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In Brooks, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant violated the FDCPA when he filed a Notice of Claim asserting that he was entitled to attorney's fees in the amount of $1340.00, or one-third of the debt allegedly owed.
Summary of this case from Kelley v. MED-1 Solutions, LLC (S.D.Ind. 2-6-2008)Opinion
IP 00-1467-C-M/S
June 15, 2001
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
This cause is now before the Court on defendants', Auto Sales Service, Inc.'s ("Auto Sales'") and Richard Malad's ("Malad's") (collectively the "Defendants'"), motion to dismiss the claims brought against them by plaintiff, Ms. Holly Brooks ("Brooks"). In her complaint, Brooks alleges that the Malad violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692-1692n, when he filed a Notice of Claim in the Marion County Small Claims Court, Decatur Township Division to collect a debt that Brooks owed Auto Sales. Brooks alleges that Malad's actions violated eight sections of the FDCPA.
Further, Brooks alleges that Malad's actions constitute attorney deceit in violation of Indiana Code § 33-21-1-8 and that Brooks was injured as a proximate result of that violation. Brooks also brings claims against Auto Sales alone, namely that Auto Sales violated various provisions of the secured transactions provisions of the Indiana Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") and that Auto Sales violated various provisions of the Indiana Uniform Consumer Credit Code ("UCCC"). Finally, Brooks alleges that the Defendants committed statutory deception for which she is entitled to damages pursuant to Indiana Code §§ 35-43-5-3(a)(2) and 34-24-3-1, and that the Defendants violated the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act ("IDCSA").
The Defendants allege that Brooks' claims should be dismissed either because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over her claims or because Brooks fails to make allegations that the Defendants committed some element of her claims.
The issues have been fully briefed, and the motion is ripe for ruling. For the reasons discussed herein, the Court DENIES the Defendants' motion to dismiss the FDCPA claim or Count I of the amended complaint. Finding it unclear whether the Defendants wish to pursue dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2), the Court will hold the remainder of the Defendants' motion in abeyance until the parties have had an opportunity to brief that issue as described below.
I. FACTUAL PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The facts in the light most favorable to Brooks follow. Brooks is a resident of Anderson, Indiana. Am. Compl. ¶ 3. On September 16, 1998, Brooks entered into a consumer credit contract, identified as a Retail Installment Contract and Security Agreement (the "Contract"), with Auto Sales, an Indiana corporation, for the purchase of a used car. Id. ¶¶ 6, 4. According to Brooks' complaint, the Contract states in relevant part that "if, after default, this [C]ontract is referred for collection to an attorney who is not a salaried employee of the holder hereof [Ms. Brooks] agrees to pay reasonable attorney's fees and all costs allowed by law." Id. ¶ 8.
Brooks stopped making payments due under the subject contract. Id. ¶ 9. As a result, on June 18 or 19, 1999, Auto Sales caused the subject vehicle to be repossessed. Id. ¶ 10. By letter dated June 19, 1999, Auto Sales provide Brooks a "NOTICE OF SALE" ("notice of sale letter"). Id. ¶ 11. Brooks received the notice of sale letter by certified mail, return receipt requested, sometime after June 19, 1999. Id. ¶ 12.
The notice of sale letter states in relevant part:
TAKE NOTICE THAT the above described goods, which have been repossessed by reason of default in the terms of a lein [sic] retention instrument held by the undersigned will be offered for sale at auction to the highest bidder at the date, time, and place stated above, unless prior to said sale the amount now due is paid to the undersigned, plus the expenses of repossessing, storing, repairing, and selling of the same. The undersigned hereby reserves the right to bid and purchase at the said sale.
Id. Exh. B., Letter, From Auto Sales Serv. to Holly Brooks, NOTICE OF SALE, June 19, 1999 ("Notice of Sale Letter"). The notice of sale letter stated that the date of sale was June 29, 1999 at "12:00 Noon." Id. Further, the notice of sale letter stated that Brooks owed $8,069.09. Id. Auto Sales sold the vehicle for $2,875.00 at its regular business address on August 5, 1999. Id. ¶¶ 20, 22. On September 21, 1999, attorney Malad filed a Notice of Claim in the Marion County Small Claims Court, Decatur Township, under cause number 49K02-9909-SC-4994 with the caption: Auto Sales Service, Inc. v. Holly Brooks. Id. ¶ 24; id. Exh. A., Notice of Claim, 49K02-9909-SC4994, Sept. 21, 1999 ("Notice of Claim"). The Notice of Claim states in relevant part:
[T]he Defendant is/are indebted to the Plaintiff in the sum of $5360.90 FOR REASONS STATED HEREIN: Plaintiff prays for judgment in the principal amount of $4020.90 plus pre-judgment interest of $2.12 per diem from October 19, 1999, attorney's fees of $1340.00, all arising from a breach of the Retail Installment Contract and Security Agreement (attached hereto), plus post-judgment interest, court costs, and all other proper relief. This is an attempt to collect a debt, and any information will be used for that purpose.
