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finding that the use of the term "pertaining to" rendered a document request as overly broad on its face
Summary of this case from In re BernalOpinion
CIVIL ACTION No: 00-2395-GTV
October 9, 2001
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the following motions: (1) Motion to Compel Discovery, filed by Defendants J.E. Val-Mejias, M.D., and The Galichia Medical Group, P.A. (doc. 60); (2) Motion for Protective Order and Motion to Quash the Deposition of J.E. Val-Mejias, MD., filed by J.E. Val-Mejias, M.D. (doc. 58); and (3) request to strike Plaintiff's Reply to Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time to Designate Expert Witnesses and to Strike Plaintiff's Certificate of Compelling Circumstances for Fax Filing, filed by Defendants J.E. Val-Mejias, M.D., and The Galichia Medical Group, P.A. (doc. 94)
I. Factual Background
This is a medical malpractice action in which Plaintiff asserts that Defendants I.E. Val-Mejias, M.D., and The Galichia Medical Group, P.A., were negligent with regard to the care and treatment they provided him during the time period March 5, 1997 to June 16, 1997. Plaintiff also asserts a claim for ! fraudulent concealment against Dr. Val-Mejias for concealing from Plaintiff that his pacemaker was allegedly negligently inserted in 1993. Plaintiff claims that he has suffered disabling, permanent injuries, emotional distress, and pain and suffering. He also claims that he has suffered a loss of earnings and future earning capacity.
II. Defendants' Motion to Compel Discovery (doc. 60)
Defendants move to compel Plaintiff to respond to various interrogatories and requests for production propounded by Dr. I.E. Val-Mejias and The Galichia Medical Group, P. A. They also move to compel Plaintiff to sign releases for his Social Security, medical, employment, insurance, and workers' compensation records. In addition, Defendants request that Plaintiff be required to respond to Defendants' written discovery before any party's deposition may be taken. They also request monthly case management conferences. Finally, they seek to recover the attorney fees and expenses they have incurred in connection with the filing of their Motion to Compel.
A. Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories
I. Interrogatory No. 4
This interrogatory asks Plaintiff to provide the following information:
Please state in detail your factual version of how the occurrence complained of in your Complaint took place, and identify the precise nature and extend [sic] of your alleged injuries and damages, and your prognosis regarding same.
Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory on the basis that it seeks to discover his counsel's mental impressions, opinions, and "outline and analysis" of the case. Plaintiff also objects to this interrogatory on the basis that its requests medical expert opinion, and states that such information will be provided to Defendants "in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," Finally, Plaintiff objects on the basis that the interrogatory seeks to discover facts upon which Plaintiff and Plaintiffs counsel will rely in prosecuting the case.
The Court will overrule these objections. A defendant is entitled to know the factual basis of a plaintiff's allegations. Towner v. Med James, Inc., No. 94-2285-GTV, 1995 WL 477700, *3 (Aug. 9, 1995); Continental III Nat 1 Bank Trust Co. v. Caton, 136 F.R.D. 682, 684 (D. Kan. 1991). Furthermore, requests for opinions or contentions that call for the application of law to fact are proper, Towner, 1995 WL 477700 at *3-4 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 33(c)), and an interrogatory may properly inquire into a party's contentions in the case, Bohannon v. Honda Motor Co., 127 F.R.D. 536, 538 (D. Kan. 1989). These types of interrogatories, known as "contention interrogatories" may be used to narrow and define the issues for trial, and they enable the propounding party to determine the proof required to rebut the responding party's position. Steil v. Humana Kansas City, Inc., 197 F.R.D. 445, 446 (D. Kan. 2000).
Moreover, Defendants are entitled to "a specific and substantive answer [as to] the dollar amount of plaintiff s claimed damages and a definitive description of other non-pecuniary relief, if any, plaintiff seeks." Caton, 136 F.R.D. at 687. It is not sufficient for Plaintiff to respond by stating that his expert will provide the requested damages information in accordance with the expert disclosure deadlines. See id, (overruling objection to interrogatory asking plaintiff to state the precise amount of damages he sustained as a result of the acts alleged in the complaint). The fact that a plaintiff may later supplement his interrogatory response with an expert report does not permit him to initially refuse to respond with whatever discoverable information he presently holds. Bohannon, 127 F.R.D. at 538. The Court therefore overrules Plaintiff's objections that the interrogatory seeks his counsel's mental impressions, opinions, and outline and analysis of the case.
The Court will also overrule Plaintiff's objection that the interrogatory asks Plaintiff to identify those facts upon which he may rely to prove his case. Plaintiff has mischaracterized the interrogatory Rather than asking what facts Plaintiff intends to rely upon at trial, it merely asks him to explain "how the occurrence complained of in [the] Complaint took place," to identify his damages, and to state the prognosis for his medical condition. Such a request is proper.
Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants' Motion to Compel as to Interrogatory No. 4.
2. Interrogatory No. 7
This interrogatory seeks information about Plaintiff's previous hospitalizations. Plaintiff does not object to this interrogatory but states that the requested information "can be derived from the medical records of the Plaintiff that have been or are being obtained by the Defendants pursuant to deposition subpoenas."
The Court agrees with Defendants that this is an insufficient response. While Fed.R.Civ.P. 33(d) allows a party to answer an interrogatory by producing business records in certain circumstances, that rule applies only to the business records "of the party upon whom the interrogatory has been served." Fed.R.Civ.P. 33(d). The business records option does not apply here, because the medical records are the business records of various non-party hospitals and not those of Plaintiff. Furthermore, Defendants should not be required to subpoena this information from third parties. Plaintiff, as the responding party, cannot shift the expense and burden to Defendants to obtain this information from Plaintiff's medical providers. The Motion to Compel will therefore be granted as to this interrogatory.
3. Interrogatory No. 8
This interrogatory asks Plaintiff to provide the total dollar amounts of any claims he is making for lost earnings or for the impairment of future earning capacity. It also asks Plaintiff to identify any accountant or other person with whom he has consulted or upon whom he has relied in calculating the amount of claimed earnings losses and to provide "the financial assumptions" that he or his representatives have made in performing the calculations.
Plaintiff states in his response that the amount of his economic damages is being computed by an economist expert and that the requested information will be provided when his expert's report is due. He also sates that under Rule 33(d), "the past medical expenses can be derived from medicals [sic] obtained by Defendants pursuant to deposition subpoenas."
The Court finds this response to be insufficient in several respects. First, directing Defendants to Plaintiff's medical records and/or providing information about Plaintiff's medical expenses is non-responsive to this request for lost earnings information. Second, even if the medical records were responsive, they are not business records of Plaintiff and the Rule 33(d) option to produce business records is inapplicable. Finally, as stated in the discussion of Interrogatory No. 4, Plaintiff is required to provide Defendants with what damages information he presently possesses. The fact that Plaintiff may later supplement his interrogatory response with an expert report does not permit him to refuse to respond at the present time with whatever discoverable information he presently holds. See Bohannon, 127 F.R.D. at 538 (party has duty to answer interrogatory with whatever information he has; Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(e) provides procedure for supplementing response).
The Motion to Compel will therefore be granted as to this interrogatory. 4. Interrogatory No. 9
The Court notes that a party is not required to identify a non-testifying, consulting expert and that discovery is generally not allowed regarding the facts known or opinions held by such an expert. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(B). Plaintiff, however, did not object to this interrogatory on that basis, and, thus, the Court makes no ruling as to whether the interrogatory is objectionable as requesting discovery regarding a non-testifying, consulting expert.
This interrogatory asks Plaintiff to provide various information about all claims or suits for injury or disability, "[e]xcept for the present lawsuit." Plaintiff responded by stating: "I have never filed any previous lawsuits or any other type of claim other than my claim for disability related to the matters at issue in this action. (Emphasis added.) Plaintiff did not provide any of the requested information as to that claim for disability. Plaintiff states in his opposition to the Motion to Compel that his response fully answers the interrogatory.
The Court reads Plaintiffs response to mean that he has filed a claim for disability and that the claim is related to the matters raised in this lawsuit. Plaintiff apparently believes that because his disability claim relates to the instant lawsuit, it falls within the interrogatory's "present lawsuit" I exception and he is not required to provide the requested information as to the claim. The Court disagrees, and finds that any disability claim which Plaintiff has filed does not fall within the exception. Plaintiff is therefore required to provide the requested information.
Defendants state in their reply brief that they have reason to believe that more than one disability claim has been filed by Plaintiff, but they do not explain the basis for that belief. At most, the Court can instruct plaintiff to folly answer this interrogatory as to all claims for disability. The Motion to Compel will be granted as to this interrogatory.
5. Interrogatory No. 13
This interrogatory states:
Please state with specificity each and every alleged departure from standard, approved medical practice you or your representative are alleging against J.E. Val-Mejias, M.D. in this case.
Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory on the basis that it seeks to discover his counsel's mental impressions and opinions and counsel's "outline and analysis" of the case. Plaintiff also objects to this interrogatory on the grounds that it requests medical expert opinion, and he states that such information will be provided to Defendants "in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." The Court will overrule these objections for the same reasons discussed above in connection with Interrogatory No. 4.
The Court notes that Plaintiff has asserted an additional objection to this interrogatory in his opposition to the Motion to Compel, which was not asserted in his initial response to the interrogatory.: In his opposition brief, Plaintiff asserts that the interrogatory is objectionable on the basis that it asks Plaintiff to provide each and every fact in support of his allegation that Dr. Val-Mejias departed from the standard of care.
