Opinion
A21-0189
01-07-2022
Charles Todd Bragg, Petitioner, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent.
Mille Lacs County District Court File No. 48-CR-08-1964
Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Gaïtas, Judge; and Rodenberg, Judge. [*]
ORDER OPINION
TRACY M. SMITH JUDGE.
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. Appellant Charles Todd Bragg seeks review of the district court's order summarily denying his petition for postconviction relief
2. In 2009, Bragg was convicted of eight counts of felony criminal sexual conduct and sentenced to 360 months in prison. Bragg filed a direct appeal, arguing that he did not receive a fair trial. This court affirmed Bragg's convictions. State v. Bragg, No. A09-2319, 2010 WL 5154137, at *1 (Minn.App. Dec. 21, 2010), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 15, 2011). 1
3. In October 2012, Bragg filed his first petition for postconviction relief, which was denied. This court affirmed, holding that Bragg's arguments were procedurally barred. Bragg v. State, No. A13-0413, 2013 WL 6223556, at *1 (Minn.App. Dec. 2, 2013), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 18, 2014).
4. Thereafter, Bragg brought additional unsuccessful motions in district court. Each time, this court either affirmed the district court's order or dismissed Bragg's appeal because the appealed-from order was not appealable. See Bragg v. State, No. A18-0874 (Minn.App. June 8, 2018) (order); Bragg v. State, No. A17-1319 (Minn.App. Sept. 12, 2017) (order); Bragg v. State, No. A16-1777 (Minn.App. Nov. 16, 2016) (order); Bragg v. State, No. A15-0981 (Minn.App. Feb. 5, 2016) (order op.); Bragg v. State, No. A15-0558 (Minn.App. Apr. 17, 2015) (order); Bragg v. State, No. A15-0263 (Minn.App. Feb. 13, 2015) (order); Bragg v. State, No. A14-1345 (Minn.App. Aug. 20, 2014) (order).
5. In 2021, Bragg filed the petition for postconviction relief in the present matter. The district court denied that petition, concluding that Bragg's claims were procedurally barred. Bragg appeals.
6. "We review the denial of a petition for postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. A postconviction court abuses its discretion when it has exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings." Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. 2017) (quotations, citations, and alterations omitted).
7. A person convicted of a crime who claims that the conviction violated the person's rights may file a petition for postconviction relief in the district court. See Minn. 2 Stat. § 590.01 (2020). A petition for postconviction relief may be denied without an evidentiary hearing when "the petition and the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief." Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2020).
8. "A petition for postconviction relief after a direct appeal has been completed may not be based on grounds that could have been raised on direct appeal of the conviction or sentence." Minn. Stat. § 590.01; see State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976) ("[W]here direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief."). The district court may deny a claim that is procedurally barred under Knaffla without holding an evidentiary hearing. See Colbert v. State, 870 N.W.2d 616, 619, 626 (Minn. 2015).
9. Apart from satisfying the Knaffla rule, a postconviction petition must also be timely. A petition must be filed within two years after the appellate court's disposition of direct appeal. See Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a)(2).
10. The Knaffla bar, and the two-year limitations period in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a), do not apply to a motion to correct a sentence that is properly brought under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. Washington v. State, 845 N.W.2d 205, 211 (Minn.App. 2014); see Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9 ("The court may at any time correct a sentence not authorized by law."). "A motion for correction or reduction of sentence based solely on a challenge to the accuracy of the criminal-history score is properly brought under Minn. 3 R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, and is not subject to the two-year postconviction statute of limitations." Vazquez v. State, 822 N.W.2d 313, 314 (Minn.App. 2012).
11. In his petition for postconviction relief, Bragg asserted a number of arguments challenging his convictions and his sentence. We begin with the challenge to his sentence. Bragg argues that his sentence must be corrected because it is based on an erroneous criminal-history score. The district court denied Bragg's request to correct sentence on the ground that his petition was untimely. But, under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, a sentence based on an incorrect criminal-history score may be challenged at any time. Id.
