Opinion
No. 28564.
January 20, 1953.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT, MADISON COUNTY, J. O. SWINK, J.
J. E. Taylor, Atty. Gen., and Aubrey R. Hammett, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.
No brief for respondents.
The respondents, Joseph E. Bollinger and Sarah C. Bollinger, are applicants for old age assistance. Their applications were rejected by the county director on September 10, 1951, and thereafter, at their request, a hearing was conducted in Fredericktown, Missouri, by Hon. S. V. Medling, a referee for the State Department of Public Health and Welfare (appellant). The evidence presented at that hearing was transcribed and was thereafter reviewed by the director of said department and on November 14, 1951, he rendered a decision in which he found that applicants were ineligible to receive public assistance benefits because they owned property having a value in excess of $3,750.
The respondents duly appealed from that decision to the Circuit Court of Madison County. The record was reviewed by that court and on March 6, 1952, a judgment was entered wherein the court found "that there is not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the denial of benefits to the applicants by the said State Department of Public Health and Welfare, and that therefore, the decision of said State Department of Public Health and Welfare was arbitrary and unreasonable," and the decision of said department was "reversed and the cause remanded to said State Department of Public Health and Welfare for further proceedings not inconsistent with this judgment." From said judgment the appellant has duly perfected its appeal to this court.
The applicants are husband and wife and reside on a farm of approximately 80 acres located on Highway No. 70 about five miles west of Fredericktown. They own this farm and it is unencumbered. It is conceded by the Bollingers that they own personal property of the value of $275. The only disputed issue at the hearing was as to the value of the farm.
The appellants presented seven witnesses, including themselves, who testified concerning the value of the farm. The Bollingers were of the opinion that it had a value of from $2,000 to $2,500. Mr. Pinkley, a neighbor residing on an adjoining farm, and Mr. Griffith, another neighboring farmer, each estimated the value to be $2,500. Walter Clark, who lived in nearby Oak Grove was of the opinion that it had a market value of $2,800. A real estate agent testifying for applicants was of the opinion that its market value was $3,000, and a Fredericktown banker thought the farm would sell for $3,300.
Appellant presented Mr. Robley Martin of Ironton as its only witness on this issue. It appeared that he had been in the real estate business for 32 years and had been making appraisals during the last 10 years of that time. He testified that he was familiar with the property and was of the opinion that its reasonable market value was $4,000. Upon cross examination by the attorney for the applicants it was brought out that Mr. Martin was willing to buy the farm on that day for $4,000.
As heretofore indicated the sole issue for the determination of the director of the State Department of Public Health and Welfare was whether the applicants owned property which, in the aggregate, exceeded in value the sum of $3,750. If so, they were ineligible to receive the assistance they sought. Section 208.011 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S.
The statute regulating the procedure upon appeal to the circuit court in cases of this nature provides that the circuit court shall be determine whether or not the applicant was granted a fair hearing and whether the decision of the director was arbitrary and unreasonable. Section 208.100 subd. 5 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S.
It appears to be well settled that an applicant for old age assistance has the burden of proving eligibility. Linton v. State Department of Public Health and Welfare, Mo.App., 252 S.W.2d 841. It also seems clear that the decision of the director of the State Department of Public Health and Welfare denying the application is binding upon the court of appeals if there is substantial evidence to support it, even though this court might have decided the matter differently upon the same evidence. Brattin v. State Social Security Commission, Mo.App., 194 S.W.2d 536; Kelley v. State Social Security Commission, 236 Mo. App. 1058, 161 S.W.2d 661.
It is said in Morton v. State Social Security Commission, Mo.App., 205 S.W.2d 272, 274, "The law is well settled that, if there is any substantial evidence to support the finding of the commission, it is not within the province of the circuit court to disturb such finding."
In determining whether the record discloses substantial evidence to support the decision of the director we may consider only the testimony most favorable to support the decision. Linton v. State Department of Public Health and Welfare, supra.
In the case at bar there could be no contention that the hearing itself was not conducted in a fair and impartial manner. Respondents were present in person and represented by an attorney. The referee carefully explained the issues and procedure. Without any restraint or objection the applicants were permitted to submit all the evidence they desired to offer.
The judgment of the circuit court indicates that the only basis for holding the decision of the director to be arbitrary and unreasonable was that there was not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the same. It is our duty to determine the correctness of that conclusion.
It should be remembered that in an appeal of this nature, neither the circuit court nor the court of appeals has the power to weigh the evidence and make findings of fact therefrom. Only the director is given that power and duty. In our review, as already indicated, we are restricted to a determination as to whether the record contains any substantial evidence to support the decision of the director. In order to declare the Bollingers ineligible the director was required to find that the farm had a value of at least $3,476. He could not have done so without disregarding the opinions and estimates of the witnesses for the applicants and accepting the testimony of Robley Martin as being sufficiently substantial to authorize the finding of at least the aforesaid minimum valuation required to disqualify the respondents. It is the testimony of this witness that we deem it our duty to review with special care.
We cannot escape the conclusion that Mr. Martin was well qualified to testify as an expert regarding the value of this land. With 32 years experience in the real estate business, including 10 years as a professional appraiser, his ability in that field should be apparent. He testified emphatically that the farm had a market value of $4,000. Vigorous cross examination by the attorney for the applicants did not disclose anything tending to impeach this witness or diminish the weight to be given his testimony. It should be noted that as a part of the cross examination the witness was asked whether he would be willing to purchase the land for the sum of $4,000 and he definitely stated that he would. Such testimony is very persuasive.
We have carefully read the entire record in this case and have concluded that the finding of the director was not arbitrary or unreasonable and that there was substantial evidence to support it.
The cause is reversed and remanded with directions to the trial court to set aside its former judgment and to affirm the decision of the director of the State Department of Public Health and Welfare.
BENNICK, P. J., and ANDERSON, J., concur.