Opinion
No. CV 02-0819257 S
February 18, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The defendant in this case has filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Reargument of a decision rendered by this court on December 8, 2003 in which the court granted the Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defendant's Special Defense. In this motion dated December 22, 2003, the defendant included a brief stating his arguments as to why the court's decision should be reversed. The plaintiff, on January 2, 2004, filed an Objection to the Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration and Reargument and filed therewith a Memorandum of Law in Support of its Objection to the Defendant's Motion.
The court granted the motion for reconsideration and held a hearing on January 26, 2004 at which hearing both parties appeared and were heard. The court having heard the parties in effect republishes its opinion of December 8, 2003 with a few additional comments and a quote from Plaintiff's brief for purposes of clarification.
The case arises out of an automobile accident that occurred on December 12, 2001 on Route I-84 in Farmington, Connecticut. The plaintiff was traveling eastbound on I-84 in a motor vehicle owned by the apportionment defendant, Yana Preiss, who was also a passenger in the plaintiff's vehicle. At the same time and place the defendant, Jerome Giguere, was also traveling eastbound on I-84 when it is alleged the defendant, Jerome Giguere, suddenly and without warning, drifted into the plaintiff's lane causing the two vehicles to collide and cause injuries and damages to the plaintiff.
The second defendant Lariviere Fils De Beauce, Inc., was the owner of the vehicle being driven by Giguere. The plaintiff has moved to strike Subsection 4 to both the First and Second Special Defenses from the Defendant's Second Amended Answer, Special Defenses and Cross Claim to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint.
Subsection 4 of the First and Second Special Defenses alleges that the plaintiff failed to use or to properly use seatbelts or restraining devices pursuant to New York Vehicle and Traffic Law, Section 1229-3, when by exercising reasonable care, he could and should have done so. The plaintiff moves to strike Subsection 4 of the First and Second Special Defenses on the basis that Connecticut law has the most significant relationship to the action in question and violations of New York law cannot be alleged as Special Defenses.
Plaintiff is a New York resident while the defendants are residents of Canada. None of the parties are Connecticut residents. The accident happened in Connecticut. Pointing out that both New York and Connecticut prohibit the operation of motor vehicles without the use of safety belts but that New York permits the introduction of evidence concerning non-use of seatbelts for the purpose of mitigating plaintiff's damages, the defendant maintains that New York law should be applied to this action since the only connection that Connecticut has to this action is that it happened to be the state where the accident occurred and none of the parties are residents. The defendant contends that in this case Connecticut has "minimal" interest in determining compensation for personal injuries for citizens of New York. The essence of the defendant's position is that the plaintiff is a New York citizen and that the New York seatbelt law should apply to such citizens regardless of where the accident occurred. The defendant makes no claim that Canadian law should apply.
Both parties agree that the Connecticut Supreme Court has ruled that, in order to decide a conflict of law issue Connecticut courts must look to the guiding principles of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law. O'Connor v. O'Connor, 201 Conn. 632 (1986).
The defendant, in its analysis of the facts of this case as they relate to the Restatement, relies on Sections 6 and 145 of the Restatement omitting any reference to Section 146. The plaintiff cites to Sections 6, 146, and 145. Section 145 of the Restatement is entitled The General Principle and reads as follows:
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in Section 6; (2) Context to be taken into account in applying the principles of Section 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include: (a) the place where the injury occurred, (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue.
Section 6 is entitled Choice-of-Law Principles and reads as follows:
(1) a court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice of law.
Connecticut has no statutory directive of its own on choice of law. See the comment to Subsection 1.
(2) Where there is no such directive the factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include (a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relative policies of the other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
Section 146 is entitled Personal Injuries and reads as follows:
In an action for a personal injury, the local law of the state where the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles stated in Section 6 to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied.
With one exception the court agrees basically with the analysis, quoted below, of the plaintiff as to the determination of the state with the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties.
When determining which state's law is applicable to the instant case, this court must follow O'Connor's method of contextual inquiry to determine which state has the most significant relationship to the litigation. First, New York's interest should be examined. The New York law that the Defendant believes should apply to this case is New York Vehicle and Traffic law § 1229-c (attached Exhibit C), which requires the use of safety belts in New York State. While it is true that if the accident occurred in New York, this law would be applicable, it is also clear that New York has no interest in the application of this law beyond its borders. This is a regulatory law specifically aimed at drivers traveling upon New York roadways. New York does not attempt to enforce this law on Connecticut roadways, nor does the statute mention applicability in other jurisdictions, thus there is no indication that the New York legislature intended that this law be applied extraterritorially. Since the conduct in question occurred in Connecticut, New York has no interest in application of its seatbelt laws to this litigation.
Following the method of contextual inquiry, Connecticut's interest in the litigation must be weighed. Looking to § 145 of the Restatement, two of the four factors, location of injury and location of conduct leading to injury, indicate that Connecticut has more interest in the litigation than other jurisdictions. The third factor of § 145, domicile of parties, indicates that New York or Canada may have some interest. The fourth factor, which centers on the relationship between the parties, weights in favor of Connecticut as the scene of the accident . . .
