Opinion
19-2949
11-02-2020
James H. Brady, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Barry R. Ostrager, Jane Doe 1-10, John Doe 1-10, Defendants-Appellees.
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: James H. Brady, pro se, Wyckoff, NJ. FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: David Lawrence, III, Assistant Solicitor General (Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, and Steven C. Wu, Deputy Solicitor General, on the brief), for Letitia James, New York State Office of the Attorney General, New York, NY.
SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 2nd day of November, two thousand twenty. PRESENT: ROBERT D. SACK, ROBERT A. KATZMANN, WILLIAM J. NARDINI, Circuit Judges. FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: James H. Brady, pro se, Wyckoff, NJ. FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: David Lawrence, III, Assistant Solicitor General (Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, and Steven C. Wu, Deputy Solicitor General, on the brief), for Letitia James, New York State Office of the Attorney General, New York, NY.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Schofield, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Appellant James H. Brady, proceeding pro se, appeals from a final judgment in which the district court (Schofield, J.) sua sponte dismissed a complaint asserting claims against New York State Supreme Court Justice Barry R. Ostrager and a host of John and Jane Doe defendants under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, and state law. Brady alleges that Justice Ostrager committed error and misconduct in his adjudication of a state-court action brought by a landlord against Brady. Brady also alleges that Justice Ostrager conspired with the landlord's counsel, and retaliated against Brady for his rejection of a settlement offer and for Brady's operation of a website expressing negative views of certain members of the state judiciary. Brady seeks compensatory and punitive damages.
The district court dismissed Brady's suit, holding that Brady's claims are barred by judicial immunity and by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Brady appeals. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
The district court also dismissed Brady's claims against the John and Jane Doe defendants. Brady does not challenge the dismissal of the Doe defendants on appeal, and this issue is therefore waived. See LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1995).
I. Judicial Immunity
Upon de novo review, see Butcher v. Wendt, 975 F.3d 236, 241 (2d Cir. 2020), we conclude that the district court correctly held that Brady's claims were barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity.
As we recently did in Butcher, "[w]e affirm the dismissal of all the claims under Rule 12(b)(6), without addressing the dismissal . . . under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine." 975 F.3d at 239.
It is well settled that "judges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978). Judges are therefore subject to suit only for (1) "nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity"; and (2) "actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction." Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991). For the first category, "the Supreme Court has generally concluded that acts arising out of, or related to, individual cases before the judge are considered judicial in nature." Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2009). For the second category, a judge "will be denied immunity for damages where he (i) acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction; and (ii) knew or must have known that he was acting in such a manner." Tucker v. Outwater, 118 F.3d 930, 936 (2d Cir. 1997).
Unless otherwise indicated, in quoting cases, we omit all internal citations, quotation marks, footnotes, and alterations.
Justice Ostrager is "immune from a suit for money damages" arising from his adjudication of the state lawsuit against Brady. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 9. Brady alleged that Justice Ostrager failed to adjudicate certain defenses, ignored evidence, and issued erroneous jury instructions. All of these actions were taken in Justice Ostrager's capacity as a presiding judge and therefore were "judicial in nature." Bliven, 579 F.3d at 210. So too were those acts "alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly," Stump, 435 U.S. at 356, including Brady's allegations that Justice Ostrager conspired with various individuals, retaliated against Brady, and refused to intervene in his appeal, because these claims also arise from Justice Ostrager's rulings in the state lawsuit. See Bliven, 579 F.3d at 209-10.
Although Brady argues to the contrary, Justice Ostrager "did not act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction." Tucker, 118 F.3d at 936. At the time he presided over the state lawsuit, he was a justice of the New York Supreme Court, Commercial Division, which, in New York County, has jurisdiction over commercial disputes where the amount in controversy totals at least $500,000. N.Y Const. art. VI, § 7; N.Y. Jud. Law § 140-b; 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 202.70(a), (b)(1), (b)(3). The district court therefore correctly held that judicial immunity barred Brady's action.
II. Leave to Amend
The district court properly denied Brady leave to amend his complaint. Although district courts should grant pro se plaintiffs leave to amend a complaint at least once, that applies only "when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated." Dolan v. Connolly, 794 F.3d 290, 295 (2d Cir. 2015). Therefore, "leave to amend need not be granted when amendment would be futile." Terry v. Inc. Vill. of Patchogue, 826 F.3d 631, 633 (2d Cir. 2016). In cases like this one "[w]hen the denial of leave to amend is based on . . . a determination that amendment would be futile," we review the issue de novo. Hutchison v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Inc., 647 F.3d 479, 490 (2d Cir. 2011).
Given Justice Ostrager's judicial immunity, the district court correctly held that amendment would be futile. "The problem with [Brady's] causes of action is substantive; better pleading will not cure it." Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000). Brady's briefs do not propose any specific new claims or allegations that Brady wishes to assert; they just ask for a general right to file another complaint. We find no error in the district court's denial of leave to amend.
III. Sanctions
Justice Ostrager asks us to "order Brady to show cause why he should not be required to seek leave of this Court before filing any appeals or other documents." However, Justice Ostrager did not seek this relief by way of a formal motion and we decline to construe his request as such. See Fed. R. App. P. 27(a)(1) ("An application for an order or other relief is made by motion unless these rules prescribe another form.").
Brady takes issue with the district court's warning that "further vexatious or frivolous litigation in this Court will result in an order barring [Brady] from filing any new action in this Court without prior permission." Given that no sanctions or injunctions were actually issued, we need not address this claim. --------
We have considered Brady's remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court