The Court would have been inclined to overrule this objection, finding that Plaintiff waived it by failing to assert it in his initial objections. See Starlight Int'l, Inc. v. Herlihy, 181 F.R.D. 494, 496 (D. Kan. 1998) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 33(b)(4) ("untimely objections are `waived unless the party's failure to object is excused by the court for good cause shown.' "). Defendants, however, have not argued waiver. Instead, Defendants concede in their reply brief that contention interrogatories are improper if they ask the responding party to provide each and every fact supporting the identified; allegations. Defendants properly recognize that contention interrogatories should instead ask only for the material or principal facts supporting Plaintiff's contentions. See IBP, Inc., v. Mercantile Bank of Topeka, 179 F.R.D. 316, 321 (D. Kan. 1998). In their reply brief, Defendants thus urge the Court to compel Plaintiff to respond to this interrogatory by providing the "material or principal facts" requested.
The Court will decline to heed Defendants' request, inasmuch as this particular interrogatory does not ask Plaintiff to provide "each and every fact" in support of certain allegations. Rather, it merely asks Plaintiff to identify each alleged departure from standard, approved medical practice made by Dr. I.E. Val-Mejias. To compel Plaintiff to provide the principal or material facts supporting his allegation that Dr. Val-Mejias departed from the standard of care, as Defendants request, would have the effect of rewriting this interrogatory. The Court does not find the interrogatory to be objectionable as written. The Court will therefore compel Plaintiff to answer Interrogatory No. 13 as written.
6. Interrogatory No. 14
This interrogatory asks Plaintiff to state whether he has been convicted of any felony or misdemeanor, and, if so, to state the nature, date, and place of the conviction. Plaintiff objects on the basis that the interrogatory seeks information that is neither relevant nor calculated to lead to the discovery of relevant evidence. He also objects on grounds that "it is annoying, harassing, and unduly burdensome." Plaintiff then states that, subject to and without waiving those objections, he has not; been convicted of a felony. In his opposition to the Motion to Compel, Plaintiff adds that "upon information and belief," he has never been convicted of any crime involving dishonesty or false statement.
Defendants contend that Plaintiff should be required to provide information about all convictions so that Defendants can decide for themselves whether the crime involves dishonesty or false statement, the terminology used in Fed.R.Evid. 609(a). The Court agrees that the information is discoverable. Defendants should be provided with the requested information so that they may make their own determination as to whether the conviction falls within Fed.R.Evid. 609(a)(2) and so that they may raise whatever arguments they deem necessary at trial regarding the conviction's admissibility. The Court will grant the Motion to Compel as to this interrogatory.
Fed.R.Evid. 609(a)(2) provides that evidence that a witness committed a crime is admissible if it involved dishonesty or false statement. Otherwise, it is admissible only if the crime was punishable: by death or imprisonment in excess of one year. Fed.R.Evid. 609(a)(2).
7. Interrogatory Nos. 15-17
Each of these three interrogatories asks Plaintiff to "state each and every basis for your allegation, including each and every fact supporting your allegation" contained in various paragraphs of the Complaint. Plaintiff asserts the same objections that he asserted in response to Interrogatory No. 4. The Court will overrule the objections for the same reasons discussed above in connection with Interrogatory No. 4.
In his opposition to the Motion to Compel, Plaintiff also objects, for the very first time, that these interrogatories ask for "each and every fact" supporting the identified allegations. In their reply brief, Defendants fail to argue waiver and once again state that Plaintiff need not provide "each and every fact" but only "the material or principal facts" supporting the identified allegations.
Because these interrogatories do ask for "each and every fact" and because Defendants have conceded that Plaintiff need only provide the material or principal facts supporting the specified allegations, the Court will order Plaintiff to respond by providing only the material or principal facts that he contends support the specified allegations.
8.Interrogatory Nos. 18-20
These interrogatories ask Plaintiff to provide various information about a number of Plaintiff's claims and allegations. Plaintiff asserts the same objections that he made in response to Interrogatory No. 4. The Court will overrule those objections for the same reasons set forth above in connection with Interrogatory No. 4.
As in the case of Interrogatory Nos. 13 and 15-17, Plaintiff also objects for the very first time in his opposition to the Motion to Compel that these interrogatories ask him to provide "each and every fact" supporting these allegations. Defendants once again fail to argue waiver and state hat Plaintiff need only provide the principal or material facts. As with Interrogatory Nos. 13 and 15-17, Defendants ask the Court to compel Plaintiff to answer these interrogatories with the material or principal facts supporting Plaintiff's allegations.
