Opinion
1:17-cv-00199 (GBD) (SDA)
12-07-2021
B. Braxton/Obed-Edom, Plaintiff, v. The City of New York et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER
STEWART D. AARON, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
TO THE HONORABLE GEORGE B. DANIELS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
INTRODUCTION
Pro se Plaintiff Benjamin Braxton/Obed-Edom (“Plaintiff” or “Braxton”) brings this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violations of his constitutional rights that he alleges occurred while he was a pretrial detainee at the Manhattan Detention Center. (Am. Compl., dated May 1, 2017, ECF No. 29, at 1-17.) Currently before the Court is Defendants' renewed motion for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff's claims are barred by a general release. (Second Mot. Summary J., ECF No. 203.) For the reasons set forth below, I respectfully recommend that Defendants' motion be GRANTED and this case be dismissed.
BACKGROUND
The Court assumes familiarity with the factual background regarding the August 8, 2018 General Release and the procedural history of this case leading up to the Court's September 17, 2019 Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) on Defendant's first motion for summary judgment, as set forth therein. See Braxton/Obed-Edom v. City of New York, No. 17-CV-00199 (GBD) (SDA), 2019 WL 8955261, at **1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2019). The Court now sets forth the relevant background regarding Plaintiff's medical treatment and the procedural history following the September 17, 2019 R&R.
I. Plaintiff's Medical Treatment Through August 2018
On January 4, 2018, after writing a letter stating that he was feeling depressed, Braxton was seen “cell-side” by Daniel Hess, a Rehabilitation Counselor from the Central New York Psychiatric Center (“CNYPC”). (CNYPC Medical Records, Stavridis Decl. Ex. J, ECF 208-3, at 29.) Hess noted that Braxton wanted to see the doctor regarding his medication and was happy to learn that he had an appointment the following day (Id.) Under the section titled clinical observations, Hess noted that no psychotic symptoms were reported or observed. (Id.) On January 5, 2018, Braxton met with a psychiatrist, but declined medication. (See id. at 71 (March 2019 note referencing earlier meeting with psychiatrist).)
CNYPC operates satellite units at various correctional facilities, including Clinton Correctional Facility where Braxton was housed at the time. See Central New York Psychiatric Center, available at https://omh.ny.gov/omhweb/facilities/cnpc/ (last visited November 30, 2021); see also CNYPC Satellite and Mental Health Unit Listing, available at https://omh.ny.gov/omhweb/facilities/cnpc/satellite.pdf (last visited November 30, 2021). In Plaintiff's medical records, Hess's title is listed as “RCII[, ]” which appears to refer to a type of rehabilitation counselor. See, e.g., Murray v. Gillani, No. 9:12-CV-00401 LEK/ATB, 2013 WL 838351, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2013), report and recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 838306 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2013).
Braxton saw Hess again in a one-on-one session on January 18, 2018. (CNYPC Medical Records at 27.) Hess noted that Braxton's primary diagnosis was “Adjustment Disorders, [w]ith anxiety.” (Id.) During the session, Braxton reported that he did not like the side effects he was experiencing with his medications and refused to take them. (Id.) Hess noted “no acute distress reported/evidenced.” (Id.)
Braxton met with Rehabilitation Counselor Kristin Dimberg on March 9, 2018, after declining to meet with a counselor in February. (See CNYPC Medical Records at 26, 71-72.) During the March session, Braxton discussed his ability to manage his symptoms, and reported that his primary coping mechanisms included “staying busy working in the library, doing legal work, and writing his sister” and shared that therapy had been very helpful for him. (Id. at 71.)
On April 10, 2018, Braxton was placed in Long Term Keep Lock based on a disciplinary infraction for violent conduct/fighting. (See CNYPC Medical Records at 23.) On April 11, 2018, Rehabilitation Counselor Heather Martin conducted a mental health interview and mental status examination, which showed normal findings with no depression or anxiety. (Id. at 23-24.) Braxton also met with a psychiatrist, who noted that he was depressed about being in keep lock and frustrated based on experiences in the facility related to his gender. (Id. at 49-50.) No symptoms of anxiety disorder or psychosis were reported or observed. (Id.) Braxton told the provider that he wanted to “reconsider taking medication, ” but wanted to run the recommended medications by his sister. (Id. at 50.)
