Opinion
Civil Action 2:19-cv-1519
11-01-2021
JOHN IRA BRONSON, JR., Petitioner, v. SUPERINTENDENT KEVIN KAUFFMAN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, Respondents.
John P. Friedmann Washington County District Attorney's Office
John P. Friedmann Washington County District Attorney's Office
United States District Judge Christy Criswell Wiegand
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Cynthia Reed Eddy Chief United States Magistrate Judge
I. Recommendation
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss Habeas Corpus Petition filed by Respondents. (ECF No. 12). This motion has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation. For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that the motion be denied.
II. Report
A. Background
Petitioner, John Ira Bronson, Jr., a prisoner incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon, initiated this action on November 12, 2019, by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). (ECF No. 4). Petitioner is challenging the judgment of sentence imposed upon him by the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County on January 24, 2012. On March 18, 2020, Respondents filed the instant motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer raising two defenses: that the petition is untimely and that each of the grounds for relief raised in the petition has been procedurally defaulted. (ECF No. 12). Petitioner filed his response on September 9, 2021. (ECF No. 40). The motion is ripe for disposition.
B. Analysis
Respondents first contend that the petition is untimely under AEDPA, which generally requires a state prisoner to file his or her petition within one year after his or her conviction becomes final. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). A state-court criminal judgment becomes “final” within the meaning of § 2244(d) at the conclusion of direct review or at the expiration of time for seeking such review. See Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 418 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that a judgment becomes “final” at the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time for seeking such review); Pa.R.A.P 2521 (“a judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, which includes discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking review.”). However, the filing of a post-conviction relief petition may statutorily toll (i.e., suspend) the running of the one-year habeas limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (“The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection”). Thus, in analyzing whether a petition for writ of habeas corpus has been timely filed under the one-year limitations period, a federal court must undertake a three-part inquiry. First, the court must determine the “trigger date” for the one-year limitations period pursuant to section 2244(d)(1). Next, the court must determine whether any “properly filed” applications for post-conviction or collateral relief were pending during the limitations period that would toll the statute pursuant to section 2244(d)(2). And third, the court must determine whether any of the other statutory exceptions or equitable tolling should be applied on the facts presented.
Here, the parties agree on the basics. They agree that, pursuant to § 2244(d)(1), the triggering date of the limitations period is July 30, 2015, the date on which Petitioner's judgment became final, which triggered the statutory tolling provision in § 2244(d)(2). Petitioner's one-year limitations period began to run on the date the judgment became final.
They also agree that Petitioner properly filed a PCRA Petition on September 2, 2015. As of that date, 34 days of the limitations period had expired. They also agree that Petitioner's application for post-conviction review was pending in the Pennsylvania courts until, at least March 28, 2018, when the Superior Court of Pennsylvania dismissed Petitioner's PCRA appeal for not filing a brief. (ECF No. 12-1, Exh. 8). From here, however, the parties' points of view diverge as far as calculating the limitations period is concerned.
According to Respondents, appellate review of the denial of the PCRA petition concluded on March 28, 2018, when the Superior Court dismissed Petitioner's appeal. (Mot. at ¶ 31). In support of their position, Respondents argue that Petitioner's “Application for Reconsideration of Order, ” which was recognized as an application for reargument, was untimely filed, and as a result, the PCRA proceedings had concluded and the instant federal habeas petition was filed “607 days following the conclusion of the PCRA appellate proceedings.” (Id. at ¶ 32.) According to Petitioner, however, the limitations period was tolled until December 19, 2018, when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of appeal (“PAA”) (ECF No. 12-1, Exh. 10) and the AEDPA limitations clock resumed the next day. At that point, he had 331 days, or until November 16, 2019 to file a timely habeas petition, making the filing of his habeas petition timely by four days. (ECF No. 40).
After a careful review of the record and the arguments of the parties, the undersigned recommends that the motion to dismiss be denied in its entirety. The timeline for filing an application for reargument in the Superior Court is 14 days after entry of the order. See Pa.R.A.P. 2542(a)(1). The Superior Court docket reflects that Petitioner's application was docketed on April 18, 2018, 20 days after the entry of the order dismissing the appeal. (ECF No. 12-1, Exh. 7). Pennsylvania state courts, however, apply the prison mailbox rule. Common sense dictates that Petitioner likely delivered his application for reargument to prison officials for mailing sometime before the date the state court received and docketed the filing on April 18, 2018. Without the application being a part of the record currently before the Court, the undersigned cannot find as a matter of law that the application was untimely filed.
Petitioner filed a PAA with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on May 21, 2018 (ECF No. 12-1, Exh. 7), which was denied on December 19, 2018. (ECF No. 12-1, Exh. 10). The AEDPA limitations clock resumed on December 20, 2018, and was set to expire 331 days later (365 days - 34 days = 331 days), on November 16, 2019. However, because November 16, 2019, was a Saturday, the limitations period was extended to Monday, November 18, 2019. Petitioner placed his federal habeas petition in the prison mailing system on November 12, 2019, and thus the filing was timely by 6 days. ECF No. 1 at 34. Consequently, Respondents' motion to dismiss as untimely should be denied.
See Fed.R.Civ.P 6(a)(1)(C) (instructing that when computing time “include the last day of the period, but if the last day is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the period continues to run until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.).
Pursuant to the prison mailbox rule, the petition is deemed filed at the time the petition is placed in the prison legal mail system. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988); Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109, 113 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that “a pro se prisoner's habeas petition is deemed filed at the moment he delivers it to prison officials for mailing to the district court.”)
Respondents alternatively contend that each of Petitioner's grounds for relief has been procedurally defaulted due to his failure to raise these claims in an available state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (requiring a habeas corpus applicant to first exhaust his available state court remedies); Rolan v. Coleman, 680 F.3d 317 (3d Cir. 2012) (explaining that an unexhausted claim which can no longer be presented to the state courts had been procedurally defaulted.). The Court cannot address this aspect of the motion to dismiss without reviewing the entire state court record. Consequently, Respondents' motion to dismiss on this basis should be denied. The Court will revisit the issue of procedural default once Respondents have submitted a full answer to the petition and supplied the entire state court record.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully recommended that Respondents' motion to dismiss (ECF No. 12) be denied. Respondents should be ordered to file a full answer in accordance with the Court's prior order (ECF No. 5) within 30 days of the adoption of this Report and Recommendation. Petitioner should be directed to submit a response, if so desired, within 30 days thereafter.
IV. Notice
Any party is permitted to file Objections to this Report and Recommendation to the assigned United States District Judge. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d) and 72(b)(2), and LCvR 72.D.2, Petitioner, because he is a non-electronically registered party, must file objections to this Report and Recommendation by November 18, 2021, and Respondents, because they are electronically registered parties, must file objections, if any, by November 15, 2021. The parties are cautioned that failure to file Objections within this timeframe “will waive the right to appeal.” Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Siers v. Morrash, 700 F.2d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 1983). See also EEOC v. City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 100 (3d Cir. 2017) (describing standard of appellate review when no timely and specific objections are filed as limited to review for plain error).