From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

Broadcast Music, v. United States Shoe Corp.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
Jun 2, 1982
678 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1982)

Summary

noting that a person of "ordinary intelligence" could understand the phrase "commonly used in private homes" and finding that phrase did not render Act void for vagueness

Summary of this case from Cass County Music Co. v. Muedini

Opinion

No. 81-5162.

Argued and Submitted February 1, 1982.

Decided June 2, 1982.

R. O. Klausmeyer, Frost Jacobs, Cincinnati, Ohio, for defendants-appellants.

Peter C. Smoot, Beverly Hills, Cal., argued, for plaintiff-appellee; Kaplan, Livingston, Goodwin, Berkowitz Selvin, Beverly Hills, Cal., on brief.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Before GOODWIN and TANG, Circuit Judges, and SOLOMON, Senior District Judge.

Hon. Gus J. Solomon, Senior United States District Judge for the District of Oregon, sitting by designation.


This is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment against appellants (Casual Corner) for infringement of public performance rights belonging to Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI).

Appellants operate a chain of more than 600 women's retail apparel stores under the name Casual Corner. In many of their stores, regular radio broadcasts were played to the public through the use of a single radio receiver connected to four or more speakers mounted on the store ceiling. These radio programs included copyrighted songs. BMI is the licensee of the public performance rights for many of the songs which were played over these facilities without BMI's permission.

BMI filed an action against appellants for money damages and injunctive relief for the unauthorized public performance of copyrighted music in four Casual Corner stores. In response to BMI's motion for summary judgment, appellants contended that they did not infringe BMI's copyright because the music they played was transmitted over "a single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes," performance authorized by 17 U.S.C. § 110(5).

The district court granted BMI's motion for summary judgment.

Copyright owners have exclusive rights to perform or authorize the performance of their copyrighted works. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4). In Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 95 S.Ct. 2040, 45 L.Ed.2d 84 (1975), the Supreme Court held that a small fast-food shop of 1055 square feet in which radio programs were played by means of a radio receiver and four speakers was exempt under the existing (1909) copyright laws.

In 1976, primarily as a result of this decision, Congress enacted Section 110 ( 17 U.S.C. § 110) to limit the exemption from rights granted copyright owners under Section 106.

Section 110 exempts:

(5) communication of a transmission embodying a performance or display of a work by the public reception of the transmission on a single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes, unless —

(A) a direct charge is made to see or hear the transmission; or

(B) the transmission thus received is further transmitted to the public . . .

The legislative history of Section 110(5) shows that Congress expressly considered the Akien decision and regarded Aiken as the "outer limit" of the exemption under the new law. H.Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 87 (1976), U.S. Code Cong. Admin. News 1976, p. 5659. Casual Corner exceeds this limit, because each store has a commercial monaural system, with widely separated speakers of a type not commonly used in private homes, and the size and nature of the operation justifies the use of a commercial background music system.

For an interesting discussion of the legislation, see Korman, Performance Rights in Music Under Section 110 and 118 of the 1976 Copyright Act, 22 N.Y.L.S.L.Rev. 521 (1977).

In Sailor Music v. Gap Stores, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) Judge Gagliardi, in a careful and well-reasoned opinion on facts almost identical to those in this case, considered the reach of the exemption provision asserted by appellants here. Judge Gagliardi granted the copyright owner summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 668 F.2d 84 (2nd Cir. 1981), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 102 S.Ct. 2012, 71 L.Ed.2d 468 (1982).

There is no merit in appellants' contention that the provision "commonly used in private homes" renders the Act void for vagueness. We believe that a person of ordinary intelligence can understand and apply the requirements of the Act. The affidavits of the experts in this case showed it.

The record supports the district court's holding that there was no genuine issue of fact and that BMI was entitled to a summary judgment.

AFFIRMED.


Summaries of

Broadcast Music, v. United States Shoe Corp.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
Jun 2, 1982
678 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1982)

noting that a person of "ordinary intelligence" could understand the phrase "commonly used in private homes" and finding that phrase did not render Act void for vagueness

Summary of this case from Cass County Music Co. v. Muedini

In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. United States Shoe Corp., 678 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1982), the court held that the defendant failed to qualify for the exemption "because each store has a commercial monaural system, with widely separated speakers of a type not commonly used in a private home, and the size and nature of the operation justifies the use of a commercial background music system."

Summary of this case from Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire's Boutiques
Case details for

Broadcast Music, v. United States Shoe Corp.

Case Details

Full title:BROADCAST MUSIC, INC., PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. THE UNITED STATES SHOE…

Court:United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit

Date published: Jun 2, 1982

Citations

678 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1982)

Citing Cases

Springsteen v. Plaza Roller Dome, Inc.

The court thus held that Gap was not a small commercial establishment whose reception and performance of…

Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider

17 U.S.C. § 106(3) and (4). See also, Broadcast Music, Inc. v. United Shoe Corp., 678 F.2d 816, 817 (9th Cir.…