Id.
Brooks alleges in her complaint that "Auto Sales regularly charged, and was routinely awarded, typically by default, a flat percentage, rounded to the nearest dollar, of one-third (1/3), or thirty-three and third [sic] percent (33.33%) of the claimed amount of principal as an attorney's fee," when it litigated claims in Marion County Small Claims Court. Am. Compl. ¶ 29. Further, Brooks similarly alleges that Malad regularly charged and typically was awarded such a fee by default. Id. ¶ 30.
Brooks appeared at the trial in Marion County Small Claims Court and argued the case on its merits. Defs.' Mem. in Supp., at 1. On December 7, 1999, the Marion County Small Claims Court Judge, the Honorable Jeffrey A. Berg, entered judgment for Auto Sales and against Brooks in the amount of $4,021.90. Id., Exh. 1, Judgment Ord., Marion County Small Claims Court, 49K02-9909-SC4994, Dec. 7, 1999 ("Small Claims Judgment").
The Court notes that the Marion County Small Claims Court Judgment Order is a document outside the complaint. Generally, when the parties ask a court to look at documents outside the complaint when ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must convert the motion to a motion for summary judgment. See Levenstein v. Salafsy, 164 F.3d 345, 347 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that when a defendant attaches other documents to their motion to dismiss "the court must either convert the 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 and proceed in accordance with the latter rule, or exclude the documents attached to the motion to dismiss and continue under Rule 12[b]"); Travel All Over the World, Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudia Arabia, 73 F.3d 1423, 1429 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that "[i]f the district court considers matters outside the pleadings in connection with a motion to dismiss, it must treat the motion as one for summary judgment"). However, a court may take judicial notice of matters of public record, orders or other items appearing in the record of the case to decide a motion to dismiss. See Doherty v. City of Chicago, 75 F.3d 318, 325 n. 4 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Mack v. South Bay Beer Distrib., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986), abrogated on other grounds by, 501 U.S. 104 (1991)); Jefferson v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., 106 F.3d1245, 1250 n. 14 (5th Cir. 1997). In addition, the Court may use documents outside the pleadings to decide motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction where the attack is factual rather than facial. See Garcia v. Copenhaver, Bell Assocs., 104 F.3d 1256, 1260-61 (7th Cir. 1997) (describing the difference between a facial and a factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction and the corresponding treatment of each).
Brooks filed the instant suit on September 20, 2000, alleging that the Notice of Sale provided by Auto Sales was inconsistent with Article 9 of the UCC and UCCC. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 49-54. The Defendants aver that these affirmative defenses were not raised in the small claims court action. Defs.' Mem. in Supp., at 2. Brooks also alleges in her complaint that Malad violated the FDCPA and the Indiana Attorney Deceit statute, Indiana Code § 33-21-1-8. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 31-33; 44-48. In addition, Brooks alleges that both Defendants violated Indiana Code § 35-43-5-3(a)(2), Indiana's criminal deception statute, for which she can receive damages pursuant to Indiana Code § 34-24-3-1. Id. ¶¶ 34-39. Finally, Brooks alleges that both defendants violated Indiana's Deceptive Consumer Sales Act. Id. ¶¶ 40-43.
The Defendants moved to dismiss all of the claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) ("Rule 12(b)(6)"). Further, the Defendants' motion appears to challenge the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to issues and claims that arise from or are directly related to the transaction tried on its merits in Marion County Small Claims Court.
II. STANDARD FOR MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO RULE 12(b)(6)
When ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and the inferences reasonably drawn from them. See Baxter by Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 1994).
Dismissal is appropriate only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint that would entitle her to relief. See Hi-Lite Prods. Co. v. American Home Prods. Corp., 11 F.3d 1402, 1405 (7th Cir. 1993). This standard means that if any set of facts, even hypothesized facts, could be proven consistent with the complaint, then the complaint must not be dismissed. See Sanjuan v. American Bd. of Psychiatry and Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1159 (1996). Brooks may receive the benefit of hypotheses consistent with the complaint. See id. (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). Further, Brooks is "not required to plead the particulars of [her] claim[s]," Hammes v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 33 F.3d 774 (7th Cir. 1994), except in cases alleging fraud or mistake where the plaintiffs must plead the circumstances constituting such fraud or mistake with particularity. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b); Hammes, 33 F.3d at 778.