The Court will, once again, decline to heed Defendants' request. These particular interrogatories do not ask Plaintiff to provide "each and every fact" in support of his various allegations. Rather, they merely ask Plaintiff to provide certain, specified information about his allegations. Interrogatory No. 18 asks Plaintiff to identify each statement or act by Dr. Val-Mejias that allegedly fraudulently concealed, or attempted to fraudulently conceal, the claimed negligent insertion of Plaintiff's pacemaker. Interrogatory No. 19 asks Plaintiff to state "how your pacemaker was negligently installed" as pled in paragraphs 23 and 24 of the Complaint. Interrogatory No. 20 asks Plaintiff to identify all information that Dr. Val-Mejias allegedly failed to provide Plaintiff and to explain how Plaintiffs decisions regarding his medical care would have differed had he received the information allegedly not provided.
It appears to the Court that Defendants' reply brief mistakenly lumped these interrogatories! together with Interrogatory Nos. 15-17.
To compel Plaintiff to provide the principal or material facts supporting these claims and allegations, as Defendants now request, would have the effect of completely rewriting these interrogatories. The Court does not find the interrogatories to be objectionable as written. They are only asking Plaintiff to provide certain, specific information about his claims and allegations, information that Defendants are entitled to receive. The Court will therefore compel Plaintiff to answer Interrogatory Nos. 18-20 as written.
B. Defendants' First Request for Production of Documents
I. Request No. 1
This request is as follows:
All documents either in the possession or subject to the possession of plaintiff any insurance company or adjusting company acting in plaintiffs behalf, or in the possession or plaintiff's attorney, pertaining to the claim herein. Documents which are claimed to be privileged as a result of attorney/client privilege or attorney work product may be excluded, but it is requested that they be identified, together with this specific privilege claimed[.]
Plaintiff objects on the grounds that the request "is harassing, annoying, unduly burdensome and seeks to impose an obligation on Plaintiff not imposed by the Rules of Civil Procedure." Plaintiff also states in his response to the request that he does not have the burden to obtain records from third parties as requested. He then states that subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, "all responsive documents are available for inspection."
The Court agrees with Plaintiff that this request is unduly burdensome. The use of the term "pertaining to," often makes a discovery request overly broad and unduly burdensome on its face. See Mackey v. IBP, Inc., 167 F.R.D. 186, 197 (D. Kan. 1996). Such a phrase often requires the answering party "to engage in mental gymnastics to determine what information may or may not be remotely responsive." Id This is the case here, where the request seeks all documents "pertaining to the claim herein" and not to a single or discrete event or fact. The request is so broad and open-ended that Plaintiff could not possibly fully answer without undue burden. See id. (finding interrogatory seeking the identity of all documents " `pertaining to' comparisons or rankings of the plants of [defendant] for `any reason' " to be so open-ended and overly broad on its face that defendant could not fully answer without undue burden).
This Court usually requires a party asserting undue burden to supply some type of evidentiary support for its objection. See Kutilek v. Gannon, 132 F.R.D. 296, 300 (D. Kan. 1990) (party objecting; to discovery as unduly burdensome "cannot rely on some generalized objections, but must show specifically how each interrogatory or request is burdensome and/or overly broad by submitting affidavits or some detailed explanation as to the nature of the claimed burden."). Such support will not be required here, however, since the request is overbroad and unduly burdensome on its face. See Mackey, 167 F.R.D. at 197 ("A party resisting facially overbroad or unduly burdensome discovery need not provide specific, detailed support.").
Despite having a valid objection to a request, a party, generally speaking, is still required to answer the request to extent it is not objectionable. Id. at 198 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 33(b)(1)). An answer will not be required, however, when the request is overly broad and unduly burdensome on its face unless adequate guidance exists as to what extent the interrogatory is not objectionable. Id. (citing Nelson v. Telecable of Overland Park, No. 95-2007-GTV, 1996 WL 111250, at *2 (D. Kan. Feb. 29, 1996)).
Here, the parties here have provided insufficient guidance for the Court to determine the extent that the request is not objectionable, and, thus, no answer should be required. The Court notes, however, that Plaintiff has stated that, subject to his objections, "all responsive documents are available for inspection." To the extent Plaintiff has not already provided copies of those documents to Defendants, he shall do so. Said documents shall be produced to Defendants within fourteen (14) days of the date of filing of this Order.
2. Request No. 2
This request seeks "[a]ll statements or records of parties and witnesses taken by anyone before the date of the filing of the lawsuit herein." Plaintiff objects on the grounds that it seeks information protected by the attorney-client privilege and the attorney work product doctrine. He states that his attorney has taken some statements from Plaintiff. He further states that he is unaware of any statements or recordings given by Defendants or any witnesses and that he knows of no documents responsive to this request other than his own statements. Defendants do not discuss Request No. 2 in either their initial or reply brief, other than to state generally that they are seeking to compel answers to all four of their requests for production.
Plaintiffs objection to producing any of Plaintiffs statements will be sustained. Plaintiff has responded that he is unaware of any other documents responsive to this request. The Court cannot compel the production of documents that do not exist. The Motion to Compel will therefore be denied as to this request.
