Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-CV-4984.
February 2, 2005
MEMORANDUM
Larry Bragg filed this suit against his former employer, Hoffman Homes, Inc., alleging race discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Hoffman Homes filed a motion to dismiss based on improper venue pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3). Because I find that venue is improper in this court, I will transfer the case to the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Mr. Bragg is a resident of Lancaster, Pennsylvania. (Compl. ¶ 5). Lancaster is in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 28 U.S.C. § 118(c) (2004). Hoffman Homes is a residential facility for troubled youth with its office in Littlestown, Adams County, Pennsylvania. (Compl. ¶ 6). Adams County is located in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. 28 U.S.C. § 118(b) (2004). Mr. Bragg was employed by Hoffman Homes from January 1999 (Compl. ¶ 8) to August 2003 (Compl. ¶ 66) as a case manager/supervisor. Mr. Bragg contends that Hoffman Homes denied him a promotion and constructively discharged him based upon his race. (Compl. ¶¶ 8-41). Hoffman Homes made all decisions related to Mr. Bragg's employment at the Littlestown facility and maintains the relevant employment records at that location. (See Decl. of Mitchell Snider, Def.'s Mem. Supp. Motion to Dismiss, Ex. A, ¶¶ 2-3).
II. DISCUSSION
Title VII contains a venue provision setting forth the judicial districts in which an action may be brought. Specifically, it provides:
Each United States district court and each United States court of a place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter. Such an action may be brought in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice, but if the respondent is not found within any such district, such an action may be brought within the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal office. For purposes of sections 1404 and 1406 of Title 28, the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal office shall in all cases be considered a district in which the action might have been brought.42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3)(1994). The venue provision is exclusive for cases brought pursuant to Title VII and the general venue provision of 28 U.S.C. 1391 does not apply. See Kravitz v. Institute for Int'l Research, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15669, at *5-6 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (citations omitted). Because the alleged unlawful employment action took place in Adams County and the relevant employment records are housed there, I find that with respect to the Title VII claims, venue is improper in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
Venue must generally be established for each claim in a complaint. Id. (citations omitted). Unlike Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 does not contain a specific venue provision and venue for a § 1981 claim standing alone is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391. See, e.g., Stith et al. v. Manor Baking Co., 418 F. Supp. 150, 155 (W.D. Mo. 1976). Nevertheless, venue is improper in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania with respect to the § 1981 claim pursuant to § 1391(b), because the defendant does not reside in the Eastern District, nor did a substantial part of the events occur here. Rather, like the Title VII claim, proper venue for this claim is also in the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
Moreover, even if venue for the § 1981 claim were proper in the Eastern District, adjudication of the § 1981 claim would be proper in the Middle District under the doctrine of pendent venue because the proofs and the parties are the same for the both causes of action. See Kravitz, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *7 (citations omitted); Hayes v. RCA Service Co., 546 F. Supp. 661, 664 (D.D.C. 1982) (citations omitted). Courts have recognized that "Title VII should be considered a principal cause of action whenever it is joined with a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981" and that "proper venue must be established for that principal cause of action." Id. at 664-65.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1406(a), a district court must either dismiss a case in which venue is improper, or in the interest of justice may transfer the case to the district in which it could have been brought. Because both causes of action could have been brought in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, I will transfer the case.
III. CONCLUSION
I find that venue is improperly laid in this district and that the interest of justice are best served by transferring this case to the Middle District of Pennsylvania. An appropriate order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this day of February, 2005, upon consideration of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, it is hereby ORDERED that:(1) Defendant's Motion is DENIED;
(2) The case shall be TRANSFERRED to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1406(a);
(3) The Clerk is directed to Transfer the original pleadings of this case to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.