Braxton met with Martin again on May 1 and May 17, 2018. (CNYPC Medical Records at 19-22.) Braxton requested the first counseling appointment because of “his depression related to prior sexual harassment/misconduct perpetrated by another inmate.” (Id. at 19.) Braxton reported his coping mechanisms consist of “reading, writing to family and working on his legal paperwork.” (Id.) During the May 17 session, Braxton explained that his keep lock status recently ended, and he hoped to see the program committee soon, in order to begin working again. (Id. at 19.) Braxton reported that “he continue[d] to work on his legal case and he immerse[d] himself in legal work because that is what he enjoy[ed].” (Id.) Braxton further reported that he was “not currently having any mental health symptoms” and Martin noted that he appeared in “no acute distress.” (Id.)
On August 8, 2018, Braxton was scheduled to see a psychiatrist, but was not on the master call out list. (CNYPC Medical Records at 47-48.) Braxton was seen by a psychiatrist a few weeks later, on August 27, 2018. (Id. at 45-46.) Braxton did not report any symptoms, nor were any symptoms of mood disorder, anxiety or psychosis seen by the psychiatrist during the session. (Id. at 45.) Braxton stated he “enjoyed the session” and that he was “feel[ing] much better[.]” (Id. at 46.)
II. Procedural History Since September 17, 2019 Report And Recommendation
On October 29, 2019 and November 4, 2019, Plaintiff filed objections to the September 17, 2019 R&R, arguing that he lacked the mental capacity to enter into the General Release. (Pl.'s Objections to R&R, ECF Nos. 144 & 145.) In support of this argument, Plaintiff submitted additional medical evidence that had not been before this Court in considering Defendants' motion, including a January 10, 2019 treatment plan from the Central New York Psychiatric Center (“CNYPC”), annotated pages of the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM-V”) and a medical appointment record from the Brooklyn Detention Center dated April 9, 2016. (See ECF No. 144 at 12, ECF No. 145 at 9-13.) On March 19, 2020, District Judge Daniels adopted the R&R in part and remanded the case to me for further analysis, in light of this additional evidence, as to whether Braxton was mentally incapable of entering into the August General Release, and if so, the nature of Braxton's counsel's involvement, which may affect the validity of the contract. (3/19/2020 Mem. Decision & Order, ECF No. 146, at 8.) Thereafter, the parties conducted additional discovery regarding these issues. (See 4/8/2020 Order, ECF No. 147.) Defendants took Plaintiff's deposition on December 23, 2020 and January 20, 2021 and produced Plaintiff's medical records from Auburn Correctional Facility and CNYPC. (See Stavridis Decl. Exs. J & K.)
On July 8, 2021, Defendants filed the instant second motion for summary judgment. (See Second Mot.) Plaintiff filed his opposition on August 27, 2021 and Defendants filed their reply on September 7, 2021. (Pl.'s Mem. L. Opp. Second Mot. Summary J. (“Pl.'s Opp. Mem.”); Defs.' Reply Mem., ECF No. 215.)
Plaintiff's opposition includes a memorandum of law and attached exhibits. Because the documents are filed as a single PDF, the Court cites to the PDF pagination for both Plaintiff's Memorandum and the attached exhibits.
LEGAL STANDARDS
I. Rule 56 Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-50 (1986). The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a disputed issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321-23 (1986). A dispute concerning material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). In making its determination, the court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. “Although the same standards apply when a Pro se litigant is involved, the Pro se litigant should be given special latitude in responding to a summary judgment motion.” Caines v. Oudkerk, No. 17-CV-03060 (PGG), 2018 WL 3059653, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2018) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
II. Law Governing General Releases And Capacity To Contract
As the Court previously set forth, “[settlement agreements and releases are construed according to the general principles of contract law.” Braxton, 2019 WL 8955261, at *2 (citing Caines, 2018 WL 3059653, at *3), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 1303558 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2020). “As a general matter, ‘federal law governs the validity of releases of federal causes of action, but courts look to state law to provide the content of federal law.'” Valdiviezo v. City of New York, No. 15-CV-03902 (AJN), 2020 WL 2793090, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2020) (quoting Olin Corp. v. Consol. Aluminum Corp., 5 F.3d 10, 15 (2d Cir. 1993)). “[U]nder either standard a release is only valid if it is knowing and voluntary.” Id. (comparing Pampillonia v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 138 F.3d 459, 463 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Under New York law, a release that is clear and unambiguous on its face and which is knowingly and voluntarily entered into will be enforced.”) with Murray v. Town of N. Hempstead, 853 F.Supp.2d 247, 259 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[A] waiver of constitutional rights must be based upon clear and convincing evidence to demonstrate that the waiver is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.” (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975))).