3. Request No. 3
This requests seeks the following:
All memoranda, writings, records, tape recordings . . . or documents of any nature concerning any claim for benefits/damages made by or on behalf of the plaintiff[.]
Plaintiff responded as follows:
Plaintiff objects to Requests for Production No. 3 on the grounds that it is overly broad, annoying, harassing and unduly burdensome. Plaintiff further objects on the grounds that it seeks information protected by the attorney-client privilege and the attorney work product doctrine. Plaintiff has produced all documents in his possession, not otherwise privileged, pursuant to Initial Disclosures. Plaintiff has available family photographs for review at the offices of Plaintiff's counsel. Subject to, and without waiving the foregoing objections, Plaintiff states that all responsive documents have been produced.
In their Motion to Compel, Defendants state that Plaintiff's representation that he has produced all non-privileged documents "pursuant to Initial Disclosures" is false and that no documents whatsoever were produced with Plaintiff's initial disclosures and that no documents have been produced since the initial disclosures.
Rather than responding directly to this rather serious allegation, Plaintiff merely states in his opposition to the Motion to Compel that "Plaintiff stands by this response" and that "all responsive documents have been produced." Doc. 78 at 7. He also states in his opposition that the request "is in violation of Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1)" to the extent it seeks information about unrelated claims. Id. The Court interprets this to be a relevance objection.
Defendants counter that because Plaintiff is claiming physical impairment in this case, any past claims of disability are relevant. They argue that this is particular/ true with respect to a claim for Social Security benefits that Plaintiff apparently filed in March 1997. The Court agrees that any past disability claims are relevant, and will grant the Motion to Compel as to this request.
According to Defendants, a medical record they obtained through a subpoena indicates that Plaintiff filed a claim for Social Security disability benefits "around March of 1997." Doc. 61 at 14 Plaintiff does not confirm or deny whether he filed such a claim.
4. Request No. 4
This request seeks "[a]ll tax returns of plaintiff from 1990 through 2000." Plaintiff stated in his initial response that he would "provide those upon receipt." He also stated that he would sign an appropriate release to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) if defense counsel would provide one.
As best as the Court can determine, no tax returns have been produced. If the tax returns have been received by Plaintiff or are otherwise in his possession but he has not yet produced them, Plaintiff shall produce them to Defendants within five (5) days of the date of filing of this Order. If Plaintiff has not received the returns or they are otherwise not in his possession, he shall sign an appropriate release so that Defendants may obtain the returns. The release shall be signed and returned to Defendants' counsel within five (5) days of the date of filing of this Order.
C. Social Security Records Release
Defendants move for an order compelling Plaintiff to sign a release so that Defendants may obtain his Social Security records. As noted above, it appears that Plaintiff may have filed a claim for Social Security disability benefits in March 1997. Defendants served a subpoena on the Social Security Administration (SSA) but were informed that the SSA will not provide the records unless Plaintiff signs a release or Defendants obtain a court order. Plaintiff has refused to sign a release. He argues generally that "he cannot be forced to turn over any medical or other records that do not pertain to the injuries being addressed in this case." Doc. 78 at 7.
The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff's argument. If Plaintiff did indeed file a claim for Social Security disability benefits in March 1997 (which Plaintiff has yet to confirm or deny), that claim would be relevant to his claim in this action that he has suffered permanently disabling injuries as a result of the Defendants' claimed negligence, which purportedly occurred in March through June 1997. Plaintiff has failed to show why this information would not be relevant to this action. The Court will therefore order Plaintiff to sign a release for his Social Security records. See Rodriguez v. IBP, Inc., 243 F.3d 1221, 1230 (10th Cir. 2001) (district court has authority to order plaintiff to provide consent for release of Social Security records). Plaintiff shall sign the release and return to Defendants' counsel within five (5) days of the date of filing of this Order.
D. Medical Records Releases
Defendants also move for an order compelling Plaintiff to sign a release so that Defendants may obtain his medical records. Defendants state that Plaintiff has refused to sign any medical records releases. The requested release is a general release directed to hospitals, medical institutions, and various health care providers and is not limited to any particular time period, injury, or medical condition. See Consent to Release Information, Defendants' Exhibit J to doc. 61. Given Plaintiff's refusal to sign any medical records release, Defendants have served subpoenas on Plaintiff's health care providers, but have received very few records in response.
Plaintiff argues that he should not be forced to turn over any medical records "that do not pertain to the injuries being addressed in this case" because he has waived the physician-patient privilege only as to the specific injuries being addressed in this case and not to any other injuries or medical conditions. Doc. 78 at 7. Defendants argue, on the other hand, that Plaintiff completely waived the physician-patient privilege by bringing this lawsuit.
