Opinion
# 2016-040-055 Claim No. 122422
08-04-2016
VERON BRIGGS v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Veron Briggs, Pro Se ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN Attorney General of the State of New York By: Michael C. Rizzo, Esq., AAG
Synopsis
Court finds, following trial, that Claimant failed to establish by a preponderance of the credible evidence that he was falsely imprisoned.
Case information
| UID: | 2016-040-055 |
| Claimant(s): | VERON BRIGGS |
| Claimant short name: | BRIGGS |
| Footnote (claimant name) : | |
| Defendant(s): | THE STATE OF NEW YORK |
| Footnote (defendant name) : | |
| Third-party claimant(s): | |
| Third-party defendant(s): | |
| Claim number(s): | 122422 |
| Motion number(s): | |
| Cross-motion number(s): | |
| Judge: | CHRISTOPHER J. McCARTHY |
| Claimant's attorney: | Veron Briggs, Pro Se |
|---|---|
| Defendant's attorney: | ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN Attorney General of the State of New York By: Michael C. Rizzo, Esq., AAG |
| Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
| Signature date: | August 4, 2016 |
| City: | Albany |
| Comments: | |
| Official citation: | |
| Appellate results: | |
| See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
Pro se Claimant, Veron Briggs, failed to establish by a preponderance of the credible evidence that Defendant was liable in connection with his false imprisonment Claim. The trial of this Claim was held on June 23, 2016 at the Court of Claims in Albany, New York. At trial, Claimant submitted three exhibits into evidence (Exs. 1-3) and Defendant submitted one (Ex. A). Claimant was the only witness and testified on his own behalf.
In October, 2012, Claimant was incarcerated at Clinton Correctional Facility (hereinafter, "Clinton"). Mr. Briggs said that, on October 30, 2012, Correction Officer (hereinafter, "CO") Morrow came to his cell and told him that he was to report the next morning to begin working in Clinton's mess hall (see Ex. 3 [Claim], ¶ 2). Claimant further testified that CO Morrow previously had fired him from a job in the mess hall. Mr. Briggs stated that he explained to CO Morrow that, since then, he had been reassigned by Clinton's Program Committee to work as a porter (see Ex. 1 [Program Committee memorandum to Mr. Briggs, dated October 31, 2012, which states that he was listed as a porter on October 3, 2012 and "you no longer work in mess hall"]).
Nevertheless, Claimant said that his cell door was opened early the next morning, October 31, 2012, for mess hall workers. Mr. Briggs approached a CO and explained that he was a porter, not a mess hall worker, and was instructed to return to his cell. That same day, Claimant was placed on keeplock status and CO Morrow issued an inmate misbehavior report, charging Mr. Briggs with refusing to obey a direct order and refusing to accept a program assignment (see Ex. A, unnumbered p. 6). Six days later, on November 5, 2012, a Tier II disciplinary hearing was held at which Mr. Briggs was found not guilty, the charges were dismissed, and Claimant was released from keeplock status (see Ex. A, unnumbered pages 2-3). In rendering that decision, the hearing officer relied upon the documentation Claimant provided, and verification from the Program Committee.
Claimant asserts that the misbehavior report was "false" and was improperly issued. At trial, Mr. Briggs asserted that CO Morrow, as one of the officers in charge of the mess hall, had access to a computer and could have confirmed the inmate's work status. Likewise, he said that CO Morrow had access to a telephone and could have consulted with the Program Committee. Thus, Claimant asserts that CO Morrow failed to properly investigate Mr. Briggs' work status prior to issuing the misbehavior report, and acted negligently and maliciously in doing so.
To establish a cause of action for false imprisonment, a Claimant must establish that: (1) Defendant intended to confine him; (2) Claimant was conscious of the confinement; (3) Claimant did not consent to the confinement; and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged (Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451, 456 [1975], cert denied sub nom. Schanbarger v Kellogg, 423 US 929 [1975]). It is not disputed that Claimant was confined, was conscious of the confinement and did not consent. Thus, the issue is whether the confinement was not otherwise privileged.