When the lack of mental capacity is raised as a defense to validity of a release of a Section 1983 claim, courts typically apply state law to determine whether the release is voidable. See, e.g., Fontanez v. Sanchez, No. 19-1735, 2021 WL 3556932, at *2 (2d Cir. Aug. 12, 2021); Haskins v. Doe, No. 16-CV-08525 (RA), 2019 WL 4194150, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2019); Wells v. City of New York, No. 16-CV-00825 (KAM) (ST), 2019 WL 1270816, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2019); see also Reid v. IBM Corp., 1997 WL 357969, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1997) (assessing validity of waiver under federal law and mental capacity defense under state law). “A party's competence is presumed and the party asserting incapacity has the burden of proving incompetence.” Harrison v. Grobe, 790 F.Supp. 443, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd, 984 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1993). “Incapacity must be demonstrated at the time of the disputed transaction ]” and the burden to demonstrate incapacity “is an extremely heavy one.” Id.
The Court notes that there is a separate line of cases involving the release of federal statutory discrimination claims, “in which courts apply a more rigorous and subjective voluntariness test that departs from ordinary contract principles.” Haskins, 2019 WL 4194150, at *3 n. 3 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Rivera case cited by the Court in the September 2019 R&R is one such case. See Braxton/Obed-Edom v. City of New York, No. 17-CV-00199 (GBD) (SDA), 2019 WL 8955261, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2019) (citing Rivera v. Sovereign Bank, 976 F.Supp.2d 270, 274 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 1303558 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2020). Although, in Rivera, the court assessed the plaintiff's mental capacity argument in the context of the eight-factor test applicable to the validity of a release of federal statutory discrimination claims, the relevant considerations are the same. Accord Wells, 2019 WL 1270816, at *5 (citing Rivera and applying New York law to assessment of mental capacity).
Under New Yok law, there are two related tests to determine whether a contract is voidable due to mental incapacity. See Wells, 2019 WL 1270816, at *5 (citing Pusey v. Delta Airlines, No. 09-CV-04084, 2012 WL 893908, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 896163 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2012). Under the so-called “cognitive test, ” the court determines “whether a party's mind was so affected as to render him wholly and absolutely incompetent to comprehend and understand the nature of the transaction and make a rational judgment concerning that transaction.” Id. (citing Blatt v. Manhattan Med. Grp., P.C., 131 A.D.2d 48, 51 (1st Dep't 1987)). Under the “motivational test, ” the court determines “whether the evidence indicates that a person is suffering from a psychosis which renders him or her incapable of making a voluntary decision, and the other party was, or should have been, aware of the contractor's condition.” Id. (citing Blatt, 131 A.D.2d at 52). The motivational test was added to “protect persons who may understand the nature of the transaction but who, due to mental illness, cannot control their conduct.” Blatt, 131 A.D.2d at 51-52. In sum, a plaintiff must show that he was “incapable of comprehending the nature of a settlement agreement and the surrounding proceedings, making a rational decision concerning entering into the agreement, or of controlling her conduct.” Fontanez, 2021 WL 3556932, at *2 (quoting Scarfone v. Village of Ossining, 23 A.D.3d 540, 541 (2d Dep't 2005)).
