Opinion
32969.
DECIDED MARCH 16, 1950.
Revocation of probation; from Athens City Court — Judge Oldham. January 28, 1950.
Jake B. Joel, for plaintiff in error.
Preston M. Almand, Solicitor, contra.
1. In a proceeding for the revocation of a probation sentence, the trial court has a wide discretion and only slight evidence will support a judgment of revocation. This court will not interfere unless a manifest abuse of this discretion appears. See Allen v. State, 78 Ga. App. 526 ( 51 S.E.2d 571); Waters v. State, 80 Ga. App. 104 ( 55 S.E.2d 677).
2. Since the judgment of the trial court for the revocation of the probation sentence is supported by the evidence, it will not be disturbed by this court.
Judgment affirmed. MacIntyre, P. J., and Gardner, J., concur.
DECIDED MARCH 16, 1950.
Pursuant to a rule presented by the Solicitor of the City Court of Athens, the judge of said court on January 27, 1950, entered an order directed to W. H. Brooks, hereinafter referred to as the defendant, to show cause why a probation sentence imposed by the court on December 15, 1949, under the terms of which the defendant's driver's license was suspended for 6 months and he was sentenced to serve 6 months in jail and thereafter to serve 6 months in the public-works camps on probation, should not be revoked. On the hearing a State trooper testified that on January 26, 1950 he apprehended the defendant driving an automobile on the Athens-Watkinsville road at a time when the defendant was under the influence of beer to such an extent that it was less safe to operate the automobile than it would have been had he not been under the influence of an intoxicant; also, at that time, the defendant was driving at a time when his driver's license had been suspended by the court.
The defendant made a statement in which he admitted that a short time prior to driving the automobile he had consumed 2 bottles of beer. He insisted, however, that he was not under the influence of the beverage to any extent whatever. He pointed out that he was forced to drive the automobile due to an emergency which he fully explained to the court. A number of witnesses for the defendant testified that they saw the defendant on the occasion in question and that he was not under the influence of intoxicants to any extent whatever. The statement of the defendant as to the emergency forcing him to temporarily operate the automobile was also supported by the sworn testimony.