12. Nevertheless, Bragg's claim of an incorrect criminal-history score is without merit. Bragg argues that his sentence was improperly inflated because of a custody-status point that was erroneously assigned when he was sentenced in an unrelated 1993 case for criminal vehicular homicide. It is true that, in one of Bragg's previous postconviction challenges related to the convictions at issue here, a district court determined that Bragg had been improperly sentenced in the 1993 case. However, that error has no impact on 4 Bragg's sentence in this case. Here, Bragg was sentenced using a custody-status point of zero. His total criminal-history score was three. Those three points were all "felony points" that were assigned as a result of Bragg's two 1993 convictions for criminal vehicular homicide, each of which carried one-and-one-half points. The assignment of one-and-one-half points for each of those convictions was not affected by the erroneous calculation of Bragg's custody-status points in the 1993 case. Under the 2008 Minnesota sentencing guidelines, offenses with a severity level of VI to VIII are assigned one-and-one-half points, and criminal vehicular homicide is a severity-level-VIII offense. Bragg was thus properly assigned three total points for his criminal-history score. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.B.1.a, V (2008).
In 2016, in a challenge by Bragg to his sentence for the convictions here, the Anoka County District Court concluded that it had improperly sentenced Bragg in 1993 for two counts of criminal vehicular homicide. The district court determined that Bragg had been erroneously assigned a custody-status point at the time of his 1993 sentencing because he was not on probation at the time of that offense. But the Anoka County District Court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to correct an expired sentence or jurisdiction over Bragg's current sentence, which had been imposed by the Mille Lacs County District Court. The Anoka County District Court stated that, if Bragg wanted to address the current sentence, he needed to make a motion with the sentencing court, which Bragg then did. The denial of that motion is before us here.
13. As for the remaining issues, the postconviction court properly determined that those issues are Knaffla-barred. Bragg argues that he was denied due process because the charges against him were not initiated via an indictment. Bragg made a similar argument in 2015, which was denied by the district court, and we affirmed. Bragg v. State, No. A15-0981 (Minn.App. Feb. 5, 2016) (order op.). Bragg also appears to argue that respondent State of Minnesota committed a Brady violation during its prosecution of him and that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this matter. Bragg has already made this argument on appeal, and it was rejected by this court. Bragg, 2013 WL 6223556, at *1. Bragg also argues that the offenses for which he was convicted "should have been 5 severed." This claim appears to be related to Bragg's previous arguments that his offenses arose out of a "single behavioral incident," which were rejected by this court. Id. Because these claims were all previously raised, they are Knaffla-barred.
See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that the government violates due process when it withholds evidence that is material to the determination of either guilt or punishment of a criminal defendant).
Bragg argues that we should reject Knaffla because it violates the U.S. and Minnesota Constitutions. This court is bound to follow the supreme court's decision in Knaffla. See State v. M.L.A., 785 N.W.2d 763, 767 (Minn.App. 2010) (stating that the court of appeals "is bound by supreme court precedent"), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 21, 2010).
14. These claims are also time-barred. Bragg brought this petition in 2021, 11 years after his direct appeal in 2010. Because postconviction petitions must be filed within two years after the appellate court's disposition of direct appeal, Bragg's claims are time-barred. See Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a)(2).
15. Bragg also argues that the district court judge who denied his postconviction petition was biased and should have been removed. Bragg bases his claim of bias on the fact that the district court denied his petition even though the state did not file a brief opposing his petition. But the district court was not compelled to grant his petition even without a submission by the state. And an adverse ruling is not a basis for imputing bias to a judge. Olson v. Olson, 392 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Minn.App. 1986).
16. Finally, Bragg argues that he was denied the right to a direct appeal. However, Bragg did have a direct appeal, where he was represented by private counsel. See Bragg, 2010 WL 5154137, at *1. Bragg's claim that he was denied the right to a direct appeal is therefore demonstrably incorrect.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's order is affirmed. 6
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 7
[*]Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.