Opinion
June 5, 1989
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Held, J.).
Ordered that the orders are affirmed, with one bill of costs.
The Supreme Court properly refused to grant the appellant's motion to vacate the judgment which had been entered against her after an inquest. The appellant was personally present at the inquest which was held after she failed to timely interpose an answer. At that time, the appellant denied the allegations giving rise to her liability and requested an adjournment to call other witnesses. We find that such conduct on the part of the appellant was indicative of an intention to make the court her own forum and was sufficient to constitute an appearance (see, CPLR 320; McLaughlin, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C320:2, at 363; Henderson v. Henderson, 247 N.Y. 428; Taylor v. Taylor, 64 A.D.2d 592; McGowan v. Bellanger, 32 A.D.2d 293; see also, Siegel, N Y Prac § 112, at 140).
Furthermore, the appellant's contention that she was unfairly deprived of the right to an adjournment at the inquest is without merit. Applications for adjournments are addressed to the discretion of the trial court (Matter of Anthony M., 63 N.Y.2d 270, 283; Cuevas v. Cuevas, 110 A.D.2d 873, 877). The witnesses produced by the plaintiffs demonstrated a meritorious cause of action. The record indicates that had the appellant exercised due diligence, the application for an adjournment could have been obviated. The appellant misrepresented to the trial court that she had retained counsel who was otherwise engaged in another court. We therefore conclude that the denial of the request for an adjournment was not an improvident exercise of discretion (see, Cuevas v. Cuevas, supra; Wilson v. Wilson, 97 A.D.2d 897, 898; Balogh v. H.R.B. Caterers, 88 A.D.2d 136, 141). We also note the persistent lack of diligence in the defense of this lawsuit, highlighted by the failure of the appellant to move to vacate the judgment entered after the inquest, which was personally attended by the appellant, for a period of three years and two months.
We have considered the appellant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Mangano, J.P., Lawrence, Eiber and Spatt, JJ., concur.