"Particularity" requires plaintiffs to plead the who, what, when, where, and how of the alleged fraud. See Ackerman v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 172 F.3d 467, 469 (7th Cir. 1999); DiLeo v. Ernst Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990). Finally, the Court need not ignore facts set out in the complaint that undermine Brooks' claims, see Homeyer v. Stanley Tulchin Assoc., 91 F.3d 959, 961 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 724 (7th cir. 1986)), nor is the Court required to accept Brooks' legal conclusions. See Reed v. City of Chicago, 77 F.3d 1049, 1051 (7th Cir. 1996); Gray v. Dane County, 854 F.2d 179, 182 (7th Cir. 1988).
With these standards in mind, the Court will address each of the Defendants' arguments.
III. DISCUSSION
The Defendants move this Court to dismiss Brooks' claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the rule for dismissal because of a failure to state a claim. However, as Brooks points out in her brief, apparently the Defendants also challenge this Court's subject matter jurisdiction over Brooks' claims under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. See Defs.' Mem. in Supp., at 2-3. In addition, the Defendants apparently wish to invoke the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which precludes a district court from reviewing a claim already decided by a state court. See Manley v. City of Chicago, 236 F.3d 392, 396 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1982)). The Court will address Brooks' federal claim first under both subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, then proceed to her state law claims.
A. FDCPA CLAIM
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The Defendants allege that Brooks filed her complaint as a reactionary measure to the adverse judgment in the Marion County Small Claims Court. In essence, the Defendants aver that all of Brooks' claims arise from and are directly related to the issues tried by the Marion County Small Claims Court.
Therefore, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Brooks' claims because her sole remedy is to appeal the Marion County Small Claims Court decision.
Although the Defendants rely upon the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel to argue that Brooks' claims should be dismissed, it is unclear that those doctrines apply under the circumstances presented here. Moreover, the Defendants mention, but fail to evaluate application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which "precludes lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over claims that would require them to review a final judgment of a state court." Manley, 236 F.3d at 396. The doctrine applies to claims that were actually raised in the state court and also to claims that are inextricably intertwined with state court decisions, even if those issues were not raised in the state court action. See id.; see also Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir. 1999). Because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine challenges the subject matter jurisdiction of a lower federal court, the Court must address whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies before proceeding to affirmative defenses such as res judicata or collateral estoppel. See Long, 182 F.3d at 554-55.
To determine whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies in the current case, the Court must ask "`whether the injury alleged by [Brooks] resulted from the state court judgment itself or is distinct from that judgment.'" Id. at 554 (quoting Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1365 (7th Cir. 1996)). If Brooks' injury arises from the state court judgment itself, then the Rooker-Feldman doctrine dictates that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at 555 (citing Centres, Inc. v. Town of Brookfield, 148 F.3d 699, 701-02 (7th Cir. 1998)). However, if Brooks' injury is distinct from the state court judgment and not inextricably intertwined with it, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply. See id. (citing Centres, 148 F.3d at 701-02). If the Court determines that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply, then it will consider whether res judicata or collateral estoppel apply. See id.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to Brooks' claim under the FDCPA. Brooks' FDCPA claim challenges Malad's assertion in the Notice of Claim that he was entitled to attorney's fees of $1,340.00, which amounts to approximately one-third of the debt Brooks allegedly owed. Brooks claims that this assertion violates several sections of the FDCPA prohibiting a debt collector from using any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of a debt because her agreements with Auto Sales limited the attorney's fees recoverable to "reasonable" fees. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 31-33. Regardless of the outcome in the Marion County Small Claims Court, Brooks' cause of action under the FDCPA arose prior to entry of judgment. Accord Long, 182 F.3d at 555-556 (holding that an evicted tenant's claims under the FDCPA were independent from the eviction proceedings, therefore, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply). Furthermore, the question of whether Malad's practice violated the provisions of the FDCPA is independent of the issues of breach of contract that were litigated in the small claims court. Accord Clark v. Priority Financial Servs., Inc., IP98-1319-C-B/S, Unpublished, Entry Resolving Pending Motions, at 10 (S.D.Ind. Sept. 29, 2000). Cf. Woolley v. Krisor Assocs., 2000 U.S. dist. LEXIS 7069 (S.D.Ind. 2000). For these reasons, the Court finds that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to Brooks' claim against Malad pursuant to the FDCPA.
