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holding that a three-hour period without bathroom privileges and water does not constitute a constitutional violation
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9:99-CV-0769 (LEK)(GLS)
March 6, 2003
RONALD BOURDON, Plaintiff, Pro Se., Auburn Correctional Facility, Auburn, N.Y. 13021, For The Plaintiff.
ROGER W. KINSEY, ESQ., HON. ELIOT SPITZER Attorney General of the State, Albany, New York., For The Defendants.
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION and ORDER
This matter was referred to the undersigned for Report-Recommendation by the Honorable Lawrence E. Kahn, United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rules N.D.N.Y. 72.3(c).
Plaintiff, pro se Ronald Bourdon ("Bourdon") alleges in his amended complaint that the defendants conspired to fabricate false evidence against him for the purpose of obtaining an "unlawful search warrant," destroying exculpatory evidence, and conducting an illegal search of his property. Bourdon also claims that the defendants used excessive force against him in the course of his arrest and subsequent interrogation, all in violation of his constitutional rights (Dkt. No. 9; Am.Compl.). Bourdon seeks substantial monetary damages.
Presently before the court is the defendants' motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 (Dkt. No. 48). Bourdon filed a response (Dkt. No. 72). For the following reasons, this court recommends that summary judgment be granted in part and denied in part.
I. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment may be granted when the moving party carries its burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Thompson v. Gjivoje, 896 F.2d 716, 720 (2d Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). "Ambiguities or inferences to be drawn from the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment motion." Id. However, when the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party must do more than "simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); see also, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2502, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). At that point, the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id.
II. Background
Bourdon filed the present action on May 14, 1999. By Order filed August 11, 1999 ("August order"), District Judge Lawrence E. Kahn dismissed this action unless Bourdon filed an amended complaint within thirty days of the August order (Dkt. No. 4). Bourdon did not file an amended complaint. Bourdon appealed the August order to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals (Dkt. No. 6).
On May 17, 2000, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Bourdon's complaint as to "the judge, the prosecutors, the appointed attorneys, Broome County, and the government informer" (Dkt. No. 8 at 3). The Circuit held, however, that Bourdon was entitled to assert excessive force claims against the New York State Trooper defendants named in his original complaint as well as claims arising out of the search of his home and the seizure of property from his residence. Id.
In accordance with the decision of the Second Circuit, on August 11, 2000, Bourdon filed an amended complaint (Dkt. No. 9).
A. Bourdon's Allegations
On June 14, 1996, defendants Frank Roney ("Roney") and Alfonso Ortega ("Ortega") drafted an application to search Bourdon's home (Am. Compl., ¶ 1). The application was based on information obtained from an informant whom Roney and Ortega "knew to be false and unreliable." The informant "harbored ill will against the plaintiff." Id. at ¶ 2. Roney and Ortega presented the application to Broome County Judge Patrick Mathews in bad faith and "intentionally misled the court with false information." Id. at ¶ 3. The search warrant application submitted by Roney and Ortega lacked "probable cause." Id. at ¶ 4. Thereafter, Judge Mathews issued a search warrant, without probable cause, permitting the search of Bourdon's home. The search of Bourdon's home was "motivated by malice and an intent to arrest and seize evidence." Id. at ¶ 9.
On June 14, 1996, Bourdon's home was searched pursuant to the warrant and Bourdon and another resident of the dwelling, John Verge, were arrested. Id. at ¶ 10. When Bourdon was arrested, "his wrists were cuffed with his palms facing outward to insure added pain and discomfort, the cuffs were [then] squeezed painfully tight." Id. at ¶ 13. Bourdon was placed in the back of a squad car which was parked in the sun. The car windows were closed and the inside of the car felt "like a greenhouse." Id. at ¶ 13. He remained in the hot car, in handcuffs, for three hours without water or the use of a toilet. Id. at ¶ 14.
At one point, Roney opened the car door and said that if Bourdon told him where the guns were he could have some water, use the toilet, have his handcuffs loosened, and sit outside on a bench near the house. Id. at ¶ 15. Bourdon denied having guns. Roney got angry and told Bourdon that he "could suffer until he was ready to talk." Id. at ¶ 15. At that point, Bourdon's wrists were blue, his right leg was numb, he had wet his pants, and he had severe pain in his lower back.
