Opinion
November 20, 1931.
1. RESTRICTIONS: For School or Residence Purposes: Violation. Where the trust agreement reserved lots for public school purposes, but gave the owner the right to determine whether they should be used for public school or residence purposes, and he conveyed them to individuals instead of to the school district, the grantees were authorized to use them for residence purposes, and did not violate the restrictions by devoting them to such use.
2. ____: Private Street: Dedication: Exchange for Lots: Quitclaim Deed. Where by the trust agreement the trustees were vested with the legal title to private streets impressed with an easement for the common benefit of persons who own or occupy lots in the restricted district, and were authorized and charged with the duty to repair, maintain and improve such private streets, and also authorized, if they should conclude that such action would be for the benefit of the owners of the lots, to dedicate one or all of said streets to public use, a conveyance by quitclaim deed by the trustees of one of such private streets to the school district in exchange for a portion of such lots for public use, was not such a dedication of the street to public use as was contemplated by the trust agreement and did not convey the lots to the school district, and was invalid. The trustees were only authorized to dedicate private streets for public use as public streets. Nor did the authority to improve streets authorize the trustees to trade a street for the purpose of improving another street.
3. ____: Residences: School Purposes. A provision in the trust agreement restricting the use of lots to business or residence purposes does not authorize the use of the lots for public school purposes, and such restriction is enforceable in favor of the residence owners against the school district.
4. ____: Violations: Acquiescence: Abandonment. Acquiescence in immaterial violations of a restrictive covenant does not preclude the resident owner from restraining material violations which will operate to his injury and damage. Where the general plans for a restricted residential district have not been abandoned, and it does not appear that the restrictions imposed on all lots for residence purposes have been generally violated, failure of the owners of residential lots, for ten years, to complain of a violation of the restrictions on lots in another block, does not preclude them from complaining of material violations of the restrictions on their lots, where the evidence does not sustain a contention of acquiescence or knowledge of violations.
5. ____: ____: Injunction: School Board: Decree. In violating residential restrictions imposed on plaintiffs' lots, the school board, by the erection of an auditorium, gymnasium and other school buildings on said lots, unlawfully appropriated property belonging to them, for which an injunction will lie; and a decree will be entered continuing the case for such a reasonable time as will afford the school district an opportunity to lawfully acquire the lots, and if it fails to so acquire them a decree will then be entered enjoining the school district and its board from using the building it has already erected on said lots for an auditorium or other school purposes, and from erecting upon said lots other buildings for school purposes.
Appeal from St. Louis County Circuit Court. — Hon. G.A. Wurdeman, Judge.
REVERSED AND REMANDED ( with directions).
Daniel Bartlett for appellants.
(1) The restrictions and limitations against the use of lots 1 and 2 in block 2 for school purposes create and vest in the plaintiffs and interveners a right of property, an easement in and to each of said lots which is appurtenant to their own respective lots. Peters v. Buckner, 288 Mo. 618, 17 A.L.R. 543, 232 S.W. 1027. (a) Likewise, the easement created by the declaration of trust and agreement over and upon the private right of way known as Cornell Avenue was impressed for the common benefit of all lot owners in the subdivision, including plaintiffs and interveners. Peters v. Buckner, supra. (b) Such rights of property a court of equity will act by injunction to protect. Pierce v. Union Trust Co., 278 S.W. (Mo. Sup.) 398. (2) The "defense" offered by defendants that the property of plaintiffs and interveners will be benefited more by violation of restrictions than by some of permitted uses is without merit. A school building, with auditorium, gymnasium, manual training school and the like, attracting large gatherings of parked automobiles, will constitute a nuisance. State