The Court agrees with Defendants. The Kansas statute governing the physician-patient privilege is found at K.S.A. 60-427. Subsection (d) sets forth the circumstances under which the privilege is waived. It provides as follows:
There is no privilege under this section in an action in which the condition of the patient is an element or factor of the claim or defense of the patient or of any party claiming through or under the patient or claiming as a beneficiary of the patient through a contract to which the patient is or was a party.
K.S.A. 60-427(d).
This Court has repeatedly rejected the concept of a limited waiver under K. S. A. 60-427(d). See, e.g., Lake v. Sleeves, 161 F.R.D. 441 (D. Kan. 1994); Evertson v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, No. 82-2021-MLB, 1993 WL 245972 (D. Kan. 1993); Bryant v. Hilst, 136 F.R.D. 487 (D. Kan. 1991). The Bryant case is most instructive here. In Bryant, Judge Saffels affirmed a decision of Magistrate Judge Newman which expressly rejected a plaintiff's argument that the privilege is waived only as to the medical condition at issue. Judge Saffels stated:
In State v. Campbell, 210 Kan. 265, 281, 500 P.2d 21 (1972), the Kansas Supreme Court specifically stated that "there is no privilege under K.S.A. 1971 Supp. 60-427(d) (physician-patient privilege) in an action in which the condition of the patient is an element or factor of the claim or defense of the patient." The court in Campbell followed the clear language of K.S.A. 60-427. There is no privilege in an action in which the condition of the patient is in issue. While a privilege is generally afforded under K.S.A. 60-427(b), it is removed under K.S.A. 60-427(d). It simply does not exist. Since there is no common law physician-patient privilege, there is no privilege available to plaintiff herein. Plaintiff's argument that there is a privilege as to conditions other than the condition in issue, is without merit. The statutory language, as well as that of the court, is without qualification. The issue is not waiver or partial waiver, there is simply no privilege availab le to the plaintiff.Bryant, 136 F.R.D. at 491 (emphasis added).
In light of the above, the Court finds no merit to Plaintiff's argument that he has not waived the physician-patient privilege as to any conditions other than the specific injuries at issue in this case.
Plaintiff has asserted no other objections to signing the medical release. The Court will therefore order Plaintiff to sign the medical release, which is attached as Exhibit J to Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Compel (doc. 61). Plaintiff shall sign and return the release to Defendants' counsel within five (5) days of the date of filing of this Order.
E. Employment, Insurance, and Workers' Compensation Records Releases
Defendants also request that Plaintiff be ordered to sign releases for Plaintiff's employment, insurance, and workers' compensation records. See Exhibits J, K, and L, attached to Defendants' Memorandum (doc. 61). Plaintiff does not address these releases in his opposition brief. The Court will therefore grant the Motion to Compel as to these records releases. Within five (5) days of the date of filing of this Order, Plaintiff shall sign and return to Defendants' counsel the above-mentioned releases.
F. Request That Plaintiff Be Required to Respond to Defendants' Written Discovery Prior to the Taking of Any Party's Deposition
Defendants argue that they need Plaintiff's responses to their written discovery before they can prepare to take Plaintiff's deposition and before they can prepare to defend Dr. Val-Mejias' deposition. Plaintiff failed to address this issue in his opposition to the Motion to Compel. The Court will grant this request. No deposition of any party shall take place sooner than eleven (11) days after Plaintiff has answered Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories and First Requests for Production and produced documents responsive to the First Requests for Production, as provided for herein.
The Court notes that this ruling dovetails with its ruling on Defendant Dr. I.E. Val-Mejias' Motion for Protective Order and to Quash (doc. 58), which is addressed in Part III of this Order.
G. Request for Monthly Case Management Conferences
Defendants also ask the Court to schedule monthly case management conferences in this case. The Court finds no pressing need at the present time for regularly scheduled conferences, and, thus, this request will be denied. The Court is, however, available, if discovery issues should arise, and any party may request a telephone conference with the Court.
H. Summary of Ruling on Defendants' Motion to Compel
For the reasons set forth above, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Defendant's Motion to Compel Discovery. Any supplemental written responses to Defendants' written discovery required to be served by this Order shall be served within fourteen (14) days of the date of filing of this Order. In addition, all responsive documents ordered to be produced pursuant to this Order shall be produced to Defendants within fourteen (14) days of the date of filing of this Order. Said production shall take place at the office of Defendants' counsel or at any other location agreed upon by the parties. In addition, within five (5) days of the date of filing of this Order, Plaintiff shall sign the appropriate records releases and return them to Defendants' counsel, as directed herein.
I. Sanctions
Defendants request that they be awarded the attorney fees and costs they have incurred in connection with their Motion to Compel. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(4)(C) allows a court to impose sanctions where, as here, a motion to compel discovery is granted in part and denied in part. Under that rule, the court may "apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the motion among the parties and persons in a just manner." Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(4)(C).