Defendants seized items not included in the warrant such as Bourdon's books, his daughter's photographs and family albums, and his father's hunting license. Id. at ¶¶ 17-18. Defendants searched Bourdon's red van, his jeep, and the wooded area surrounding Bourdon's home, all places not listed in the warrant. Id. at ¶ 20. Bourdon claims that the only vehicle mentioned in the search warrant was his white van. Bourdon claims that the defendants removed a briefcase from his red van, moved it to the white van, and "staged a fraudulent photograph that depicted [the briefcase] as being originally found in the white van." Defendants also removed some items from the briefcase and placed them in Bourdon's home and then pretended that the items were originally found in the home. Id. at ¶ 20. Defendants later used the documents found in the briefcase to obtain an indictment against Bourdon. Id. The search ended at 9:35 p.m. Bourdon's home was left "in shambles." Id. at ¶ 21.
During the search, defendants seized and improperly disposed of exculpatory evidence, specifically Bourdon's father's valid hunting license which was found in the same closet with the seized guns. The valid hunting license was never included in the inventory list of the items seized. Id. at ¶ 23.
After the search, Bourdon was taken to the state trooper barracks for interrogation. Bourdon's shoes were taken away and he was forced to stand barefoot on the cold cement floor "with one wrist painfully chained to a wall for another three hours." Id. at ¶ 22. Roney and Jeffrey Dorward ("Dorward") interrogated Bourdon, "inflicting pain and threats to obtain information." Id.
The defendants also "coerced" John Verge into providing information during an "unconstitutional interrogation." Based upon this information, the defendants returned to Bourdon's home three hours later and seized his father's guns from the rafters of the home. Id. at ¶ 24.
Bourdon claims that the defendants deliberately withheld evidence, conducted another illegal search of his home on the following day and seized more evidence, then "unlawfully combined all of the evidence as being seized on June 14, 1996." Id. at ¶ 25. Bourdon claims that the defendants violated his right to due process, to be free from unreasonable search and seizure and false arrest, and to be free from the use of excessive force in the course of an arrest.
B. Defendants' Affidavits
1. Defendant Roney
Roney states that on June 12, 1996, his barracks received a citizen's complaint against Bourdon that he had physically harassed two women and "brandished a handgun" (Dkt. No. 49; Roney Aff. at ¶¶ 3-4). The complainants and Paul Mollis ("Mollis"), a friend of Bourdon's, each gave written statements to the state police. Id. at ¶ 5-6; see also, Ex. A (copy of the Investigation Report), pp. 6-11 29-37. Mollis told the state police that he had been to Bourdon's home several times over the last year and had seen weapons there. Mollis stated that on June 13, 1996, he saw Bourdon near his white van with a pistol in his hand (Roney Aff., Ex. A, pp. 13-16). On June 13, 1996, Roney went to Bourdon's home and Bourdon identified himself as "John Verge" (Roney Aff., ¶ 11).
Based upon Roney's investigation and the statements given, Roney and Ortega prepared a search warrant application (Roney Aff., ¶ 8; see also, Id., Ex. A, pp. 39-45). Judge Mathews determined that probable cause existed and issued a search warrant on June 14, 1996 (Roney Aff., ¶ 9; Id., Ex. A, pp. 65-67).
On June 14, 1996, the defendants executed the search warrant at Bourdon's home. Bourdon again identified himself as "John Verge" and was thereafter arrested for second degree criminal impersonation. Defendant LaRock handcuffed Bourdon and placed him in a patrol car.
Roney states that at one point he asked Bourdon to tell him where the guns were located (Roney Aff., ¶ 19). At some point, McEvoy took Bourdon to the woods, removed the handcuffs and allowed him to urinate. McEvoy then reapplied the cuffs and placed Bourdon in another patrol car. Id. at ¶¶ 19-21. The search stopped when it became too dark to work, and LaRock was assigned to guard the site for the night. Id. at ¶¶ 24-25.
Bourdon was brought to the police barracks and secured to a "bull ring" which Roney describes as a ring secured in the wall. One of Bourdon's handcuffs was attached to the bull ring. Bourdon was brought from the holding area to Roney's office several times. Each time, his shoes were removed because Bourdon was considered an escape risk. Id. at ¶¶ 27-28.
