Opinion
No. 99 C 7205
August 22, 2000.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Sarah Bradley ("Bradley") sues A.M. Castle Co. ("Castle") for sex discrimination in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Bradley contends she was treated differently from male employees and ultimately was discharged because of her sex. Castle moved for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.
BACKGROUND
The court views the background facts in a light most favorable to Bradley as the non-movant; all disputed facts must be resolved in her favor for purposes of this motion. Fisher v. Transco Services-Milwaukee. Inc., 979 F.2d 1239, 1242 (7th Cir. 1992).
Castle is a steel service company that processes and distributes steel bar stock and tubing. On April 12, 1999, Castle hired Bradley as a probationary employee at its plant in Franklin Park, Illinois. All Castle nonmanagerial new hires are classified as probationary employees for the first 45 days of their employment. During this period, they can be discharged at anytime, without resort to grievance procedures provided in the collective bargaining agreement governing Castle's organized employees. The probationary period is designed to allow a new hire to demonstrate her suitability for continued employment by showing her ability to perform assigned tasks and report to work in a reliable and punctual manner. Bradley was aware that she should be fired at any time during the period. Bradley Dep. at 21.
Larry Smith ("Smith") is assistant operations manager of the steel processing area of the plant and his duties included hiring and firing. Smith Dep. at 7-8. After Bradley's hire, Smith told her she would be trained as a saw operator. A saw operator processes steel bar stock delivered to her workstation. The operator uses an overhead crane to place the steel on the sawing machine. After the dimensions of the cut are entered into the sawing machine from a computer, the saw automatically cuts the steel and transports cut pieces to the machine's exit table. While the steel is being cut, the saw operator is expected to perform various other duties, such as changing saw blades and chip removal brushes, maintaining proper coolant and hydraulic fluid levels in the saw, packing the cut pieces of steel for shipping, moving the packaged steel to a loading dock by using an overhead crane, and cleaning the workstation. However, saw operators do most of their cleaning just prior to 10 minutes before the end of a shift. A saw operator does not need to stay past her shift to complete a job begun during her shift because the next shift worker will take over. Bradley was never shown a job description for the saw operator position.
Bradley began working as a saw operator on the first shift, and was supervised by William Swanson ("Swanson"). After two weeks, Bradley was transferred to the third shift pursuant to her request, where she was supervised by Phillip Hunter ("Hunter"). A third supervisor, Dean Pavar ("Pavar"), also supervised Bradley at some point during her employment. Bradley was trained by saw operators Mark Ferguson ("Ferguson"), Ricky Kovach ("Kovach"), John Pettway ("Pettway") and Wayne Tarka ("Tarka") during her probationary period. Hunter initially assigned Bradley to work with Pettway and Ferguson. A week later, Hunter assigned Bradley to work her saw alone. Ferguson and Pettway told Hunter that Bradley was "catching onto" the saws well, and Hunter told Bradley she was "catching on okay." Hunter Dep. at 41, 45.
Bradley was terminated on May 28, 1999. Castle asserts Bradley was terminated because she failed to satisfactorily perform many of her job duties; Bradley contends she was terminated because of her sex. Castle first asserts Bradley failed to properly maintain her workstation. Sometimes Bradley would clean her station while waiting for the saws to cut the steel. However, Castle asserts Hunter had to instruct Bradley on at least three occasions to improve her housekeeping efforts and maintain her workstation by packaging cut pieces of steel and cleaning up saw chips and coolant around her saw. Castle's Rule 56. 1(a)(3) Uncontested Facts ("Castle Rule 56.1") par; 26. On one of these occasions, Hunter instructed Bradley three times within a three or four hour period to clean her work area; Bradley delayed in doing so and failed to clean up satisfactorily.Id, par; 25. On another occasion, Smith noticed Bradley left her workstation with eight cut pieces on the saw, and Kovach, who worked the same saw Bradley used on a different shift, complained to Hunter that Bradley left cut pieces of steel on the work area instead of packaging them. Id Par; 28, 30. Allowing cut pieces to accumulate could damage the saw. Smith observed Bradley lackadaisically sweeping the workroom floor during her first week. On three or four occasions, Swanson saw Bradley sitting idle alongside a desk in her work area; she stood up upon Swanson's approach. Id. par; 37.