DISCUSSION
The issue before the Court is whether Plaintiff has produced evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that he lacked the mental capacity to enter the August 8, 2018 General Release and, if so, the impact on the validity of the General Release. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Braxton has not produced evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that he was unable to comprehend and understand the nature of the transaction or that he was incapable of making a voluntary decision and that Defendants were aware of his condition. In any event, even if Braxton could make such a showing, the Court finds that he ratified the General Release.
I. The General Release Is Not Voidable Based On Lack Of Mental Capacity
First, the Court finds that Braxton has failed to present evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that, at the time he signed the General Release, his mind was “so affected as to render him wholly and absolutely incompetent to comprehend and understand the nature of the transaction[.]” Blatt, 131 A.D.2d at 52. To support his claim, Braxton cites to a January 10, 2019 Corrections Based Treatment Plan, in which he reported that his anxiety interfered with his daily functioning. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at 7, 23.) Although the record indicates that Braxton suffered from anxiety both prior to and after he signed the General Release, that alone is insufficient to create an issue of fact as to his mental competency to execute the release. See Haskins, 2019 WL 4194150, at *4 (plaintiff's self-reported history of schizophrenia, anxiety, and depression, and references in medical records to other psychological disorders did not create a genuine issue of fact as to plaintiff's competency to execute release of claims as such records “did not address whether or how [the plaintiff's] ability to comprehend the unambiguous, one-and-a-half-page [r]elease may have been impacted.”); see also Cardona v. Cmty. Access, Inc., No. 11-CV-04129 (MKB), 2013 WL 304519, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2013) (“Plaintiffs' assertion that they suffer from anxiety is not enough to demonstrate that they suffered from a condition that was debilitating enough to prevent them from entering into the [settlement agreement].”) (citing cases)). Moreover, as set forth above, Braxton's medical records from 2018 consistently indicate that no mental health symptoms were reported or observed.
To support his claim of incapacity, Braxton also attempts to rely on evidence that he experienced episodes of “fading out” and that he suffered from PTSD. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at 6-19.) However, even assuming Braxton suffered from these impairments, he has not presented evidence that they impacted his cognitive ability at the time he signed the General Release. With respect to episodes of fading out, Braxton points to two ambulatory health records, one, dated July 31, 2018, where he reported that he had “a history of passing out” and the other, dated August 31, 2018, where he requested a protective helmet to protect his head “when or if he fades out.” (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at 26, 41.) Braxton also cites to his corrected deposition testimony, which states, “[a]fter the fade outs reside, I have residual negative cognitive effects . . . [i]t takes a couple of weeks to gain my bearings ....” (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at 39.) Braxton argues that, together, these facts support a finding that he lacked capacity at the time he signed the General Release. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at 16.) However, there are no confirmed reports of Braxton passing out in his medical records (see, e.g., Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at 41 (noting fading out episode was “unwitnessed”)) and no medical evidence to suggest that any reported “fade-outs” impacted his cognitive ability. Moreover, although Braxton reported these incidents around the time he entered the General Release, the July 31, 2018 note indicates only that he reported a history of passing out, not that he experienced such an episode on or around that date. Accordingly, Braxton has not produced sufficient evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact that he lacked the capacity to enter into the General Release because of his reported “fade-outs.”
Next, Braxton argues that he suffers from PTSD and, as a result, lacked the mental capacity to execute the General Release. (See Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at 6-13.) Braxton cites to an OMH progress note form July 2020, where he explained that a traumatic incident occurred in the 1990's and that he was diagnosed with PTSD in 2010. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at 25.) He also cites to treatment notes from appointments in August and September 2020, during which he complained of PTSD and stated that his PTSD started in July/August of 2018. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at 7-8, 24, 27.) In addition, Braxton refers to his deposition testimony that PTSD “affected [his] judgment, [his] collection of events, [his] sleep, [his] eating, [his] organizing, and communication regarding [his] daily activities” and “affected [his] proper judgment and collection of events even with assistance regarding those simple tasks.” (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at 28-29.)