For similar reasons, the Court finds that neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel doctrines bar Brooks' FDCPA claim. Malad argues that Brooks cannot collaterally attack the Marion County Small Claims Court's award of attorney's fees by filing a claim under the FDCPA. Malad cites Spears v. Brennan, 745 N.E.2d 862 (Ind.Ct.App. 2001), in support of this theory. In Spears, a plaintiff brought a claim under the FDCPA against an attorney who had prepared pleadings in a suit to recover a consumer debt against the plaintiff. The attorney had sought a one-third contingency fee in the claim. Id. at 870-872.
The Indiana Court of Appeals held that the attorney's request for a one-third contingency fee for the collection of a consumer debt was not a violation of the FDCPA because the plaintiff could have challenged the small claims court's decision that the fee was reasonable; the FDCPA claim was a collateral attack on that order. Id. at 872. The Spears court reasoned that under Indiana law a contingent fee is presumably a "reasonable fee," and that the small claims court's determination that the fee was reasonable should be challenged at the trial court level rather than on collateral attack. Id.
In the federal system, collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is an affirmative defense that prohibits re-litigation of an issue (a) between the same parties that (b) is the same as that involved in a prior action, (c) was actually litigated in the prior suit, and (d) was essential to the final judgment. See Adair v. Sherman, 230 F.3d 890, 893-94 (7th Cir. 2000). Malad asserts that whether he was entitled to attorney's fees at all and whether the amount was reasonable were issues tried in small claims court. Therefore, Brooks' allegation that he violated the FDCPA by claiming a one-third contingency fee in the Notice of Claim was actually litigated in the prior suit and necessary to the outcome.
But, Malad fails to provide evidence that the issue of whether he violated the FDCPA because of his representation in the Notice of Claim of his attorney's fees was litigated in the small claims court action.
Although the result in the Marion Small Claims Court may affect the damages Brooks is entitled to under the FDCPA, Malad has not shown that the issue of his misrepresentation and liability under the FDCPA was fully and necessarily litigated in the prior action.
Further, as Brooks points out, "pursuant to Rule 11(F) of the Indiana Small Claims Rules, `a judgment shall be res judicata only as to the amount involved in the particular action and shall not be considered an adjudication of any fact at issue in any other action or court.'" Pl.'s Resp., at 4 (quoting Ind. Small Claims Rule 11(F)) (emphasis deleted). Indiana courts have stated that Indiana Small Claims Rule 11(F) "was intended primarily to limit issue preclusion where some fact in the small claim action is at issue in another case." Cook v. Wozniak, 500 N.E.2d 231, 233 (Ind.Ct.App. 1986), adopted and aff'd, 513 N.E.2d 1222 (Ind. 1987). Therefore, even if the small claims court had adjudicated the issue of Malad's liability for violation of the FDCPA, it would not estopp Brooks from pursuing her FDCPA claim.
The Court finds that subject matter jurisdiction over Brooks' FDCPA claim is proper. It will now turn to Malad's arguments pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
2. Failure to State a Claim
Brooks' amended complaint alleges that Malad violated eight provisions of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e that prohibit the use of any false, deceptive or misleading representation in connection with collection of a consumer debt. Specifically, Brooks alleges that Malad (1) engaged in conduct the natural consequences of which was to harass, oppress or abuse Brooks, (2) used false, deceptive or misleading representations or means in connection with collection of the debt, (3) represented falsely the character, nature, and amount of the alleged debt, (4) represented falsely the services rendered or compensation that may lawfully be received by him for collection of the debt, (5) threatened to take or actually took action that could not legally be taken, (6) used false representations or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect the debt,(7) used unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to colle the debt, and (8) attempted to collect an amount when such amounts were not expressly permitted by law or the agreement giving rise to the alleged debt, and in fact were prohibited by statute, rule or custom. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 32(a)-32(h). Notwithstanding this lengthy list of allegations, Brooks summarizes her claim in the following manner:
"Plaintiff contends that an attorney is not allowed to request attorney's fees based on a percentage of a consumer's debt" unless the agreement between the creditor and debtor so provides. Pl.'s Resp., at 10-14. Thus, the Court finds that Brooks' claims would be valid, if at all, under allegations 2, 4, 7 8 above.
Malad argues, however, that filing a Notice of Claim with a disputed amount listed as a claim, including the amount of attorney's fees, is not a misrepresentation of the amount owed by Brooks in violation of the FDCPA. Moreover, Malad contends that Brooks made no allegations in her complaint that the attorney's fee requested was prohibited by statute, rule or custom, therefore, her claim must fail.
