Opinion
No. 3-934 / 03-0143
Filed February 11, 2004
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Mark J. Smith, Judge.
Niky Bowles appeals from a grant of summary judgment in favor of Robert McGivern. AFFIRMED.
John F. Doak of Katz, Huntoon Fieweger, P.C., Rock Island, IL, for appellant.
Thomas D. Waterman and Richard A. Davidson of Lane Waterman, L.L.P., Davenport, and John R. Martin and Thomas D. Warner, City of Davenport Legal Department, Davenport, for appellee.
Heard by Zimmer, P.J., and Miller and Hecht, JJ.
Niky Bowles appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Robert McGivern. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On July 19, 2000, as the Davenport City Council was about to vote on a zoning request, Niky Bowles addressed the council and asked that her alderman, Robert McGivern, abstain from voting. She believed McGivern was biased against her and told the council that on a previous occasion he had called her a "crazy woman." McGivern interjected with the following statement: "Your Honor, just for clarification, for clarification your Honor, I called her a freaking crazy woman."
On July 15, 2002, Bowles filed a petition accusing McGivern of slander for his statement at the July 2000 council meeting. McGivern moved for summary judgment contending that the phrase "freaking crazy woman" constituted non-actionable opinion or rhetorical hyperbole. In the alternative, McGivern argued that Bowles self-published the comment. After a hearing, the district court granted McGivern's motion for summary judgment concluding Bowles self-published the comment. The district court further concluded that even if Bowles did not self-publish the comment, the words were non-actionable name-calling or routine hyperbole. Bowles appeals.
II. Standard of Review.
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment for the correction of errors at law. Theisen v. Covenant Med. Ctr., 636 N.W.2d 74, 78 (Iowa 2001). Summary judgment is appropriate when the record, when viewed as a whole, reveals no genuine issue of material fact. Id. To determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, we view the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. at 79. If the facts are not in dispute, we will affirm if we determine the district court correctly applied the law. Sanford v. Mantermack, 601 N.W.2d 360, 363 (Iowa 1999).
III. Discussion.
The district court concluded that the circumstances surrounding McGivern's use of the phrase "freaking crazy woman" indicated McGivern was engaging in mere name-calling or routine hyperbole. Relying on the concurrence in Suntken v. Den Oden, 548 N.W.2d 164, 167 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996), the district court noted that "nasty epithets, however vitriolic, are not libelous" and that words "that are mere name-calling or found to be rhetorical hyperbole or are employed in only a loose, figurative sense have been deemed nonactionable."
Bowles contends the district court erred in its conclusion that McGivern's statement was nonactionable hyperbole or name-calling. She points to a letter written by McGivern in November 2001, which states that McGivern was "truly concerned with [Bowles'] present physical and psychological state." Bowles contends, viewing the record in the light most favorable to her, this letter raises a genuine issue of whether, when McGivern called Bowles a "freaking crazy woman," he was attempting to allege a provable fact — that she was mentally ill.
"Opinion is absolutely protected under the first amendment." Jones v. Palmer Communication, Inc. 440 N.W.2d 884, 891 (Iowa 1989). To determine whether a statement constitutes nonactionable opinion or an actionable false statement, we must consider (1) the precision and specificity of the disputed statement; (2) the verifiability of the statement; and (3) the context in which the statement is made. Id.
Although McGivern's letter indicates that sixteen months after he made the statement at issue he was concerned about Bowles' psychological state, we conclude this letter is irrelevant to our analysis of the above-listed factors. We must consider the immediate context of the statement to determine whether McGivern's words constituted nonactionable opinion or provable fact. We conclude, as did the district court, that McGivern's statement that Bowles was a "freaking crazy woman" constituted nonactionable opinion. While "crazy" can be used as a factual assertion, describing someone who has been diagnosed by a professional with a mental illness, "crazy" is also commonly used to express an opinion that someone is unusual, impractical, erratic or unsound. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 531 (1993). McGivern's use of the euphemistic intensifier "freaking" indicates the use of "crazy" in this context was not a provable, factual allegation, but rather constituted an emotional venting of opinion. Additionally, the setting in which McGivern made his comment supports the conclusion that his words were mere name-calling. McGivern is not a mental health professional and his statement was made at a city council meeting in response to Bowles' contention that he should abstain from voting on the zoning request. There is no allegation that any other discussion regarding Bowles' mental health took place, either before or after McGivern's comment. Given the totality of the circumstances, we conclude McGivern's statement, as offensive as it may have been to Bowles, constituted nonactionable opinion as a matter of law. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment for McGivern.
We note that we are not holding that calling someone "crazy" could never constitute slander. Instead we conclude that given the facts of this case, including the setting, the addition of the word "freaking" and the emotional nature of McGivern's interactions with Bowles, McGivern's statement is not capable of a slanderous meaning. We do not deny that it may be possible, given the proper circumstances, for the use of the word crazy to constitute slander. In this regard, our holding is consistent with those of other jurisdictions. See Weyrich v. The New Republic, Inc., 235 F.3d 617, 624 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding statement that plaintiff "suffered from bouts of pessimism and paranoia" is nonactionable); Estate of Martineau v. Arco Chem. Co., 203 F.3d 904, 914 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding employer's statements that plaintiff's decedent was "insane, delusional and irrational" did not constitute slander); Haywood v. Lucent Techs. Inc., 169 F. Supp.2d 890, 915-16 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (holding employer's statements that plaintiff was "unstable" was nonactionable opinion); Rockwell v. Allegheny Health, Educ. Research Found., 19 F. Supp.2d 401, 406 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (holding statements that plaintiff was "sick" and "vindictive" constituted nonactionable opinion); Fikes v. Furst, 81 P.3d 545, 550-51 (N.M. 2003) (holding that rival professor's statements that plaintiff was "crazy," "delusional," and "paranoid," when viewed in context, were nonactionable opinions); Hohlt v. Complete Health Care, Inc., 936 S.W.2d 223, 224 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (holding statements that plaintiff was "crazy" and "stupid" were properly dismissed as nondefamatory).
Although Bowles also alleges the district court erred in its conclusion that she self-published McGivern's comment, because of our resolution of the above issue, we find it unnecessary to address Bowles' other arguments.