ex rel. Oliver Cadillac Co. v. Christopher, 298 S.W. (Mo. Sup.) 720; Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365. Furthermore, a party may not make a solemn engagement, and then disregard it on the plea that no harm will result to other parties thereto. Spahr v. Cape, 143 Mo. App. 114; St. Louis Safe Dep. Bank v. Kennett Estate, 101 Mo. App. 370; Pierce v. Trust Co., 278 S.W. (Mo. Sup.) 409. (3) The vote of a majority of the property owners in the school district could not deprive plaintiffs and interveners of their property. It was not shown that the attitude of complaining parties was known to defendants or that they relied upon or were influenced by that attitude. In fact, defendants were wholly indifferent to any acts, conduct, or attitude of complainants. Under such circumstances, there could be no estoppel. St. Louis Safe Dep. Bank v. Kennett's Estate, supra; Spahr v. Cape, supra. (4) The violation of restrictions in other blocks in the subdivision could not excuse or justify defendants' violation of these restrictions with respect to lots 1 and 2 in block 2. Compton Hill Imp. Co. v. Strauch, 162 Mo. 1187 Mo. App. 85; Spahr v. Cape, supra; St. Louis Safe Dep. Bank v. Kennett Estate, supra. Especially is this true where, as here, there was no evidence that complainants had any knowledge of such violation elsewhere. Miller v. Klein, 177 Mo. App. 572. (5) Here, there has been a taking of private property by an agency of the State, namely, the school district of University City, without compensation and without due process of law. Mo. Constitution, Art. 2, sec. 21; U.S. Constitution, 14th Amendment, sec. 1; Peters v. Buckner, 323 S.W. (Mo. Sup.) 1027; Chicago v. Railroad Co., 166 U.S. 236.
Holland, Lashly Donnell, Jacob M. Lashly and M.P. Phillips for respondents.
(1) The reservations, if any, with respect to the use of lots 1 and 2 of block 2 were for the benefit of the grantor and not enforceable at the instance of plaintiffs. Toothaker v. Pleasant, 315 Mo. 1239. (2) Plaintiffs are violating the record restrictions and do not come into equity with clean hands and are, therefore, entitled to no relief. Compton-Hill Improvement Co. v. Strauch, 162 Mo. App. 85. (3) Plaintiffs have been guilty of laches and are estopped by their conduct to complain of the use of lots 1 and 2 in block 2 for school purposes. Compton-Hill Improvement Co. v. Strauch, 162 Mo. App. 84; Lyons v. School District, 311 Mo. 349. (4) The damages, if any, to appellants, property, is so far disproportionate to the damage the school district will sustain by granting the relief prayed for by appellants, as to be unconscionable, and equity in such a case will deny petitioner injunctive relief. Bailey v. Culver, 84 Mo. 531; St. Louis Safe Deposit Savings Bank v. Kennett Estate, 101 Mo. App. 395; Schopp v. Schopp, 162 Mo. App. 558; Forsee v. Jackson, 192 Mo. App. 408; Lyons v. School District, 311 Mo. 349. (5) The school district possessing the power of eminent domain could by such proceedings remove restrictions, if any, prohibiting the use of property for school purposes. In this event only money judgment could be given. Equity should, therefore, in view of the public interest, refrain from granting injunctive relief, but should leave plaintiff to resort to a common-law action for damages, if any they have sustained. Second Street Improvement Co. v. Ry. Co., 255 Mo. 519; Horine v. Peoples Sewer Co., 200 Mo. App. 237.
This came to me on re-assignment. Plaintiffs and interveners seek to enjoin the school district of University City and its board of education from erecting a school building on certain lots and a private street (Cornell Avenue) in University Heights, a division of said city, and from using any building erected thereon as an auditorium, gymnasium or for other public school purposes. They alleged that the erection of the building thereon would violate certain building restrictions. No temporary injunction or restraining order was prayed for or granted. After service of summons, defendants proceeded with the work, and at the time of trial the building had been completed at a cost of $170,000. Defendants admitted the building would be an auditorium and used for public school purposes. The court found the issues in favor of defendants on plaintiffs' and interveners' petitions, and in favor of plaintiffs and interveners on defendants' cross-bill. Plaintiffs and interveners appealed. Defendants did not appeal. Therefore, we only consider questions presented on plaintiffs' and interveners' petitions and defendants' answer.