The Court deems it appropriate to award Defendant a portion of the costs and expenses that they have incurred with respect to this Motion to Compel. To aid the Court in determining the proper amount of sanctions, Defendants' counsel shall, within twenty (20) days of the date of filing of this Order, file an affidavit itemizing the expenses, including attorney fees, that Defendants have incurred in connection with their Motion to Compel. Plaintiff shall have eleven (11) days thereafter to file a response to the affidavit, and Defendants shall have eleven (11) days thereafter to file a reply brief, if they so choose. After reviewing the briefs, the Court will issue an order specifying the amount and time 1 of payment.
The Court recognizes that before Rule 37(a)(4) sanctions may be imposed, it must afford the parties an "opportunity to be heard." See id The Advisory Committee Notes to the 1993 Amendments to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(4) make it clear that a court may consider the issue of sanctions "on written; submissions." Here, Defendants specifically requested sanctions in their Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Compel, and Plaintiff had the opportunity to respond to that request. The Court therefore finds that the parties have had sufficient "opportunity to be heard" within the meaning of Fed.R.Civ.P. 37.
Having determined that Defendants are entitled to recover a portion of their reasonable expenses and fees, the Court must next determine whether it is Plaintiff's counsel or Plaintiff himself who should pay the sanctions. To the extent possible, sanctions should be imposed only upon the person or entity responsible for the sanctionable conduct. White v. General Motors Corp. Inc., 908 F.2d 675, 685-86 (10th Cir. 1990) (imposing Rule 11 sanctions); McCoo v. Denny's, Inc., 192 F.R.D. 675, 697 (D. Kan. 2000) (imposing Rule 11, 26(g)(3), and 37(a)(4) sanctions); Starlight Int'l, Inc. v. Herlihy, 190 F.R.D. 587, 593 (D. Kan. 1999) (imposing Rule 26(g) and 37(b) and (d) sanctions). The sanctioning of a party, as opposed to the party's counsel, "requires specific findings that the party was aware of the wrongdoing." McCoo, 192 F.R.D. at 697 (citing White, 908 F.2d at 685-86).
In the absence of any evidence that Plaintiff himself was responsible for the objections asserted to Defendants' discovery requests or for the arguments made in response to the Motion to Compel, the Court finds it appropriate to hold the law firms of Plaintiff's counsel solely responsible for paying the monetary sanctions.
Pursuant to Kansas Rule of Professional Conduct 5.1 and the comment thereto, the partners or shareholders in a law firm are responsible for making reasonable efforts to assure that all lawyers in the firm conform to the rules of professional conduct. The Court therefore holds that the law firms representing Plaintiff rather than the individual attorneys shall be responsible for payment of the expenses.
III. Defendant's Motion for Protective Order and to Quash the Deposition of J.E. Val-Mejias, M.D. (doc. 58)
A. Merits of the Motion
For good cause shown, the Court will grant Defendant I.E. Val-Mejias, M.D.'s Motion for Protective Order and to Quash. Dr. Val-Mejias shall be deposed at the offices of his attorney in Wichita, Kansas. The deposition shall take place at a date and time that is mutually agreeable to Dr Mejias and all counsel and shall take place no sooner than eleven (11) days after Plaintiff has answered Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories and First Requests for Production and provided the documents responsive to the requests for production and signed and returned the releases, as provided for herein.
The Court notes that no response was filed by Plaintiff to the Motion for Protective Order and to Quash. The Court therefore could have granted the Motion as uncontested. See D. Kan. Rule 7.4. Plaintiff did, however, address many of the issues raised in the Motion for Protective Order and to Quash in his brief in support of his Motion for Extension of Time to Designate Expert Witnesses (doc. 73). The Court will therefore decline to treat the Motion for Protective Order and to Quash as uncontested. The Court, however, instructs Plaintiffs counsel to comply with D. Kan. Rule 7.1 when opposing any other motions filed in this case.
B. Sanctions
Although Defendants have not requested sanctions, the Court must nevertheless address the issue. Rule 26(c) incorporates the sanctions provisions of Rule 37(a)(4). Rule 37(a)(4)(A) governs the imposition of sanctions here. It provides as follows:
If the motion is granted . . . the court shall, after affording an opportunity to be heard, require the party . . . whose conduct necessitated the motion or the party or attorney advising such conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees, unless the court finds that the motion was filed without the movant's first making a good faith effort to obtain the disclosure or discovery, without court action, or that the opposing party's nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially justified, or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
Based on the present record, it appears that the imposition of sanctions against Plaintiffs counsel may be appropriate here. Rule 37(a)(4)(A), however, requires the Court to afford the parties the "opportunity to be heard" before imposing sanctions. A hearing is not necessary, and the Court may consider the issue of sanctions "on written submissions." See Advisory Committee Notes to the 1993 Amendments to Rule 37(a)(4).