During Verge's interrogation on June 14, 1996, he told Dorward about a "secret compartment" in Bourdon's home. Id. at ¶ 29; see also, Ex. A, pp. 22, 49-50. McEvoy returned to the secured search area, located the secret compartment and found a shotgun, a rifle, and a handgun (Roney Aff., ¶ 37; Id., Ex. A, pp. 23-26). Bourdon was then arraigned on felony charges of criminal possession of a weapon and criminal possession of forged instruments (Roney Aff., ¶ 38).
2. Defendants Edwards and LaRock
Edwards and LaRock stated that on the day the search warrant was executed, Bourdon falsely identified himself as John Verge. He was arrested for second degree criminal impersonation (Dkt. No. 51; Edwards Aff., ¶¶ 3-7; Dkt. No. 52; LaRock Aff., ¶¶ 1-7). LaRock stated that after Bourdon's arrest, he handcuffed Bourdon and put him in a patrol car. LaRock was assigned to guard the search area overnight when it became too dark to continue. Later in the evening, McEvoy returned to the search site and located a secret compartment in Bourdon's home wherein he found a rifle, a shotgun, and a pistol (LaRock Aff., at ¶¶ 15-17).
3. Defendant McEvoy
McEvoy stated that about two hours after the search began, he escorted Bourdon to the woods and allowed him to urinate (Dkt. No. 53; McEvoy Aff., ¶¶ 3-5; see also, Id., Ex. B, Bourdon's Dep. at 79:13). McEvoy stated that after the search was stopped for the night, he returned to the site, located a secret compartment and found a shotgun, a rifle, and a pistol (McEvoy Aff., ¶¶ 7-9).
4. Defendant Dorward
Dorward stated that after the search stopped for the night, he interrogated John Verge who told him that there was a "secret compartment" in Bourdon's home (Dorward Aff., at ¶ 15; Dkt. No. 54). Verge signed, in Dorward's presence, a four page statement which included information about the secret compartment. Id. at ¶ 16; see also, Id., Ex. A, pp. 22, 49-52.
5. Defendant Ortega
Ortega stated that on June 14, 1996, he helped Roney prepare a search warrant application for Bourdon's home, vehicles and premises (Dkt. No. 55; Ortega Aff., ¶ 3). Ortega stated that on that same day, he was present when Roney "affirmed" the application in the presence of Judge Mathews.
III. Collateral Estoppel
Under the full faith and credit statute, federal courts must give preclusive effect to state court judgments whenever the courts of the State in which the judgment was entered would do so. Hickerson v. City of New York, 146 F.3d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing inter alia Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96, 101 S.Ct. 411, 415, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980)). New York law provides that an issue may not be relitigated if the identical issue was "necessarily decided in a previous proceeding, provided that the party against whom collateral estoppel is being asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action." Id. at 104 (citations omitted). The party opposing the application of collateral estoppel has the burden of proving that he was denied the full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue or issues in question. Id. at 109 (citing In re Sokol, 113 F.3d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 1997); Kaufmann v. Eli Lilly Co., 65 N.Y.2d 449, 456, 482 N.E.2d 63-67, 492 N.Y.S.2d 584, 588 (1985)).
A determination of whether the party opposing collateral estoppel had a full and fair opportunity to litigate involves considering the "realities of the prior litigation," including circumstances which may have had the practical effect of discouraging a party from fully litigating an issue. Id. (citing Ryan v. New York Telephone Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 501, 467 N.E.2d 487, 491, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823, 827 (1984). The factors to be considered include the nature of the forum and the importance of the claim in the prior litigation, the incentive and initiative to litigate, the actual extent of the litigation, and the competence and expertise of counsel. Id.
A. The Search Warrant
The Fourth Amendment forbids "unreasonable searches and seizures" of a person's "papers and effects" and requires that any search warrant be supported by "probable cause." U.S. Const. Amend. IV. The existence of probable cause is a complete defense to a claim that plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights have been violated because the search warrant was obtained unlawfully. DeFelice v. Ingrassia, 210 F. Supp.2d 88, 92 (D.Conn. 2002).
Bourdon claims that the search warrant was not based upon probable cause and therefore the warrant was unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. Specifically, Bourdon claims that the search warrant application prepared by Roney and Ortega was (a) based upon information obtained from an unreliable informant that they knew to "harbor ill will against the plaintiff (Am. Compl., ¶ 2); and, (b) presented to the Broome County Court "in bad faith" because it contained intentionally misleading and false information. Id. at ¶ 3.