Braxton has not produced any evidence that he has been formally diagnosed with PTSD and all the evidence Braxton cites to as proof of his lack of capacity because of his PTSD is dated well after August 8, 2018. (See, e.g., Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at 22-25, 27.) Regardless, even assuming Braxton suffered from PTSD at the time he signed the General Release, he has not produced any competent medical evidence that his mental illness impacted his capacity to understand the agreement. Braxton points to diagnostic labels in the DSM-V, comments by providers, and his own statements, none of which relate to his capacity at the time of the signing of the General Release. See Reid, 1997 WL 357969, at *8 (granting summary judgment where plaintiff's only evidence of mental disability were his own affidavits describing his mental health and treatment and plaintiff failed to present any competent medical evidence from the pertinent time period); see also Cardona, 2013 WL 304519, at *5. Accordingly, I find that Braxton has not produced sufficient evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact that he lacked the capacity to enter into the General Release because of PTSD.
Nor has Braxton established that the General Release “was the result of impulsive or irrational behavior beyond his control and that [the defendants] knew, or should have known, that he did not possess the proper capacity to enter into contracts[.]” Blatt, 131 A.D.2d at 52. Braxton's medical records from prior to and after the date he signed the General Release consistently note that no symptoms of psychosis were reported or observed. (See, e.g., CNYPC Medical Records at 45, 50.) Even assuming Braxton was in a state of psychosis on the date he signed the General Release, he has not produced any evidence to show that Defendants were aware, or should have been aware, of his mental state. See Wells, 2019 WL 1270816, at *5 (citing Pusey v. Delta Airlines, No. 09-CV-04084, 2012 WL 893908, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2012)). Plaintiff cites to deposition testimony regarding his mental state (see Pl.'s Opp. Memo. at 10, 38-40), but none of this testimony supports a finding that Defendants knew or should have known about his state of mind. Thus, I find that Plaintiff has not produced sufficient evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to this issue.
II. Even If Voidable, The General Release Is Not Void
A “contract executed by a party who suffers from a mental illness or defect . . . is voidable, not void.” Livingston v. Bev-Pak, Inc., 112 F.Supp.2d 242, 247 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing Reid, 1997 WL 357969, at *7 (quoting the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 15(1)). “A voidable contract is one where one or more parties have the power, by a manifestation of election to do so, to avoid the legal relations created by the contract, or by ratification of the contract to extinguish the power of avoidance.” Reid, 1997 WL 357969, at *10 (citing Restatement (Second) § 7). “If the releasing party does not promptly repudiate the contract or release, he will be deemed to have ratified it.” Cardona, 2013 WL 304519, at *4. “[W]hen a party ratifies a voidable contract, he in effect makes a new promise or creates a new legal duty to perform.” Reid, 1997 WL 357969, at *10.
Here, Braxton never sought to void the General Release or repay the settlement funds. Nor does he contend that he has remained incapacitated indefinitely. Accordingly, I find that Braxton ratified the General Release and therefore is bound by its terms. See Fontanez, 2021 WL 3556932, at *2 (citing Fertico Belgium S.A. v. Phosphate Chems. Exp. Ass'n, 120 A.D.2d 401, 404 (1st Dep't 1986) (providing that a plaintiff may not obtain the benefits of an agreement while seeking to avoid its consequences)); see also Reid, 1997 WL 357969, at *1 (plaintiff ratified release by accepting benefits of transaction even after incapacity was removed and failing to tender back consideration).
Indeed, as Defendants point out (see Def.'s Mem. at 1-2), Braxton has settled multiple lawsuits with the City of New York during the relevant time period and, although Braxton contends that he was “not satisfied” with at least one other settlement, he also recognized the need to compromise and has not sought to undo those agreements. (See Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at 13-14.)
III. There Is No Other Ground To Invalidate The Release
Plaintiff has not raised any challenge to the validity of the General Release other than based on his mental capacity and has not presented any other evidence to suggest that he signed the General Release unknowingly or involuntarily. Moreover, the fact that Braxton had the opportunity to consult counsel further supports the conclusion that he knowingly and voluntarily signed the General Release. See Haskins, 2019 WL 4194150, at *3 n.3.
Braxton asserts that he never met with his counsel and was unable to understand the General Release due to PTSD. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at 11-12.) For the reasons set forth herein, the Court finds that Braxton has not presented sufficient evidence regarding a lack of capacity. Further, regardless of Braxton's interaction with counsel, he does not dispute that he had the opportunity to consult with counsel. See Haskins, 2019 WL 4194150, at *3 n.3. (noting that even under more rigorous voluntariness test it is the opportunity to consult counsel that is critical).
