Opinion
NO. C 98-3717 THE
February 5, 2003
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
This matter came before the Court on Monday, February 3, 2003, for hearing on the motion of defendants Craig Franklin and Steven Cambra for a summary judgment based on the doctrine of qualified immunity. Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed an opposition memorandum, exhibits thereto, and an application under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f). Having carefully considered the parties' written and oral arguments, and the record herein, the Court denies plaintiff's Rule 56(f) application and grants defendants' motion for the reasons set forth below.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises out of the stabbing death on March 9, 1998 of William Boyd ("Boyd") on the "B Yard" of Pelican Bay State Prison ("PBSP") by another inmate, Duke Bolter. His widow, Kim Boyd, brought this action seeking to hold various defendants liable for Boyd's death under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On May 29, 2002, this Court granted summary judgment in defendants' favor with respect to all remaining defendants and claims except for one claim against correctional sergeant Craig Franklin ("Franklin") and former PBSP warden Steven Cambra ("Cambra"). This claim, which is the subject of the instant motion, alleges that Franklin and Cambra ("defendants") violated Boyd's Eighth Amendment rights by being deliberately indifferent to a serious risk to his safety. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that defendants knew that Boyd was in danger if he remained in the B Facility after testifying in the trial of correctional officer Jose Ramon Garcia ("Garcia") on November 18, 1997, but nonetheless allowed him to remain there after that date instead of effectuating his transfer to another institution. This failure to transfer Boyd, plaintiff further alleges, led to his death in March of 1998. In its order denying summary judgment on this claim, the Court concluded that while "the record is somewhat thin, and certain evidence relied upon by plaintiffs is not tied in any way to the defendants, the Court concludes that there is sufficient evidence in the record to create a genuine dispute as to this factual issue [defendants' knowledge of danger to Boyd] such that it cannot be determined as a matter of law." See May 29, 2002 Order at 6.
Presently before the Court is defendants' motion that they are entitled to a summary judgment on this remaining claim based on the doctrine of qualified immunity. While plaintiff has attempted to strengthen and expand the record with respect to the state of defendants' knowledge, the Court concludes that even if her additional evidence is accepted, and it is viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff, defendants are entitled to a summary judgment based on qualified immunity.
II. DISCUSSION
The defense of qualified immunity protects "government officials . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The "'concern of the immunity inquiry is to acknowledge that reasonable mistakes can be made,'" and that it is "often difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine will apply to the factual situation that he faces." Estate of Ford v. Rameriz-Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). This is why the rule of qualified immunity "'provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.'" Id. (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001)). "Therefore, regardless of whether the constitutional violation occurred, the [official] should prevail if the right asserted by the plaintiff was not 'clearly established' or the [official] could have reasonably believed that his particular conduct was lawful." Romero v. Kitsap County, 931 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir. 1991). In short, officers can have "a reasonable, but mistaken, belief about the facts or what the law requires in any given situation" and still be entitled to qualified immunity. Id. Whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity raises a legal question for the court to decide. Martimez v. City of Oxnard, 270 F.3d 852, 855 (9th Cir. 2001).
Application of the qualified immunity doctrine involves a two-step process. The first step concerns the merits of the case. Specifically, the court must determine whether, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the facts show that the defendants' conduct violated a constitutional right. In this case, this Court previously found a triable dispute with respect to whether defendants violated Boyd's Eighth Amendment rights because they were deliberately indifferent to a serious risk to Boyd's safety. In prior years, this ruling would preclude a grant of qualified immunity and the inquiry would end there. In Ford, 301 F.3d 1043, however, the Ninth Circuit, construing Saucier, 533 U.S. 194, held that, in Eighth Amendment claims, the existence of a material dispute on the merits — or even a finding in plaintiff's favor on the merits — no longer precludes a finding of qualified immunity on a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 1048-1050, 1053. "Courts may not simply stop with a determination that a triable issue of fact exists as to whether prison officials were deliberately indifferent." Id. at 1053; see also Hope v. Peizer, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 2515 (2002). Instead, the qualified immunity inquiry is considered "separate from the constitutional inquiry," and thus the court must proceed to the second step. Ford, 301 F.3d at 1049, 1053.
Under the second step, it is the plaintiff's burden to demonstrate that the law governing the official's conduct at the time of the incident was "clearly established." In answering this question, the "'relevant, dispositive inquiry. . . . is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.'" Ford, 301 F.3d at 1050 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). See also Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201-202; Hope, 122 S.Ct. at 2516 (state of the law must give the defendants "fair warning" that their conduct was unconstitutional").