Bradley denies this. According to Bradley, Hunter only asked her to clean her workstation once during the three or four hour period and she cleaned up in response. to Hunter's instructions. Bradley Dep. at 137. Bradley denies she ever left her saw with cut pieces on the saw or floor. Id. at 139, 142-145. Bradley further asserts she processed her orders quickly and requested additional work from Hunter and Swanson when she completed her assigned work; Hunter and Swanson ordinarily granted the requests. Id. at 47-48. Bradley asserts Ferguson discouraged her from working hard and seeking more work because he told her she made the male employees look bad. Id. at 60-62.
Second, Castle asserts Bradley failed to demonstrate mastery of the overhead crane and that she told Smith she was afraid of the crane. Castle Rule 56.1 par; 24. Bradley purportedly asked other employees to operate the crane for her. Hunter Dep. at 65. Bradley contends she never expressed a fear of the crane and that after a week or so, she became comfortable using the crane. Bradley Dep. at 73, 140-41.
Third, Castle asserts Bradley refused to learn how to load trucks. One day, Hunter asked Bradley to learn from Pettway how to load trucks. According to Castle, Hunter noticed Bradley had returned to her desk and was talking with another employee shortly thereafter. Believing Bradley could not have learned to load trucks so quickly, Hunter asked Bradley why she stopped training with Pettway; Bradley replied she believed she knew how to load trucks. Hunter then asked a truck driver to ask Bradley to load his truck. Bradley declined, asserting she was too busy. Castle Rule 56.1 par; 32. Bradley denies she told Hunter she already knew how to load trucks or that she declined to help the truck driver load his truck. Bradley Dep. at 138. Bradley asserts she returned to her station because Hunter called for Pettway while Pettway was showing her how to load trucks; Pettway told her to go back to her workstation and await his return. Id. at 38. Bradley contends Hunter and Pettway never mentioned truck loading again. Id. at 39.
Finally, Castle contends Bradley left the premises in a car during working hours. Castle's rules of conduct are posted on the bulletin boards at the plant and prohibit employees from leaving their workstation without permission. Bradley was aware that work rules were posted. Bradley Dep. at 132. According to Castle, Bradley did not have permission to leave and did not notify anyone she was leaving. The next day, Bradley admitted leaving the premises and asserted. She did not know she was not permitted to leave the premises during working hours. Castle Rule 56.1 par; 35. Bradley denies this incident. Bradley Dep. at 125.
On May 27, 1999, near the end of Bradley's probationary period, Smith asked Hunter and Swanson if Bradley should be retained; Smith did not ask Pavar. Smith told them "[they had] to make a call here because her 45 days are coming up, and [he] needed to know if this employee is worth retaining based on [their] surmising of the situation." Smith Dep. at 81. Swanson replied that Bradley was "iffy," and Hunter told Smith that he would not retain Bradley because Bradley did not properly maintain her work area and allowed cut pieces of steel to accumulate on her saw table, she left the premises without permission during work hours, and she lacked self-motivation. Id. at 82-84. Hunter also told Smith about the truck-loading incident. Castle Rule 56.1 par; 38.
That same day, Smith decided to terminate Bradley because she failed to maintain her worksite, complete assigned tasks, master use of the overhead crane, and because she lacked motivation and left the premises without permission. Castle Rule 56.1 par; 39. Although Smith testified that Hunter and Swanson were his main source of information on Bradley's performance and that he was "prepared to abide by whatever call [Hunter and Swanson] were going to make," Smith Dep. at 85, 87, based on Swanson and Hunter's previous reports and Smith's own observations of Bradley, Smith believed Bradley should be terminated; if Swanson and/or Hunter had advised him to retain Bradley, he would have required them to persuade him to join that decision. Castle Rule 56.1 par; 40. Smith told Steve Petitt ("Petitt"), an operations manager, that Bradley would be terminated. Petitt asked Smith whether he was being consistent with other probationary employees and whether the discussion with Hunter and Swanson and the reasons for Bradley's termination were documented. Castle did not always document such reasons, and Smith replied he did not know if they were documented in Bradley's case. Petitt told Smith to do so. On May 28, Hunter informed Bradley that she was terminated. Bradley asked for a second chance. Hunter told her he was not in a position to grant a second chance because the termination decision was Smith's. Later that day, pursuant to Petitt's advice, Smith asked Swanson to document the reasons for Bradley's termination. Smith later told Hunter and Swanson to document the meeting they had with Bradley when they terminated her.