As stated above, the party seeking the benefit of collateral estoppel has the burden of showing the identity of the issues, and the party opposing the application of collateral estoppel has the burden of showing that he did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claims in the prior action. D'Andrea v. Hulton, 81 F. Supp.2d 440, 443 (W.D.N.Y.), adopted by 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20701 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 1999) (citing inter alia Khandhar v. Elfenbein, 943 F.2d 244, 247 (2d Cir. 1991)). In order to find identity of issues, the court must find that the issue to be decided in the second action was material to the first action and essential to the decision in the first action. Id. The court must also find that a different judgment in the second action would destroy or impair rights or interests established by the first action. Id. (citing Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v. B. C. Nieberg Realty Corp. Inc., 250 N.Y. 304, 307, 165 N.E. 456 (1929)).
Defendants argue that the validity of the search warrant and, in particular, the presence of probable cause to issue the warrant, have already been litigated twice by Bourdon in state court. First, at a suppression hearing and again, upon appeal of Bourdon's conviction; therefore, he may not litigate the issues again.
Bourdon previously argued in state court that "the warrant was not supported by probable cause in that it relied upon an application from which there were material omissions, and which contained false statements by Roney, and information supplied by an informant who was not reliable." See People v. Bourdon, 258 A.D.2d 810, 811 (3d Dep't 1999). The state court determined that probable cause did exist to issue the warrant and thus, the warrant was properly issued. Id. at 812. Bourdon's attempt to relitigate the very same issues in this court must fail.
Because the state court has already decided that there was probable cause to issue the search warrant and Bourdon had a full and fair opportunity to argue this issue in state court, this court recommends that the defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted as to Bourdon's claim that the warrant was illegally issued.
B. Search and Seizure
The Fourth Amendment requires that search warrants "particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Bourdon claims that the search conducted in accordance with the warrant was unreasonable because it exceeded the scope of the warrant.
Bourdon argues that the search was unreasonable because the defendants searched places not specifically identified in the search warrant. The warrant permitted the defendants to search Bourdon's person, his residence and any unattached structures, a white 1983 GMC van registered to him, any vehicle that he is found to be present in, and any person in Bourdon's residence or in any vehicle with Bourdon (Dkt. No. 49 at 65-67). Bourdon claims that the defendants searched his "second van, his jeep, and property surrounding his home, and a trailer" and seized items not specifically listed in the search warrant.
Defendants argue in conclusory fashion that the issues concerning the actual search and seizure have been fully litigated in state court. They offer no evidence to support this argument.
This court is unable to determine the reasonableness of the search and seizure or whether this claim is barred by collateral estoppel. Accordingly, without addressing the merits of this claim, the court recommends that the defendants' motion for summary judgment be denied, without prejudice, as to Bourdon's claim that the search and seizure was unconstitutionally executed. Defendants are granted permission to file a renewed motion for summary judgment on this issue which must be filed within forty-five days following a final decision by the District Judge on this motion for summary judgment. Any renewed summary judgment motion filed by the defendants must include a full presentation of the record of Bourdon's underlying state court proceedings including, but not limited to, any state court decision made at Bourdon's suppression hearing, a complete transcript of Bourdon's suppression hearing, and any briefs or other relevant papers filed by him on appeal.
C. Fifth Amendment Claim
The Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides in part that "[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. Amend. V. It guarantees "the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty . . . for such silence." Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1493-94, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964).
Bourdon claims that while subject to custodial interrogation, he was cuffed to the wall in a standing position for hours and forced to stand on a cold cement floor without shoes. Bourdon claims that he did not want to talk but the defendants continued to question him. At his deposition, he claimed that the defendants threatened him with "a long term incarceration" if he didn't reveal where his guns were. He also claimed that Dorward threatened that he "better cooperate with Roney, because Roney gets very upset" (Dkt. No. 50, Dep. at 104). Bourdon asserts a claim for violation of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.
"Even if it can be shown that a statement was obtained by coercion, there can be no Fifth Amendment violation until that statement is introduced against the defendant in a criminal proceeding . . . [t]o constitute a Fifth Amendment violation 'use of the [coerced] statement at trial is not required,' but that there must be some 'use or derivative use of a compelled statement at any criminal proceeding against the declarant.'" Deshawn v. Safir, 156 F.3d 340, 346-47 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted).