The Court finds that Brooks' complaint states a claim that Malad violated the FDCPA provisions that prohibit "[t]he false representation of — . . . any services rendered or compensation which may be lawfully received by any debt collector for the collection of a debt," 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(B), and that prohibit "unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt" by trying to collect "any amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation)" that was not "expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law," 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1).
Brooks' complaint alleges that the Notice of Claim Malad filed in the Marion County Small Claims Court request attorney's fees of $1,340.00, or approximately one-third of the principal balance owed to Auto Sales. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 26, 27. She also alleges that her contract with Auto Sales required that she pay "reasonable attorney's fees." Id. ¶ 8. Further, Brooks alleges that Indiana Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5 governs the determination of "reasonable attorney's fees." Id. ¶ 28. Finally, Brooks alleges that Malad's action, presumably filing the Notice of Claim, falsely represented the compensation that may be lawfully received by him for the collection of the subject debt and the same action was an attempt to collect a fee that was not expressly permitted by the agreement giving rise to the alleged debt. Id. ¶¶ 32(d) 32(h). These allegations, taken together, state a claim that Malad violated the FDCPA when he designated a specific amount of attorney's fees in the Notice of Claim. Brooks' remaining claims under the FDCPA are unsupported by the allegations of her complaint.
Therefore, Malad's motion to dismiss the FDCPA claim in its entirety is hereby DENIED. Brooks' claims pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (2)(B) and 1692f(1) survive; however, her claims pursuant to other sections of the FDCPA are dismissed.
Malad also argues that Brooks failed to provide evidence that she was damaged as a result of Malad's alleged violation of the FDCPA. However, Brooks is not required to provide "evidence" of damages to defend against a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Moreover, the Seventh Circuit has made clear that under the FDCPA proof of actual damages is unnecessary to recover statutory damages. Keele v. Wexler, 149 F.3d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 499 (7th Cir. 1997); Baker v. G.C. Servs. Corp., 766 F.2d 775, 781 (9th Cir. 1982)). The Keele court explained: "[T]he FDCPA is designed to protect consumers from the unscrupulous antics of debt collectors, irrespective of whether a valid debt actually exists. See Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 341 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting Baker, 766 F.2d at 777). Thus, the plaintiff who admittedly owes a legitimate debt has standing to sue if the [FDCPA] is violated by an unprincipled debt collector." Id. at 595. Therefore, Malad's attempt to dismiss the FDCPA claim on this ground also fails.
B. STATE CLAIMS
In her complaint, Brooks alleges that this Court has supplemental subject matter jurisdiction over her state claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) because they arise out of the same case or controversy. Am. Compl. ¶ 2. See also International College of Surgeons v. City of Chicago, 153 F.3d 356, 366 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that supplemental jurisdiction is proper over "accompanying state law claims arising out of the same case or controversy).
It is clear that the Defendants feel dismissal of the claims is appropriate pursuant to the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. However, these doctrines are defenses, which are usually addressed after a court determines it has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims. Adair, 230 F.3d at 893-94. Further, although the Defendants never specifically state that they wish to dismiss Brooks' complaint on the basis of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Defendants' do argue that dismissal is proper because Brooks has asked the Court to sit as an appellate court over the small claims court judgment, which is prohibited under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a subject matter jurisdiction doctrine and should be addressed before the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. See Adair, 230 F.3d at 893-94.
But, the Defendants' brief also obliquely suggests that dismissal of the state law claims would be proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2), because the state law claims predominate over the federal law claim. See Defs.' Reply, at 12 (stating that "the Plaintiff has attempted to avoid the glaring error that this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the seven state counts that predominate this entire action"). Because it is unclear from the pleadings whether the Defendants actually wanted to raise this issue and have Brooks address it, the Court will allow the Defendants fifteen days from the date of this Order to file a supplemental motion to dismiss pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2) and supporting brief. Brooks shall have fifteen days thereafter to respond; the Defendants seven days thereafter to reply. If the Defendants do not file such a supplemental motion, the Court will presume the Defendants do not wish to raise the issue with the Court and the Court will proceed to rule on the motion addressed in part by this Order.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Court has found that it has subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claim and that her complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted. Therefore, the Defendants' motion to dismiss Count I of the plaintiff's amended complaint is DENIED.
It is unclear whether the Defendants intended to raise the issue of whether this Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 in light of this ruling. Because subject matter jurisdiction is a fundamental tenet of federal jurisprudence, the Court will allow the Defendants fifteen days from the date of this Order to supplement its motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim with a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and supporting brief. If such motion is made, the plaintiff shall have fifteen days thereafter to respond; the Defendants shall then have seven days thereafter to reply. At that time, the Court will address the plaintiff's state law claims.