According to Bradley, no one explained to her the standard of performance for a saw operator, and neither Hunter nor Swanson ever spoke to her about her job performance. Bradley Dep. at 48-49. Bradley was not formally written up or reviewed while working at Castle. However, Hunter periodically informed Smith of Bradley's problems. Hunter Dep. at 78. No records show that Bradley was assigned to a specific area or had a specific responsibility.
DISCUSSION
I. STANDARDS
A movant is entitled to summary judgment under Rule 56 when the moving papers and affidavits show there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Unterreiner v. Volkswagen of America. Inc., 8 F.3d 1206, 1209 (7th Cir. 1993). Once a moving party has met its burden, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Becker v. Tennenbaum-Hill Assoc., Inc., 914 F.2d 107, 110 (7th Cir. 1990). A genuine issue of material fact exists when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Stewart v. McGinnis, 5 F.3d 1031, 1033 (7th Cir. 1993). This standard is applied with added rigor in employment discrimination cases, where issues of intent and credibility often dominate. Sarsha v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 3 F.3d 1035, 1038 (7th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). Although this language could be misconstrued to require heightened review in employment cases, the Seventh Circuit has stressed that "there is no separate rule of civil procedure in employment discrimination cases;" rather, the "added rigor" language means only that "courts should be careful in a discrimination case as in any case not to grant summary judgment if there is an issue of material fact that is genuinely contestable, which an issue of intent often though not always will be." Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics. Inc., 103 F.3d 1394, 1396 (7th Cir. 1997). Employment discrimination case or not, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Co., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
Bradley may prove her sex discrimination claim under Title VII in one of two ways. First, she may present direct evidence of discrimination.See, e.g., World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985);Perfetti v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 950 F.2d 449, 450 (7thCir. 1991). Second, she may rely on indirect evidence of discrimination, employing the burden-shifting framework recognized by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). As the record discloses no direct evidence of sex discrimination, Bradley must attempt to prove her Title VII claim according to the indirect method of proof. Under McDonnell Douglas, Bradley has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of sex discrimination. A prima facie case requires Bradley to show: (1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she was meeting Castle's legitimate performance expectations; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) Castle treated similarly situated persons not in the protected class more favorably. Simpson v. Borg-Warner Automotive Inc., 196 F.3d 873, 876 (7th Cir. 1999). If Bradley establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to Castle to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the challenged employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-03; Simpson, 196 F.3d at 876. If Castle articulates a non-discriminatory reason for its action, the burden shifts back to Bradley to show Castle's proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination. Simpson, 196 F.3d at 876. Bradley may establish pretext by showing Castle's reason is unworthy of credence or that the decision to terminate was more likely than not motivated by discriminatory reasons. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); DeLuca v. Winer Indus., Inc., 53 F.3d 793, 797 (7th Cir. 1995). The ultimate burden of persuasion remains at all times with Bradley. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
II. TERMINATION
Castle contends Bradley was terminated because she (1) failed to properly maintain and clean her worksite; (2) failed to complete assigned tasks and allowed pieces of cut steel to accumulate on her saw table; (3) left the premises without permission during work hours; (4) failed to master use of the overhead crane; and (5) lacked motivation. Bradley claims these reasons are pretextual and that similarly situated male employees engaged in all of these activities without being terminated. To show pretext, Bradley must advance evidence "tending to prove that the employer's proffered reasons are factually baseless, were not the actual motivation for the discharge in question, or were insufficient to motivate the discharge."Adreani v. First Colonial Bankshares Corp., 154 F.3d 389, 394 (7th Cir. 1998). "When the defendant offers multiple reasons for its employment decision, the plaintiff must show that all of the proffered reasons are pretextual." Ghosh v. Indiana Dep't of Environmental Management, 192 F.3d 1087, 1092-93 (7th Cir. 1999).