It is here that plaintiff does not sustain her burden. At the time of Boyd's death, Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), had established the general proposition that prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment if they are deliberately indifferent to the safety of inmates. Id. at 834. Plaintiff, however, can not rely on Farmer to demonstrate that the law was clearly established with respect to the specific situation that confronted defendants. "It is not sufficient that Farmer clearly states the general rule that prison officials cannot deliberately disregard a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate." Ford, 301 F.3d at 1050-51. While plaintiff need not show that defendants' precise action has previously been ruled unlawful, Hope, 122 S.Ct. at 2515, whether the law was "clearly established" must be analyzed "'in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.'" Ford, 301 F.3d at 1050. Thus, in Ford, for example, where an inmate was killed by his cell mate, the Court found that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, emphasizing that "neither Farmer nor subsequent authorities ha[d] fleshed out 'at what point a risk of inmate assault becomes sufficiently substantial for Eighth Amendment purposes.'" Id. at 1051 (citation omitted).
Here, there were no cases, laws or regulations that addressed the subject of placement of inmates who testify in judicial proceedings. Rather, as plaintiff does not dispute, the decision of where to house Boyd after he testified in the Garcia case was subject to the regulations that govern the classification, placement, and transfer of inmates generally. These regulations provide that placement decisions are discretionary and are to be made by prison officials based on a number of factors, including age, gang membership, documented enemies, and sexual orientation. See Pl's Resp. to Undisputed Material Facts (No. 24-26); see also People v. Flower, 62 Cal.App.3d 904, 913-914 (1976) ("The responsibility of assigning prisoners to specific institutional falls upon the Director of Corrections, who is to exercise his discretion so as to maximize achievement of the goals of his department"); 15 CCR §§ 3370, 3375(b); 3375.2. While plaintiff also cites to 15 CCR § 3271, this regulation is very general in nature, providing that "Every employee, regardless of his or her assignment, is responsible for the safe custody of the inmates confined in the institutions of the department." As such, like in Ford, neither Farmer nor subsequent law had "fleshed out 'at what point a risk of inmate assault becomes sufficiently substantial for Eighth Amendment purposes.'" Id.(citation omitted). This gap "necessarily informs 'the dispositive question' of whether it would be clear to reasonable correctional officers that their conduct was unlawful in the circumstances [they] confronted." Id.(citation omitted).
Indeed, under these circumstances, plaintiff must show that a reasonable officer in defendants' positions would have clearly known that their decision not to transfer Boyd was unconstitutional because it created a risk "so high" as to be constitutionally impermissible. Ford, 301 F.3d at 1051. As the factors noted above suggest, discretionary decisions concerning the transfer and placement of inmates often involve matters of risk. Thus it is not enough to show that a reasonable officer in defendants' position would have realized that a particular placement decision created some risk. Rather, the risk must be "so high" that it would have been apparent to the officer that a particular placement decision was unconstitutional, notwithstanding the absence of law governing the specific situation confronted. Here, the record indicates that defendants could have reasonably, albeit perhaps mistakenly, believed that a decision not to transfer Boyd was lawful. Id. at 1049-50 (reasonable belief, even if mistaken, is protected by qualified immunity).
Plaintiff does not dispute that an officer determining whether to transfer an inmate who has testified in a court proceeding should "review the totality of the factors relevant to the unique circumstances of each case" including, but not limited to (1) the inmate's expressed concerns for his safety, if any, (2) against whom the inmate testified, if anyone, (3) how damaging was the testimony given by the inmate, (4) the inmate's reputation within the institution and (5) whether the inmate is having problems with his current housing assignment. See Pls' Resp. to Undisputed Material Facts (No. 26).
The evidence relating to these factors indicates that defendants could have reasonably believed that a decision not to transfer Boyd was lawful. For example, the evidence is undisputed that Boyd never expressed to either defendant any fear for his safety and he never requested a transfer. See Pls' Resp. to Undisputed Material Facts (Nos. 9, 11-12, 14, 17). Nor was the testimony he provided in the Garcia case clearly damaging to either side. While the Court found that these factors did not justify granting defendants' motion for summary judgment on the merits of this claim, they are relevant to assessing whether defendants, in exercising their discretion not to transfer, should have clearly known that they were exercising it in an unconstitutional manner. In addition, Franklin knew that Boyd was commonly known as a shot caller" (one who directs inmates to assault other inmates) which customarily means that the inmate commands more respect from inmates on the yard. Franklin Decl. ¶¶ 15-18. Nor was Franklin aware of any problems Boyd was experiencing on the B Yard. Id.
Plaintiff states only that Boyd expressed concern about safety to another inmate, Daniel Harger. See Pl's Oppo at 8.
Against this backdrop, plaintiff's evidence is not sufficient to demonstrate that defendants knew that the risk to Boyd in the B Yard, from testifying in the Garcia case, was "so high" as to be constitutionally impermissible. For example, plaintiff's Exh. L is an amicus curiae brief filed by Deputy District Attorney James Fallman in an unrelated case which has only tangential relevance. She also points to a memorandum to Correctional Captain B.J. O'Neill dated October 9, 1997, (Pl's Exh F) that included a statement that another inmate said that Boyd was "borderline in trouble for not assaulting his cell mate when ordered to do so by the A.B (Aryan Brotherhood)." There is no indication that this memo was provided to defendants or that it relates to Boyd's testimony in the Garcia case.