IV. Defendants' Motion To Seal
Also before the Court is a motion by Defendants to seal two exhibits filed in support of their motion for summary judgment that contain Plaintiff's medical records. (See Letter Motion to Seal, ECF No. 207.) For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion is granted, but the Court will not seal the portions of this Report and Recommendation that summarize Plaintiff's records.
“[I]t is well-settled that documents submitted to a court for its consideration in a summary judgment motion are-as a matter of law-judicial documents to which a strong presumption of access attaches, under both the common law and the First Amendment.” Est. of Jackson by Jackson v. Cty. of Suffolk, No. 12-CV-01455, 2019 WL 3253063, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. July 19, 2019) (citing Brown v. Maxwell, No. 18-2868, 2019 WL 2814839, at *3 (2d Cir. July 3, 2019) (internal citation omitted)); see also Valentini v. Grp. Health Inc., No. 20-CV-09526 (JPC), 2020 WL 7646892, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2020) (medical documents submitted in conjunction with motion to dismiss were judicial documents entitled to at least some presumption of public access). Despite this presumption, “court documents may be sealed if ‘specific, on the record findings are made demonstrating that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.'” Dunham v. City of New York, No. 11-CV-01223 (ALC), 2021 WL 918373, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2021) (quoting Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2006)). “[C]ourts in this circuit regularly allow medical records to be filed under seal, finding that parties have a strong privacy interest in their medical information.” Spring v. Allegany-Limestone Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 14-CV-0476S, 2021 WL 4166628, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2021); see also Valentini, 2020 WL 7646892, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2020) (plaintiff's privacy “countervailing interest” to presumption of public access).
However, to the extent the Court relies on certain documents “in reaching its decision on the litigants' ‘substantive legal rights' . . . the presumption of public access is ‘at its zenith.'” Moroughan v. Cty. of Suffolk, No. 12-CV-00512 (JFB) (AKT), 2021 WL 280053, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2021) (quoting United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1995); Bernstein v. Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, 814 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 2016)); see also United States v. Cohen, 366 F.Supp.3d 612, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (“[T]he strength of the public's right to access judicial documents is at its zenith when the documents play a role in determining litigants' substantive rights'-that is, ‘conduct at the heart of Article III' that implicates ‘the need for public monitoring.' ”) (quoting Amodeo, 71 F.3d at 1049).
Here, Plaintiff has put his medical condition at issue in this lawsuit and has filed certain of his medical records on the public docket. Nonetheless, the set of Plaintiff's medical records filed by Defendants covers a longer time period and contains many details not necessary to the Court's determination. Accordingly, the Court will permit Exhibits I and J to Defendant's motion to be filed under seal, but will not seal the portions of this Report and Recommendation that summarizes Plaintiff's relevant medical history. Accord United States v. Monge, No. 17 CR. 61112 (AT), 2020 WL 3872168, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2020) (permitting medical records to remain under seal but not order discussing “essential facts of those records”); see also Kochan v. Cty. of Cattaraugus Sheriff Deputy, No. 17-CV-00452, 2020 WL 8812836, at *12 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2020) (declining to seal opinion and order discussing plaintiff's psychiatric evaluations).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully recommend that Defendants' second motion for summary judgment be GRANTED. In addition, I hereby Order that Defendant's motion to seal (ECF No. 207) is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is respectfully requested to mail a copy of this Report and Recommendation to the Pro se Plaintiff.
* * *
NOTICE OF PROCEDURE FOR FILING OBJECTIONS TO THIS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The parties shall have fourteen (14) days (including weekends and holidays) from service of this Report and Recommendation to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d) (adding three additional days when service is made under Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(b)(2)(C), (D) or (F)). A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen days after being served with a copy. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Such objections, and any response to objections, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 6(d), 72(b). Any requests for an extension of time for filing objections must be addressed to Judge Daniels.
THE FAILURE TO OBJECT WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL RESULT IN A WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS AND WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 6(d), 72(b); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).