Bradley neglects to discuss whether she shows a prima facie case of discrimination based on her termination. Because the court can resolve her termination claim on pretext grounds, it may assume she states a prima facie case and proceed directly to the pretext analysis. Fairchild v. Forma Scientific, Inc., 147 F.3d 567, 572 (7th Cir. 1998) (assuming the requirements of a prima facie case and resolving the ADEA case on the basis of pretext); Fuka v. Thompson Consumer Electronics, 82 F.3d 1397, 1404 (7th Cir. 1996) (assuming the requirements of the prima facie case and dealing with performance deficiencies in the context of pretext). Because Castle has offered non-discriminatory reasons for Bradley's termination, it is appropriate to proceed directly to the ultimate issue of pretext. Sample v. Aldi. Inc., 61 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir. 1995); Ragland v. Rock-Tenn. Co., 955 F. Supp. 1009, 1015(N.D.ILL. 1997)
As an initial matter, the court must address Bradley's argument there is sufficient evidence that Castle's proffered reasons for her termination are pretextual because she testified she did not do many of the things (such as fail to clean her worksite and leave the plant without permission) that purportedly formed the basis for her termination. This line of argument is unavailing. At most, Bradley shows that Smith's belief in her inadequate performance, and the resulting decision to terminate her, were erroneous. However, the issue of pretext does not address the correctness or desirability of reasons offered for employment decisions. Kariotis v. Navistar Int'l Trans. Corp., 131 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 1997); McCoy v. WGN Continental Broadcasting Co., 957 F.2d 368, 371 (7th Cir. 1992). Rather, "[a]n employer's honest belief, whether or not it is mistakenly held, is the issue relevant to these situations." Jackson v. E.J. Brach Corp., 176 F.3d 971, 985 (7th Cir. 1999). Bradley must do more than show Smith made a mistake or did not correctly evaluate her performance. She must present evidence showing Smith did not honestly believe the stated reasons for her termination and that the real reasons were discriminatory.Jackson, 176 F.3d at 983 ("if [the employer] honestly believed in the nondiscriminatory reasons it offered, even if the reasons are foolish or trivial or even baseless . . . [plaintiff] cannot prevail") (citations omitted).
Bradley's stronger pretext argument is that similarly situated males who engaged in the same unsatisfactory behavior were not disciplined. To establish she was similarly situated in this context, Bradley must point to male employees who shared similar work duties and had similar work and attendance records but were not terminated. Rush v. McDonald's Co., 966 F.2d 1104, 1112 (7th Cir. 1992); Sargis v. Amoco Corp., 996 F. Supp. 790, 793 n. 1 (N.D. Ill. 1998). This comparison must "demonstrate more than occasional leniency toward other employees who had engaged in conduct of a similar nature." Hiatt v. Rockwell Intern. Corp., 26 F.3d 761, 771 (7th Cir. 1994). Along these lines, Bradley first argues similarly situated male employees who allowed chips and cut pieces of steel to accumulate on their saws were not disciplined. Hunter observed Pettway and Jose Horekey ("Horekey") with cut pieces accumulating around their saws, but Hunter never wrote them (or any other employees) up for this, and Smith never complained about them. Hunter Dep. at 63-64; 75. Hunter testified he did not discipline Pettway because he had assigned Pettway to other jobs in addition to cutting steel, such as loading trucks and using a loader to transport materials; as result, Pettway did not have enough time to package the cut steel at his station. Id. at 119. Horekey also performed other tasks that did not allow him time to package the material left on the saw. Id. at 120. Bradley offers no evidence showing she shared similar responsibilities in addition to working the saw. Thus, Bradley does not show Pettway and Horekey were similarly situated to her.
