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noting that the first prong of § 1500 analysis is to address the timing of the claims, and the second prong examines whether the claims are the same
Summary of this case from Ak-Chin Indian Community v. U.S.Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-12400-RWZ
September 23, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Plaintiffs John and William Breneman own property located in New Braintree, Massachusetts, which is adjacent to the privately owned, public use Tanner Miller Airport ("Airport"). Most of the land is undeveloped. Between May 21, 1986, and October 17, 1988, Airport owner Leonard Tanner ("Tanner") hired A. Amorello Sons, Inc. ("Amorello") to remove gravel, stone walls, a fence, and a hill from plaintiffs' property in order to extend a runway. Trees were also cleared and waste was buried thereon. Plaintiffs discovered the alterations in August 1991 and slightly more than a year later, commenced the first of a series of legal and administrative actions for redress.
On September 25, 1992, plaintiffs filed suit in state court against Tanner who, in turn, impleaded Amorello as a third-party defendant. Two years later, plaintiffs added Amorello as a defendant. Plaintiffs alleged trespass, willful trespass to trees in violation of state law, continuing trespass and damage to the land, conversion, negligence, and unfair and deceptive trade practices. They sought damages, establishment of land boundaries, an order demanding that defendant remove the runway extension, and funds to remove the materials defendants dumped onto plaintiffs' property and to return the land to its original condition. The Worcester Superior Court granted defendant Amorello's Motion to Dismiss on grounds that plaintiffs' claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Breneman v. Tanner, No. 922705, 1999 WL 1336436 (Mass.Super.Ct. Feb. 1, 1999). On October 21, 1999, the court allowed defendant Amorello's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Tanner's contribution claim and also allowed defendant Tanner's Motion for Summary Judgment as to all claims (except his counterclaim of adverse possession) because they were time-barred. Breneman v. Wolfson, 10 Mass.L.Rptr. 634 (Mass.Super.Ct. 1999). Plaintiffs' appeal is pending. The parties subsequently dismissed the adverse possession claim without prejudice.
John Wolfson is the executor of Leonard Tanner's estate.
Some time in December 1997, plaintiffs reported to the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") a discrepancy between runway length as reported by the FAA in the Airport Directory of the Airman's Information Manual and as measured by plaintiffs. The FAA acknowledged the inaccurate runway measurement and apologized to the plaintiffs on behalf of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Aeronautics Commission ("CMAC"). On May 18, 2000, FAA published the 61st Edition of the New York Sectional Chart, an aeronautical navigation chart for pilots showing the extended runway. Subsequently, plaintiffs filed notices for proposed reconstruction of the fence and hill on their property. On February 15, 2001, FAA issued an Order in Aeronautical Study, which determined that replacement of the hill and fence would be hazardous to air navigation. Soon thereafter, on April 9, 2001, plaintiffs appealed the FAA's dismissal of their petition for review of the Order to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. In an unpublished opinion, the court determined that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the FAA's advisory opinion concerning the resurrection of the fence. Although the plaintiffs established standing to challenge the FAA's opinion concerning the replacement of the hill, the court found that the determination was not arbitrary and capricious and further, that plaintiffs "ran afoul of this court's chutzpah doctrine when they conceded at oral argument that they intend to build the hill in part to impede air traffic at the Airport." Breneman v. Federal Aviation Administration, No. 01-1165, Consolidated with 01-1166, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 4322, at *7 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 26, 2002). Finally, the court found all of plaintiffs' other constitutional challenges to the FAA's determination concerning the hill to be meritless.
On September 13, 2001, plaintiffs returned to Worcester Superior Court with a petition in equity seeking review of the CMAC's final decision which denied their request to replace the hill on their property. After a hearing on plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on September 16, 2002, the court took the matter under advisement. According to the docket sheet submitted by plaintiffs, decision has not yet been rendered. (PL's Response to August 12, 2003 Order at Exh. C.).
Next, plaintiffs filed suit against the United States in the Court of Federal Claims on December 13, 2002, claiming inverse condemnation based on the actions of the FAA. On August 6, 2003, the court denied the government's Motion to Dismiss, but granted its Motion for Summary Judgment, and entered judgment for the United States. The court found the FAA's publication of the New York Sectional Chart recognizing the extension of Tanner's runway and its hazard determinations based on plaintiffs' plans to rebuild the fence and hill did not constitute a Taking under the Fifth Amendment. Breneman v. The United States, No. 02-1854 L, 2003 U.S. Claims LEXIS 234 (Fed.Cl. August 6, 2003).
On the same day that they initiated suit in the Court of Federal Claims, plaintiffs filed a seven count Complaint in this Court against the FAA, the CMAC, and the Airport. Plaintiffs claim that the "final orders and regulation of the FAA and CMAC in conjunction with the actions of the Tanner Hiller Airport have appropriated the greater portion of the plaintiffs' property to the public without compensation." (Complaint at 2). They characterize the action as one seeking "an injunction and invalidation of the actions of the FAA [and] CMAC as well as compensation for the temporary use of their property or in the alternative damages and compensation for the inverse condemnation of their property." (Complaint at 4). Each defendant has filed a Motion to Dismiss.