After looking to § 145 of the Restatement, this court must also look to § 6 to determine which jurisdiction has a more significant relationship to the present litigation. According to Restatement § 6(e) and (b), "the basic policies underlying the particular field of law" and "the relevant policies of the forum," respectively, are factors to be considered when making a determination in conflict of laws. As the Court in O'Connor stated, the doctrine of lex loci delicti has traditionally been applied as a policy of tort law in Connecticut, the forum state. The Court certainly did not suggest that this doctrine be abandoned altogether. On the contrary, the Court states several times that it is only when "reason and justice require the relaxation of its stringent insistence" on applying lex loci to determine the applicable law in Connecticut. O'Connor, supra.
This court must also examine the "justified expectations" of the parties involved, according to Restatement § 6(d), weighing the importance of the parties' reliance upon their justified expectations of the law. Here, the Plaintiff was clearly justified in believing that Connecticut regulatory laws were in force when traveling upon a Connecticut roadway. There was certainly no expectation that New York law would apply simply because Plaintiff was from New York. Along these lines, the Defendant should also have expected that Connecticut laws were applicable when traveling through Connecticut. For example, if both parties believed that Connecticut speed limits were in force at the time of the accident, they should also expect that the law would operate similarly as to seatbelt use.
Next, there is the necessary inquiry under § 6(f) of the Restatement, which states that "certainty, predictability and uniformity of result" are factors to be considered when making a determination of a conflict of laws. As there was a justified expectation that Connecticut seatbelt laws were in force at the time of the incident, it would lead to confusion and inconsistency to hold that New York law applies to this case. If Connecticut speed limits are to be enforced while upon Connecticut roadways, so should other Connecticut regulatory laws regarding roadway travel. Inquiry under § 6(f) thus indicates that Connecticut's seatbelt law, and not New York's, should apply in this case.
Connecticut courts have consistently applied the principles set forth in O'Connor and Williams to make determinations regarding conflicts of law issues. See Reichhold Chems, Inc. v. Hartford Accident Indem. Co., 252 Conn. 774 (2000); Lord v. Lord, 2002 Conn.Super. LEXIS 2748, 33 Conn. L. Rptr. 88 (Conn.Super.Ct. Aug. 20, 2002); Grondolsky v. Costello, 2001 Conn.Super. LEXIS 3629, 31 Conn. L. Rptr. 157 (Conn.Super.Ct. Dec. 20, 2001). In a case very similar to the one at bar, a Connecticut court ruled that although both Plaintiff and Defendant were residents of New York, the most significant contact test indicated that Connecticut law should apply to an accident occurring on a Connecticut roadway. Brunow v. Burnett, 1994 Conn.Super. Lexis 842, 11 Conn. L. Rptr. 273 (1994) (Attached Exhibit D). The court weighed the factors listed by the applicable sections of the Restatement of Conflicts of Law, and determined that Connecticut had a significant interest, mainly due to location of the accident and the fact that Connecticut has a significant interest in the safety of its roadways. Brunow, supra, at *8. In another case that is similar to the one at hand, a Connecticut court looked to the most significant relationship test to determine what law should apply when the plaintiff sued under Connecticut law for an accident that occurred in Connecticut. The defendant moved for summary judgment, asserting that because the vehicle was leased to plaintiff in New Jersey, New Jersey law should apply. The court rejected the defendant's argument, and ruled that because Connecticut had the "most significant contacts" with the litigation, Connecticut law should apply. Greenidge v. Volvo, 1988 Conn.Super; Lexis 1032 (1998) (attached Exhibit E). Therefore, the Defendant's First and Second Special Defenses, subsection (4) should be stricken as each alleges violations of New York Law. CT Page 2483
The exception mentioned above is the last sentence of that portion of the plaintiff's brief where he states:
Additional factors indicating Connecticut's interest that this court should consider are the fact that the accident occurred on a Connecticut highway, that Connecticut police and other emergency response personnel responded to the accident, and that the parties involved received emergency medical attention in Connecticut. Additionally, the plaintiff received medical attention in Connecticut at a cost of over $190,000 and spent several months following the incident in Connecticut medical facilities.
While none of the specific facts in the first sentence are enumerated in the Complaint, it is not unreasonable for the court to assume, based upon the severe nature of the injuries alleged in the Complaint, that they all occurred. Facts that are necessarily implied in a complaint need not be expressly alleged. Trichilo v. Trichilo, 190 Conn. 774, 779 (1983); Lamb v. Barns, 202 Conn. 158 (1987).
In addition to the points mentioned by the plaintiff in his brief, the court points to comment (d) under Section 146 which is entitled When Conduct and Injury Occur in the Same State.
In the majority of instances, the actor's conduct, which may consist either of action or non-action, and the personal injury will occur in the same state. In such instances the local law of the State will usually be applied to determine most issues involving the tort. — This state would usually be the state of dominant interest, since the two principal elements of the tort, namely conduct and injury, occurred within its territory. The State where the defendant's conduct occurs has the dominant interest in regulating it and in determining whether it is tortious in character. Similarly, the state where the injury occurs will, usually at the least, have the dominant interest in determining whether the interest affected is entitled to legal protection.
It is evident that the conduct of the parties referred to in the Restatement concerns the conduct of the parties driving their automobiles on Connecticut highways.
Under the heading of Reporter's Notes at the end of Section 146 is a comment (d) which reads as follows: "With respect to issues relating to the standards of conduct, the local law of the state of conduct and injury has been invariably applied."
In the opinion of this court, the law of the State of Connecticut has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties with respect to the issue of the application of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law, Section 1229-c. Consequently, the Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Subsection 4 of Special Defense Number 1 and Number 2 is granted.
Hale, JTR