Since Bourdon admitted at his deposition that he made no statement to police during interrogation (Dkt. No. 50, Dep. at 123), he cannot prove a necessary element of the Fifth Amendment violation, namely "use or derivative use of a compelled statement" against himself. Since Bourdon alleges no injury, this Court recommends the dismissal of Bourdon's Fifth Amendment claim.
IV. False Arrest
"The right to be free from arrest or prosecution in the absence of probable cause is a long established constitutional right." Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Authority, 124 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir. 1997). In order to state a claim for false arrest under the federal constitution, plaintiff must show that he was arrested without probable cause. Lowth v. Town of Cheektowaga, 82 F.3d 563, 569 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Broughton v. New York, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 456, 335 N.E.2d 310, 313, 373 N.Y.S.2d 87, 93 (1975)). Probable cause exists when the arresting officer has "knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a crime." Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996). In assessing the existence of probable cause, the court must consider the facts available to the officer at the time of the arrest and immediately before it. Lowth, 82 F.3d at 569. The existence of probable cause is a complete defense to an action for false arrest, even if the plaintiff is subsequently acquitted of the charges, because probable cause constitutes justification for the arrest. Weyant, 101 F.3d at 852 (citing Bernard v. United States, 25 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 1994)). In deciding whether probable cause to arrest exists, a police officer is entitled to rely on the victim's allegations that a crime has been committed. Martinez v. Simonetti, 202 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 1995)). A police officer is also entitled to rely on the allegations of fellow police officers. Martinez, 202 F.3d at 634 (citing Bernard v. U.S., 25 F.3d 98, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1994)). The evidence needed to establish probable cause is less than that necessary to support a conviction. Krause v. Bennett, 887 F.2d 362, 370 (2d Cir. 1989). Probable cause may be determined on the law on a motion for summary judgment if there is no dispute as to the pertinent events and the knowledge of the police officer. Weyant, 101 F.3d at 852.
Bourdon contends that his arrest on the night of June 14, 1996, was without probable cause. Because this court finds that the defendants had probable cause to arrest Bourdon and that Bourdon was eventually convicted, the false arrest claim fails.
Roney states that on June 13, 1996, he went to Bourdon's home and spoke to a man who identified himself as John Verge (Roney Aff., ¶ 11). Unbeknownst to Roney, the man was actually Bourdon. On June 14, 1996, the date of Bourdon's arrest and search of his home, Roney spoke to Bourdon who again identified himself as John Verge. Roney held out two photographs of Ronald Bourdon for Bourdon's inspection. Bourdon affirmed that the photos were of Ronald Bourdon but persisted in holding himself out to be John Verge. Id. at ¶¶ 12-14. Roney, knowing the man he was conversing with was actually Bourdon, arrested Bourdon for second degree criminal impersonation. Id. at ¶ 16; see also, Edwards Aff., ¶¶ 4-7; LaRock Aff., ¶¶ 1-7; and Dorward Aff., ¶¶ 1-7. In his own affidavit, Bourdon admits that when Roney spoke to him on June 13, 1996, Bourdon "lied and said that he [Bourdon] was not Mr. Bourdon, and that he [Mr. Bourdon] was not home" (Dkt. No. 72; Bourdon Aff., ¶ 9). Bourdon admitted that when he was asked for identification, he produced "a New York State drivers license with his photo on the license, in the name of John Verge." Id. at ¶ 10. Bourdon further testified that "[d]efendants Roney and Dorward were unaware that they were being duped by him, and that he was really Mr. Bourdon and not John Verge." Id. at ¶ 11. Additionally, Bourdon testified at his deposition that (a) he possessed a driver's license in the name of John Verge which had his picture on it; and, (b) that on June 13, 1996, he falsely identified himself to Roney as John Verge and offered the false driver's license in support of his claim. Dep. at 35-36 55-56. Bourdon was arrested for second degree criminal impersonation following his second conversation with Roney.
New York Penal Law § 190.25(1) provides: "A person is guilty of criminal impersonation in the second degree when he [i]mpersonates another and does an act in such assumed character with intent to obtain a benefit or to injure or defraud another." Conviction of this crime requires proof that the defendant impersonated a real person and not simply used some fictitious or assumed name. People v. Sadiq, 236 A.D.2d 638, 654 N.Y.S.2d 35 (N.Y.App.Div.), appeal denied sub nom., People v. Sikandar, 89 N.Y.2d 1100, 682 N.E.2d 995, 660 N.Y.S.2d 394 (1997). The "benefit" contemplated by the statute prohibiting criminal impersonation need not be monetary but may consist of the desire to avoid apprehension or prosecution. People v. Sherman, 116 Misc.2d 109, 455 N.Y.S.2d 528 (Rochester City Court, Monroe County 1982).