Bradley notes that Charles Clark ("Clark"). a Castle employee and union chairman during Bradley's employment, observed male saw operators with full chip buckets and accumulated pieces of cut steel on the saw. Clark Aff. Par; 6-7, Bradley's Rule 56. 1(b)(3) Facts ("Bradley Rule 56.1"), Ex. 15. As union chairman, Clark is privy to all disciplinary actions against Castle's workers covered by the union contract. Id. par; 8. According to Clark, there are no cases of discipline against hourly workers for having full chip buckets, allowing cut pieces to accumulate, or failing to sweep their work area. Id. par; 9. However, these vague statements by Clark do not identify the workers Clark observed or establish that the workers shared the same job duties as Bradley. Moreover, Clark was privy to disciplinary actions against organized workers covered by the union contract; but this does not establish his knowledge of discipline against probationary employees like Bradley. Finally, Bradley asserts that when she worked with Swanson, she kept her area clean and did not let cut pieces collect on the saw. However, this does not cast doubt on Hunter's testimony of unsatisfactory performance while working under him.
Second, Bradley contends similarly situated male employees who left the premises without permission were not disciplined. In support, Bradley points only to an incident where Aaron Malone left without permission to go to a service station. Bradley Rule 56.1 Ex. 16. No discipline was taken at the time. Id. However, Bradley offers no facts showing that Malone was a probationary employee or that he was never disciplined pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement's disciplinary procedures. Bradley also asserts she did not recall that work rules were posted at the plant, suggesting she did not know she could not leave without permission and that her transgression should have been excused. However, this shows only that Castle's decision to terminate her may have been unfair; it does not establish she was terminated because of her sex.
Finally, Bradley asserts male workers were given more time to develop their crane skills. She points to a memorandum stating that Rocco Carella was approved as qualified on the crane on October 7, 1999, allegedly five months following his hire. Bradley Rule 56.1 Ex. 17. However, Bradley provides no details of Carella's employment or what his duties were during those five months to establish that she was similarly situated to Carella.
In sum, Bradley fails to show that she was similarly situated to male employees who were retained despite purportedly inadequate performance and that the asserted reasons for her discharge were pretextual. Moreover, Castle asserted a host of reasons for Bradley's termination: failure to maintain her worksite, leaving the plant without permission, failure to learn proper use of the crane or how to load trucks. In trying to show pretext, Bradley points to individual employees who exhibited one of these deficiencies; she points to no similarly situated male who exhibited them all. Finally, Bradley fails to show Smith did not believe the reports he received from Hunter and Swanson about her performance, or that those reports (coupled with Smith's own observations) did not form the basis of his decision to terminate her, however incorrect or baseless those reasons may be. Accordingly, Bradley fails to offer evidence supporting a reasonable inference she was terminated based on her sex.
III. DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT
Bradley argues that Castle discriminated against her based on sex because it treated male employees more favorably in various aspects of employment. Bradley fails to show she was similarly situated to these male employees. Bradley first claims she was denied the opportunity to work overtime. Bradley asserts that five male probationary employees, Paul Bruneau, Joseph Frazier, Maximo Hernandez, Wissam Issa, and Kevin Little, were offered overtime within their first 10 days of employment. Bradley does not provide evidence showing these workers were similarly situated. She does not indicate their qualifications for overtime work, when they were offered overtime, and who offered them overtime. See Auston v. Schubnell, 116 F.3d 251, 254 (75h Cir. 1997). At Castle, a supervisor typically asks only those employees in his bay to do overtime work. The five probationary employees were not directly supervised by Hunter or Swanson (as was Bradley) and worked in different bays of the plant. Moreover, Bradley admitted she was not fully trained to perform overtime work. Bradley's Resp. to Castle Rule 56.1 par; 58. The circumstances under which these employees were offered overtime may differ from Bradley's.