The petitions are conventional, alleging the imposition of restrictive covenants on the lots and Cornell Avenue, the violation thereof by defendants, that plaintiffs and interveners are without adequate remedy at law, and praying injunctive relief. The answer admitted the validity of the instrument imposing the restrictions, but denied violation thereof, and pleaded certain affirmative defenses.
University Heights Realty Development Company (herein designated Company) owned a tract of land in St. Louis County. It laid out and subdivided the land into blocks and lots with private streets, designating it University Heights, and caused a plat thereof to be recorded in the office of the Recorder of Deeds of said county. Thereafter it executed and recorded in said office an instrument designated "Declaration of Trust Agreement," imposing on said lots and private streets the restrictions under consideration.
Plaintiffs and interveners own residence property in University Heights. They contend that the erection of the building and its use as an auditorium and gymnasium is a violation of building restrictions imposed on said lots and Cornell Avenue by the trust agreement.
The restrictions on these lots were considered by the St. Louis Court of Appeals in Bub v. McFarland, 196 S.W. 373. A part of the plat of University Heights will be found in that opinion. The building in question is located on a part of lot one in block two and a part of Cornell Avenue located south of lots one and two in said block. Interveners' residence is located on lot three in block two. Plaintiffs' residence is located on lots two and three in block three.
I. Defendants contend that the use of lots two and three of block three by plaintiffs for residence purposes Violation of is a violation of restrictions, and for that Restrictions. reason plaintiffs are in court with unclean hands.
Under the trust agreement said lots are reserved for public school purposes. However, the company was given the right to determine if they should be used for public school or residence purposes. It determined the question by conveying them to individuals instead of conveying them to the school district. It follows that plaintiffs were authorized to use the lots for residence purposes.
II. Defendants claim title to Cornell Avenue by quitclaim deed. Under the trust agreement trustees were vested with the legal title to private streets impressed with an easement for the common benefit of persons who own or occupy said Private Street: lots. They are authorized and charged with the Dedication. duty to repair, maintain and improve said streets. They are also authorized (if they should conclude that such action will be for the benefit of the owners of lots) to dedicate one or all of said streets for public use. The trustees conveyed Cornell Avenue to the school district by quitclaim deed in exchange for a portion of lot two in block two, to be used for street purposes.
It is argued that the conveyance was a dedication of Cornell Avenue to public use. It was for public use, but not such use as contemplated by the parties to the trust agreement. If this conveyance is valid, it follows that the trustees are authorized to convey all of said streets for such or similar use. It is clear they are only authorized to dedicate private streets for public use as public streets. And the authority to improve streets did not authorize the trustees to trade a street on the theory of improving another street. The school district acquired no interest in Cornell Avenue by the quitclaim deed.
III. Defendants contend that the reservation with respect to the lots on which the building is located was for the benefit of the company and not enforceable at the instance Restriction to of plaintiffs or interveners. Residences.
Under the trust agreement said lots are reserved for offices, stores or places of business. The company was also given the right to determine if these lots should be so used or for residence purposes. Plaintiffs and interveners do not seek to enforce said reservation as such. They seek relief under a provision of the trust agreement which follows:
"The lots [which include the lots on which this building is located] in this section described shall not, however, be used for any purposes other than the purposes for which they are respectively reserved, or for private residence purposes as aforesaid, to which purposes they are hereby expressly restricted, into whosoever hands they may come. . . ."
This provision restricts the use of said lots to business or residence purposes. The defendants were not authorized by the trust agreement to use them for school purposes.