In light of Bourdon's own admission that on June 13, 1996, he willingly and knowingly identified himself as "John Verge", a real person, and produced a driver's license containing fraudulent information in support of this claim for the ostensible purpose of misleading the state police, it is absurd that he now argues that there was no probable cause to arrest him. Moreover, an officer is not required to make a full investigation of the surrounding circumstances prior to taking action. "Once a police officer has a reasonable basis for believing there is probable cause, he is not required to explore and eliminate every theoretically plausible claim of innocence before making an arrest." Ricciuti, 124 F.3d at 128. Roney's version of the events is believable and his credibility is bolstered by the fact that Bourdon admitted to the very behavior for which he was arrested. Bourdon has not provided information or evidence to contest the defendants' allegations concerning probable cause. Under the circumstances, because probable cause is determined based upon the information available to the officer at the time of the arrest, the officers had a reasonable basis for believing there was probable cause to arrest Bourdon on June 14, 1996.
In any event, Bourdon was ultimately convicted of second degree criminal impersonation. See People v. Bourdon, 258 A.D.2d 810 (3d Dep't 1999). The Second Circuit has held that a plaintiff's conviction prevents his recovery on a § 1983 claim for false arrest. Cameron v. Fogarty, 806 F.2d 380, 387 (2d Cir. 1986). "Where the civil rights plaintiff has been convicted of the offense for which he was arrested, we have in effect accepted the fact of that conviction as conclusive evidence of good faith and reasonableness of the officer's belief in the lawfulness of the arrest." Id. at 388. Evidence of a conviction is a complete defense to a § 1983 action for false arrest. Id. at 388-89.
Since probable cause and Bourdon's conviction are each a defense to a false arrest claim, this court recommends the dismissal of Bourdon's false arrest claim.
V. Excessive Force Claim
The Supreme Court has made it clear that excessive force used by officers during an arrest violates the Fourth Amendment which guarantees citizens the right to be free from unreasonable seizures of the person. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394, 1098 S.Ct. 1865, 1871, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). "To establish a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim, a plaintiff must show that the force used by the officer was, in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him, 'objectively unreasonable' under Fourth Amendment standards." Horton v. Town of Brookfield, 98CV01834, 2001 WL 263299 (D.Conn. 2001) (citing Finnegan v. Fountain, 915 F.2d 817, 823 (2d Cir. 1990) (other citation omitted).
Bourdon complains that he was handcuffed for three hours while the search was conducted. He was also handcuffed, sometimes to a wall, at the police barracks for an additional two to three hours (Dkt. No. 50; Dep. at 105-110). During his time in the patrol car, the defendants were actively involved in executing the search warrant and Bourdon was left alone in the car. The defendants admit that Bourdon was later cuffed to the wall at the police barracks. However, Roney explains that this is "the only holding area available in the Troop Barracks" (Roney Aff. at 3). He also explains that this system, referred to as a bull ring, is commonly used at troopers' barracks throughout the state. Id. at 3.
Handcuffing has been found to give rise to a claim of excessive force where an individual suffers an injury as a result of being handcuffed. Gonzales v. City of New York, 98-CV-3084, 2000 WL 516682, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. March 7, 2000); Simpson v. Saroff, 741 F. Supp. 1073, 1078 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). "Where the plaintiff does not allege that a prior injury existed or that an injury resulted from being handcuffed, however, courts have found that no constitutional violation exists and have dismissed the claims." Horton, 2001 WL 263299, at *7 (citing Scott v. County of Nassau, 94CV4291, 1998 WL 874840, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 1998) (granting summary judgment where there were no additional allegations of excessive force or allegations of prior injury); Murphy v. Neuberger, 94 Civ. 7421, 1996 WL 442797, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 1996) (granting motion to dismiss where plaintiff did not allege that he suffered any injury as a result of being handcuffed); Foster v. Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 914 F.2d 1076, 1082 (8th Cir. 1990) (affirming grant of summary judgment where plaintiff did not provide evidence of permanent injury).