Bradley asserts Ferguson and Pettway were routinely asked to work overtime while she was not. Bradley was not similarly situated because Ferguson and Pettway were not probationary employees during Bradley's tenure. Under the collective bargaining agreement covering organized workers, overtime is offered to employees based on seniority; probationary employees are not offered overtime if bargaining unit employees agree to work overtime. Castle Rule 56.1 par; 57. Bradley never requested to work overtime and she admitted that even if she had requested overtime, Hunter was unable to assign her overtime because all his needs were met with non-probationary employees. Bradley's Resp. to Castle Rule 56.1 par; 58. Bradley also contends overtime went unworked on occasion when Ferguson and Pettway declined overtime, suggesting Castle would allow overtime to go unworked rather than ask Bradley to do it. Bradley Dep. at 69. This contention is specious given that Bradley admitted she never requested overtime and that she was not qualified for overtime.
Next, Bradley asserts three male probationary employees were given interim performance reviews at 15 and 30 days into their probationary periods, while she was not. Bradley contends these reviews allowed male employees to address specific points of concern, a benefit not afforded her. However, Hunter testified these reviews were not instituted until after Bradley was terminated. Hunter Dep. at 71-72. Copies of the reviews supplied to the court by Bradley indicate the first review did not occur until June 8, 1999. Bradley Rule 56.1, Ex. 14. Therefore, Bradley fails to show the reviews were implemented during her probationary period.
Third, Bradley asserts Castle extended the 45-day training period of male probationary employees Richard Stewart ("Stewart") and Wissam Issa ("Issa") while refusing to do the same for her. Bradley fails to show she was similarly situated to these employees. Smith asked the union to extend Stewart's probationary period because Stewart was assigned multiple jobs during his probationary period and Smith did not believe Stewart was given enough time to train on any single job; therefore, Castle could not adequately assess whether Stewart should be retained. Castle Rule 56.1 par; 60. Unlike Stewart, Smith did not extend Bradley's probationary period because Bradley was primarily assigned to one job and he believed her performance was unsatisfactory. Id. par; 60. Bradley argues this reason is specious because Castle did not keep records about where particular saw operators worked and because Stewart's 15-day and 30-day reviews indicated he learned the basics of various tasks and would be an asset to the company if he kept up the hard work. Bradley Rule 56.1, Ex. 14. Simply because Stewart received favorable reviews at 15 and 30 days does not mean Castle had completed a full evaluation of his suitability for continued employment on a particular job assignment. Moreover, Stewart did not report to the same supervisors as Bradley, and Smith had no reservations about Stewart's work ethic. Smith Aff. par; 7. Issa was hired on January 31, 2000, over half a year after Bradley's termination. Bradley fails to offer evidence establishing she was similarly situated to Issa, such as working on the same tasks or under the same supervisor.
Bradley argues Smith's affidavit regarding Stewart's performance is inadmissible because Smith does not state he ever observed Stewart working. However, as one responsible for personnel decisions and in charge of seeking extensions of the probationary period, Smith may be presumed to be familiar with Stewart's performance.
Fourth, Bradley asserts male employees were given special instructions and additional training on how to do their jobs while she was simply given work without instructions. However, instructions for sawing were provided by computer. Bradley admitted that when she needed instructions, she obtained them from the computer or from male coworkers when she requested them. Bradley Dep. at 50-53, 66-67. The only employees Bradley identifies as receiving special instructions were Ferguson and Pettway. Id. at 50, 55. On one or two occasions, Hunter provided Ferguson with special instructions on how he wanted a "hot" order needed immediately. Id. at 49-56, 65-66, 82. Bradley was not similarly situated to Ferguson and Pettway; Bradley fails to show her work required the same instructions as work done by Ferguson and Pettway, both non-probationary employees. Moreover, the one time Bradley requested instructions from Hunter, Hunter directed Bradley to Ferguson or Pettway, who provided instructions. Id. at 66-67. Finally, Bradley asserts without elaboration that when she asked Swanson questions, he ignored her. Id. at 52-55. Even if true, this does not constitute materially different treatment because Bradley was able to obtain instructions from the computer or her coworkers.
CONCLUSION
The motion for summary judgment is granted.