. First Nat. Bank of Commerce, 644 So.2d 219, 223 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1994) (citation omitted) The Court previously found in its December 13, 2000 order that "La] t the time each plaintiff was released, he had knowledge of his injury and of facts suggesting that his release was delayed improperly." Broussard v. Foti, 2000 WL 1842992, at *3 (E.D. La. Dec. 13, 2000). Therefore, the limitations period for each plaintiff began to run upon his release from jail. Hawkins was released from jail on October 18, 1999.
An action brought after the expiration of the limitations period will be dismissed as prescribed, if the limitations period has not been interrupted or tolled. Generally, state law governs tolling issues in § 1983 cases. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 269, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1943 (1985). Under Louisiana law, a class action interrupts prescription as to the claims of all members of the class. See Factor VIII or IX concentrate Blood Prods. Litigation v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 2000 WL 282787, *4 (E.D. La. March 14, 2000) (citing Williams v. State of Louisiana, 350 So.2d 131, 137 (La. 1977)). In a Title VII case, the United States Supreme Court found that the "commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action." Crown, Cork, Seal Company, Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 353-354, 102 S.Ct. 2392, 2397 (1983) ( quoting American Pipe and Construction Co v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554, 94 S.Ct. 756, 766 (1974)). The Supreme Court explained that unless the filing of a class action tolled the statute of limitations, potential class members would be induced to file motions to intervene or join in order to protect themselves against the possibility that certification is denied. See American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 555, 94 S.Ct. at 766. This would inevitably frustrate the purpose of class actions, which is to promote efficient litigation. See id. Thus, the statute of limitations remains tolled for all members of the putative class until denial of the class certification. See Parker, 462 U.S. at 353-354, 102 S.Ct. at 2397.
Here, Sheriff Foti argues that Hawkins' detention claim has prescribed because Hawkins filed suit more than one year after he was released from custody. Sheriff Foti argues that Hawkins did not file his complaint until January 26, 2001, when plaintiffs filed the second amended complaint naming Hawkins as a plaintiff. However, the relevant inquiry is whether Hawkins' claim had prescribed as of the filing of the original complaint. Hawkins' claim accrued the day he was released from jail, October 18, 1999. The original complaint was filed less than one year later on August 4, 2000. As of this date, Hawkins' claim had not prescribed, and the original class action complaint served to toll the statute of limitations. Accordingly, Hawkins' claim has not prescribed.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies defendant's motion to dismiss the unlawful detention claim of Darryl Hawkins.