In Arteaga v State of New York (72 NY2d 212 [1988]), the Court of Appeals held that the State has absolute immunity from liability in the area of prison discipline when its employees act under the authority of and in full compliance with the statutes and regulations, and their actions constitute discretionary conduct of a quasi-judicial nature (see Shannon v State of New York, 111 AD3d 1077 [3d Dept 2013]; Loret v State of New York, 106 AD3d 1159 [3d Dept 2013]; Davis v State of New York, 262 AD2d 887, 888 [3d Dept 1999]).
Pursuant to the regulations of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, an inmate may be confined to his or her cell "[w]here an officer has reasonable grounds to believe that an inmate … represents an immediate threat to the safety, security or order of the facility" (7 NYCRR §251-1.6[a]). "It has been held that this regulation can be interpreted as 'authorizing keeplock whenever an officer reasonably believes that a facility rule has been violated by an inmate, thus establishing an "immediate threat" to the "order of the facility" ' " (Matter of Pettus v West, 28 AD3d 907, 908 [3d Dept 2006], quoting Matter of Bowe v Smith, 119 Misc 2d 453, 455 [Sup Ct Wyoming County 1983]). Likewise, an inmate who "refuses to participate in an assigned activity may be confined to his cell" (see 7 NYCRR §251-1.6[c]). The reasons for such confinement are to be set forth in the misbehavior report (see 7 NYCRR §251-1.6[e]; Matter of Bowe v Smith, supra. Finally, when an inmate is confined pending a disciplinary hearing, in no event may such hearing commence beyond seven days of such confinement (7 NYCRR §251-5.1[a]).
Here, the State followed the rules and regulations by issuing a misbehavior report, confining the Claimant to his cell, and holding a timely disciplinary hearing. This is the activity of prison officials which was given absolute immunity by Arteaga, even though the charges were dismissed at the Tier II hearing. CO Morrow ordered Mr. Briggs to a work assignment in the mess hall on October 31, 2012 and issued a misbehavior report when Claimant failed to do so. CO Morrow was wrong about Mr. Briggs' work assignment and his error was corrected at the disciplinary hearing and the charges were dismissed. Claimant has not articulated any facts, however, to support a claim that CO Morrow acted in excess of his authority or in violation of any relevant rules or regulations.
Claimant also suggested that CO Morrow acted out of malice or animus toward Claimant, rather than a mistaken belief that Mr. Briggs worked in the mess hall, but he, likewise, failed to establish those allegations. In this regard, the Court does not know what documentation Claimant proffered at his Tier II disciplinary hearing. It notes, however, that the Program Committee's memorandum, in evidence as Exhibit 1, is dated October 31, 2012. Thus, that document was unavailable to CO Morrow on October 30, 2012 when he informed Mr. Briggs that he was to begin working in the mess hall, and, again, early the next morning when Claimant failed to follow that instruction. Likewise, while Claimant said that CO Morrow had fired him some weeks earlier (see Ex. 2 [Claimant returned his white uniform used in the mess hall on September 14, 2012]), he failed to establish that CO Morrow remembered that earlier interaction. Finally, and in any event, it is a "well-settled principle that absolute immunity protects quasi-judicial decisions even when tainted by improper motives or malice" (Arteaga v State of New York, supra at 220, fn 2, citing to Tarter v State of New York, 68 NY2d 511, 518 [1986]).
Therefore, based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes that Claimant failed to establish by a preponderance of the credible evidence his Claim that the misbehavior report was improperly or maliciously issued by CO Morrow and that he was falsely imprisoned. The Claim is hereby dismissed.
All motions made at trial upon which the Court reserved decision are now denied.
All objections upon which the Court reserved decision at trial are hereby overruled.
The Chief Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
August 4, 2016
Albany, New York
CHRISTOPHER J. McCARTHY
Judge of the Court of Claims