Bourdon has not alleged or provided any evidence of permanent injury as a result of being handcuffed. He does not claim to have had a pre-existing injury of which the officers were aware, or to have requested medical treatment while being handcuffed or immediately thereafter. The mere fact that Bourdon was uncomfortable for several hours is not enough to establish a constitutional violation. See Miller v. Glanz, 948 F.2d 1562, 1569-70 (10th Cir. 1991) (plaintiff experienced only "momentary discomfort" when he was handcuffed in an "awkward position" for two hours). Thus, this court cannot find that handcuffing Bourdon, without more, constitutes a violation of his constitutional rights.
Bourdon also claims that he was subjected to physical and emotional abuse during his confinement at the police barracks. However, at his deposition, he admits that the defendants did not hit or strike him with anything (Dep. at 105). He merely states that they threatened him with a lengthy incarceration. Bourdon further states that he was in pain and he was stiff after sitting in the car for three hours. Bourdon has alleged no injury and admits that there was no physical contact between himself and the defendants beyond the handcuffing. Bourdon has failed to allege any excessive force used at the police barracks. Accordingly, this court recommends that Bourdon's excessive force claim be denied.
VI. Conditions of Confinement
Pretrial detainees may not be subjected to conditions and restrictions that amount to "punishment" without due process of law. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979); Weyant, 101 F.3d at 856. A detainee's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights concerning the conditions of his confinement are "at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner." City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 463 U.S. 239, 244, 103 S.Ct. 2979, 2983, 77 L.Ed.2d 605 (1983) (citations omitted). The standard for analyzing a pre-trial detainee's Fourteenth Amendment claim is the same as the Eighth Amendment standard. See Weyant, 101 F.3d at 856. Thus, a pretrial detainee's pleadings regarding the conditions of his confinement are sufficient if they meet both an objective and a subjective standard. To meet the objective standard, the claims must be "sufficiently serious" — the deprivation must deny minimal civilized measure of life's necessities. As to the subjective standard, plaintiff must allege that the defendants "had a sufficiently culpable state of mind amounting to at least deliberate indifference." Dawes v. Walker, 239 F.3d 489, 493-94 (2d Cir. 2001) (citations omitted); see also, Weyant, 101 F.3d at 856.
Because plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee, his conditions of confinement is analyzed under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Bourdon alleges that the manner in which he was detained after his arrest violated his constitutional rights. Bourdon claims that immediately after his arrest, he was placed in a hot, unventilated car for three hours without water or bathroom privileges. Later at the barracks, he was required to stand, off and on, for three hours while handcuffed to a wall without shoes or socks.
At his deposition, Bourdon admitted that he was allowed to urinate in the woods at about 9:30 p.m. Since the search began at approximately 6:30 p.m., Bourdon went, at most, three hours without bathroom privileges and water (Roney Aff. at 2).
This court finds that Bourdon has failed to allege or substantiate both the objective and subjective components necessary to establish that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference in their methods of confinement. He has failed to adequately allege that he was denied minimal necessities of civilized life for a substantial period of time. See Whitted v. Lazerson, 96 Civ. 2746, 1998 WL 259929, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 1998) ("temporary deprivation of the right to use the toilet, in the absence of serious physical harm or a serious risk of contamination, simply does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation"); Warren v. Irvin, 985 F. Supp. 350, 356 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (Depriving inmate of water for three days because he was using it to flood his cell did not amount to Eighth Amendment violation).
In any event, because the defendants have stated a legitimate purpose in Bourdon's confinement — to secure Bourdon during the search and interrogation by the only means available — Bourdon has failed to establish that the defendants secured him in this manner merely as a form of punishment. Accordingly, this court recommends that the defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted as to Bourdon's conditions of confinement claim.
VII. Heck v. Humphrey
In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), the Supreme Court held that a § 1983 action seeking damages is not cognizable if a decision in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily invalidate a criminal conviction unless the conviction or sentence had been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called into question by a federal habeas court. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87.
Bourdon's claims concerning the validity of the search warrant, the false arrest claim, and the Fifth Amendment violation have been recommended to be dismissed on the merits. Thus, this court need not analyze these claims under Heck.
Still remaining is Bourdon's claim that the defendants exceeded the scope of the search warrant. Because this court has determined that it cannot assess the validity of these claims without further development of the record by the defendants, this court also cannot consider at the present time whether Heck would invalidate these claims.
