Summary
concluding that the statute of limitations period commences against each installment as it becomes due, not from the date of the decree of divorce
Summary of this case from Arevalo v. ArevaloOpinion
No. 10615
June 14, 1978
Appeal from order reducing arrearages to judgment, Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; J. Charles Thompson, Judge.
Manzonie Massi, Las Vegas, for Appellant.
Lehman Professional Corp., Las Vegas, for Respondent.
OPINION
This opinion was filed, as an unpublished order, June 7, 1978. Because of the paucity of published authority on the issues, we have been requested to publish the order as an opinion.
In 1971, the parties obtained a divorce, and, pursuant to the divorce decree, appellant was to pay respondent, in partial settlement of her alimony and community property rights, $1,000 per month, commencing July 1, 1971, until the sum of $10,000 had been paid. Respondent received no payments and, on November 29, 1977, moved the district court to reduce the arrearages to judgment. The district court granted the motion as to $5,000 of the arrearages, holding that recovery of the remainder was barred by the six-year limitation on actions contained in NRS 11.190.
1. Appellant's contention that NRS 11.190 bars recovery of the entire $10,000 is without merit. The six-year period prescribed by that statute commenced to run against each installment as it became due, not from the date of the divorce decree. See Brown v. Vonsild, 91 Nev. 646, 541 P.2d 528 (1975).
2. We also reject the contention that the district court had no jurisdiction to grant the requested relief because of a pending appeal in the case. This matter was entirely collateral to and independent from that part of the case taken up by appeal, and in no way affected the merits of the appeal. See Osborn v. Riley, 331 So.2d 268 (Ala. 1976); Dear v. Locke, 262 N.E.2d 27 (Ill.App. 1970); cf. East Standard M. Co. v. Devine, 59 Nev. 134, 81 P.2d 1068 (1938). As noted, we deem briefing by respondent unnecessary and oral argument unwarranted. Under these circumstances, we deny respondent's motion for an attorney's fee to contest the appeal. Accordingly, this appeal shall stand submitted and, in the absence of reversible error, we ORDER this appeal dismissed.