Opinion
No. 00 C 6256
April 25, 2002
ORDER
Before the court is the plaintiff's motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) to vacate the prior dismissal of this case for want of prosecution. Because the court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction, the motion to vacate is granted and the case is dismissed on that ground.
Plaintiff Christopher Briggs filed this pro se action in October 2000. He complains that his federal constitutional rights were violated in a Lake County circuit court proceeding. The state court action involved Briggs's ex-wife, Peggy Wickline-Briggs ("Wickline"). Through her attorney, Donald Battaglia, Wickline filed a Petition for Rule to Show Cause asking the court to hold Briggs in contempt. On September 27, 2000, a hearing was held on this petition and Briggs was found in contempt by Judge David M. Hall. The petition was inadequate, Briggs urges, because it was not verified, did not state whether the charged contempt was civil or criminal, and did not set forth the facts of the contempt fully and certainly. In addition, Briggs complains that he did not receive proper notice of the hearing. Briggs seeks $10 million in damages from Wickline, Battaglia, and Judge Hall, and a declaration that the practices of the defendants violated due process. Judge Hall's motion to dismiss the complaint was granted. After Briggs failed to appear at two status hearings, the remainder of the case was dismissed for failure to comply with a court order and want of prosecution. Nine months later, Briggs filed the present motion to vacate the order of dismissal, explaining that Battaglia threatened to send Briggs to jail "for a long time" if Briggs pursued this action.
By default, a dismissal for want of prosecution operates as an adjudication upon the merits. Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). A dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, on the other hand, says nothing about the merits of a cause of action. Id. "Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause." Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1869) (quoted in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998)). For the reasons outlined below, this court is without subject-matter jurisdiction over this case. Accordingly, the court's previous order of dismissal is vacated and the case is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See Del Vecchio v. Conseco, Inc., 230 F.3d 974, 980 (7th Cir. 2000) (vacating the district court's order dismissing the action on the merits and remanding the case with instructions to dismiss it for want of federal subject-matter jurisdiction).
Briggs is in effect asking this court to review the decision of the Lake County circuit court. This court has no jurisdiction to entertain such a request. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine the "lower federal courts lack jurisdiction to engage in appellate review of state court determinations." Ritter v. Ross, 992 F.2d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 21 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring)); accord District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923). "Litigants cannot file collateral attacks on civil judgments; instead they must seek review in the Supreme Court." GASH Assocs. v. Village of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 727 (7th Cir. 1993). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars not only attacks on issues actually decided in state court, but also extends to claims that are "inextricably intertwined" with the state court judgment. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n. 16. A claim is "inextricably intertwined" with a state court decision if the district court "is in essence being called upon to review the state court decision." Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483-84 n. 16. In making this determination the court must decide whether the injury alleged by Briggs resulted from the state court judgment itself or is distinct from that judgment. Rizzo v. Sheahan, 266 F.3d 705, 713 (7th Cir. 2001). The only injuries alleged by Briggs derive from the state court judgment itself. See Ritter, 992 F.2d at 754 ("It is settled that `a plaintiff may not seek a reversal of a state court judgment simply by casting his complaint in the form of a civil rights action.'") (quoting Hagerty v. Succession of Clement, 749 F.2d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 1984)). This court is therefore without subject-matter jurisdiction and the case must be dismissed.
That Briggs's claims may have merit or that he alleges violations of federal constitutional rights are not relevant factors in determining this court's jurisdiction. GASH, 995 F.2d at 728 ("[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine bar[s] the litigation, because the plaintiff's injury stem[s] from the state judgment-an erroneous judgment, perhaps, entered after procedures said to be unconstitutional, but a judgment nonetheless."). Briggs's remedy is to directly appeal the state court's contempt order. Wright v. Tackett, 39 F.3d 155, 158 (7th Cir. 1994). The Illinois court system is perfectly able to entertain all of his claims, Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n. 16 (noting "the competence of state courts to adjudicate federal constitutional claims"), and it is there that Briggs's claims must be adjudicated. If Briggs is still unsatisfied after exhausting his remedies in the Illinois courts, he may then try his luck through a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257.