Opinion
Civil Action No. 1:99cv359-D-B.
April 27, 2001.
OPINION
This cause is before the court on the Defendants, Baptist Memorial Hospital Golden Triangle (Baptist), Dr. Joseph Battaile (Dr. Battaile), and Paul Cade's (Cade), motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Upon due consideration, the court finds that the motion should be granted in part and denied in part.
Factual Background
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56, the court must take as true the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 216 (1986). The court's factual summary is so drafted.
The Plaintiff, Cynthia Braswell (Braswell), is a Caucasian female who was employed by Baptist in October, 1979, where she remained until December, 1998, when she resigned. During her employment with Baptist, she received only three negative evaluations, all of which followed her reports to Cade, Director of Behavioral Health at Baptist, about Dr. Battaile's rude, vulgar, and unprofessional behavior.
The incidents in question took place over a three year period. Dr. Battaile routinely used the words "nigger," "bluegum," and "fuck" in his conversations. He called Braswell an "idiot" in front of patients and often cursed at her in front of fellow employees. He told dirty jokes, had an Egyptian dildo delivered to the office, and coined nick names for some of the fellow doctors, including, "big ass bitch," "GI Josephine," and "Weiner." Dr. Battaile often said that he wanted a "fucking piece" of someone, including, at least on one occasion, Braswell. He once flipped Braswell the "bird" from his car, while leaving the office, and even walked behind Braswell with his hands clutched like he was going to choke her.
Braswell reported these incidents to Cade, however, the harassment continued until Braswell became fearful for her safety and began to carry mace for her protection. Her work hours were subsequently reduced and she received for the first time, several negative evaluations. She eventually quit her job.
Braswell has filed claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming discrimination based on her sex, hostile work environment, constructive discharge, and intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Defendants now move this court to enter an order of summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Summary Judgment Standard
On a motion for summary judgment, the movant has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265, 275 (1986) ("the burden on the moving party may be discharged by `showing'. . .that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case"). Under Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the burden then shifts to the non-movant to "go beyond the pleadings and by. . .affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d at 274. That burden is not discharged by "mere allegations or denials." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). All legitimate factual inferences must be made in favor of the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 216 (1986). Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d at 273. Before finding that no genuine issue for trial exists, the court must first be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the non-movant. Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538, 552 (1986).
Discussion A. Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims .
Claims arising under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, require state action. In order to state a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Braswell must demonstrate that the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights was committed by a person or entity acting under the color of state law. See Doe v. Dallas Independent School District, 153 F.3d 211, 215 (5th Cir. 1998); see also, Allbright v Good Shepard Hospital, Inc., 884 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1989) (upholding dismissal of § 1983 claim on basis that private hospital was not acting under color of state law); Farkas v. Texas Instrument, Inc., 375 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1967) (the Fourteenth Amendment and the statutes enacted pursuant to it, including the civil rights statute, apply only where there is state action).
The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in relevant part, that "[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . ."
Baptist is a private, not-for-profit corporation, organized under the laws of the State of Mississippi. It is not owned by, nor in any way affiliated with, the State of Mississippi. In fact, nowhere in Braswell's complaint does she set forth the likelihood that Baptist might be state a actor. Thus, the court is of the opinion that Baptist is not a state actor, and as such, Braswell has failed to set forth a necessary element of her Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983 claims. Further, Cade and Dr. Battaile are employees of Baptist and thus are also not state actors. Consequently, the court finds that Braswell's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Fourteenth Amendment claims fail as a matter of law.
B. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claims .
42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 provides in part:(a) Statement of equal rights
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
The United States Supreme Court has clearly established that claims for sexual discrimination are not within the scope of § 1981. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 167, 96 S.Ct. 2586, 2593, 49 L.Ed.2d 415 (1976); see also, Brandon v. Baptist Memorial Hospital-Golden Triangle, Inc., 2000 WL 679140, *3 (N.D.Miss.). A review of Braswell's complaint and deposition reveal that she has made no claim for discrimination based on her race or national origin. Hence, the court finds that Braswell's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 fail as a matter of law.
C. Title VII claims against Cade Dr. Battaile individually .
Braswell alleges claims under Title VII against Cade and Dr. Battaile individually. Individuals, however, cannot be held liable under Title VII. See Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 262 (5th Cir. 1999) ("While Title VII defines the term employer to include `any agent' of any employer, . . ., this circuit does not interpret the statute as imposing individual liability for such a claim.") (citing Pfau v. Reed, 125 F.3d 927, 935-36 (5th Cir. 1997)); Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 652 (5th Cir. 1994) (recognizing intent of Congress not to impose individual liability under Title VII). Thus, neither Cade nor Dr. Battaile can be held individually liable under Title VII. As such, the court finds that all Title VII claims against Cade and Dr. Battaile as individuals, fail as a matter of law.
D. All remaining claims .
As to all remaining claims, the court finds that the Defendants' motion for summary judgment is not well taken and shall be denied.
The Defendants have failed to show that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In any event, the court has the discretion, which it exercises here, to allow the Plaintiff's remaining claims to proceed to trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ("Neither do we suggest . . . that the trial court may not deny summary judgment in a case where there is reason to believe that the better course would be to proceed to a full trial.").
Conclusion
The court finds regarding Braswell's claims under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, she failed to show state action. Regarding her claims under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981, she failed to show discrimination based on her race or national origin. Regarding her claims under Title VII, the court finds that the Defendants, Cade and Dr. Battaile cannot be sued individually. All remaining claims shall proceed to trial.
A separate order in accordance with this opinion shall issue this day.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Pursuant to an opinion issued this day, it is hereby ORDERED that
the Defendants' motion for summary judgment (docket entry # 49) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART;
the Plaintiff's claims under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, as to all Defendants;
the Plaintiff's claims under Title VII against the individual Defendants, Paul Cade and Dr. Joseph Battaile are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and
all remaining claims shall be allowed to proceed to trial.
SO ORDERED.