VIII. Qualified Immunity
As an alternative basis to grant dismissal, the defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity protects government officials who perform discretionary functions in the course of their employment. It shields them from liability for money damages where "their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). It also protects officials from "the burdens of costly, but insubstantial, lawsuits." Warren v. Keane, 196 F.3d 330, 332 (2d Cir. 1999) (quotation marks and internal citations omitted).
The question of whether qualified immunity will protect a public official depends upon "'the objective legal reasonableness' of the action assessed in light of the legal rules that were 'clearly established' at the time it was taken." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (citations omitted). Furthermore, the contours of the right violated must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official might understand that his actions violate that right. Id. at 640, 107 S.Ct. at 3039; Keane, 196 F.3d at 332. The test for "evaluating whether a right was clearly established at the time a § 1983 defendant acted is: '(1) whether the right in question was defined with "reasonable specificity"; (2) whether the decisional law of the Supreme Court and the applicable circuit court support the existence of the right in question; and, (3) whether under pre-existing law a reasonable defendant official would have understood that his or her acts were unlawful.'" African Trade Information Center, Inc., v. Abromaitis, 294 F.3d 355, 360 (2d Cir. 2002); see also, Charles W. v. Maul, 214 F.3d 350, 360 (2d Cir. 2000).
Additionally, the Second Circuit has held that a court may dismiss a claim based upon qualified immunity without first deciding the substantive claims therein. See Horne v. Coughlin, 191 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 1999). Also within this decision, the Second Circuit suggested that the qualified immunity issue should be addressed before the substance of a claim. The court shall now consider the defendants' claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity.
In this case, it has been clearly established that persons have a right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, false arrest, excessive force, inhumane conditions of confinement, and self-incrimination. However, this court finds that it was objectively reasonable for the defendants to believe that their conduct did not violate Bourdon's constitutional rights. The record reflects that the defendants could not have known that the statements provided in support of the search warrant were unreliable or that they lacked probable cause to arrest Bourdon. In fact, Bourdon admits to behavior which would amount to probable cause to arrest.
The record also reflects that Bourdon was handcuffed in a car for approximately three hours without water or the use of bathroom facilities. Bourdon makes no allegations that he told the defendants during this time that he was in pain or discomfort. Finally, the record reflects that while at the police barracks, Bourdon was handcuffed to a wall for approximately one and one-half hours on two separate occasions. Again, Bourdon does not allege that he complained of pain or discomfort to the defendants at this time. Bourdon also admits that he was never physically attacked by the defendants. Under these circumstances, it was reasonably objective to believe that Bourdon was not in pain or distress. Furthermore, this court finds that the defendants did not use excessive force upon Bourdon or confine him under inhumane conditions. Finally, since Bourdon made no statement during his interrogation, it was reasonably objective for the defendants to believe that they did not violate Bourdon's right to be free from self-incrimination.
Accordingly, as an additional basis to grant summary judgment, this court recommends that the claims concerning the search warrant, false arrest, excessive force, unconstitutional conditions of confinement, and the Fifth Amendment be dismissed because the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on these claims.
IX. Stay of Discovery
By Order of this court filed February 27, 2002, discovery in this action was stayed until a final decision was rendered on this motion for summary judgment. Because it is recommended that the defendants may file a renewed motion for summary judgment, the stay of discovery is continued until either (1) a decision by the District Judge on any renewed motion for summary judgment; or (2) absent any extensions of time granted by this court, the expiration of the time to file a renewed motion for summary judgment if no such motion has been filed.
WHEREFORE, based on the above, it is hereby
RECOMMENDED, that the defendants' motion be GRANTED (Dkt. No. 48) to the extent that the following claims are dismissed on the merits as well as on the basis of qualified immunity:
a. Invalid search warrant;
b. False arrest;
c. Excessive force;
d. Illegal conditions of confinement; and
e. Fifth Amendment claim, and it is further
RECOMMENDED, that the defendants' motion be DENIED in all other respects, without prejudice, the defendants may file a renewed motion for summary judgment addressing Bourdon's claim involving the search and seizure issue. Any renewed motion must be filed within forty-five days following a decision by the District Judge on this summary judgment motion; and it is further
ORDERED, that the stay of discovery is continued until either: (1) a decision by the District Judge on any renewed motion for summary judgment; or (2) absent any extensions of time granted by this court, the expiration of the time to file a renewed motion for summary judgment if no such motion has been filed.
NOTICE: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have ten days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN TEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, 6(a), 6(e).