Because Defendants did not request sanctions in their Motion for Protective Order, there has been no briefing on this issue, and, thus, no "opportunity to be heard" as required by the Rule. The Court will therefore order Plaintiff and his counsel, to show cause, in writing, within twenty (20) days of the filing of this Order , why the Court should not require the law firms of Plaintiff s counsel to pay the reasonable expenses and fees that Defendants have incurred in making this Motion for Protective Order. Defendants shall have eleven (11) days thereafter to file a response thereto, if they so choose. In the event the Court determines that sanctions should be imposed, the Court will issue an order setting forth a schedule for the filing of an affidavit reflecting the amount of fees and expenses that Defendants have incurred, and for the filing of any related briefs.
IV. Defendants' Request to Strike (doc. 94)
Defendants seeks to strike the following pleadings: (1) Plaintiff's Reply to Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Extension of Time to Designate Expert Witnesses; and (2) Plaintiffs Certificate of Compelling Circumstances for Fax Filing. The Court will deny the request IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion to Compel Discovery (doc. 60) filed by Defendants I.E. Val-Mejias, M.D., and The Galichia Medical Group, P.A., is granted in part and denied in part, as set forth herein. Any supplemental written responses to Defendants' written discovery required to be served by this Order shall be served within fourteen (14) days of the date of filing of this Order. In addition, all responsive documents ordered to be produced pursuant to this Order shall be produced to Defendants within fourteen (14) days of the date of filing of this Order, except for the requested tax returns. Said production shall take place at the office of Defendants' counsel or at any-other location agreed upon by the parties. If Plaintiff has received copies of his tax returns or they are otherwise in his possession but he has not yet produced them, Plaintiff shall produce them to Defendants within five (5) days of the date of filing of this Order. If Plaintiff has not received the returns or they are otherwise not in his possession, he shall sign an appropriate release so that Defendants may obtain the returns. The release shall be signed and returned to Defendants' counsel within five (5) days of the date of filing of this Order. In addition, within five (5) days of the date of filing of this Order, Plaintiff shall sign and return to Defendants' counsel the releases for his Social Security, medical, employment, insurance, and workers' compensation records, which are attached as Exhibits H, J, K and L, to doc. 61.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no deposition of any party shall take place sooner than eleven (11) days after Plaintiff has answered Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories and First Requests for Production and produced documents responsive to the First Requests for Production, as provided for herein.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' request for monthly case management conferences (doc. 60) is denied. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' request for sanctions relating to Defendants' filing of their Motion to Compel (doc. 60) is granted in part. Within twenty (20) days of the date of filing of this Order, Defendants' counsel shall file an affidavit itemizing the expenses, including attorney fees, that Defendants have incurred in connection with their Motion to Compel. Plaintiff shall have eleven (11) days thereafter to file a response to the affidavit, and Defendants shall have eleven (11) days thereafter to file a reply brief, if they so choose.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Protective Order and to Quash the Deposition of I.E. Val-Mejias, M.D., (doc. 58) is granted. Dr. Val-Mejias shall be deposed at the offices of his attorney in Wichita, Kansas. The deposition shall take place at a date and time that is mutually agreeable to Dr. Mejias and all counsel and shall take place no sooner than eleven (11) days after Plaintiff has answered Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories and First Request for Production and produced documents responsive to the First Request for Production, as provided for herein.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff and his counsel shall, within twenty (20) days of the date of filing of this Order, show cause, in writing, why the Court should not require the law firms of Plaintiff s counsel to pay the reasonable expenses and fees incurred by Defendants in making the Motion for Protective Order and to Quash the Deposition of IE. Val-Mejias, M.D. (doc. 58). Defendants shall have eleven (11) days thereafter to file a response thereto, if they so choose.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Request to Strike Plaintiffs Reply to Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Extension of Time to Designate Expert Witnesses and to Strike Plaintiffs Certificate of Compelling Circumstances for Fax Filing (doc. 94) is denied. IT IS SO ORDERED.
AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER
Plaintiffs Motion for Extension of Time to Designate Expert Witnesses (doc. 72) and Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Depositions and Settlement Conference (doc. 105) are hereby granted in part. The Court enters the following Amended Scheduling Order:1. The depositions of parties shall be completed by October 31, 2001. All other discovery shall be completed by November 30, 2001.
2. A settlement conference shall be completed by October 31, 2001.
3. Disclosures required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2), including reports from retained experts, are due from plaintiff by October 26, 2001 and from defendants by November 23, 2001 No rebuttal experts shall be allowed.
4. The final pretrial conference shall be held on December 12, 2001 at 3:00 p.m. The parties' joint proposed Pretrial Order shall be submitted to the Magistrate Judge by December 5, 2001.
5 Dispositive motions are due December 21, 2001.
5. After consultation with the District Judge, the Court removes this case from the February 5, 2002 trial calender and places it on the April 2, 2002 trial docket .
IT IS SO ORDERED.