Plaintiff also emphasizes that Boyd and one other inmate (Daniel Harger) were the only two inmates returned to the general population at PBSP following their testimony in the Garcia trial. While the Court took this into account in finding a triable issue on the issue of deliberate indifference, it is not sufficient to defeat defendants' claim of qualified immunity given that the other inmates requested transfers and/or gave testimony that Franklin considered to be in favor of the prosecution. Moreover, the fact that Harger suffered no problems in the PBSP general population after his testimony supports the conclusion that defendants could have reasonably believed that retaining Boyd in the B Yard would not necessarily present a risk "so high" as to be constitutionally impermissible.
As plaintiff emphasizes, Harger was transferred from PBSP after Boyd's death. This action, however, does not demonstrate that defendants knew, at the time of Boyd's death, that his continued placement in the B Yard put him at a risk so high as to be constitutionally impermissible.
Plaintiff also provides a transcript of an interview of Boyd by Franklin in October 1995. See Pl's Exh. C. She reads certain statements by Franklin to imply that Pelican Bay would protect Boyd only if he cooperated in an on-going investigation into the conduct of Garcia and others. Pl's Exh. C at 693. Even if one accepts this reading of the transcript, it does not show that Franklin knew in November 1997 that failing to transfer Boyd from PBSP after he testified in the Garcia case would, in fact, put him at a risk "so high" as to be constitutionally impermissible. Similarly, the transcript of Franklin's testimony in the preliminary hearing in the criminal action against Duke Bolter (Pl's Exh. P) does not demonstrate that Franklin or Cambra knew that a decision not to transfer Boyd created risks "so high" as to be clearly unconstitutional. Plaintiff also relies upon a declaration from inmate Theordic Van Smith, currently incarcerated at Atascadero State Hospital. Defendants correctly object that this declaration is from a witness never before disclosed. Even assuming arguendo, however, the declaration was properly presented, it would not alter the Court's analysis. While Smith states that Franklin was aware of danger to Boyd, he also states that Boyd told Franklin he nonetheless wanted to stay at Pelican Bay to be close to his wife.
Plaintiff has also filed an application to take further discovery pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f). Specifically, plaintiff seeks to take the deposition of Deputy District Attorney James Fallman ("Fallman"). To obtain relief under Rule 56(f), an applicant must (1) describe the particular discovery sought and explain how it would preclude entry of summary judgment and (2) justify why the discovery could not have been obtained earlier. In re: Sillicon Graphics Inc. Securities Litigation, 183 F.3d 970, 989 (9th Cir. 1999).
Plaintiff states that the discovery was not previously sought by former counsel Robert Noel and Marjorie Knoller because of the "fraud on the part of plaintiff's former counsel." Pl's Federal Rule 56(f) Application at 2. The Court assumes that plaintiff is referring to the theory advanced by plaintiff's other former counsel (Catherine Campbell and Robert Navarro) that Noel and Knoller intentionally misdirected this action to deflect attention from the actual perpetrators of Boyd's death who were also clients of Noel and Knoller. Even assuming arguendo this theory is correct, it would not explain the failure to take Fallman's deposition since taking such a deposition would be consistent with implementing their alleged fraud. If the theory is incorrect, there is again no reason the deposition could not or would not have been taken. Plaintiff also asserts that Noel and Knoller had a "personal hatred for Fallman." Id. This assertion, even if true, does not explain why Knoller would not or could not have taken Fallman's deposition. Accordingly, plaintiff has not justified why the discovery sought could not have been obtained earlier.
In addition, plaintiff has not states in conclusory fashion that Fallman would provide testimony that Franklin was aware that Boyd was in danger due to Fallman's knowledge of the activities of Powers, Garcia, Alvarado and Lewis. Plaintiff has not demonstrated with sufficient specificity a basis for concluding that Fallman would have a factual basis for testifying that Franklin understood that the risk to Boyd of remaining in the B Yard was "so high" as to be unconstitutionally permissible, or otherwise provide evidence sufficient to defeat defendants' motion for qualified immunity.
In hindsight, defendants made the wrong choice in failing to transfer Boyd from PBSP after he testified in the Garcia case. Plaintiff has also presented sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact as to whether defendants were deliberately indifferent to Boyd's safety. However, given the lack of any law or regulation addressing the type of situation that confronted defendants — i.e inmate placement after testifying in a judicial proceeding — and given all of the circumstances and relevant considerations, and viewing the evidence presented in a light most favorable to plaintiff, this Court can not say that it would have been clear to a reasonable correctional officers in defendants' position that a transfer was constitutionally required. Ford, 301 F.3d at 1050 (dispositive inquiry is "whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted"). Because plaintiff has not demonstrated that the law was "clearly established," defendants are protected by qualified immunity from liability for their alleged violation of Boyd's Eighth Amendment rights. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202. As such defendants' motion for summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity must be granted.
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, and good cause appearing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that defendants' motion for summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity is granted.
The Clerk is directed to close the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE
Decision by Court. This action came to trial or hearing before the Court. The issued have been tried or heard and a decision has been rendered.
IT IS SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the defendants' motion on summary judgment based on qualified immunity is GRANTED.