Summary
In Bricker v. Gardner, 355 Pa. 35, 36, we said: "The defendants contend that the parking was for a purpose allowed by the statute or excepted from its general prohibition.
Summary of this case from Deluca v. Manchester Ldry. Dry Cl. Co.Opinion
May 27, 1946.
June 25, 1946.
Negligence — Automobiles — Standard of duty — Statutes — Traffic regulations — Violation — Illegal parking — Legal cause — Superseding cause — Vehicle Code.
1. Proof of violation of the parking provisions of the Vehicle Code is proof of negligence rendering defendant liable for the legal result of the negligence. [36]
2. One who claims that his conduct was within an exception or immunity from a general prohibition contained in a statute must affirmatively prove that he comes within it; and where the evidence is oral, the ascertainment of the fact is for the jury. [36]
3. Where the defendant claims that the legal cause of plaintiff's injury was an independent act of negligence of a third person which operated as a superseding cause and the evidence relating to such intervening force is oral, the question of causation is for the jury. [36-7]
Before MAXEY, C. J., LINN, STERN, PATTERSON, STEARNE and JONES, JJ.
Appeals, Nos. 7 and 8, May T., 1946, from orders of C. P., Dauphin Co., June T., 1941, No. 621, in case of Joseph O. Bricker v. Marion J. Gardner et al. Orders affirmed; reargument refused August 19, 1946.
Trespass for personal injuries. Before WOODSIDE, J.
Motions by defendants for judgment on whole record after disagreement of jury. Orders entered overruling motion. Defendants appealed.
Spencer G. Hall, with him Paul G. Smith, City Solicitor, for appellants.
Louis Gordon, for appellee.
Argued May 27, 1946.
These appeals are from the refusal of defendants' motions for judgment on the record after disagreement of the jury: Act of April 20, 1911, P. L. 70, 12 P.S. 684. Judge WOODSIDE'S opinion, reported in 56 Dauphin County Reports 384, adequately disposes of the motions for judgment.
The plaintiff, in his employer's truck driven by another employee, was injured when the truck collided with a parked truck belonging to the defendant, the City of Harrisburg, in charge of Gardner, the other defendant. The truck was parked in a "No Parking" zone. An ordinance prohibited parking in this zone. Parking is defined in the Motor Vehicle Code, Act of May 1, 1929, P. L. 905, as amended, 75 P.S. 2, and is regulated by sections 1019 (a), 1020, 75 P.S. 611, 612. See also Stuckwish v. Hagan Corp., 316 Pa. 513, 175 A. 381; Henry v. Liebovitz, 312 Pa. 397, 167 A. 304; Ashworth v. Hannum, 347 Pa. 393, 32 A.2d 407. Plaintiff's theory was that the parking was unlawful and the proximate cause of the damage. Proof of violation of the parking provisions of the Vehicle Code is proof of negligence rendering defendants liable for the legal result of the negligence: Jinks v. Currie, 324 Pa. 532, 188 A. 356; Purol Inc. v. Great Eastern System, 130 Pa. Super. 341, 197 A. 543; Vunak v. Walters, 157 Pa. Super. 660, 43 A.2d 536; D'Ambrosio v. Philadelphia, 354 Pa. 403, 47 A.2d 256.
"Parking. The standing of a vehicle, except police or fire department vehicle or ambulance, whether occupied or not, upon a highway otherwise than temporarily for the purpose and while actually engaged in loading or unloading, or in obedience to traffic regulations or traffic signs or signals."
The defendants contend that the parking was for a purpose allowed by the statute or excepted from its general prohibition. A party claiming such exception or immunity from a general prohibition must bring himself within it; the defendants therefore had the burden of satisfying the jury that the parking was such as was allowed by the statute: cf. Mashinsky v. Philadelphia, 333 Pa. 97, 101, 3 A.2d 790; Com. v. Freed, 106 Pa. Super. 529, 162 A. 679; see 9 Wigmore: Evidence, sec. 2486. As the evidence was oral, the ascertainment of the fact was for the jury: Nanty-Glo Borough v. American Surety Co., 309 Pa. 236, 163 A. 523; Keck v. P. R. T. Co., 314 Pa. 389, 171 A. 478; Sefton v. Valley Dairy Co., 345 Pa. 324, 28 A.2d 313.
It was also suggested that the parking, if unlawful, was not the proximate cause of the accident, that the conduct of the driver of the truck in which the plaintiff was riding was an independent act of negligence constituting the legal cause of plaintiff's injury: see Kline v. Moyer, 325 Pa. 357, 191 A. 43. That evidence also was oral and necessarily for the jury.
Orders affirmed.