Plaintiffs cannot sustain their claims against the Airport. Count I fails because inverse condemnation is a cause of action against a governmental entity and the Airport is privately owned. United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 253, 257, 100 S.Ct. 1127, 1130 (1980). To the extent that plaintiffs are asserting claims against the Airport for trespass or conversion, they are barred by the three-year statute of limitations. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2A (actions of tort and replevin must be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues). Count II, entitled "Invalidation of Government Action," does not apply to the Airport.
In deciding plaintiffs' state law claims, the Court exercises its supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), which states that "in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution."
Counts III and IV allege violation of and conspiracy to violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although the typical Section 1983 case is against a state actor, a Section 1983 claim is viable against a private party if the plaintiff can show that the private defendant had an agreement with a state actor to deprive plaintiff of rights. Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 151, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1605 (1970). Here, plaintiffs contend that "[t]he CMAC and the Airport deprived plaintiffs of their property rights in violation of the Fifth Amendment by suppressing or concealing [and conspiring to suppress and conceal] the date(s) and facts surrounding the illegal extension of the runway at the Tanner Hiller Airport." (Complaint at 30). However, the alleged suppression is not a violation of the Fifth Amendment; and, in any case, there is no evidence that the Airport and the CMAC had such an agreement. Furthermore, any concealment was highly unlikely; the Massachusetts Superior Court noted that "while it may not have been easy to initially discover buried tree stumps, a plainly visible gravel hill and many trees were openly leveled, placing the plaintiffs on notice." Breneman v. Tanner, No. 922705, 1999 WL 1336436 (Mass.Super.Ct. Feb. 1, 1999).
In Count V, entitled "Use of Property," plaintiffs contend that the Airport used their property without authorization or compensation, but does not specify the grounds on which the claim is brought. If they are alleging a violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 131, § 40, they, as private parties, cannot sue.Christoffels v. Alton Properties, Inc., 285 N.E.2d 453, 454 (Mass. 1972) (stating that Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 131, § 40 "protects only the public interest and confers no enforceable rights on the plaintiffs.").
Count VI alleges that the actions of the defendants "constitute an appropriation and confusion of plaintiffs' property with the Tanner Hiller Airport property by creating the appearance that the approach surfaces, the primary surface of the runway and other parts of Tanner Hiller Airport are part of the "airport" when in reality this property belongs to the plaintiffs." (Complaint at 33-34.). Again, to the extent that plaintiffs are claiming trespass, their claim is, as noted earlier, barred by the three-year statute of limitations. Finally, plaintiffs' last claim to quiet title to the property and remove the cloud from its title cannot be maintained "unless both actual possession and the legal title are united in the plaintiff." Daley v. Daley, 14 N.E.2d 113, 116 (Mass. 1938). Here, plaintiffs do not have actual possession of the land in controversy — the Airport does. Because plaintiffs cannot prevail on any of their claims against the Airport, the Airport's Motion to Dismiss is allowed.
Res judicata bars plaintiffs' claims against the FAA. Res judicata is a judicially constructed doctrine based on three policy considerations: (1) avoiding the cost of multiple lawsuits, (2) conserving judicial resources, and (3) preventing inconsistent outcomes.Bay State HMO Management, Inc. v. Tingley Systems, Inc., 181 F.3d 174, 181 (1st Cir. 1999). "The doctrine of res judicata bars all parties and their privies from relitigating issues which were raised or could have been raised in a previous action, once a court has entered a final judgment on the merits in the previous action."Aunyx Corp. v. Canon U.S.A., Inc., 978 F.2d 3, 6 (1st Cir. 1992). There are two aspects of res judicata-claim preclusion and collateral estoppel. Grella v. Salem Five Cent Savings Bank, 42 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 1994). The elements of claim preclusion are: "(1) a final judgment on the merits in an earlier action; (2) an identity of parties or privies in the two suits; and (3) an identity of the cause of action in both suits." Id. The entry of a final judgment on the merits extinguishes plaintiffs' rights to pursue remedies as to the whole or part of the transaction at issue in the complaint. Isaac v. Schwartz, 706 F.2d 15, 16 (1st Cir. 1983).
Plaintiffs have already appealed the FAA's decision to the D.C. Circuit and brought the same claims against the United States in the Court of Federal Claims resulting in judgment for the defendant. Here, for the third time, plaintiffs are seeking to invalidate the FAA's determinations. Plaintiffs cannot continue to file lawsuits until they obtain the result they seek.
The parties are the same in the two suits as recognized by plaintiffs in their Complaint: "[t]he defendant, FAA, is an administrative agency of the United States and acts for the United States." (Complaint at 6.).
Finally, CMAC contends that plaintiffs' suit against it is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. "It is clear, of course, that in the absence of consent a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment."Pennhurst State School Hospital v. Halderman, 104 S.Ct. 900, 908, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). This is true regardless of the nature of the relief sought, Id. In their Complaint, plaintiffs state that defendant CMAC "is an administrative agency of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and acts for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts." (Complaint at 6). Because defendant CMAC has not consented to suit, plaintiffs' claims must be dismissed.
Accordingly, the Motions to Dismiss by the Airport, the FAA, and the CMAC are ALLOWED. Judgment may be entered dismissing the complaint with prejudice.