IV. It is not claimed that the general plan for a restricted residential district had been abandoned and it does not appear that the restrictions imposed on lots for residence purposes have been violated. However, defendants contend that Acquiescence. for ten years plaintiffs acquiesced in the violation of similar restriction on block one, and for that reason are in no position to complain. The rule is stated as follows:
"Generally, acquiescence in violations of a restrictive covenant which are immaterial, and do not affect or injure one, will not preclude him from restraining violations of the restrictions which would so operate as to cause him to be damaged." [Ward v. Prospect Manor Corp., 46 A.L.R. 364, l.c. 372.] As stated, under the trust agreement block one was reserved for business purposes. In 1915 the school district purchased a building for school purposes, a part of which was located on lots ten and eleven of block one, and a small part on Cornell Avenue. In 1916 plaintiffs moved into the district. In 1919 the district purchased lots three, four, five, six, seven, eight and nine of block one. Mrs. Britton was a member of the board from April, 1920, to April, 1925. At the time she became a member, plans had been completed for the erection of the school building on the lots last mentioned. In 1920 the district purchased lots one and two of block one for playground and landscape purposes. Mrs. Britton testified that during this time she did not know that block one was restricted, and that in 1923 she advocated the purchase of lots one and two of block two for playground and landscape purposes. Other members of the board testified that said lots were at that time under consideration for school rooms. The proposition was defeated.
Mr. Britton testified that at the time they moved to the district he knew block one was restricted but was informed the restriction was different from the restrictions imposed on other lots; that he was not interested, for the school rooms on block one would be eight hundred feet from his residence and would cause no disturbance; that the auditorium is across the street from his residence and is connected with the gymnasium; that the noise of the games, entertainments, manual training and automobiles interfere with the enjoyment of his home and greatly damage his property.
Having the rule in mind, we do not think the evidence sustains the contention. Plaintiffs' failure to object to said violations did not mislead defendants. Indeed, a school building occupied a part of restricted lots and a part of Cornell Avenue before plaintiffs moved to the district, and the board had planned other buildings on restricted lots before Mrs. Britton became a member of the board. Under the circumstances plaintiffs are not precluded from objecting to the violation of the restriction under consideration. They have the right to stand upon the contract set forth in the trust agreement. Under similar circumstances the St. Louis Court of Appeals so ruled after a review of the authorities. [St. Louis Safe Deposit Bank v. Kennett Est., 101 Mo. App. 370, 74 S.W. 474; Spahr v. Cape, 143 Mo. App. 114, 122 S.W. 379; Improvement Co. v. Strauch, 162 Mo. App. 76, 149 S.W. 1159; Miller v. Klein, 177 Mo. App. 557, 572, 160 S.W. 562.]
In this connection defendants contend that plaintiffs knew several months before this suit was commenced that Timely defendants intended and were preparing at heavy Objection. expense to use said lots for school purposes, and misled them by not objecting to said use.
A few months before the suit, the question of issuing bonds of the district to provide funds for improvements was being considered. About that time a member of the board was interviewed by Mr. Britton, plaintiff, and reporter for the Globe-Democrat. This member testified that he told Mr. Britton they contemplated buying said lots and beautifying the part not used. Mr. Britton testified that he did not so understand the member; that he understood from the interview that the auditorium addition would be built to the north, whereas it was built to the west and near his residence. The article published in the newspaper as a result of this interview sustains Mr. Britton. It is stated therein that the "north extension will contain an assembly hall that will enlarge, when desired, the present gymnasium and auditorium." Thus it appears there is no evidence to sustain the contention.
On the contrary, plaintiffs first learned, February 6, 1926, that the district was proceeding to erect a building on said lots. On February 10, 1926, Mr. Britton wrote a letter to a member of the board inquiring about the matter. Attorneys for plaintiffs on said date objected to the erection of the building in a letter to the president of the board and directed attention to the restrictions imposed by the trust agreement. Thereafter and on March 16, 1926, this suit was filed.
In violating the restriction imposed on said lots, the defendants unlawfully appropriated property belonging to plaintiffs and interveners. [Peters v. Buckner, 232 S.W. 1024, 1027.] For this reason the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to continue the case for such Decree. reasonable time as may be necessary to afford the school district of University City and its board of education an opportunity to lawfully acquire the interests of plaintiffs and interveners in the property so appropriated. If at the end of such time they have failed to do so, the court is directed to enter a decree enjoining said district and its board of education from using said building or part thereof located on said lots and private street for an auditorium or other school purposes, and from erecting upon said lots other buildings or parts thereof for school purposes. All concur.