Summary
accepting as adequate plaintiff's voluntary fee reduction of over seven percent
Summary of this case from Rolland v. RomneyOpinion
Civil Action No. 99-10617-DPW
March 24, 2003
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
The plaintiffs, who concededly prevailed in this action by securing a consent decree committing the defendants to substantial efforts to increase the resources of the Commonwealth for the benefit of certain of its disabled citizens, move for the interim award of attorney's fees and costs through December 31, 2001. Plaintiffs request attorney's fees in the amount of $674,504.05 and costs of $23,112. The defendants have submitted a "Partial Opposition."
At its foundation, the defendants' partial opposition challenges the billing rates of plaintiffs' legal counsel, who were affiliated with the Boston law firm of Hill and Barlow during the relevant time period. As an alternative, defendants suggest that the hourly rates adopted by Magistrate Judge Neiman in connection with similar litigation, Rolland v. Cellucci, 106 F. Supp.2d 128 (D.Mass. 2000), are more appropriate.
The Rolland rate was derived from a schedule apparently developed for the legal services of the Massachusetts Law Reform Institute to address its own need to provide a benchmark for the services of attorneys who are not ordinarily offering their services in a marketplace which can set a market rate. The application of the MLRI schedule in Rolland also had the effect, however, of reducing the rates for lawyers at the firm of Foley, Hoag Eliot substantially below their standard billing rates.
If I were presented with more robust support for the willingness of a parallel market in civil rights attorneys to pay the published billing rates established by Hill and Barlow, I would be more inclined to approximate such rates. But no doubt because of the largely contingent and/or noncommercial quality of civil rights litigation, I do not find such a market rate available. Rather, pricing for legal services in this area must be gleaned from the administered pricing arrangements evident in an assortment of sporadically reported cases. I should note, in addition, I am not satisfied that the published billing rates of major law firms necessarily reflect the prices clients in fact pay for services in the general market for attorneys fees. In order to make a more nuanced evaluation of law firm pricing, it would be necessary to evaluate the realization rate of the individual legal service providers, roughly defined as the percentage of that provider's published billing rate actually realized in collections from paying clients over some meaningful time period.
In the absence of a more nuanced showing regarding the market experience for civil rights claims in general and the individual attorneys in particular, I will employ a variation on the Rolland schedule to fees. This will involve a personal, single current rate applied to all the relevant years of the litigation and is designed to provide recognition of the time value of deferred compensation. In this connection, I will apply to Mr. McKittrick, lead counsel, a rate of $325, substantially more than that awarded the somewhat comparable Foley, Hoag partner in Rolland but reflective of the high end of awards for some accomplished civil rights advocates in this district, see generally Ciulla v. Rigney, 89 F. Supp.2d 97, 104 n. 8 (D.Mass. 2000). With respect to both Ms. Rose and Mr. Friedman, I will apply a rate of $170 per hour.
I will similarly apply a $120 per hour the rate for the modest hours of Mr. Folkman, Mr. Svonkin and Ms. Schneckner and a rate of $75 per hour for summer associates.
While the plaintiffs have voluntarily reduced their recorded time charges by 7.3% of their total time recorded, defendants also challenge certain of the remaining time for which compensation is sought. I have reviewed in depth the plaintiffs claimed time generally and that challenged by the defendants in particular. After that review, I decline to make any further reductions. It is always tempting — both as an assertion of the power of independent judgment and as a demonstration of the detailed examination undertaken — to trim hours here or there in attorneys' fees requests. But I am satisfied that the deployment of resources claimed was reasonable to the tasks confronting the plaintiffs. Any interposition by me of further specific reductions would be arbitrary and idiosyncratic nitpicking.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that plaintiffs shall recover attorneys' fees in the amount of $577,233.00 and costs in the amount of $23,112.00.